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THEJUDGES OF THE UN1TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was graduated
magna cumakde from Smith College in 1962,
and from Harvard Law School in 1965. Af-
ter graduating from law school, Judge
Seymour practiced law in Boston, Massachu-
setts from 1965 until 1966, in Tulsa, Okla-
homa in 1967 and in Houston, Texas from
1968 until 1969. From 1971 to 1979 she prac-
ticed with the Tulsa law firm of Doerner,
Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson. In
1979, she was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and
the American and Oklahoma County Bar
Associations. AdditionallyJudge Seymour
served as a bar examiner from 1973 through
1979; she served on the United StatesJu-
dicial Conference Committee on De-




Judge Porfilio was born in Denver, Colo-
rado in 1934. He received his BA from the
University of Denver in 1956 and received
his LL.B. from the University of Denver Col-
lege ofLaw in 1959. Judge Porfilio then prac-
ticed law with the Denver firm of Carbone
& Walsmith until 1962. From 1962 until
1975, he worked in the Colorado Attorney
General's Office. SpecificallyJudge Porfilio
served as Assistant Attorney General from
1962 until 1967, as Deputy Attorney General
from 1967 to 1972, and as Attorney General
for the State of Colorado from 1972 until
1975.
InJanuary, 1975,Judge Porfilio was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Porfilio was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from 1949
to 1951, and Brigham Young University from
1955 to 1956 when he graduated. Judge
Anderson then attended the University of
Utah College of Law where he received his
LL.B. degree in 1960. He was Editor in Chief
of the Utah Law Review, Order of the Coif,
and Phi Kappa Phi. He then served as a trial
attorney in the tax division of the United
States Department ofJustice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in
Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he prac-
ticed until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen states,
and in the United States Supreme Court. He
has served as President and Commissioner
ofthe Utah State Bar. AdditionallyJudge
Anderson has been a member of the Utah
Judicial Counsel and the UtahJudicial Con-
duct Commission, and he has served as
Chairman of the Utah Law andJustice Cen-
ter Committee. Judge Anderson's civic ac-
tivities include lectures at the University of
Utah College of Law, member of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Salt Lake Area Cham-
ber of Commerce, and director of numer-
ous corporations. He is a Master of the
Bench, American Inn of Court Number VII.
JUDGE
DEANELL R TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia, Kan-
sas. She received her BA in American Stud-
ies from the University of Kansas in 1968 and
was a member of Mortar Board and Phi Beta
Kappa. Judge Tacha then attended law
school and received herJ.D. from the Uni-
versity of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House FellowJudge Tacha was sent on offi-
cial trips to southeast Asia, east and central
Africa, and the European Economic Com-
munity. After her fellowship,Judge Tacha
was an associate with the law firm of Hogan
and Hartson in Washington, D.C. In 1973,
she returned to Kansas and entered private
practice in Concordia, Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the fac-
ulty of the University of Kansas Law School
in 1974. In, 1979, she became associate Vice
Chancellor ofAcademic Affairs, and in 1981,
she became the Vice Chancellor for Aca-
demic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.




Judge Baldock was born in Rocky, Okla-
homa, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico. Judge
Baldock attended the New Mexico Military
Institute, where he graduated in 1956. He
received hisJ.D. from the University of Ari-
zona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, PA. In 1983, he
became a federal districtjudge in Albuquer-
que, New Mexico and was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1985. In 1988,Judge Baldock re-
ceived an OutstandingJudge Award from
the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE
MARY BECK BRISCOE
Judge Briscoe is a CircuitJudge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. She
was born in 1947 in Council Grove, Kansas,
and received her B.A. degree in German and
International Relations from the University
of Kansas, herJ.D. degree from the Univer-
sity of Kansas School of Law, and her LL.M.
degree from the University of Virginia
School of Law.
Judge Briscoe worked as an attorney-
examiner for the Interstate Commerce
Commission from September 1973 to March
1974, and served as an Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney from March 1974 to March 1984. She
was appointed as Chief Judge of the Kansas
Court of Appeals in September 1990. She
assumed her present position in May 1995.
Judge Briscoe is a Fellow of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation and the Kansas Bar
Foundation. She is a member of the Ameri-
can Bar Association and serves as Vice-chair
of the Appellate Judges Conference. She is
a member of the Kansas Bar Association and
serves on the Bench-Bar Committee. In 1992
she was awarded the KBA Outstanding Ser-
vice Award for her work as Co-Chair of the
Task Force on the Status of Women in the
Legal Profession. She is a member of the
Topeka Bar Association, the Washburn Law
School Association, the Women Attorneys
Association of Topeka, the AmericanJudica-
ture Society, and the National Association of
WomenJudges. She serves on the University
of Kansas Law Society Board of Governors.
Judge Briscoe is married to Charles
Briscoe, an attorney in Topeka, and an in-
structor in the legal aid clinic at the Univer-
sity of Kansas Law School.
JUDGE
WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934 in
Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in Upton
and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge Brorby at-
tended the University of Wyoming and re-
ceived a B.S. in Business. He graduated with
a J.D. with Honor from the University of
Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United
States Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He en-
gaged in the private practice of law in
Gillette, Wyoming from 1961 to 1988.Judge
Brorby was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
WyomingJudicial Supervisory Commission.




Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kansas
in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas. He
received his B.A. in economics from North-
western University in 1962 and received his
J.D. from the University of Michigan Law
School in 1965, where he graduated first in
his class, While at the University of Mich-
gan Law School, he was elected to the Or-
der of Coif, the Barrister Society, and he was
Editor-in-chief of the Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked for Justice
Byron R. White of the United States Su-
preme Court during the 1965-66 term. From
1966 until 1998, he practiced as a trial law-
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, Gra-
ham & Stubbs. In 1998,Judge Ebel was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct profes-
sor at the University of Denver College of
Law, teaching Professionalism and Ethics at
Duke University School of Law, teaching
the confirmation class at the St.James Pres-
byterian Church and participating in numer-
ous Bar Association activities. He has served
as vice-president of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation and is a fellow of the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers, a seniorjudge of the
Doyles Inns of Court, and a member of the
Town & Gown Society.
JUDGE
PAULJ. KELLY
Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr. was born in
Freeport, New York, in 1940. He received a
B.B.A. in Economics and Finance from the
University of Notre Dame in 1963 and his
J.D. from Fordham University School of Law
in 1967.
From 1968 to 1992,Judge Kelly engaged
in a general litigation practice with the New
Mexico law firm of Hinkle, Cox, Eaton,
Coffield & Hensley. Judge Kelly served in
the New Mexico House of Representatives
from 1977 to 1981.
Currently, Judge Kelly is a member of
the Board of Visitors of the Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law and serves as President
of the Northern New Mexico American Inn
of Court- Judge Kelly has been active in vari-
ous Bar activities. He has served on a New
Mexico Board of Bar Examiners, the New
Mexico Appellate Judges' Nominating Com-
mission, as a reviewing officer and Hearing
Committee chair for the Disciplinary Board
of New Mexico Supreme Court, as a mem-
ber of the New Mexico Public Defender
Board, the New Mexico State Personnel
Board and as President of the Chaves
County Bar Association. Judge Kelly was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1992.
JUDGE
ROBERT H. HENRY
Judge Henry was born in Shawnee,
Oklahoma on April 3, 1953. He received his
B.A. in Political Science in 1974 and hisJ.D.
in 1977, both from the University of Okla-
homa.
After graduating from law school, Judge
Henry opened a private law practice in
Shawnee and served in the Oklahoma
House of Representatives for five terms. In
1986, at the age of thirty-three, he was
elected Oklahoma Attorney General, run-
ning unopposed for re-election in 1990. In
1991, he became Dean of the Oklahoma City
University School of Law, where he taught
in the areas of state and local government
law and legislation.
Judge Henry served on numerous com-
mittees of the National Association of At-
torneys General, including the Supreme
Court Committee, which he chaired, and
the State Constitutional Law Advisory Board.
He is an American Bar Foundation Fellow,
a Commissioner of Oklahoma on the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and a member of the
American Law Institute. Judge Henry has
also served on numerous civic and educa-
tional boards including the Oklahoma Na-
ture Conservancy, the Board of Visitors of
the University of Oklahoma Press, and the
Western History Collection of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma. He has received the Con-
servationistof theYear Award from the Okla-
homa Wildlife Federation, the Human
Rights Award from the Oklahoma Human
Rights Commission, and is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa.
Judge Henry was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1994.
JUDGE
CARLOS F. LUCERO
Judge Lucero was born in Antonito,
Colorado in 1940. He received his BA from
Adams State College and his J.D. from
George Washington University. In 1995, he
was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Lucero clerked forJudge William
E. Doyle of the District Court of Colorado
for the 1964-1965 term. Prior to his clerk-
ship, he was staff aide for the United States
SenateJudiciary Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure. He en-
tered in private practice in Alamosa, Colorado
where he became a senior partner in the
law firm of Lucero, Lester and Sigmund.
While in private practice,Judge Lucero
served on the Colorado Supreme Court
Board of Law Examiners, the ABA Action
Commission to Reduce Court Cost and De-
lay, the advisory board to the ABAJournal,
the ABA Committee on the Availability of
Legal Services, and the CBA Ethics Commit-
tee. He also served on President Carter's
Presidential Panel on Western State Water
Policy, the Board of Directors of Colorado
Rural Legal Services, the Colorado Histori-
cal Society and the Santa Fe Opera Associa-
tion of New Mexico. In addition, he was




Judge Michael R. Murphy was born
August 6,1947 in Denver, Colorado. He was
raised in Rawlins, Wyoming. He received a
BA. from Creighton University in 1969 and
hisJ.D., with honors, from the University of
Wyoming in 1972.
He is married to Mickey Donnelly
Murphy and has two children, Amy and
Michael. In 1972-73,Judge Murphy served
as a law clerk to the late David T. Lewis, then
Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit. Judge
Murphy began private practice in 1973 as
an associate in the Salt Lake City law firm of
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. He
remained with that law firm until his ap-
pointment in 1986 by Governor Bangerter
to the Third District Court, a trial court of
general jurisdiction over Salt Lake, Summit
and Toole Counties, Utah. Judge Murphy
was the presidingjudge of the Third District
Court from 1990 until his appointment to
the Tenth Circuit in 1995.
Judge Murphy has served on many
boards, commissions, and committees, in-
cluding the Utah State Sentencing Commis-
sion, the Utah Advisory Committee on Child
Support Guidelines, the Utah Child Sexual
Abuse Task Force, the Board of District
CourtJudges, and the Utah Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Judge Murphy was named Judge of
the Year by the Utah State Bar in 1992. In
1989 he was awarded the Freedom of Infor-
mation Award by the Society of Professional
Journalists and, in 1995, the Utah Minority
Bar Association Award.
Judge Murphy is a Fellow of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, a member of the Utah
and American Bar Associations and a former
member of the Wyoming State Bar. He is
also a member and past president of
Sutherland Inn of Court II. Judge Murphy
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals by President
Clinton on August 14, 1995. His chambers
are in Salt Lake City, Utah.
SENIORJUDGE
MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brigham
Young University in 1957 with high honors.
Judge McKay then received hisJ.D. from the
University of Chicago in 1960 and was the
law clerk forJusticeJesse A. Udall of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court for the 1960-61 term.
From 1961 to 1974,Judge McKay practiced
with the law firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoe-
nix, Arizona; however, he did take a two year
leave to serve as Director of the United
States Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa. Judge
McKay was a law professor at Brigham Young
University from 1974 until 1977. In 1977,
he was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge
McKay currently resides in Provo, Utah.
SENIORJUDGE
WILLIAMJ. HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to Okla-
homa City in 1927. During World War II, he
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army. Af-
ter the waJudge Holloway returned to com-
plete his undergraduate studies at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in
1947. Judge Holloway then attended
Harvard Law School, where he graduated
in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department ofJustice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice.Judge Holloway was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and became Chief
Judge in 1984. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
SENIORJUDGE
ROBERT H. McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LLB. degrees from the Univer-
sity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an
Honorary Doctor of Law Degree from the
University.
During World War II,Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney and as
a Colorado District CourtJudge. In 1961,
Judge McWilliams was elected to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court where he served until
he was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. In
1984, he assumed senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi
Delta Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIOR JUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late Frank
A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's Con-
gressman, Governor and United States Sena-
tor. Judge Barrett attended the University
of Wyoming for two years prior to his ser-
vice in the Army during World War II. Fol-
lowing the war, he attended Saint
Catherine's College at Oxford University
and Catholic University of America and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of Wyo-
ming Law School in 1949. In 1973, he re-
ceived the Distinguished Alumni Award
from the University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for the
towns of Lusk and Manville and attorney for
the Niobrara County Consolidated School
District. From 1967 until 1971,Judge Barrett
served as Attorney General for the State of
Wyoming. In 1971, he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. In 1987, he assumed senior status.
Judge Barrett was a member of the Ju-
dicial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court of Review, and




Judge Logan was born in Quenemo, Kan-
sas, in 1929. He received his BA. from the
University of Kansas in 1952 and graduated
magna cum laude from Harvard Law School
in 1955. He became law clerk for United
States CircuitJudge Walter Huxman and sub-
sequently practiced with the Los Angeles law
firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Judge
Logan became a professor at the University
of Kansas Law School in 1957 and was se-
lected in 1961 as Dean of that school. He
served in that capacity until 1968. Since 1961,
Judge Logan has been a visiting professor at
Harvard Law School, the University of Texas
Law School, Stanford University of Law, and
the University of Michigan Law School. He
lectures at Duke University Law School. He
was a special commissioner for the United
States District Court for the District of Kan-
sas from 1964 until 1967 and was a canddate
for the United States Senate in 1968.
Judge, Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate plan-
ning, administration and corporate law. In
1977, he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Logan retired from the court on
July 14, 1998.
EDITOR' S NOTE
This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Tenth Circuit
Survey issue. On this occasion, as with the arrival of all milestones, some
reflection upon the unique qualities of this issue is in order. The Tenth
Circuit Survey issue is a student production in every sense. Articles se-
lected for publication are both authored and edited completely by mem-
bers of the Denver University Law Review. The survey issue provides
new members of the Law Review an opportunity to demonstrate their
abilities and showcase their talents. This issue also allows the Law Re-
view as a whole to contribute to the legal community of this region by
providing a focused research tool to the practitioners of the Tenth Cir-
cuit. By joining the practical with the theoretical, the Tenth Circuit Sur-
vey issue holds a special position in each volume of the Denver Univer-
sity Law Review.
Thank you to all of the authors, editors, and members of the Denver
University Law Review for their efforts in bringing this survey to com-
pletion, in particular the Board of Editors for their support and assis-
tance. The editor would also like to thank his wife Philippa and son
Caiden for their unabiding love, patience and understanding.
Christopher Dopke, Editor




Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),' represents a
congressional endorsement of arbitration and, effectively, a codification
of freedom of contract. The Act allows parties to enter into, and to have
enforced, arbitration agreements.2 The FAA "does not affect any contract
that has not the agreement in it to arbitrate, and only asks... the parties
to come in, and carry through, in good faith, what they have agreed to do.
It does nothing more than that."3
The United States Supreme Court has championed this Act of Con-
gress with nearly constitutional regard.! The Court has made clear that
the FAA's broad reach will be given great deference; judicial resistance
to or undermining of arbitral resolution will not be sanctioned.! The exact
extent of the deference to be granted, however, remains somewhat unde-
fined. When the FAA will, or must, yield to another federal statute is an
issue that has been debated since the Act's inception.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed
this issue twice during the survey period,7 reaching different outcomes. In
McWilliams v. Logicon,8 the court found that the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA)' does not preclude application of the FAA, but in
fact encourages arbitration of disputes.'" In Davister Corp. v. United Re-
public Life Insurance Co.," the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act," which grants power to the states to regulate the business of insur-
ance, preempts the FAA. The Court determined that the public interest of
protecting policyholders outweighed the freedom of contract principle
embodied in the FAA.'3 The incongruent decisions in McWilliams and
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
2. See id. at § 2.
3. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES
AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 141 (1989) (citing 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep.
Graham)).
4. See id. at 127.
5. See id.
6. See Michael A. Landrum & Dean A. Trongard, Judicial Morphallaxis: Mandatory Arbi-
tration and Statutory Rights, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 345, 360-70 (1998) (outlining the devel-
opment of the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the FAA to agreements to arbitrate
statutory-based claims).
7. The survey period addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
8. 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
10. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 576.
11. 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
13. See Davister, 152 F.3d at 1282.
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Davister illustrate the undefined supremacy of the FAA when it is impli-
cated in a claim brought under another federal statute.
Conversely, it is relatively clear when courts will defer the FAA to
state law principles. As a federal statute, the FAA preempts any incon-
sistent state law." The FAA's applicability, however, is dependent on the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate which, in turn, is dependent on
state law principles regarding contract formation.'5 Thus, in state law
actions, the courts' role is limited to the determination of whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists and to the enforcement of rendered arbitra-
tion awards. The Tenth Circuit decided two cases during the survey pe-
riod that are consistent with this principle of FAA supremacy in state law
actions. In Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex,"6 the court limited its re-
view to the arbitrability of the plaintiffs claim. In Miera v. Dairyland
Insurance Co.,"7 the court limited its review to the enforcement of the
rendered arbitration award. These two cases illustrate the recognized role
of state law actions that implicate the FAA.
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's decisions relating to the
Federal Arbitration Act during the survey period. Part I provides a gen-
eral background on the FAA, including the judicial deference tradition-
ally granted to the Act. Part II discusses the Tenth Circuit's decisions
relating to the FAA's supremacy over other federal statutes. Specifically,
Part U considers the court's decisions involving situations when parties
contractually agree to arbitrate their disputes, subsequently have a dis-
pute arise implicating federal law and, in resolving the dispute, one party
wants to be released from its agreement to arbitrate. Part III reviews the
Tenth Circuit's decisions relating to the applicability of the FAA in ac-
tions brought under state law.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and Federal Law
The Federal Arbitration Act ensures the "[vialidity, irrevocability
and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. ''8 The Supreme Court has
consistently upheld this Act with an almost unbending presumption in
14. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1995); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984); see also Ellwood F. Oakley, HI & Donald 0. Mayer,
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary Federalism,
47 S.C. L. REv. 475, 497-98 (1996) (noting that while the Southland majority held that the FAA
was substantive federal law, preempting inconsistent state law, the dissent viewed the FAA as pro-
cedural in nature, applying only in federal courts with no preemptive effect). See also infra Part I.B.
15. Cf, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42,
45-46 (2d Cir. 1993).
16. 126 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1997).
17. 143 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. 1998).
18. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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favor of arbitrability. In what has been described as the "arbitration tril-
ogy,"'9 the Court's decisions in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.,'" Southland Corp. v. Keating,2' and Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,' firmly hold that the Court will sustain the
fundamental congressional objective embodied in the FAA. In Moses
Cone, the Court established that the FAA provides, as a matter of federal
law, that issues concerning the scope of arbitrability should be resolved
in favor of arbitration. ' In Southland, the Court broadened the scope of
the FAA by holding that, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, state courts, as well as federal courts, must
apply the substantive law of the FAA:2' "In creating a substantive rule
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to fore-
close state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements."' Dean Witter involved an alleged violation of a federal
statute-the United States Securities Act of 1934.' Upon Byrd's com-
plaint in federal district court arising out of a brokerage agreement con-
taining an arbitration provision, Dean Witter moved the court to compel
arbitration pursuant to the provision.27 In a unanimous opinion, the Court
held that "the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a dis-
trict court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties
to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement
has been signed."' The Court founded each decision on its sensitivity to
the "fundamental congressional intent to ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate."
The "Court's unbending objective: fostering the unfettered recourse
to arbitration,"' was again evidenced in 1987 in Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon.' In this landmark case, the Supreme Court ef-
fectively overruled Wilko v. Swan,3' a case in which the Court had carved
an exception to the FAA's broad applicability. 2 The Wilko Court
19. Linda R. Hirschman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1306-07 (1985).
20. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). In Moses, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals has the
authority to remand a case to compel arbitration, in order to facilitate Congress's goal of prompt
arbitration. See id. at 29.
21. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Southland involved a California franchise law which limited certain
types of arbitration. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 3-4.
22. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). The Court held that the district court erred when it refused a motion
to compel arbitration of state claims against a securities broker-dealer. See Moses. Cone., 470 U.S. at
223-24.
23. See Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
24. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 13-16.
25. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
26. See Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 214.
27. See id. at 214-15.
28. Id. at 218. (emphasis added).
29. ld. at 127.
30. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
31. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
32. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-34.
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determined that the arbitration provision at issue in a brokerage contract,
which was regulated by the Securities Act of 1933, 3 violated the public
policy of the Securities Act, rendering the arbitration agreement
unenforceable.' In McMahon, the issue before the court focused on the
arbitrability of claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934" and the Racketeer Influenced and the Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).36 In a 5-4 holding, the Court "further amplifie[dl the already
extensive reach of the emphatic public policy favoring arbitration."M As
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO do not have express lan-
guage barring arbitration, the Court held that the FAA governs, and thus
any claims brought under either act involving a valid arbitration agree-
ment must be arbitrated.' Underlying this decision was again the Court's
seemingly unyielding preference for arbitration when a valid arbitration
agreement exists.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act and State Law
Since its enactment in 1925, the FAA has raised issues of federal-
ism. Enacted during the Swift v. Tyson3 era of federal common law, the
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' in 1939 raised the question of
whether the FAA provided procedural or substantive rights.'1 The status
of the FAA, and thus its applicability in diversity suits, was not deter-
mined for nearly thirty years.
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing. Co., 2 held that when a contract involves inter-
state commerce, courts must apply the FAA.' The Court did not directly
address the federalism issue, but effectively decided that issue in its
opinion." Holding that Congress could provide substantive directives to
federal courts in areas where it has authority to act, the Court implicitly
held that the FAA created federal substantive rights-federal substantive
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
34. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994); see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220,222 (1987).
37. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 126.
38. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242.
39. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
40. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41. See Erie Railroad, 304 U.S. at 78. The Erie Doctrine, while a murky area of the law, is
interpreted as a prohibition against the application of federal substantive law when state created
substantive rights would be affected. Cf CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 141 n.13.
42. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
43. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406.
44. Cf. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 109.
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rights that must be applied in federal court.5 The Court's subsequent
decision in Southland made clear that, under the Supremacy Clause, the
state courts must apply the FAA as well. '
The Supreme Court has clearly voiced that the strong policy favoring
the FAA will be honored. A valid arbitration agreement will be enforced
even though the underlying claim may have been resolved differently
under state or federal law. As the decision in McMahon indicates, only
when Congress has expressly banned arbitration of certain disputes will
the policy favoring arbitration yield. '7 The Tenth Circuit during the sur-
vey period primarily followed this precedent. The decisions in Avedon
and Miera are consistent with the supremacy granted the FAA in state
law actions. The court's decision in McWilliams similarly is consistent
with the strong policy favoring arbitration. Davister, however, creates an
exception to the broad applicability of the FAA. Holding that the public
policy of protecting insurance policyholders outweighs the public policy
of promoting arbitration, Davister represents the rare situation when a
court overrules the applicability of the FAA without express congres-
sional direction to do so.
II. CASE DISCUSSION: FEDERAL STATUTES AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
Congress enacts federal statutory law to protect various public pol-
icy interests: the ADA,8 for example, was enacted to protect disabled
individuals; the McCarran-Ferguson Act 9 was enacted to protect insur-
ance policyholders; the FAA was enacted to protect parties' ability to
agree to arbitrate their disputes. Many interests protected by federal stat-
ute are subject to contractual agreements-agreements in which parties
may agree to arbitrate disputes. The contractual interests protected by the
FAA often seem at odds with those interests protected by other federal
statutes. In arbitration, arbitrators are not required to apply the law.'
Thus, whether a party waives statutory protection by entering an agree-
ment to arbitrate is an issue with which the courts have struggled, and on
which the Supreme Court has remained silent. During the survey period,
the Tenth Circuit decided two cases involving a conflict between a fed-
eral statute and the FAA. In McWilliams v. Logicon,5' the court held that
the public policy interest protected by the ADA did not outweigh, nor
conflict with, the policy of the FAA favoring arbitration. In Davister
45. See id.; see also Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 424-25 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for circumventing the "forum shopping" prohibitions under Erie by failing to require that
federal substantive law created under the FAA be applied by state courts).
46. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1984).
47. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
50. See Landrum & Trongard, supra note 6, at 370-74.
51. 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Corp. v. United Republic Life Insurance Co.,2 the court held that the
public policy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act outweighed the freedom of
contract policy embodied in the FAA. This section examines these two
decisions, provides a comparison of the Tenth Circuit's decisions to
those of other circuits, and analyzes the potential ramifications of the
Tenth Circuit's rulings.
A. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. McWilliams v. Logicon53
a. Facts
Logicon, Inc. employed McWilliams as a work area controller for
approximately seven years.' McWilliams' employment agreement con-
tained an arbitration agreement stating that "'any controversies, claims,
and/or disputes arising out, of the termination of [his] employment with
[Logicon], shall be settled exclusively through binding arbitra-
tion... pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act."'"'  Logicon fired
McWilliams in May of 1995.6 In response, McWilliams filed suit in fed-
eral district court claiming that his termination violated the ADA." He
alleged that the company fired him because he suffered from a number of
disabling conditions for which he had requested accommodation." Logi-
con moved to stay litigation pending arbitration and the court granted
this motion in consideration of the employment agreement." The arbi-
trator entered an award in favor of Logicon and the district court af-
firmed.' McWilliams appealed.61
b. Issues Considered
The Tenth Circuit considered three issues: (1) was McWilliams em-
ployed in interstate commerce, and thus within the FAA's exclusionary
language of section 1,' (2) are claims brought under the ADA subject to
binding arbitration in accordance with the FAA, and (3) did Logicon
waive its right to arbitrate by waiting until after McWilliams had filed
suit to move for arbitration.
52. 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998).
53. 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998).
54. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 574.
55. Id.
56. See id. (quoting the arbitration agreement contained in the employment agreement).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 574-75.
60. See id. at 575.
61. See id.
62. See id.; see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.




Applying a de novo standard of review" to all three issues, the court
first considered whether application of the FAA was precluded by the
exclusionary language of section 1 which states: "nothing herein con-
tained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad em-
ployees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."' Citing to circuits that have construed this exclusion nar-
rowly, the court determined that section 1 excludes only those workers
engaged in the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.' The court
concluded that McWilliams' employment as a "work area controller" did
not directly affect the channels of commerce, and therefore, did not pre-
clude applicability of the FAA under section 1.67
The court then considered whether McWilliams' ADA claim pre-
cluded enforcement of the arbitration agreement." Citing to the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration, the court relied on Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.,' holding that the presumption in favor of ar-
bitrability exists even when a party's claim is founded upon statutory
rights.' The Tenth Circuit concluded that McWilliams' ADA claim was
arbitrable, finding that the ADA encourages rather than prohibits
arbitration.7'
Finally, the court considered whether Logicon had waived its right
to arbitration by waiting until after McWilliams had filed his complaint
to commence arbitration. The court analyzed the alleged waiver under
Peterson v. Shearson/American Express Inc.," and Metz v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,73 which defined factors relevant to a deter-
mination of whether a party has waived its right to enforce an arbitration
agreement. The Peterson/Metz factors assessed by the McWilliams court,
included: (1) were the parties' actions inconsistent with the right to arbi-
trate; (2) were the parties well into preparation for litigation when one
party invoked arbitration; (3) did the party request arbitration near the
trial date; (4) did the defendant seeking arbitration file a counterclaim
without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) had intervening steps,
such as taking advantage of judicial discovery, taken place; and (6) had
the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party.' In applying
these factors, the court found that Logicon's conduct was not inconsis-
64. See id. (relying on Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995)).
65. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
66. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 575-76.
67. See id. at 576.
68. See id.
69. 55 U.S. 20(1991).
70. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 576 (citing Gilmer, 55 U.S. at 26).
71. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
72. 849 F.2d 464, 467-68 (10th Cir. 1988).
73. 39 F.3d 1482, 1489 (1Oth Cir. 1994).
74. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 576.
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tent with its right to arbitrate under the employment agreement; the par-
ties were not well into preparation; Logicon had invoked arbitration
shortly after McWilliams filed his claim; McWilliams was not required
to defend against a counterclaim; and Logicon had not abused discovery
or any other judicial procedures that would not have been available in an
arbitral proceeding." The court, therefore, concluded that Logicon had
not waived its right to enforce the arbitration agreement, and it conse-
quently affirmed the lower court's order compelling arbitration.76
d. Analysis
McWilliams represents the general judicial consensus regarding the
applicability and supremacy of the FAA. The FAA will rarely yield to
statutory claims. When a valid arbitration agreement exists, the role of
the judiciary is thus limited to (1) determining the arbitrability of the
parties' dispute, and (2) the subsequent enforcement of the arbitrator's
decision.
2. Davister Corp. v. United Republic Life Insurance Co.'
a. Facts
United Republic Life Insurance Company (United) and Davister
Corporation entered into an agreement whereby United would purchase,
via a stock transfer, R.G. Acquisition Corporation (RGA) from
Davister.8 The deal included a transfer of real property interests in Texas
which constituted RGA's principal assets." The agreement regarding the
property transfer contained an arbitration provision.' Subsequent to this
agreement, the Utah Insurance Commissioner reviewed the transaction
and notified United that the transaction was improper and must be re-
versed.' Before reversal of the transaction was complete, the Utah
Commissioner filed suit in Utah state court seeking control of United.82
The Commissioner then filed suit in Texas state court to gain control of
the real property interest involved in the transaction.8' Davister inter-
vened, seeking to rescind the contract, claiming that the order from the
Commissioner to reverse amounted to a failure of consideration in its
transaction with United. ' In the meantime, the Utah state court issued an
order compelling the liquidation of United and appointing the Commis-
75. See id. at 576-77.
76. See id. at 577.
77. 152 F.3d 1277 (10thCir. 1998).









sioner as liquidator." The Utah state court then ordered a stay of all
claims against United pursuant to Utah statute; the Texas state court
honored the stay." Davister then filed suit in United States District Court
for the District of Utah against the Commissioner, and against United,
seeking to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement between the par-
ties related to the Texas property interest. 7 The district court refused to
compel arbitration, and Davister appealed."
b. Issue Considered
At issue before the court was whether the FAA must yield to a state
court blanket stay in an insurance liquidation setting-specifically,
"whether state law governing insurance company delinquency proceed-
ings reverse pre-empt the [FAA] under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.""
Davister argued that the national policy favoring arbitration embodied in
the FAA mandated arbitration when the parties have agreed to submit
their dispute to arbitration.' United and the Utah Commissioner argued
that the McCarran-Ferguson Ace1 does not allow any act of Congress to
preempt any state law regarding the regulation of the business of insur-
ance and thus the arbitration provision could not be enforced under the
FAA, but must be assessed under relevant state law.
92
c. Majority Opinion
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: "No Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."'93 Therefore,
the court began its analysis by considering whether the liquidation pro-
ceeding against United fell within the Act's meaning of "the business of
insurance." Relying on United States v. Fabe," the court determined
that a state statute enacted specifically to protect insurance policy holders





89. Id. at 1280 (quoting Munich American Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 587
(5th Cir. 1998)).
90. See id. at 1278.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994). See also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
92. See Davister, 152 F.3d at 1279.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
94. Davister, 152 F.3d at 1279.
95. 508 U.S. 491 (1993). Fabe provides a three part test to determine what insurance is, and
thus when the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be applied: "(1) does the federal statute at issue 'spe-
cifically relate to the business of insurance;' (2) was the state statute enacted 'for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance'; (3) would application of the federal statute 'impair, interfere,
or supercede' the state statute." Davister, 152 F.3d at 1279 n.l (quoting Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500-01).
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cates the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' Citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Munich American Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford,' the court then held that
the FAA is reverse pre-empted whenever the McCarran-Ferguson Act is
implicated."8
Applying this analysis to the Davister facts, the court concluded that
Utah enacted the statute consolidating claims against a liquidating in-
surer to protect policyholders." Thus, the court held that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was implicated and application of the FAA was reverse
pre-empted."' The court recognized that the parties had agreed to arbi-
trate disputes arising out of the property transfer agreement; however, it
stated that it would not allow a "putative creditor to pluck from the entire
liquidation proceeding one discrete issue and force arbitration contrary to
the blanket stay entered by the Utah state court.""' Thus, in a liquidation
setting, the FAA will not govern agreements to arbitrate; state law, on the
other hand, will control the transaction pursuant to the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.
d. Dissenting Opinion
In dissent, Judge Lucero argued that the majority opinion adopted
an overly broad interpretation of Fabe and the majority had wrongly
provided an exception to the supremacy of the FAA without the neces-
sary express command from Congress." Stating that Fabe limits the
business of insurance merely to the "protection of policyholders," Judge
Lucero argued that the blanket stay of an arbitral proceeding is a benefit
to all creditors and not specifically a benefit to policyholders." Further,
he asserted that Utah's law does not mandate against arbitration within
the insurance context, and therefore, the FAA should not have been pre-
cluded from its applicability absent express legislative direction."
e. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit made a conspicuous move in holding claims
within the jurisdiction of the McCarran-Ferguson Act immune from the
FAA. To overcome the strong presumption of arbitrability, express con-
gressional language mandating exclusive judicial jurisdiction is usually
required." The Tenth Circuit in Davister carved an exception to the ap-
96. Davister, 152 F.3d at 1281-82.
97. 141 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1998).




102. See id. at 1282-83.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1283.
105. Cf CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 130.
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plicability of the FAA when Congress had not expressly mandated a ju-
dicial remedy. The Davister decision, therefore, conflicts with the strong
presumption in favor or arbitration.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that the business of insurance
shall be subject to the laws of the several states.'0 The Act provides that a
private contract between two parties may contain an arbitration clause; it
further declares that state law principles will govern the interpretation of
insurance contracts."° Insurance contracts, however, involve interstate
commerce, thus invoking the applicability of the FAA." Hence, regard-
ing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the following issue is
raised: whether the FAA or state law is applicable when an insurance
company becomes insolvent and the agreement provides for arbitration
of disputes arising out of the liquidation.
B. Other Circuits
There is a split on this issue within the circuits, and silence from the
Supreme Court. The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude application of the FAA. In
Hamilton Life Insurance Co. v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.,m
9
the Second Circuit held that McCarran-Ferguson does not exempt the
business of insurance from other federal statutes unless such compliance
would conflict with state laws regulating insurance."' The court stated
that "[t]he plain and unambiguous statutory language is persuasive evi-
dence that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not intended to preclude the
application of these federal statutes to insurance unless they invalidate,
impair or supersede applicable State legislation regulating the business of
insurance.""' Holding that state arbitration statutes do not invalidate,
impair, or supersede states' regulation of the business of insurance, but
regulate "the method of handling contract disputes generally," the court
refused to find the FAA reverse pre-empted by operation of New York
law regulating the business of insurance."2
The Ninth Circuit, in Bennett v. Liberty National Fire Insurance
Co.,' 3 held that Montana's insolvency statute does not regulate the busi-
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1994).
107. Cf, Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Em-
pirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust,
Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-Ferguson Act-1941-1943,43 CATH. U. L.
REv. 399, 432-33 (1994) (arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be eliminated and a
federal regulation of insurance put in place).
108. See id.
109. 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969).
110. See Hamilton, 408 F.2d at 611.
Ill. Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
112. Hamilton, 408 F.2d at 611. The court referred to the Texas Arbitration Act and the New
York Arbitration Act specifically in determining that state law relating to arbitration did not operate
to regulate the business of insurance. See id.
113. 968 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1992).
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ness of insurance and, therefore, does not preclude applicability of the
FAA."' The court rested its decision on its determination that the liqui-
dator-plaintiff sought to enforce rights primarily derived from the insol-
vent insurer's contract rather than from Montana's insolvency
regulation."' The court held that because the underlying dispute between
the parties was one of contract, and not one of insurance policyholders'
rights, the parties were compelled to arbitrate their dispute pursuant to
the FAA."'6 In its decision, the court rejected the argument that the public
policy interest furthered by the regulation of insolvent insurers should
outweigh the federal interest in compelling arbitration under the FAA."7
Finding no harm to the liquidator, but merely an alternative forum for
resolution, the court rejected the reverse preemption effect of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act.'
The Tenth Circuit, with its decision in Davister, joined the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits in finding that state statutes regulating liquidation are pro-
tected from federal preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act."9 The
Fifth Circuit in Munich,'"' imposed a per se rule of reverse preemption
denying the enforceability of any arbitration agreement in insolvency
proceedings.' The Sixth Circuit, in Fabe v. United States Department of
Treasury,'" held that Ohio's liquidation statute "protecte[d] the interests
of the insured" and "regulate[d] the 'business of insurance,"' and was
thus protected from federal preemption.'" Accepting certiorari on Fabe,
the Supreme Court failed to define the relationship between the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act and the FAA.'"' The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's
decision, but only on the grounds that "to the extent that [the Ohio prior-
ity statute at issue] is designed to further the interests of other credi-
tors ... it is not a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance."' '
This lack of direction from the Supreme Court has led to a split in the
circuits on the question of whether the FAA applies to insurance contracts.
The Tenth Circuit's decision marks a rare instance where other public
policy concerns outweigh the presumption favoring arbitrability. Davister
further marks the rare instance where the presumption favoring arbitrabil-
ity is overcome, not by a congressional command, but by judicial directive.
114. See Bennett, 968 F.2d at 972-73.




119. Cf. Rice, supra note 107, at 438-39.
120. 141 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1998); see also infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
121. See Munich, 141 F.3d at 595-96.
122. 939 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1991).
123. Fabe, 939 F.2d at 350-51.
124. See United States v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,508 (1993).
125. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 508.
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III. CASE DISCUSSION: STATE COMMON LAW AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
A. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex'2
a. Facts
Twist, a manufacturing company that designs and produces clothing
and accessories for snowboarding, is the assignor of Avedon Engineer-
ing, a Colorado corporation."v Twist began using textiles produced by
Defendant Seatex, a New York-based division of Balson-Hercules, a
Rhode Island corporation." In preliminary dealings with Seatex, Twist
negotiated quantity, price, and quality standards through telephone and
facsimile communications. Twist then ordered Seatex products and, in
response, Seatex sent Twist its standard sales confirmation forms.'
At the bottom of the forms, special conditions appeared in small
type, including a condition giving notice regarding arbitral resolution of
disputes arising out of the transaction."' The back of the form contained
two clauses relating to arbitration: one stating that disputes arising out of
the transactions would be settled by arbitration; the other that any future
transactions would be controlled by the terms of the sales confirmation
form, unless superseded by a signed contract. "' These terms were not
negotiated by the parties, but were inserted unilaterally by Seatex
through use of a standard form. "3 Twist received and paid for the goods
ordered, but did not sign or return the sales confirmation forms.M
The dispute between the parties arose when Twist ordered water-
proof fabric from Seatex, which subsequently peeled. "' Consumers re-
turned clothing made with this fabric to Twist." After unsuccessfully
trying to resolve the problem with Seatex, Twist sued in Colorado state
court . 3 After removal to federal court on diversity basis, Seatex asserted
that the arbitration clause became part of the contract pursuant to section
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)."8
126. 126 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1997).
127. See Avedon, 126 F.3d at 1281 & n.2.
128. See id. at 1281.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1281& n.3.
132. See id. at 1281 & n.4.





138. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Twist argued that section 2-207 prohibited inclusion of the arbitra-
tion term because it would materially alter the contract.'39 The district
court disagreed, holding that the arbitration clause did not materially
alter the contract, and thus it granted Seatex's motion for a stay of litiga-
tion pending arbitration." Six months passed, and Seatex moved for
summary judgment for Twist's failure to timely arbitrate."' The court
held that according to the contract, Twist was bound to initiate arbitration
proceedings within one year of breach. 24 Twist had failed to do so, and
the court thus granted Seatex's motion for summary judgment.' 3
b. Issues Considered
At issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the parties had agreed
to arbitrate the dispute and whether insertion of the terms materially al-
tered the contract.'" An ancillary, but ultimately dispositive, issue before
the court was whether New York or Colorado law governed the contract."
c. Decision
The court applied a de novo standard of review to both the district
court's grant of the motion to compel arbitration and its denial of a jury
trial on the issue of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate the
dispute." Pursuant to the FAA, before compelling arbitration, the court
first looked for an agreement to arbitrate."7 The court held that section 2-
207 of the UCC controlled the determination of the existence of an
arbitration agreement.'"4 Section 2-207 provides that unilaterally inserted
terms become part of the contract unless (1) an offer is made expressly
conditional to its terms, (2) additional terms are expressly objected to, or
(3) the term materially alters the contract."9
The court assessed the agreement pursuant to section 2-207, finding
Twist had neither limited its acceptance of any of the offers to their terms
nor expressly objected to them in the preliminary sales confirmation
forms."' Consequently, whether the unilaterally inserted term had become
part of the contract depended on whether the term materially altered the
contract.





144. See id. at 1283.
145. Cf id. at 1284.
146. See id. at 1283.
147. See id. (referring to 9 U.S.C. §§ 3,4 (1994)).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1283 n.8 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207 (1994)).
150. See id. at 1283-84.
[Vol. 76:3
ARBITRATION
Whether the inserted term regarding arbitration materially altered
the contract depended upon which state's law governed the contract."'
The difference in state law would affect two issues: the materiality of the
arbitration clause and the one year limitation on the arbitration clause."
Colorado had not addressed the issue of the materiality of an arbi-
tration clause; thus, the court assumed that Colorado would apply "a
conventional UCC analysis."'' 3 Under this analysis, the burden of show-
ing that arbitration is a material alteration is on the party opposing its
inclusion.' Conversely, New York presumes that arbitration is material
and, thus, that it will not become part of the contract unless the parties
expressly agree to it."'
Colorado had not adopted the general UCC provision permitting
parties to contractually reduce their limitations period.' Under Colorado
law, parties may not agree to reduce the time allowed to bring a claim to
something less than the statute of'limitations.'57 Thus, in Colorado the
limitation on the time allowed to commence arbitration would be a mate-
rial alteration to the contract. Conversely, New York has adopted the
general UCC provision permitting parties to contractually agree to alter
the limitations period to a minimum of one year."' Therefore, under New
York law, the one-year limitation period would not materially alter the
contract, as it would be a reasonably expected term of the agreement.""
Seatex argued that New York's law finding the arbitration clause a
material alteration to the contract would always bar inclusion of an arbi-
tration clause and that the FAA prohibits such a bar."w The court, how-
ever, held that the FAA does not preempt New York's interpretation of
section 2-207."6' The court noted that the existence of an arbitration
agreement must be established before the FAA is invoked, because the
FAA enforces private agreements to arbitrate and does not force parties
to arbitrate when they had not agreed to do so.' 2 State law governs
whether an arbitration agreement exists. Consequently, the FAA will not
preempt New York's interpretation of the materiality of arbitration
agreements within the context of UCC section 2-207 in determining the
validity of an agreement to arbitrate.'63




155. See id. at 1285.
156. See id. at 1286 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-2-725 (West 1992)).
157. See id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-2-725(1)).
158. See id. at 1285 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1997)).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1286.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1286-87.
163. See id. at 1287.
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As the district court did not examine the choice of law issue, and
since that issue would be determinative of whether an arbitration agree-
ment existed, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
determination of the choice of law issue.IM
d. Analysis
The arbitrability of a dispute is an issue firmly within the jurisdic-
tion of the courts." This threshold issue, as the Avedon court held, must
be determined pursuant to state contract law principles. As the Tenth
Circuit did in Avedon, courts may consider whether parties actually
agreed to arbitrate; indeed, arbitration is a creature of contract and, thus,
can only be manifest by party agreement.' By limiting review to the
validity of the arbitration agreement, courts grant deference to the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, a posture that recognizes and respects the strong
presumption in favor of arbitration because of its underlying principle of
freedom of contract.
2. Miera v. Dairyland Insurance Co.'6
a. Facts
Renetta Miera was injured in New Mexico in an automobile colli-
sion with an uninsured motorist on April 17, 1994." Miera's insurer was
Dairyland Insurance. Dairyland provided Miera with uninsured motorist
protection as well as medical and collision coverage.'" Following the
accident, Miera submitted a claim to Dairyland, upon which the company
paid $5,137.50 to the lienholder on Miera's vehicle and $1,134.91 to
Miera for medical expenses." Unable to resolve further personal injury
and property loss claims by Miera, the parties submitted the issue to ar-
bitration . 7' Arbitrators determined Miera's total loss as $17,134.91.' 7
Dairyland then paid Miera $10,862.50, the difference between the
amount previously paid and the amount awarded by the arbitrators."
Miera filed suit in New Mexico state court to confirm the arbitration
award and to seek further relief under New Mexico's Unfair Trade Prac-
164. See id. at 1288.
165. It is well recognized that whether an issue arbitrable may be decided by a court on contract
law principles. This is true even if the agreement to arbitrate requires arbitral resolution of "all
disputes between the parties," common language in arbitration agreements.
166. Cf First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
167. 143 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. 1998).
168. See Miera, 143 F.3d at 1338.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1338-39.




tices Act and Unfair Claims Practices Act.'" Dairyland removed the suit
to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction.'" Finding jurisdiction,
the district court granted Dairlyand's motion for summary judgment on
Miera's statutory claims.'76
b. Issue Considered
Specifically before the court was the issue of whether, under New
Mexico law, an insurer can offset amounts previously paid to a
policyholder against an arbitration award of uninsured motorist damages
in the same policy.'"
c. Decision
In rendering its decision, the court first stated that arbitration is a
creation of contract and that parties agree to the scope of arbitration.'78
The court then referred to Quinones v. Pennsylvania General Insurance
Co., W in which the plaintiff had been injured in an uninsured motorist
collision.'" While the jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000, the court did
not instruct it on the collateral source rule, which would have allowed the
plaintiff to recover past medical expenses although the insurer had al-
ready paid those claims under a separate clause in the insurance agree-
ment."' The Quinones court founded its decision on public policy con-
cerns that "[n]o policy would be served by requiring Penn General [the
insurer] to twice pay.., past medical expenses. '82
The court found in Miera that the parties had agreed to the scope of
arbitration.'83 Arbitrable issues were limited to the total amount of dam-
ages due, reserving the legal question of offset to later resolution.'"
Concluding that Quinones was controlling, the court held that Dairyland
had paid medical and property loss bills of over $6,000 prior to arbitra-
tion.' The arbitration award specified that $1,134.91 represented reim-
bursement for necessary medical care.'" Dairyland had paid this amount
to the plaintiff for medical care.'87 The arbitrators had awarded
174. See id. (referring to Unfair Claim Practices Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-1 6-20 to -30
(Michie 1978); Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-2 to -10 (Michie 1978)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1341.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 1341-42 (referring to Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167
(10th Cir. 1986)).
180. See Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1169.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 117-1.
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$17,134.91 in total damages. Pursuant to Quinones, the court held that
the insurer may offset amounts previously paid from the payment
awarded under an uninsured motorist claim." Consequently, the court
determined that Dairyland had paid all damages owed to Renatta Miera.
d. Analysis
The FAA provides for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.'"
In Miera, the Tenth Circuit did not review the merits of the award; the
court merely determined the logistics of enforcing the rendered arbitral
award. This power does not conflict with the FAA and, in fact, provides
more evidence of its recognized supremacy. The limitation on judicial
review ensures the integrity of the arbitral process and the respect for
parties' freedom of contract.
CONCLUSION
State law review of arbitration issues is limited to determinations of
whether valid arbitration agreements exist, and to enforcement of ren-
dered arbitration awards. The Tenth Circuit cases Miera and Avedon
conform with this well-recognized relationship. As these decisions illus-
trate, the role of state law in a claim implicating the FAA is well defined.
The relationship between the FAA and other federal statutes is not as
well defined. Federal statutory claims subject to arbitration agreements are
often challenged. The courts traditionally refuse to preempt the FAA un-
less Congress expressly provides that arbitration is not an available forum
for dispute resolution of the claim. The Tenth Circuit followed this line of
reasoning in McWilliams, holding that a claim brought under the ADA did
not prevent the application of the FAA. The Tenth Circuit, however, carved
a rare exception. Where Congress has not provided a mandate against ar-
bitration, and where the Supreme Court has failed to clarify the relation-
ship between the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the FAA, the Tenth Circuit
forced the FAA to yield. Davister effectively allows state insurance law to
preempt the FAA. Arbitration clauses in insurance contracts will only be
valid and enforceable if they satisfy state laws regarding the arbitrability of
insurance disputes. The Davister court concluded that the public policy of
protecting the insured outweighs the public policy of protecting freedom of
contract. Davister thus undermines the FAA and illustrates the undefined
relationship between the FAA and other federal statutes.
Kristen Angus*
188. See id.
189. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Denver College of Law. The author would like to
extend special thanks to Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau for providing invaluable insight and
guidance throughout the writing of this article.
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CIVIL RIGHTS: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
INTRODUCTION
Every year the courts are burdened with a vast number of civil rights
claims against government officials. This saddles the judicial system
with the complex task of balancing the public policy interests of the state
against the interest in safeguarding an individual's rights.' Most of the
recent controversy regarding immunity for officials and municipalities
revolves around ambiguous legislative intent and recent judicial expan-
sion of the law surrounding civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.2 During the present survey period,3 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was placed in the difficult position of weighing the need to
compensate individuals for the constitutional harms they suffer against
the need to provide public officials and municipalities with room for
discretion.
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's approach to qualified im-
munity and municipal liability actions arising under section 1983.' Part I
discusses the procedural and substantive process of appeal from sum-
mary judgment based upon qualified immunity, particularly those judi-
cial tests developed for assessing alleged violations of an individual's
First Amendment right to free speech. Part II focuses on recent proce-
dural changes developed for reviewing the denial of qualified immunity
to city officials. Finally, Part III evaluates how the court determines mu-
nicipal liability and in what context a municipality will be held liable for
its policies or customs.
1. See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitu-
tional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 262 (1995) (discussing the dilemma facing federal
courts using judicial standards to balance the need to insulate public officials from needless litigation
against the need to compensate individuals whose rights have been violated).
2. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 497, 499 (1992) (indicating that the immunity
doctrine is unstable due to inconsistencies in the Court's interpretive function).
3. The survey period addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit from September 1, 1997 through August 31, 1998.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides individuals with a cause of action, stating in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Background
The Supreme Court has struggled with the doctrine of qualified im-
munity over the past four decades Although not specifically mentioned
in section 1983, the Supreme Court has incorporated this doctrine into
interpretations of the statute.6 Qualified immunity provides state and lo-
cal officials with an affirmative defense that shields them from ciVil li-
ability while performing discretionary functions.' The doctrine is prm-
ised on the perceived societal need to allow officials leeway in their dis-
cretionary roles and to protect those who could not have anticipated that
their conduct was unconstitutional! By applying qualified immunity to
section 1983 jurisprudence, the Court recognized the importance of pro-
tecting officials from over-deterrence, undue interference with official
duties, and potentially disabling threats of liability.9
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald,"6 which
affords state and local officials increased protection upon the assertion of
the immunity defense." Harlow sets forth a broad set of general guidelines
that require lower courts to analyze immunity claims on a case-by-case
basis.'2 These guidelines require weighing the fundamental concerns of
both an individual's need for relief against the need to limit a public offi-
cial's liability. As with all balancing tests, there is wide room for judicial
discretion." Following the guidelines set out in Harlow, the Tenth Circuit
developed a framework for analyzing qualified immunity cases.
The Tenth Circuit's standard of review for examining qualified im-
munity issues consists of a three-part test (hereinafter the "Immunity
Test"). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy any part of this test, a court will
grant qualified immunity to the defendant." The first part of the analysis
requires that the pleadings set forth all of the factual allegations neces-
sary to sustain a finding that the defendant violated a constitutionally or
5. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (holding that no civil liability attaches
to officials for actions constituting legitimate legislative activity).
6. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986).
7. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
8. Cf. Chen, supra note 1, at 273.
9. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
10. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
11. See id. Following its decision in Harlow, the Court established stricter guidelines to pro-
tect officials from liability. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (adopting a "reasonable
official" standard of review for allegedly unconstitutional official action).
12. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (discussing the public policy concerns involved in denying or
granting qualified immunity); cf Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 (applying an "objective reasonable" stan-
dard to determine whether qualified immunity should be granted); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
528 (1985) (characterizing defendant's claim of immunity as one raising a question of law properly
addressed in the appellate court).
13. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-07.
14. See Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995).
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statutorily protected right." Second, the plaintiff must show that the right
violated was clearly established prior to the conduct in question."' Fi-
nally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable official would
have known that her conduct violate4 this clearly established right."
The Immunity Test applies in all instances where qualified immu-
nity is asserted as a defense to section 1983 claims. The Supreme Court,
however, has expanded certain types of claims, particularly those arising
under the First Amendment. In these cases, the third prong of the Immu-
nity Test requires proof of an improper motive in order for a plaintiff's
action to survive a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified
immunity."
Section 1983 claims requiring proof of improper motive are subjected
to a heightened pleading standard. Examples of such claims include those
alleging retaliation for the exercise of free speech in violation of the First
Amendment,"' race and gender discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause,2 and violations of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.2' The rationale behind subjecting
these claims to a heightened pleading standard is that while improper mo-
tive is easy to allege, it is difficult for officials to disprove.' Since motive
is a pure issue of fact, normally left for the trier of fact, the court must de-
termine whether the defendant possessed the requisite state of mind for a
plaintiff's claim to survive a motion to dismiss.'
Over the last few years, appellate courts have imposed the height-
ened burden of proof whenever improper motive is a required element of
the claim.' The purpose for adopting this heightened burden of proof is
15. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir.
1988).
16. See Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (stating that a defendant asserting qualified
immunity prevails if, at the time of the conduct in question, there was no clearly established law to
put her on notice that the conduct was unconstitutional); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530-34 (indicating
that defendant is entitled to qualified ithmunity, even though his actions were unconstitutional, if at
the time of the conduct it was not clearly established that the behavior was unconstitutional). This
requirement serves to ensure that the defendant was on notice that the right existed. See Garramone
v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-.
41 (1987); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530; Davis, 468 U.S. at 191 (1984).
17. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997).
18. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1590(1998).
19. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Farmerv. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
22. See Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1590.
23. See id.
24. See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role
of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 82 (1997). Courts adopting this approach
typically require the plaintiff to produce "specific, non-conclusory factual allegations" to establish
the official's state of mind before discovery takes place on a motion for summary judgment. See
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to protect public officials from the costs associated with defending
against civil actions.' 'These social costs include the expense of litiga-
tion, diversion of official energy from pressing public issues and the de-
terrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office."'
During the present survey period, however, the Supreme Court de-
cided Crawford-El v. Britton," which addressed the propriety of a
heightened pleading standard above and beyond that already required for
qualified immunity. In Crawford-El, the D.C. Circuit created a height-
ened evidentiary standard requiring a plaintiff, prior to any discovery,, to
produce clear and convincing evidence of improper motive in order to
defeat an official's assertion of qualified immunity. 8 This pleadifig re-
quirement raised the original standard, which required only the pro4c-
tion of specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact.
In beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court cited its holding in
Harlow,2' in which it determined that a "bare allegation of malice should
not suffice to subject government officials either to the cost of trial or to
the burdens of broad-reaching discovery."" The Court continued, holding
that when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court
should focus only on the legal question of whether the official's conduct
violated a clearly established law." The Court indicated, however, that in
situations where a plaintiff asserts a claim requiring proof of wrongful
motive, the appellate court may require the plaintiff to put forward "spe-
cific, non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper mo-
tive.., in order [for the claim] to survive [a] defendant's pre-discovery
motion for dismissal or summary judgment."" In doing so, the Court
reasoned that this requirement does not rise to the level of a new height-
ened pleading standard, but relies on existing procedures that are avail-
able to federal judges handling claims that involve the examination of an
official's state of mind.3
In reviewing a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss in a First
Amendment case, the court must apply a modified version of the Immu-
nity Test. As previously noted, the first part of the test addresses whether
Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1996); Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1535
(10th Cir. 1995); Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991).
25. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
26. Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1593 n.12.
27. 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
28. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
29. Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1591-92.
30. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
31. See Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1592.
32. Id. at 1596-97.
33. See id. at 1596. The Court discussed two primary options open to a trial court prior to
permitting any discovery at all. See id. The first entails ordering a reply to the defendant's answer.
See id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a)). The second involves granting the defendant's motion for a niore
definite statement. See id. (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 12(e)).
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the plaintiffs pleadings allege sufficient facts to support a finding that
the defendant violated a constitutionally or statutorily protected right. In
the First Amendment free speech context, a plaintiff will only prevail on
this aspect of the qualified immunity analysis if it can be shown that the
speech in question is protected. This analysis requires the balancing of
four factors set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Pickering v.
Board of Education." The plaintiff's speech must involve a matter of
public concern; the violation must outweigh the employer's interest in
maintaining an efficient workplace; the speech must have been a sub-
stantial factor in the detrimental employment action; and it must be dem-
.onstrated that the defendant, in the absence of the protected speech,
would have taken the same action against the plaintiff.' The plaintiff will
prevail on the first prong of the Immunity Test only with the satisfaction
of each element of this four-part test (Pickering balancing test).
After the plaintiff successfully demonstrates that the governmental
action was taken in disregard of a protected speech activity, the second
prong of the Immunity Test requires the court to examine whether the
First Amendment right was clearly established prior to the conduct in
question." Third, the court must analyze whether the defendant knew or
should have known that her conduct violated the clearly established
right." Satisfaction of these three prongs allows a plaintiff to survive a
motion to dismiss founded upon qualified immunity. The following case
is illustrative of the judicial struggle to compensate victims for violations
of their rights while continuing to defer to an official's discretion in car-
rying out her duties.
34. See, e.g., Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir.
1988).
35. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
36. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Matters of public concern are those of interest to the
community, such as social or political concerns. See Lytle v. City of Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 863
(10th Cir. 1998).
37. See Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (stating that a defendant asserting qualified
immunity prevails if, at the time of the conduct in question, there was no clearly established law to
put her on notice that the conduct was unconstitutional); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
530-34 (1984) (indicating that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, even though his actions
were unconstitutional, if at the time of the conduct it was not clearly established that the behavior
was unconstitutional).
38. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit has
noted the difficulty in holding public officials accountable for violating First Amendment rights
determined through the use of a Pickering balancing test. See Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879
F.2d 706, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that while public officials lose immunity in the face of
clearly established law, "because a rule of law determined by a balancing of interests is inevitably
difficult to anticipate, it follows that where Pickering balancing is required, the law is less likely to
be well established than in other cases"), reh'g granted on other grounds, 888 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.
1989).
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B. Dill v. City of Edmond39
1. Facts
In July 1991, Detective Dennis Dill raised concerns regarding the
culpability of a suspect subsequently convicted of committing a double
homicide.' Dill brought his concerns to his supervisor, but was told not
to pursue the matter any further as it might cause problems with the
case.4' After Dill made additional attempts to provide facts that could
exculpate the suspect, Dill's supervisor demoted him from detective to
patrol officer. '2 Dill filed suit against the City of Edmond, the Chief of
Police, and his immediate supervisor under section 1983, alleging viola-
tion of his First Amendment right to free speech. 3 The district court..dis-
missed the claim, holding that Dill's speech was not constitutionally
protected and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity."
On appeal, Dill asserted that the district court erred in dismissing his
claim on the basis of qualified immunity. '
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis under the first prong of the
Immunity Test by examining whether Dill's claim properly asserted a
First Amendment free speech violation as informed by the four-factor
Pickering balancing approach. Addressing the first two factors, the Tenth
Circuit analyzed whether the speech involved matters of a public concern
that outweighed the interest of the employer in promoting the efficiency
of the public services. ' The court observed that the district court improp-
erly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, even though it was un-
clear whether Dill's speech was disruptive to the operation of the
Edmond Police Department. ' In addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the defendants' interests in maintaining efficiency did
not outweigh Dill's interest in "discussing possible police misconduct
39. 155 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998).
40. Dill, 155 F.3d at 1200.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1200-01.
43. See id. at 1201.
44. See id.
45. See id
46. See id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). In Pickering, the
Supreme Court held that, in order to determine whether an employee's speech is constitutionally
protected, a court must evaluate whether (1) the speech involves a matter of public concern, (2) the
violation outweighs the employer's interests of public service efficiency, (3) the speech was a "sub-
stantial factor or motivating factor" in the detrimental action of the employer, and (4) in the absence
of the protected speech, the same action would have been taken against the employee. See Pickering,
391 U.S. at 568; see also Lytle v. City of Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 863 (10th Cir. 1998); Gardetto v.
Mason 100 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing the four-step test for reviewing a retaliation
claim).
47. See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1203.
[Vol. 76:3
CIVIL RIGHTS
during a homicide investigation.'"5 Next, with respect to the third factor
of Pickering, the court held that Dill's statements concerning the exis-
tence of exculpatory evidence was a direct cause of his demotion from
detective to patrol officer.' Finally, under the fourth factor, the court
concluded that the defendants' actions were retaliatory and that they pro-
vided no evidence that the same action would have been taken had his
speech not been protected.' Balancing these factors, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that Dill successfully met the Pickering test and, therefore,
Dill established the existence of a First Amendment right satisfying the
first prong of the Immunity Test.
Having decided that Dill's pleadings asserted a First Amendment
free speech claim, the Tenth Circuit evaluated the remaining two prongs
of the Immunity Test-whether the right was clearly established prior to
the governmental activity in question and whether a reasonable official
would have known the conduct violated that right!' The court found that
the "protected status of [Dill's] speech was sufficiently clear that the
defendants reasonably should have been on notice that their actions
would violate [his] First Amendment rights." 2 Relying on both its own
precedent and relevant cases from other circuits, the court concluded that
Dill's demotion from detective to patrol officer was unreasonable and
violative of the First Amendment. 3
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit began by examining the nature and scope of the
First Amendment right to free speech. The court was careful to keep in
mind the importance of balancing the need to protect individual liberties
against governmental and social welfare concerns. The question of the
48. Id. (citing Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep't of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 595 (10th Cir.
1994)).
49. See id. at 1205.
50. See id. at 1204.
51. See id. (citing Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 1997) (determining
that the heightened pleading standard required the complaint to contain "specific non-conclusory
allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved [and
construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff], demonstrate that the actions taken were not
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law")).
52. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied on Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), which held
that the unlawfulness of the conduct in question only has to be evident in light of pre-existing law,
rather than declaring the specific right unlawful in previous precedent. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at
640. A clearly established right is apparent when there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision
on point, or when "the clear weight of authority from other courts ... 'found the law to be as the
plaintiff maintains."' Id. at 1205 (quoting Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493,
1498 (10th Cir. 1992)).
53. See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1204 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 72, 74 (1990)
(holding that the denial of transfers or promotions because of employee's political affiliation can be
a basis for a First Amendment violation) and Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding that a First Amendment violation occurred when a public school teacher was har-
assed, reprimanded, and suspended because of her complaints about school conditions)).
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extent to which the court may deny an individual a remedy for depriva-
tion of a constitutional right to further the public policy goal of protect-
ing officials from needless litigation underlies any determination of im-
munity. In this last year, the Tenth Circuit grappled with immunity issues
and utilized the Supreme Court's view of sound public policy, adhering
to the approaches set forth in Harlow and Crawford-El.'
In Dill, the Tenth Circuit tipped the scales toward the need to com-
pensate individuals for their injuries over the desire to protect public
officials. Applying the Pickering balancing test, the Dill court held that a
person's interest in having their right to speak freely protected out-
weighed the public policy interest in shielding officials from excessive
litigation.5 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit focused more on the possible
retaliatory behavior of public officials than on the employee's disruptive
speech.'
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have addressed similar First Amendment issues in a
manner consistent with that of the Tenth Circuit. For example, the Sec-
ond Circuit, in Gubitosi v. Kapica,7 applied the analysis set forth in
Crawford-El to determine whether the plaintiff was fired from her job in
retaliation for the exercise of her right to free speech.' Before the court
could determine that the plaintiffs right was clearly established and that
the defendant violated that right, the plaintiff had to provide evidence
from which a jury could conclude that the official engaged in retaliation
against her." In doing so, the Second Circuit noted that once the official
has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment based
upon qualified immunity, the plaintiff "may not respond [in her plead-
ings] simply with general attacks upon the defendant's credibility.
' '
The Second Circuit recognized that the pleadings evidenced a "total
absence of evidence of retaliation," and noted that there were other sig-
nificant reasons that could have resulted in termination of her employ-
ment." The Second Circuit also concluded that the plaintiff failed to es-
tablish that the defendant violated a clearly established law prohibiting
54. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (lessening the standard used in deter-
mining if an official is protected under qualified immunity from a requirement to act both subjec-
tively and objectively in good faith to merely whether a reasonable official would have been aware
that he committed a constitutional violation); see Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1587
(1998) (sustaining the original pleading standard that requires a plaintiff to allege specific non-
conclusory facts in determining whether a First Amendment right to free speech was established).
55. See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1203.
56. Cf. id.
57. 154 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1998).
58. See Gubitosi, 154 F.3d at 33 (quoting Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1598).
59. See id.




such retaliation.' Thus, the plaintiff failed to show the defendant was
objectively unreasonable in assuming that he did not violate the plain-
tiff's First Amendment right to free speech.'
The Eleventh Circuit, in Martin v. Baugh,' reversed the district
court's denial of qualified immunity based upon the plaintiff's failure to
allege facts sufficient to establish a violation of his right to free speech.'
The plaintiff, a radio technician, claimed that his supervisor retaliated
against him for criticizing the way in which the city awarded a contract."
The plaintiff argued that his statements constituted speech protected by
the First Amendment and that his supervisor's disciplinary actions
against him violated clearly established law.' The Eleventh Circuit, not-
ing the inherent difficulty in establishing whether certain speech should
be protected," applied the Pickering balancing test to determine whether
"(1) the speech at issue involve[d] a matter of public concern, and (2) the
value of the speech outweigh[ed] its potential for disruption of govern-
ment workplace efficiency." Noting that the Pickering test requires le-
gal determinations that are greatly fact-specific and does not provide a
"clear, bright-line rule[],"'' the court found that a reasonable person could
not have known that the conduct at issue would give rise to a First
Amendment violation." The plaintiff failed to provide any case law that
could have put the defendant on notice that his disciplinary actions were
in violation of a First Amendment right.' Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that "qualified immunity is a doctrine that focuses on the actual, on
the specific, on the details of concrete cases."73 Therefore, the court held
that the law was not clearly established at the time of the defendant's
conduct and reversed the decision of the lower court.'
The Eighth Circuit, in Porter v. Dawson Education Services Coop-
erative,' dealt with a case in which a public employee brought a section
1983 action against board members for her discharge based upon an al-
leged violation of her right to free speech. The district court set aside the
jury verdict and entered judgment in favor of the board members. 6 The
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. 141 F.3d 1417 (llthCir. 1998).
65. See Martin, 141 F.3dat 1418.
66. See id
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1420.




73. Ud. at 1420-21 (quoting Lassite
Cir. 1994)).
74. See id.
75. 150 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1998).
76. See Porter, 150 F.3d at 891-92.
of Educ,, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
r v. Alabama A&M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (11th
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Eighth Circuit determined that "when [the Pickering balancing test] is at
issue, the asserted First Amendment right can rarely be considered
'clearly established' for purposes of the Harlow qualified immunity
standard."' The Eighth Circuit, conducting the Pickering balancing test,
held that "the government's interest as an employer in the effective
functioning of the workplace outweighed appellant's interest in speaking
on the issue of the confidentiality of student identification information."'
Notwithstanding its holding in Porter, however, the Eighth Circuit
found that the plaintiff in Campbell v. Arkansas Department of Correc-
tion' met the requirements of the Pickering balancing test.'m Once again,
the plaintiff brought a section 1983 claim for violation of his free speech
rights. The plaintiff, a prison warden, spoke out about unsatisfactory
conditions at the prison.' In applying the Pickering balancing test, the
court focused on the first factor, seeking to determine whether protecting
the plaintiff's speech was considered a matter of, public concern. 2 The
court held that the plaintiff had a "right to bring [the complained of]
problems to light both within the department and in a manner that at-
tracted media attention""' and recognized that prior case law clearly es-
tablished protection of this type of speech. ' Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity be-
cause a reasonable person would have known that retaliating against the
plaintiff for speaking out on issues of public concern violates the plain-
tiff's First Amendment rights. 5
II. REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DENIALS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. Background
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has taken traditional
rules of procedure and broadly expanded them at the appellate level.' For
instance, it held that pretrial orders denying qualified' immunity are im-
77. Id. at 892 (discussing the application of the Pickering balancing test for determining
whether an employer's termination of a public employee violated the First Amendment).
78. Id. at 895. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court, which
likewise found that the Pickering balancing test favored the public employer. See id. at 892.
79. 155 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 1998).
80. See Campbell, 155 F.3d at 950.
81. See id. at 960.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id. (citing Powell v. Basham, 921 F.2d 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that a "deputy
sheriff s comments to superiors about concerns that touched on department operations and efficiency
involved matters of public concern")).
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-07 (1996) (stating that appeals from
summary judgment orders denying qualified immunity are not always precluded when material facts




mediately appealable."7 This allows an appellate court to grant defendants
qualified immunity based solely on the pleadings, without discovery or a
trial." As a result, an adverse decision at the appellate level can legally
deprive victims of constitutional harms of their day in court. The Court,
in Behrens v. Pelletier,"' also expanded the appellate review process to
allow for multiple appeals of the denial of qualified immunity.
When reviewing district court orders denying qualified immunity,
the federal circuits adhere to the standards set forth in Behrens" and its
predecessor, Johnson v. Jones.9" Using these standards, the Tenth Circuit
held that "orders denying qualified immunity before trial are immedi-
ately appealable to the extent they resolve abstract issues of law."' As
justification for its holding, the court observed that orders denying quali-
fied immunity are "collateral"-meaning that they are not the main is-
sues in the case." Accordingly, such orders are immediately appealable."
In order for a denial of qualified immunity to be appropriate, the
district court must determine that there is no abstract question of law at
issue." If the reason for appeal is to assert error in the district court's
denial of qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation, then immediate appeal is appropri-
ate.' An order denying qualified immunity is not appealable if the trial
court merely determined that the facts asserted by the plaintiff are suffi-
ciently supported by evidence in the record for the claim to survive
summary judgment.'
87. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,530 (1985) (stating that "a district court's denial of
a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final
decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment").
88. Cf. id.
89. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 308-09 (holding that an appeal from unfavorable qualified im-
munity ruling did not deprive jurisdiction over a second appeal on the same grounds).
90. Seeid. at311-12.
91. 515 U.S. 304, 316 (1995) (finding jurisdiction lacking on the ground that no questions of
law were presented where plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that offi-
cials had violated his constitutional rights).
92. Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312,
and Johnson, 515 U.S. at 312-14)).
93. Behrens, 516 U.S. at 305 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949)).
94. Prior to Johnson, the Tenth Circuit held that review of denials of qualified immunity was
available regardless of whether the appeal was based upon a question of law or fact. See Austin v.
Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991) (determining denial of qualified immunity appro-
priate for appellate review where a genuine dispute exists between plaintiffs' and defendants' ac-
counting of relevant facts), overruled by Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
95. See id. at 312-13; see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 (indicating that jurisdiction was estab-
lished on appeal because the issue focused on whether the law was clearly established).
96. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25.
97. See Foote, 118 F.3d at 1422 (citing Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312 (providing a narrow inter-
pretation of Johnson to allow review of certain orders for summary judgment in cases where the
facts are still in dispute)). For instance, it has been noted that the appellate court, in reviewing this
type of order, will review the disputed facts as well as case law determining whether the law was
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Clanton v. Cooper8
a. Facts
Pursuant to a warrant issued by Jody Cooper, an Oklahoma Fire
Marshal Agent, the plaintiff, Carolyn Clanton, was arrested for arson of
her brother's trailer house." The sole basis of the arrest warrant was an
oral statement, which was subsequently proved to be false, made by
Clanton's nephew who later testified that he was coerced by Cooper into
making the statement." Following Clanton's arrest, Cooper asked the
police to hold her, without bail, due to her possible involvement in a
homicide connected with the arson charge."' As a result, the police ar-
rested Clanton and imprisoned her for one to three days (the duration of
imprisonment was in dispute).'" The trial court quashed the warrant for
Clanton's arrest due to a lack of probable cause and the lack of a grand
jury indictment." Clanton then sued Cooper under section 1983 forI dep-
rivation of her liberty on a theory of false arrest and imprisonment."
Specifically, Clanton asserted three violations: (1) knowingly including
false information in the affidavit supporting her arrest warrant, (2)
knowingly providing false information supporting the charges against
her, and (3) coercing her nephew into a false confession." The district
court denied Cooper's motion for summary judgment based upon quali-
fied immunity."° On appeal of the qualified immunity denial, Cooper
argued that "all of his actions were within the scope of his authority,"
and "that he did not violate any 'clearly established' law."'"
clearly established when the defendant's conduct occurred. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Interlocutory
Appeals from Orders Denying Qualified Immunity: Determining the Proper Scope of Appellate
Jurisdiction, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 21 (1998) (arguing that the appeals courts have misread
the qualified immunity standard articulated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald by granting appellate courts the
power to change procedural rules and expand their jurisdiction). If the law was clearly established
then the review can take place even though disputed issues of material facts exist. See id.; cf
Achtenberg, supra note 2, at 548-49 (asserting that the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
deprives citizens of a trial and overly protects public officials).
98. 129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1997).
99. See Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1151.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id at 1151-52.
103. See id. at 1152.
104. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
105. See Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1154.





The Tenth Circuit asserted jurisdiction because the denial of quali-
fied immunity was based upon Cooper's violation of a clearly established
law.'" It first evaluated Clanton's allegation regarding Cooper's state-
ments in the affidavit. The court determined that if Cooper produced
intentionally false information, his conduct would constitute a violation
of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement-a requirement the
court recognized as clearly established law."'
As to the second claim, the Tenth Circuit held that Cooper's request
that the arresting officer detain Clanton due to possible involvement in a
homicide was unconstitutional,"' since the conduct in question violated
Clanton's right to due process of law."' The Tenth Circuit noted that
Clanton failed to cite cases that clearly established the unconstitutionality
of Cooper's conduct."2 Instead of ending its analysis there, however, the
court took it upon itself to determine whether such case law existed. Its
inquiry unearthed Franks v. Delaware,"3 a case labeling as unconstitu-
tional conduct that the court found was substantially similar to that at
issue in the instant matter.' Accordingly, since the law was clearly es-
tablished, the Tenth Circuit held that qualified immunity did not attach to
Cooper."5
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that qualified immunity did not
apply to Cooper with respect to his conduct in eliciting the nephew's
confession."'6 In so holding, the court reviewed its earlier decision in
Griffin v. Strong,"7 which stated, "[t]o be admissible, a confession must
be made freely and voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats in
violation of due process or obtained by compulsion or inducement of any
sort.""' In the instant case, "Cooper falsely told [Clanton's nephew] that
physical evidence connected him to the crime," and that "he would get a
108. See id. (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995) (stating that the appeals court
has jurisdiction to review "where (1) the defendant [is] a public official asserting a defense of quali-
fied immunity and (2) the issue appealed concern[s] not which facts the parties might be able to
prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts show[] a violation of clearly established law"
(alterations in original))).
109. See id. at 1154 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding "that it
is the deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the affiant, not of any non-governmental informant
that is unconstitutional"); see also Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that
deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the affiant is unconstitutional).
110. Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1157.
Ill. Id.at1I56.
112. See id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding that the burden
lies with the plaintiff to show that a particular law is so clearly established that a "reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates the law")).
113. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
114. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 154; see also Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1157.
115. See Clanton, 129 F.3dat 1156-57.
116. See id. at 1158.
117. 983 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1993).
118. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1542.
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twenty-five-year sentence if he didn't confess.""" Noting that, in light of
the factual circumstances, the possibility of an involuntary confession
existed, and holding that the law in the area of confessions was clear, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that qualified immunity was inappropriate."O
2. Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co.'
a. Facts
Sylvia Baptiste filed a section 1983 action against Colorado Springs
Police Officers Hernholm and Martin for violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights." Security guards detained Baptiste while shopping at
a J.C. Penney store on suspicion of shoplifting a sterling silver ring."
The security guard's suspicions were aroused while viewing a videotape
depicting Baptiste pulling out a ring she purchased earlier, comparing it
to another which belonged to J.C. Penney, and placing it back in her
bag.' A search of her purse did not produce the ring."
J.C. Penney personnel called Officer Hernholm for assistance. He
viewed the videotape and later requested the service of a female officer,
Officer Martin, to conduct a pat-down search.' " Martin viewed the last
portion of the videotape, conducted the pat down, and found nothing."
The officers then informed Baptiste that she was free to leave."
Following the incident, Baptiste filed a lawsuit alleging that the
officers lacked probable cause to make the arrest and that they violated
her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. In response, the officers moved for summary judgment based
upon qualified immunity-a motion the district court denied." The offi-
cers appealed."'
119. Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1157. The Tenth Circuit applied Griffin to evaluate whether clearly
established law existed before the conduct took place. See id. at 1159 (quoting Griffin, 983 F.2d at
1543 ("Where a promise of leniency has been made in exchange for a statement, an inculpatory
statement would be the product of inducement, and thus not an act of free will.")).
120. See id. Prior to this case, the Tenth Circuit did not specifically address the issue of whether
a reasonable official would have known that using an involuntary confession of a suspect against
another suspect may violate clearly established law. Id.
121. 147 F.3d 1252 (1oth Cir. 1998).




126. See id. at 1255.
127. See id.
128. See id.





The Tenth Circuit found jurisdiction pursuant to its ruling in Clan-
ton.'' At issue on review was the district court's determination that "the
law allegedly violated by the defendant was clearly established at the
time of the challenged actions," and that "under either party's version of
the facts the defendant violated that law.'32
In response to the plaintiffs first claim, the Tenth Circuit cited its
ruling in Anderson v. Creighton3 3 for the proposition that "the contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right."'' In reviewing the
defendants' asserted entitlement to qualified immunity, the Tenth Circuit
focused on whether the warrantless arrest violated Baptiste's clearly es-
tablished rights under the Fourth Amendment.3 1 The court evaluated the
warrantless arrest under the probable cause standard" and determined
that, even if the officers mistakenly concluded that probable cause ex-
isted, they were still entitled to qualified immunity so long as they were
reasonable in making that conclusion.3
The officers relied on statements made by the security guards to
assess probable cause.'35 The Tenth Circuit, noting that such an assess-
ment is only necessary absent the officer's personal observations, " con-
cluded that it was unnecessary to rely "solely on a security guard's alle-
gations when the officers [had] before them an exact replication of all the
information on which the guard's allegations [were] based."'" Accord-
ingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers were unreasonable in their
finding of probable cause."
In addressing the defendants' second claim, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the law protecting an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures was clearly established prior to the conduct in
131. See id. at 1255 n.5 (citing Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1997) (stat-
ing that an order denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immu-
nity is reviewable to the extent that the order resolves abstract issues of law)).
132. Id. (citing Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997)).
133. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
134. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
135. See Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1256.
136. See id. (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (indicating that the probable cause
standard will determine the propriety of a warrantless arrest)).
137. See id.
138. See id. The officers relied on a Seventh Circuit decision which reasoned that it is sufficient
for an officer to base probable cause on statements made by a witness who seemed to be telling the
truth. See id. (citing Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432,439 (7th Cir. 1986)).
139. See id. at 1257.
140. Id. (citing BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "a police offi-
cer may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the circumstances of an arrest")).
141. See id.
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question. 2 In so doing, the court referenced its holding in Lusby v. T.G.
& Y. Stores," in which a guard failing to conduct an independent inves-
tigation as to whether a suspect actually paid for a specific item violated
the constitutional or statutory rights of the plaintiff.'" Noting the similar-
ity of the facts in Lusby to those in the present case and reasoning by
analogy, the Tenth Circuit held that the police officers violated the con-
stitutional rights of Baptiste when they ignored easily accessible evi-
dence."'5 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
nial of qualified immunity.'"
3. Radecki v. Barela"
a. Facts
While attempting to subdue a suspect, Officer Barela asked a by-
stander, Radecki, for assistance; specifically, the officer requested that
Radecki strike the suspect with a flashlight.'" As Radecki approached,
the suspect gained control of Barela's gun and subsequently shot and
killed Radecki.'"
Radecki's survivors brought a section 1983 action against the offi-
cer for violation of Radecki's Fourteenth Amendment right to substan-
tive due process of law.' The claim alleged that the officer, acting in
reckless disregard for public safety, created a dangerous situation that
resulted in Radecki's death. The district court denied Barela's motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.' 2 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reviewed the denial in two separate appeals.'
In his first appeal, Barela asserted that he did not act with "reckless
intent." The Tenth Circuit remanded with an instruction explaining that
"in order for the plaintiff to prevail on a substantive due process claim
142. See id. at 1257-58. The defendants argued that, under existing case law, officers were
permitted to rely on the statements of security guards and that plaintiff failed to present any prece-
dent to the contrary. See id. at 1257. In fact, the defendants believed that any law limiting the offi-
cer's reliance on statements would be considered "new law." Id. at 1258.
143. 749 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1984).
144. See Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1432.
145. See Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1259.
146. See id. at 1260.
147. 146 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).





153. See Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (second appeal); Radecki v. Barela,
77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (first appeal). The Tenth Circuit based the first appeal on Uhirig v.
Harder, 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995), a prior decision that determined the standard for a plaintiff to




against an individual police officer, she must demonstrate that the officer
acted in a manner that 'shocks the conscience.""' In doing so, the court
replaced the "reckless" standard with a more stringent one: namely, one
that required the conduct to be "conscience-shocking." Notwithstanding
this fact, the district court ruled that Barela's conduct did, indeed, "shock
the conscience" and found for the plaintiff."' The second appeal resulted.
b. Decision
In the second appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law based
upon the substantive component of the due process clause." The sub-
stantive component of the due process clause protects individuals from
actions of the government "regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them.".... While procedural due process provides "a
guarantee of fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property by a State,"'58 substantive due process goes further
and protects individuals from behavior that "shocks the conscience,"
even when that behavior complies with the procedural due process re-
quirements.
With this concept in mind, the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether
Barela's conduct rose to a conscience-shocking level." The Supreme
Court's holding in Sacramento County v. Lewis,"W provided the structure
for this analysis: to trigger scrutiny of a due process violation, the con-
duct must have been motivated by harmful intent and fail to further a
legitimate government interest. 6 ' Under this analysis, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that Barela was not liable because the plaintiffs failed to al-
lege that he acted with intent to do harm. 2 Accordingly, the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's grant of qualified immunity."
154. Radecki, 146 F.3d at 1229 (citing Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 571).
155. Id.
156. See id
157. Id. (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (providing the
standard for determining whether an official's actions violate the substantive portion of the due
process clause)).
158. Id. (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
159. See id. at 1230.
160. 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998)). In Lewis, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what degree
of fault is necessary to make a constitutional claim against a police officer on substantive due proc-
ess deprivation grounds. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1710. The violation in question involved a high
speed chase. See id. The degree of fault necessary in this type of situation was one in which the
police officer had the purpose "to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest." See id. at
1711. In making its determination, the Supreme Court considered (1) the need for restraint in defin-
ing their scope, (2) the concern that section 1983 not replace state tort law, and (3) the need for
deference to local policymaking bodies in making decisions impacting upon public safety. See id.
161. See id. at 1718.
162. See Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998).
163. See id.
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C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's treatment of qualified immunity during the sur-
vey period illustrates the practical effects of the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Behrens and Johnson, which attempted to create a more stable
body of immunity law. The Tenth Circuit, acting in accord with these
cases, limited its review of qualified immunity to interlocutory appeals
only where abstract issues of law existed. " This heralded a departure
from the former Tenth Circuit treatment of qualified immunity which
allowed interlocutory appellate review whenever a court denied to grant
immunity to an official, regardless of whether the issue pertained to
questions of law.
Additionally, the court's denial of immunity in Clanton and Baptiste
demonstrated a strong Tenth Circuit intent to compensate victims for
deprivations of their individual rights.'6" In Clanton, where the defendant
official was alleged to have provided false information in an affidavit,
the court's decision to deny immunity was relatively straightforward.
The court's role in Baptiste, however, was more complex. The Baptiste
court examined whether the law at issue was clearly established or
whether it was advancing "new law."" The court distinguished the facts
in the cases offered by the defendants from those in the present case."
This distinction obliterated any chance for the defendants to obtain im-
munity; however, the court did not characterize its holding as "new law."
Rather, in observing the totality of the circumstances, the court merely
recognized that the need to compensate a victim of an illegal search and
seizure outweighed the interest in preserving police discretion to deter-
mine probable cause, and held accordingly. Even in Clanton, where the
plaintiff was unable to offer precedent demonstrating that the defendant's
conduct violated clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit boldly pro-
vided case law in its absence.' In both cases, the Tenth Circuit seemed
acutely aware of the danger in granting immunity in situations where
officials may use their power to further their own interests.
164. See Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled by Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995). For procedural summaries of the Tenth Circuit's review of orders
denying summary judgment based upon qualified immunity, see Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,
1422 (10th Cir. 1997), and Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F3d 1547, 1551-52 (10th Cir. 1995).
165. Congress' intent in the enactment of section 1983 was not only to remove the barriers to
the federal court system that civil rights litigants faced, but also to provide a remedy against bad
actors who in other circumstances would be immune. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monetl Legacy:
Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under § 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
539, 548 (1989).
166. See Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998).
167. See Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1259.
168. See Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit cited
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), as demonstrating that the law was clearly estab-
lished prior to the conduct in question. See id.
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The Tenth Circuit offered some consolation to officials, however. In
Radecki, the court expanded its procedural process to allow for multiple
appeals of the denial of qualified immunity.'" This provides officials
seeking such immunity several chances to obtain its protections.'
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit created yet another hurdle to plain-
tiffs in section 1983 actions by raising the standard for evaluating official
conduct from "reckless disregard" to conduct that "shocks the con-
science."'7' A requirement of conscience-shocking behavior, being more
difficult to prove, will allow more officials to prevail on qualified immu-
nity. This is unfortunate, since the proper place for evaluating con-
science-shocking behavior should be with the fact finder and not the ap-
peals court.
This problem, however, serves to illustrate the quandary courts are
placed in when called upon to evaluate conduct resulting when an offi-
cial is called upon to utilize his discretion in emergency situations. As
was true in Radecki, the official may not have time to properly determine
what consequences could arise from the conduct at issue, and necessity
dictates in such situations that deference be given to such conduct when
the actor makes a good faith mistake.'" Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit,
following the policy set forth by the Supreme Court, deferred to local
policymaking officials whose decisions impact public safety.'
D. Other Circuits
While the other circuits appear to follow the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to evaluating denials of qualified immunity, there seems to be
confusion as to when an interlocutory appeal is factual in nature rather
than one concerning an abstract issue of law. For instance, the Fifth Cir-
cuit observed that, under certain circumstances, "a court of appeals may
have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what
facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, likely 'assumed."'7
169. See Radecki, 146 F.3d at 1232.
170. See Radecki v. Barela, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Medina v. City and County
of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1494 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that in order to be considered a constitu-
tional violation, the plaintiff must prove that "the state actor directed his or her conduct toward the
plaintiff")).
171. Radecki, 77 F.3d at 493 (citing Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling that to
satisfy the shock the conscience standard, a plaintiff must do more than show that the government actor
intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power)).
172. Cf Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
173. See Radecki, 146 F.3d at 1232 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708,
1718 (1998) (discussing the need for restraint when defining the scope of substantial due process for
the purpose of adhering to local officials policymaking power)).
174. Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 289 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319
(1995), and holding a denial of qualified immunity based upon questionable facts as one not pre-
senting a question of law).
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Other circuits grappled with similar issues. F6r instance, the Fourth
Circuit, in Brooks v. Davis,'" dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction
when it determined that a denial order was not properly raised in a mo-
tion for summary judgment and was, therefore, not appealable.76 The
Fourth Circuit recognized that the appeals court exercises jurisdiction
only over final orders and certain interlocutory and collateral orders." In
the present appeal, the order was neither a final order nor an appealable
interlocutory or collateral order because the defendants failed to claim
qualified immunity in their motion for summary judgment.'7" The Fourth
Circuit concluded that dismissal of the appeal was proper because the
facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the materials
before the court, and argument would not aid the decisional process."
III. LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER THE DocTRINE OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
A. Background
In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has substantially altered
municipal liability under section' 1983. Prior to 1978, the Court inter-
preted section 1983 to provide a remedy for plaintiffs against individual
state and local officials only."l In Monroe v. Pape,"' the Supreme Court
observed that Congress specifically rejected an amendment to the statute
that would have included municipalities within its scope."' Thus, mu-
nicipalities were not subject to section 1983 liability.'
The decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services," however,
overruled Monroe by expanding the statute to include municipalities.' In
Monell, the Court determined that a municipality is not immune when its
employee violates a constitutional right by carrying out an official policy
of that municipality.'" In reversing Monroe, the Court observed that
175. See Brooks v. Davis, Nos. 97-7374, 97-7449, 1998 WL 196739, at *1 (4th Cir. April 24,
1998) (unpublished opinion).
176. See id. at *2.
177. See id. at *1 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
178. See id. at *2 (citing Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1990)
(stating that, to the extent that defendants challenged the district court's denial of summary judgment
based upon their claim of qualified immunity, raised only in their answer, they waived this claim by
failing to raise it in either their motion for summary judgment or their objections to the magistrate
judge's report)).
179. See id.
180. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978).
181. 365 U.S. 167(1961).
182. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190-91 (theorizing that Congress must have questioned its power
under the Constitution to draft legislation imposing civil liability on state municipalities and, thus,
rejected to do so).
183. See id. at 188-89.
184. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).




Congress intended for the statute to include municipal actions that were
traceable to municipal policies.""7 Thus, Monell indicated that if a mu-
nicipality's policy caused a constitutional violation, it would be held
liable for that violation.' u The Court noted that the concept of respondeat
superior did not apply to a municipality, stating that liability must be
based upon more than the relationship between an employer and an em-
ployee, liability must be attributable to a policy decision of the munici-
pality.'1
In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown,'90 the Supreme Court
recognized that causation need not be proven when a municipality's pol-
icy is clearly unconstitutional.'9 There are certain situations, however,
where a policy is lawful on its face, thus making the inquiry of causation
and culpability much more difficult."m Cases that allege inadequate hiring
and training policies fall into this latter category of review.'"
The Supreme Court addressed the specific issue of inadequate mu-
nicipal official training policies in Canton v. Harris.'" There, the Court
held that liability as a result of inadequate training required a showing of
"deliberate indifference."'" The following Tenth Circuit decisions reflect
the inherent difficulties in determining municipal liability.
187. See id at 690-92 (concluding that the main issue in determining whether municipal liabil-
ity exists is one of causation).
188. See id. at 691.
189. See id. at 693-94.
190. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
191. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 406.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that the
training regimen of a police department need not include specific instruction intended to prevent
officers from raping young women); Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 93 n.6 (Ist
Cir. 1994) (stating that there is no obvious need for extensive training of officers in how to deal with
the mentally handicapped); cf Kerr v. City of W. Palm Beach, 865 F.2d 1546 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(recognizing the inadequacy of training for the police force's canine unit); Doe v. Calumet City, 754
F. Supp. 1211, 1225 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding the city liable for failure to train officers regarding
constitutional limitations on strip searches).
194. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
195. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. The Court determined that in order to satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard, a municipality must have actual or constructive notice that its action or failure
to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation and consciously or deliberately
choose to disregard the risk of harm. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397,407 (1997)).
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. J.B. v. Washington County"
a. Facts
J.B. arose from a situation in which Pamela Humphreys, a Wash-
ington County Deputy, received an eyewitness report of a father sexually
abusing his seven-year-old child." After consulting with two judges, the
county attorney, and the Utah Division of Family Services, Humphreys
filed a petition with the juvenile court requesting an order to temporarily
remove the child, L.B., from her home to conduct an interview.'" The
juvenile court granted the order and the child was removed for seven-
teen-and-one-half hours.'" The interview revealed no evidence of child
abuse and the juvenile court dismissed the case for lack of sufficient evi-
dence.' L.B.'s mother, J.B., sued Washington County.f' The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of the county.'
b. Decision
In determining the constitutionality of the county's policy, the Tenth
Circuit first analyzed whether the conduct was in accord with the
county's policy or custom. The plaintiff maintained the burden of prov-
ing that the act of removing L.B. from the home in situations where sex-
ual abuse is suspected conformed to the policy of Washington County.'
The Tenth Circuit found that the decision to remove L.B. from her home
to interview her was in accord with the County Sheriff's Office's policies
and procedures and, therefore, met the first prong of the municipal li-
ability test.2
The second prong of the analysis focused on causation. In deter-
mining whether the action taken caused a deprivation of a protected
right, the Tenth Circuit first examined whether any such right was at
issue.' In holding that one was, the court noted that the plaintiff argued
violations of her right to procedural and substantive due process, her
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and her right to equal protection of the law.'
196. 127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997).
197. See J.B., 127 F.3d at 922.
198. See i.




203. See id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
204. See id. at 924 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-2 (Supp. 1996)).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 923-3 1.
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The Tenth Circuit next weighed J.B.'s interest in having her rights
safeguarded against the interest of the state in protecting the interests of
children within its jurisdiction.' Concluding that the state's interest out-
weighs that of J.B., and holding, accordingly, that the actions of the
county did not result in a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.'
2. Barney v. Pulsipher?
a. Facts
Two female inmates alleged that their jailer, Gerald Pulsipher, sexu-
ally assaulted them in two separate incidents t Both inmates were serv-
ing minor sentences-a DUI conviction and a shoplifting conviction!"
Box Elder County Jail Procedures required two jailers to be on duty each
shift; however, when the violations took place, Pulsipher was the only
jailer on duty.2' In both cases, Pulsipher took the female inmate to an
unmonitored area and sexually assaulted her?3
Barney and Christensen filed a section 1983 claim against the
county and its commissioners,"" asserting that the county policy for han-
dling female inmates was inadequate due to the county's failure to ade-
quately staff, train, and supervise its jailers."' As a result, they were sub-
jected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment."" The district court, in granting the county's motion for
summary judgment based upon qualified immunity, held that the defen-
dants did not act with deliberate indifference as required for an Eighth
Amendment violation. It further determined that, even had such indif-
ference been established, the conditions of confinement did not rise to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment.2"" Finally, the court held that
placing women in solitary confinement for the purpose of providing
separate housing for men and women furthered a legitimate governmen-
tal interest. 9
207. See id. at 925, 927,929, 931.
208. See id. at 932.
209. 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998).
210. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1303.
211. See id. at 1304-05.
212. See id.
213. See id
214. See id. at 1303.
215. See id. at 1306.
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b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed the plaintiff's claim that the
county should be held liable for failing to train Pulsipher.' Noting that
causation was difficult to prove in the instant case because the county's
training policy was "lawful on its face and the municipality therefore
[had] not directly inflicted the injury through its own actions,"' the
Tenth Circuit held that for liability to attach, the county must have had
constructive notice of its failure to act, awareness that the failure resulted
in a constitutional deprivation, and have consciously chosen to disregard
the risk of harm."' The Tenth Circuit concluded that the failure to train
claim failed because there was no evidence demonstrating that the mu-
nicipality was on notice that such actions were conducted prior to the
present incident.' The Tenth Circuit intimated that even if the training
policies were inadequate, it would be unreasonable to assume that rape is
an obvious consequence of a deficient training program.z' Additionally,
the Tenth Circuit focused on Pulsipher's background, which did not indi-
cate any reason for the municipality to believe that he would be likely to
sexually assault female inmates.2" Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the county was not liable for its decision to hire him.'
3. Myers v. Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners7
a. Facts
Tom Myers, intoxicated, suicidal, and armed with a .22 caliber rifle,
locked himself in his apartment, prompting his wife to call for police
assistance."5 The officers spent all afternoon and evening in contact with
Myers, attempting to prevent his suicide." Ultimately, the county sheriff
ordered entry into the apartment, Myers reacted by pointing a gun at the
police officers, and the police officers responded by shooting and killing
Myers.'
Suzanne Myers filed suit under section 1983, alleging that, in
shooting her husband, the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department and
the Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners violated his
220. See id.
221. Id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997) (recognizing
that when the policy is unlawful on its face, the causation element is easily ascertained)).
222. See id. at 1307 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407).
223. See id. at 1308.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1308-09.
226. See id. at 1309.
227. 151 F.3d 1313 (1998).





Fourth Amendment rights."' In particular, Myers claimed that the offi-
cer's use of excessive force in attempting to apprehend her husband, in
addition to the department's failure to adequately train its officers in the
use of force, violated Myers rights."2 Further, Myers claimed that her
husband's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, asserting that the
failure of the county "to train its officers in suicide prevention, counsel-
ing the mentally ill, or treatment for substance abusers" triggered liabil-
ity." The district court granted summary judgment on each claim in fa-
vor of the municipality based upon municipal immunity.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit based its analysis on the decision set forth in Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services,"5 which established that liability
may attach to a county if an employee, acting pursuant to county poli-
cies, violates a constitutional right.a' The court observed that the trial
jury concluded that Myers was not deprived of either his Fourth or
Eighth Amendment rights-a conclusion that possibly precluded the
county from liability.237 In so noting, the Tenth Circuit cited City of Los
Angeles v. Heller," where the Supreme Court held that if "a municipality
is 'sued only because [it was] thought legally responsible' for the actions
of its officers, it is 'inconceivable' to hold the municipality liable if the
officers inflict no constitutional harm." 9
Notwithstanding this holding, however, the Tenth Circuit observed
that there are situations where a municipality is not precluded from li-
ability even when the jury finds for the defendant official.2' This situa-
tion arises when a jury concludes that the defendant official violated a
constitutional right, but should have been granted qualified immunity
231. See id. at 1316.
232. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see Myers, 151 F.3d at 1316. In Monett, the Court determined that a
plaintiff who sues under section 1983 must demonstrate that the municipal employee actually vio-
lated a constitutional or statutory right, and that it was the policy of the municipality that was the
driving force behind the infringement. See Monel, 436 U.S. at 658.
236. See Monel, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
237. See Myers, 151 F.3d at 1316-17 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (noting that an employee who was acquitted of a charge of excessive force "precluded the
imposition of liability on the City of Los Angeles for adopting a policy condoning the use of exces-
sive force")). In Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1994), the court held that
"[b]ecause [defendant police officer] did not violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the district court
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against the [city] for inadequate training, supervision, and
pursuit policies." Webber, 43 F.3d at 1344. The court went on to state: "A claim of inadequate
training, supervision, and policies under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority
absent a finding of a constitutional violation by the person supervised." Id. at 1345.
238. 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
239. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
240. See Myers, 151 F.3d at 1317.
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because he or she acted reasonably." The Tenth Circuit noted that, in
Heller, even though the district court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment based upon municipal immunity, the record on ap-
peal did not establish the basis of the verdict--consequently, the Heller
rule did not preclude the municipality from suit.2
The Tenth Circuit found the evidence in the instant case, however,
insufficient to establish that the county's officer training policy on the
use of excessive force gave rise to a constitutional deprivation. ' It con-
cluded that that policy was "well within constitutional bounds, 2" noting
that Myers aimed his weapon in the police officers' direction despite the
fact that the officers announced themselves upon entering.' The court
likewise held that the county's training for dealing with armed persons
who are suicidal, mentally ill, and/or substance abusers was adequate.'
As to the allegation that the county violated the Eighth Amendment, the
Tenth Circuit held there was insufficient evidence to show that not only
did a constitutional violation occur, but that it was the county policy that
caused the injury?'7
4. Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble'
a. Facts
In January 1991, Chief of Police Jackson arrested Pietrowski for
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and speeding. '9 Town po-
lice detained Pietrowski until March 29, 1991, when he was released on
bail.' He was acquitted of DUI in September of the following year." '
Pietrowski later filed a section 1983 claim against the Town of Dib-
ble, arguing lack of care in the hiring and training of the chief of police,
who allegedly subjected Pietrowski to malicious prosecution.' 2 The dis-
241. See id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
242. Myers, 151 F.3d at 1317-18.
243. Id. at 1318 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (holding that the
only time a failure to train will serve as grounds for municipal liability is when it reflects a "deliber-
ate" or "conscious" refusal by the municipality to rectify the failure)); see also Houston v. Reich,
932 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a municipality will be liable only for a complete
failure to train or for grossly negligent or reckless training likely to result in future misconduct).
244. Myers, 151 F.3d at 1318; see Romero v. Board of County Comm'rs, 60 F.3d 702, 704
(10th Cir. 1995) (establishing that, for the purpose of self defense, an officer's use of excessive force
is not constitutionally unreasonable).
245. See Myers, 151 F.3d at 1318.
246. See id. at 1319.
247. See id. at 1320.
248. 134 F.3d 1006 (10th Cir. 1998).
249. See Pietrowski, 134 F.3d at 1007.
250. See id
251. See id.
252. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
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trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the town on the
claims."3 An appeal followed.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by pointing out that "an action
against a person in his official capacity is, in reality, an action against the
government entity for whom the person works."' Noting Pietrowski's
argument that the lower court should not have granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the town because, in his malicious prosecution claim, he
sought to hold the town liable for its lack of care in hiring and training
the chief of police," the Tenth Circuit suggested that, without the use of
respondeat superior, the plaintiffs claim was more than likely insuffi-
cient.' Further, the court observed that the plaintiff did not present ade-
quate evidence that the hiring and training procedures were insufficient
to withstand summary judgment.' Thus, holding that a plaintiff must
show that the policy or custom of the town contributed to the deprivation
in order for the town to be held liable for a constitutional violation, '8 and
that the town's decision "reflect[ed] deliberate indifference to the risk
that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right [would]
follow,"' the Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff failed to make
such a showing and was therefore not entitled to prevail. Accordingly, it
affirmed the holding of the district court.' °
C. Analysis
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit handled several cases
involving the municipal immunity doctrine. Each case dealt with the
doctrine differently, depending on the type of claim asserted. In J.B., it
was apparent that the conduct at issue conformed with the policy of the
county." Thus, the court held the municipality free from liability after
concluding that the policy of taking potentially abused children out of the
home was constitutional and stating the Tenth Circuit's objective was to
protect public welfare agencies from needless litigation that could take
away from the efficiency of policing child abuse. 2 Similarly, in Myers,
where the court upheld the adequacy of the defendant county's policy
providing for the training of officers on excessive force, the county was
253. See id. at 1008.
254. Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165--66 (1985)).
255. See id. at 1009.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997)).
259. Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 411).
260. See id.
261. See J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 923 (10th Cir. 1997).
262. See id.
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likewise held free from liability. 3 And finally, in Barney, the court
found that municipal training policies do not require education on how to
abstain from sexually assaulting inmates, consequently holding the de-
fendant municipality free from liability owing to the sexual misconduct
of one of its jailers.'
The Tenth Circuit reviewed claims against municipalities conserva-
tively, with clear deference to agency discretion, finding on several occa-
sions that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the municipality
both knew of an official's improper actions and failed to correct them.
This approach occurred in Barney, where the court found that the evi-
dence was insufficient to conclude that the defendant commissioners
knew of the jailer's criminal conduct.' It also occurred in Pietrowski,
where the plaintiff was unable to prevail on his claim against the Town
of Dibble because the evidence was not sufficient to establish a lack of
care in the hiring and training of its police chief.' Unfortunately, be-
cause the Tenth Circuit declined to indicate why the evidence was insuf-
ficient, we cannot determine why they came to that conclusion.
In general, the Tenth Circuit appeared reluciant to give deference to
victims of constitutional harms where a municipality was involved. De-
spite the fact that, in some situations, justice can only prevail when a mu-
nicipality is held liable for the criminal actions of its employees, the Tenth
Circuit closely adheres to the view that respondeat superior does not ap-
ply. ' Due to the Supreme Court's failure to recognize that the focus of the
judicial inquiry should not be on the municipality and constitutionality of
its policies, but on the conduct of those representing it, the victim is forced
to carry the evidentiary burden of proving not only that the complained-of
conduct took place, but that the municipality knew of its occurrence and
failed to rectify it.' Consequently, the Tenth Circuit has no choice but to
find for the municipality in most situations, thus "exposing the public to a
tremendous risk of invasions of civil rights"' and ensuring that the only
way a victim can prevail on a municipality claim is when the policymaker
itself creates the constitutional wrong.
263. See Myers v. Oklahoma County Bd., 151 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (1998); cf David Rudovsky,
How to Handle Unreasonable Force Litigation: Prosecution and Defense Strategies in Police Mis-
conduct Cases, 590 PtiC. L. INsT. 259, 321-22 (1998).
264. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998).
265. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311.
266. See Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble, 134 F.3d 1006, 1009 (1998).
267. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
268. See Susannah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Be-
comes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REv. 517, 532 (1987) (rejecting the Supreme Court view that
the theory of respondeat superior is inapplicable to municipality litigation). Mead noted that Con-
gress "intended to impose liability for constitutional harm on those who have not themselves done
the 'subjecting,' but rather are responsible for those who have," thereby determining that even
though the municipality did not actively cause the harm, the action of its employees falls within the
causation theory. Id at 532-33.




While the Supreme Court's holding in Monell dictates the standard of
review employed by circuit courts evaluating municipal liability in section
1983 actions, variations in fact patterns make the outcome of such actions
anything but predictable. For example, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case
in which the main issue on appeal centered on county liability for unsafe
prison conditions.' ° In determining whether the defendant county was de-
liberately indifferent to potential harms to prison detainees, the Eighth
Circuit noted that substantial evidence of constitutional violations existed
to support imposition of liability.27' Absent such substantial evidence, how-
ever, the Eighth Circuit, in similar fashion to the Tenth, is unlikely to place
liability on a municipality for the acts of its employees."
CONCLVSION
From the Harlow and Brown Court's reformation of the heightened
pleading standard in certain qualified immunity cases, to Behrens' ex-
pansion and distortion of the procedural process for appealing such
claims, it seems that the Tenth Circuit's desire to protect government
officials and the agencies employing them grossly outweighs the court's
desire to protect the individual liberties set forth in the Bill of Rights. For
more than forty years, the Supreme Court struggled with immunity under
section 1983 and still it offers, at best, an unstable body of law. Thepur-
pose of section 1983 is not furthered when the federal courts create mis-
guided policies to protect public officials from taking responsibility for
their own actions. Until the Supreme Court recognizes the original intent
behind passage of the civil rights statute, justice will forever be denied to
those who have been constitutionally victimized.
Marisa A. Amin*
270. See Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998). The facts arose out of a
situation where a fifteen year old was detained and, while awaiting trial, was brutally tortured, raped,
and humiliated by other detainees for a period of five days. See id. at 922.
271. See Washington County, 150 F.3d at 922-23 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994) (recognizing that prison officials may be held liable under Eighth Amendment for denying
humane conditions of confinement only if they know that inmates face substantial risk of serious
harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to change it)).
272. Cf Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 475-76 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
arrestee could not satisfy deliberate indifference standard in claim based solely on plaintiff's place-
ment in a cell designed to accommodate wheelchair-confined inmates); Doe v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist.,
153 F.3d 211, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the district did not delegate policy making
authority to school principal, and holding that district's failure to adopt official sexual abuse policy
did not support municipal liability); Hayden v. Grayson, 134 F.3d 449, 456-57 (1st Cir. 1998) (dis-
missing claim of municipal liability based upon allegations of a selective law enforcement policy
and general failure to train the town police chief).
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Denver College of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Alan Chen of the University of Denver College of Law for his knowledge and





During this survey period,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit twice addressed the issue of piercing the corporate veil.
In the first of these cases, Floyd v. Internal Revenue Service,2 the court
addressed a reverse piercing argument presented by the IRS, in which the
IRS sought to liquidate corporate assets to satisfy the tax obligations of
an underlying owner. The second case, National Labor Relations Board
v. I. W. G., Inc.,' presented the court with the issue of veil piercing in the
context of an administrative agency holding a shareholder liable for the
corporation's evasion of specific legal obligations. Part I of this survey
examines the general theory of veil piercing. Part II provides a similar
background on reverse piercing and focuses on the Tenth Circuit's judi-
cial interpretations of this doctrine. Part III examines the specific sce-
nario where the corporate veil is reverse pierced on the grounds that an
entity used the corporate form to evade specific legal obligations.
I. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: BACKGROUND AND THEORY
One of the most fundamental features of the corporate form is lim-
ited liability.! Recognizing that a corporation is a "distinct legal entity,"
separate from the persons comprising it, limited liability provides that
shareholder liability shall be limited to the shareholder's investment in
the corporation.' Thus, limited liability effectively encourages investment
in high-risk ventures which otherwise might endanger the personal
wealth of those providing capital.!
Limited liability, by its very operation, restricts the assets from
which creditors may seek repayment when the corporation is in bank-
ruptcy, default, or must subsequently satisfy legal judgement. When the
available assets are inadequate to satisfy the claims of creditors, those
creditors often seek to pierce the corporate veil-asserting the theory of
inappropriate use of the corporate form to recover directly from share-
I. This survey period is from September 1, 1997 to August 31, 1998.
2. 151 F.3d 1295 (l0thCir. 1998).
3. 144 F.3d 685 (10th Cir. 1998).
4. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 130 (3d ed. 1983).
5. Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting, further, that
piercing is a radical remedy warranted only in exceptional circumstances such as fraud or deceit).
6. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON Er AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 241 (2d ed. 1988).
7. See Huard, 147 F.3d at 409; see also LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER,
CORPORATIONS 70 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that limited liability exists because it facilitates (1) capital
formation, (2) desirable management risk-taking, (3) broad based investment diversification, and (4)
public stock trading markets).
8. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036, 1039-40(1991).
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holders or officers." Unsurprisingly, veil piercing claims have become the
most litigated area in corporate law.'" Nevertheless, the legal standard for
determining when to set aside "the corporate veil is notably imprecise
and fact-intensive.""
Courts typically require a showing of two elements before piercing
the veil.'" The first element looks at excessive unity of interest' 3-
whether the shareholders exert excessive control over the corporation."
Courts applying this first element often utilize concepts such as
"alter ego" or "mere instrumentality," to support piercing the veil." The
9. See generally 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CoRPORATIoNs § 41 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (explaining that practically all authorities
agree that under certain circumstances the corporate form should be disregarded "in the interest of
justice in such cases as fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or to work out the
equities among members of the corporation internally and involving no rights of the public or third
persons").
10. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 1036.
11. Crane v. Green & Freedman Baking Co., 134 F.3d 17,21 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating also that
"no hard and fast rule as to the conditions under which the [corporate] entity may be disregarded can
be stated as they vary according to the circumstances of each case"). The Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals presented the quandary succinctly when it noted that as a balancing test, the same factual
scenario may lead to differing results depending upon the competing policies behind recognizing the
corporate form and the policies justifying piercing. See Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson, 707 So.2d
454, 457 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52
LA. L. REV. 271,276 (1991)).
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1054 (10th Cir. 1993)
(examining the District of Columbia Circuit Court's approach which analyzes the degree of adher-
ence to corporate formalities and whether recognition of the corporate structure would be inequita-
ble) (citing Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also Note, Piercing
the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 853,
854-55 (1982).
13. See Note, supra note 12, at 854.
14. See, e.g., Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147 F.3d 406, 414 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
"the corporate veil should only be pierced with respect to contract claims when compelling equitable
considerations favor this remedy; otherwise, courts are not to disturb the allocation of risks estab-
lished by the parties"); see also Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998); Franklin A.
Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift he Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853, 854-55 (1997). In its analysis, a court will likely
ask whether an excessive degree of unity exists among the entities. See BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW §§ 6.02-.06, 10.03 (1987) (addressing "instrumentality,"
"alter ego" and "identity" doctrines); see also Bergesen v. Lindholm, 760 F. Supp. 976, 987-88 (D.
Conn. 1991) (comparing the instrumentality and identity rules).
15. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 195 (3d ed. 1992). Whether the "alter ego"
and "mere instrumentality" concepts are subdivisions within the veil piercing doctrine, or provide
independent grounds for liability is disputed. See id.; cf., e.g., Massachusetts Carpenters Cent. Col-
lection Agency v. Belmont Concrete Corp., 139 F.3d 304, 308 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a foreign company through veil piercing required fraud, while in
contrast, wrongful motives were not required in this ERISA action which utilized the alter ego
doctrine). Additionally, the court stated that "the policies generally served by various corporate veil
piercing approaches, address different interests than does the alter ego doctrine." Id. at 308 (citation
omitted); cf. Crane, 134 F.3d at 22 (utilizing a different, less rigid test, the federal common law
standard adopted by the First Circuit, to evaluate an ERISA plaintiffs veil piercing claim); Futura
Dev. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico, 144 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1998)
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second element looks at inequitable injury to creditors as a result of the
unity between corporation and shareholder." This examination may re-
quire consideration of fraudulent intent and the degree of injustice im-
posed through recognition of the corporate form."
Generally, the term "alter ego" indicates that the corporation is in-
distinguishable from the shareholder.'8 As the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated, "[tlo call corporations alter egos is to say that they are
one-that a single business uses a variety of corporate names and char-
ters but is still just one entity."'" In 1931, Frederick J. Powell formulated
a checklist for use in determining whether a subsidiary corporation con-
stitutes the "alter ego" of its parent.' Today, courts commonly rely on
numerous factors derived from Powell's list in the veil piercing analysis.'
(refusing to expand jurisdiction to include an alter ego claim, the court held the alter ego claim was
not merely a factual determination that identifies an original judgment debtor). These cases distin-
guish between generic veil piercing claims and alter ego claims, but find both are part of the same
doctrine, involving a substantive rule of liability.
16. See, e.g., Bufco Corp. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 964,969 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Greater Kansas City
Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052; Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (7th Cir.
1993); White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732, 732 (1995). Jurisdictions using the three-prong test
require proof that both fraud and injustice would result from recognition of the corporate form. See
Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1054. In contrast, courts utilizing the two-prong test require
proof that either fraud or injustice would result from recognition of the corporate form. See id. at
1052. The former, at least theoretically, leads to a more difficult burden of proof to sustain. But (;f
id. (minimizing the significance of this difference).
17. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052; cf, e.g., Crane, 134 F.3d at 22 (quoting
Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986)). Under both tests, variations exist on the enumeration
of such elements. For example, in Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson, 707 So.2d 454, (La. Ct. App.
1998), the court stated that the two-part test is met if
(1) the corporation is an alter ego and has been used by the shareholder to carry out some
sort of fraud or (2) even in the absence of fraud, the shareholder has failed to conduct
business on a "corporate footing" to such an extent that the corporation has become in-
distinguishable from the shareholder.
Id. at 456-57. On the other hand, the Second Circuit, in Thrift Drug, Inc., v. Universal Prescription
Administrators, 131 F.3d 95, (2d Cir. 1997), held that piercing the corporate veil under New York
law requires a showing "(i) that the owner exercised complete domination over the corporation with
respect to the transaction at issue; and (ii) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong
that injured the party seeking to pierce the veil." Id. at 97.
18. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052.
19. United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1998).
20. FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A
PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY 9 (1931). The factors included:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the subsidiary.
(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or other-
wise causes its incorporation.
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation or no
assets except those conveyed by the parent corporation.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or the statements of its officers, the subsidiary
is described as a department or division of the parent corporation, or its business or finan-
cial responsibility is referred to as the parent corporation's own.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own.
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The "mere instrumentality" concept is similar.' Courts may disre-
gard the corporate form when a corporation's structure, or its manner of
conducting affairs, indicates that the corporation acted as an adjunct, or
mere instrumentality, of the other." The doctrine often arises in the par-
ent-subsidiary context. A court may hold a subsidiary entity a mere in-
strumentality when the parent corporation exercises a requisite level of
control. Such control is "not mere majority or complete stock control, but
complete domination, not only of finances, but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity
as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will, or existence
of its own."'
The inequitable injury redressed through piercing will typically con-
sist of one or more of the following situations:
(1) The creditors' reliance on the collective credit of the entities; (2)
The misappropriation of the assets of one entity by another or the in-
currence of liabilities by one entity for the benefit of another; (3) The
failure to maintain proper corporate formalities; (4) The operation of
the entities as one enterprise; (5) The intentional evasion of specific
legal obligations; or (6) The undercapitalization of an entity.n
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest
of the subsidiary but take their orders from the parent corporation in the latter's interest.
(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.
Id.
21. See, e.g., Middleton, 707 So. 2d at 456 (listing five primary factors to consider to deter-
mine the appropriateness of veil piercing: "1) commingling of corporate and shareholder funds; 2)
failure to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and transacting corporate affairs; 3) under-
capitalization; 4) failure to provide separate bank accounts and booking records; and 5) failure to
hold regular shareholder and director meetings") (quoting Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So.2d
1164, 1168 (La. 1991)); Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330-31 (N.C. 1985) (listing the four
primary factors for deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity under the instrumentality rule
as: "(1) inadequate capitalization; (2) noncompliance with corporate formalities; (3) complete domi-
nation and control of the corporation so that it has no independent identity; and (4) excessive frag-
mentation of a single enterprise into separate corporations." (citations omitted)).
22. See Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Broussard
v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 349 (4th Cir. 1998). The two doctrines are
distinguished by the controlling figure of the corporation in question, "alter ego" refers to one which
is controlled by an actual person, whereas "mere instrumentality" refers to a corporation controlled
by another corporation. Cf Boyce L Graham, Comment, Navigating the Mists of Metaphor: An
Examination of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 56 J, AiR L. & COM. 1135, 1140-42
(1991).
23. See Broussard, 155 F.3d at 349.
24. See id. (citing Glenn, 329 S.E.2d at 330 (stating three elements of the "instrumentality
rule" for determining whether to pierce the corporate veil: (1) the domination and control of the
corporate entity; (2) the use of that domination and control to perpetuate a fraud or wrong; and (3)
the proximate causation of the wrong complained of by the domination or control)); see also Smith,
135 F.3d at 786.
25. Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 381, 426 (1998). The third and fourth elements require classification. Some note that the
failure to maintain corporate formalities typically does not result in injury to any particular individ-
ual. See id. at 432. Rather than focusing on the direct injury, courts may use a retributive rationale,
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The veil piercing cases heard by the Tenth Circuit during the survey pe-
riod dealt with evasion of specific obligations through the manipulative
use of the corporate form. ' Creation of a corporation solely to avoid the
effects of applicable laws or regulation may lead the courts to pierce the
veil. 7
Other courts have previously found, under circumstances resem-
bling those encountered in Floyd and LW.G., such manipulative use of
the corporate form to evade legal obligations. For example, under facts
similar to those alleged in Floyd,2 the Ninth Circuit held transferring
assets between a corporation and an individual to evade the individual's
tax liability constituted an inappropriate use of the corporate form.' Un-
der facts similar to those alleged in L W.G., ° the Ninth Circuit held the
formation of a successor corporation, which continued the same business
as the original corporation for the purpose of evading obligations of the
original corporation, was also an inappropriate manipulation of the cor-
porate form.'
A choice of law issue may arise in veil piercing cases due to the
state's ability to adopt "widely divergent and sometimes contradictory"
based on the "concept that a corporate charter is a privilege granted by the state and that such privi-
lege should be revoked when the rules are not followed and the corporate form abused." Id. at 433.
The fourth element refers to enterprise theory, which justifies piercing based solely on a high degree
of unity, without requiring additional proof of unfair injury arising from such unity. See id. at 435.
The inequity may be implied through "the failure to attach the consequences of the enterprise's
action to the enterprise as a whole." Id.
26. See Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998); NLRB v. LW.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685
(10th Cir. 1998).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1998); NLRB
v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993); White Oak Coal Co., Inc., 318
NLRB 732 (1995).
28. See Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1296-97.
29. See, e.g., Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 999 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating
that a corporate entity may be pierced when used to evade taxes); Century Hotels v. United States,
952 F.2d 107, 112 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the shareholders "used the corporate form for illegiti-
mate ends. They did so to enjoy the material benefits of the world without having to bear its tax
burden.").
30. SeeI.W.G., 144 F.3d at 687.
31. See, e.g., NRLB v. O'Neill, 965 F.2d 1522, 1531 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving the creation of
several corporations to avoid labor obligations while continuing operation of the corporations);
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco-Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (involving
situation where controlling shareholder dissolved corporation in anticipation of patent infringement
liability); Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union v. Gateway Cafd, Inc., 588 P.2d 1334, 1343 (Wash.
1979) (involving situation where corporation dissolved and transferred assets to affiliate to avoid
obligations under settlement agreement). Other examples include the formation of a separate corpo-
ration to undertake a high-risk enterprise to isolate liability and the participation in otherwise pro-
hibited activities (i.e., barred by statute, regulation or order). Cf., e.g., In re Phillips Petroleum Secs.
Litig., 738 F. Supp. 825, 839 (D. Del. 1990) (stating subsidiary was merely an alter ego for parent,
created to insulate the parent corporation from possible securities fraud liability); Parker v. Bell
Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (involving the creation of a separate
entity to maximize the limitation of liability for asbestos litigation); United States v. Thomas, 515 F.
Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (involving attempted evasion of medicare recoupment statute).
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corporate law standards 32 and disparate doctrinal application (between
federal and state law) by federal courts.3 Generally, the federal govern-
ment, and in turn, the federal courts, defer to state regulation of corporate
law.' In the case of interpreting federal statutes, however, the federal
courts have underscored that veil piercing may require reference to fed-
eral common law." Regardless, federal courts will often use state law for
guidance.' These circumstances have led to controversy over whether a
uniform federal common law test for piercing the corporate veil should
apply.
37
The remainder of this survey, although frequently revisiting these
traditional components of standard veil piercing, focuses more on non-
traditional veil piercing circumstances. In Floyd v. Internal Revenue
Service' the Tenth Circuit addressed reverse piercing in an alter ego
32. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES 283 (6th ed. 1997); Note, supra note 12, at 855. Some states have more
liberal requirements than others for piercing the corporate veil. For example, some jurisdictions
require fraud or inequitable result, while other jurisdictions will disregard the corporate entity based
only on a finding of excessive unity of interest alone. Cf., e.g., Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147
F.3d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1998) (waiving limited liability if the corporate form is disregarded by
shareholders or used for fraud). But cf Thrift Drug, Inc. v. Universal Prescription Adm'rs., 131 F.3d
95, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying New York law, the court required demonstration of complete
domination used to commit fraud or wrong that caused the injury which was the subject of the com-
pliant); see also Daniel G. Brown, Comment, Jurisdiction over a Corporation on the Basis of the
Contacts of an Affiliated Corporation: Do You Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. CIN. L.
REv. 595, 601 (1992).
33. See Note, supra note 12, at 857-61.
34. See id. at 855-59, 861-62. State law may not control the veil piercing analysis when
federal law applies. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1093 (1st Cir.
1983) ("The corporate form is a creation of state law and states may impose stringent limitations on
attempts to disregard it .... These limitations, however, do not constrict a federal statute regulating
interstate commerce for the purpose of effectuating certain social policies."); see also Sebastopol
Meat Co. v. Secretary of Agric., 440 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting the inadequacy of the
corporate form to prohibit compliance with a federal regulatory agency, and that state limitations on
the alter ego doctrine may be inapplicable); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 565 (2d
Cir. 1956) (noting the corporate form may be disregarded to further a federal regulatory statute's
purpose).
35. See NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating
veil piercing is subject to federal law when it arises from a federal labor dispute); see also Bufco
Corp. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting the NLRB typically applies a federal
common law test). Application of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) is another situation in which this question arises, however, the Supreme
Court has not yet addressed whether federal or state law should apply in such circumstances. See
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1886 n.9 (1998) (noting that, because the parties did not
raise that issue, the Court would not decide it).
36. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1886 n.9.
37. See id. (noting the significant disagreement among courts and commentators over whether,
in enforcing CERCLA's indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal
common law of veil piercing).
38. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998) (involving creditors who sought personal liability of the
founder of three corporations).
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context. In National Labor Relations Board v. L W.G., Inc.39 the court
addressed the alter ego doctrine in a case involving evasion of obliga-
tions for unfair labor practices.
II. REVERSE PIERCING
A. Background
Reverse piercing occurs when either a corporate insider or a person
suing a corporate insider attempts to merge the separate legal identities
of the corporation and the corporate insider. ' In contrast, standard veil
piercing typically involves a creditor of the corporation who seeks pay-
ment from shareholders." Courts may distinguish reverse piercing claims
as either "inside" or "outside" cases, depending on the position of the
person arguing for disregard of the corporate form.'
Most reverse piercing cases involve inside reverse piercing."3 Inside
reverse piercing occurs when a dominant shareholder or corporate insider
argues for the disregard of the corporate form in the process of seeking,
for example, access to corporate claims against third parties, or protec-
tion of corporate assets from third party claims against the insider." In
inside cases, the third party (often a corporate creditor or debtor) would
object to the merger of the corporation and the individual. ' Accordingly,
the third party's wrongful act may justify the reverse pierce.'
Bitar v. Wakim" illustrates inside reverse piercing. Bitar suffered
injuries from a slip and fall accident while on the job." Wakim was the
president and sole shareholder of Beirut Bakery, Inc., the corporation
that employed Bitar." The corporation leased the property from Wakim,
who owned and maintained the property in his own name.' Wakim
sought inside reverse piercing to hold himself and the corporation as the
same entity.' If considered one entity, he could rely upon the exclusive
39. 144 F.3d 685 (10th Cir. 1998).
40. See Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16
J. CORP. L. 33, 36 (1990); see, e.g., Hovis v. United Screen Printers Inc. (In re Elkay Industries
Inc.), 167 B.R. 404, 410 (D. S.C. 1994) (stating that debtor's estate wanted debts of subsidiary
included as a debt of parent to avoid preferential payment utilizing reverse piercing).
41. See Gevurtz, supra note 14, at 905.
42. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 36-37.
43. See id. at 37.
44. Cf.id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 51.
47. 572 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. 1998).
48. See Bitar, 572 N.W.2d at 191.
49. See id
50. See id. at 191-92.
51. See id. at 192.
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remedy provision of worker's disability compensation to shield him from
personal liability. 2
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to reverse pierce, leaving
Wakim with possible personal liability. 3 Noting that the president "chose
to maintain the property in his own name and to lease it to the corpora-
tion" to gain the advantages offered by the corporate form, the court
found no equitable basis for a reverse piercing of the corporate veil.' The
court stated, "those who create, and take advantage of, a corporate
structure should not be allowed to disregard that structure when it suits
their purposes."" This notion that the owners should not "have it both
ways" often provides grounds for dismissal of reverse piercing claims
brought by corporation owners.'
Outside reverse piercing, which occurs less often than inside reverse
piercing, typically involves a third party suing a corporate insider and
attempting to disregard the corporate form to gain access to a corpora-
tion's assets. 7 Here; the insider and the corporation object to the merger
of the two entities." Courts look to the wrongful conduct of the corporate
insider or the corporation to justify the piercing 9 Courts often reject out-
side reverse piercing, however, upon a showing that not all of the share-
holders were involved in the conduct. Courts reason that allowing a re-
verse pierce in such a circumstance results in unfair prejudice to those
parties not involved in the wrongful conduct.'
Perhaps due to the fact that reverse piercing seems to contradict tra-
ditional corporate law notions of limited liability, courts are often reluc-
tant to apply the reverse piercing doctrine' This hesitancy can be traced
back to Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlin Transportation Co.,62
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 193.
55. Id.
56. Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation
Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 668 (1989) (quoting In re Beck Indus.,
479 F.2d 410,418 (2d Cir. 1974)).
57. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 37.
58. See id. at 36.
59. See id. at 51.
60. See id. at 65.
61. A court's willingness to accept a reverse piercing claim may depend on the nature of the
underlying cause of action. See David M. Grimes, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil, 13 No. 5
BANKR. STRATEGIST 1, 2-3 (1996). The majority of receivership and bankruptcy decisions, for
example, hold that reverse veil piercing "is a valid cause of action." Id. at 2. Other courts recognize
reverse piercing only in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Stoebner v. Lingenfelter, 115 F.3d 576, 580
n.4 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Minnesota law); Flight Servs. Group, Inc. v. Patten Corp., 963 F. Supp.
158, 160 (D. Conn. 1997). A number of courts have rejected the doctrine outright. See Grimes,
supra, at 3.
62. 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929).
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the first case to address outside reverse piercing. In rejecting the doc-
trine, Judge Learned Hand stated:
Perhaps it would be too much to say that a subsidiary can never be li-
able for a transaction done in the name of the parent, the situation at
bar. Any person may use another as a screen, and one may conceive
cases where such an arrangement might exist. But such instances, if
possible at all, must be extremely rare, and there is not the slightest
evidence of the sort here. Although it is quite true that the two com-
panies were very intimately related, the [subsidiary] never intended in
fact to make the [parent] its agent, nor did it interpose in any way in
the conduct of its affairs. Rather their relations were reversed, so that
the [subsidiary] could not have interposed, whatever might be the li-
ability of the [parent] for the transactions formally undertaken by the
[subsidiary] .63
No court re-addressed outside reverse piercing until 1957." This time,
however, the court in question was more receptive, allowing outside re-
verse piercing to occur in a marital property case.' Over the next forty
years litigators used the doctrine intermittently with varying degrees of
success, however, Judge Learned Hand's notion of proceeding cautiously
consistently endured.'
Prior to the survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed reverse
piercing on two occasions-both times rejecting the doctrine.' The mat-
ter first arose in Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks," a dispute
over financial responsibility for the expenditures related to a joint ven-
ture for the development of a gold mine. ' Weston was the mine's princi-
ple promoter and Cascade was the managing agent for the joint venture."0
Weston, Cascade, and numerous entities affiliated with Weston were
responsible for the mine's development and production operations." In
1980, the investors purchased working interests in the gold mine.' The
63. Kingston, 31 F.2d at 267.
64. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 57.
65. See W.G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Wash. 1956) (holding in favor of the
wife in a marital property case, the court found that the husband and corporation acted as alter egos
and upheld a lien attached to a corporation's property where corporation was controlled by the
husband).
66. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 57--64 (giving a detailed description of the cases dealing with
outside reverse piercing).
67. Cf Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1998); Cascade Energy & Metals
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1579 (10th Cir. 1990).
68. 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving a dispute over a gold mine between the mine's
principle promoters and a group of investors). During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit heavily
relied upon Cascade in its reverse veil piercing analysis employed in Floyd.
69. See Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1561.
70. See id. at 1562.
71. See id. at 1564.
72. See id.
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venture was initially funded with promissory notes and a development
loan .73
By 1982, the money from the development loan was depleted, and
Weston assessed investors to pay additional costs.' Some investors, con-
cerned by the lack of gold production, drew from the mine.7' The results
indicated the mine contained little gold, and the material Cascade had
mined was a low quality ore. 6 Ultimately, Weston, Cascade, and the
other Weston affiliated entities sued the investors for the additional de-
velopment costs, and the investors counter-claimed for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and securities violations.
77
The trial court applied Utah law,' and reverse pierced the veils of
four entities deemed alter egos of Weston and Cascade.' It held them
jointly and severally liable for the damages, which included the wrong-
fully collected assessments for the additional development costs, misap-
propriated funds from the joint venture, and the investors' attorney's
fees.' The court primarily based its decision on the fact that Weston had
almost total control of the four entities, particularly with respect to their
finances."'
On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed, denying the outside
reverse piercing claim.' First, the court defined the purpose of allowing
incorporation as an isolation of liabilities. 3 Consequently, veil piercing
should only occur when done "reluctantly and cautiously." Second, the
Utah Supreme Court had not clearly adopted the reverse piercing doc-
trine, much less outside reverse piercing." Third, noting that contract
73. See id. at 1564-65. The income and cash flow projections put forth in the offering memo-
randum for the working interests forecasted that the mine's operating profits would satisfy the
promissory notes and a development loan, thus additional cash contributions from the investors
would not be required for repayment. The mine, however, immediately had problems, and Weston
changed the mining techniques, which also were not fruitful. See id.
74. See id. at 1565.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id at 1566.
78. See id. at 1575 n.18.
79. See id. at 1576.
80. See id at 1566-67.
81. See id at 1576. The court noted:
(1) Weston dominated the boards of directors and the management of the four entities; (2)
Weston was "single-handedly" able to transfer assets among the various entities and did
so; and (3) Weston commingled the funds of the various entities in the sense that when he
transferred funds from one entity to another, the funds were deposited in the receiving





85. See id. at 1576-77. The court stated this was a special "variant" of the reverse pierce in
that an outsider, rather than an insider, was asserting the claim, and special problems resulted. Id. at
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creditors and tort creditors differed in their consensual nature, the court
expressed reservation against piercing in voluntary contract situations.'
Fourth, although Weston used the entities for personal objectives, he still
maintained and held the entities out as separate organizations.' Fifth,
under Utah law, veil piercing requires more than just unity of interest
alone;"5 instead, the claimants must show the relationship between the
injury and either the unity of interest or their reliance on the corpora-
tion's lack of separateness.9 The claimants failed to demonstrate either of
these scenarios.'
Subsequent to Cascade, both state and federal courts expressed
hesitancy to apply the reverse piercing doctrine.9 During the survey pe-
riod, the Tenth Circuit confronted reverse piercing in Floyd v. Internal
Revenue Service,' and consistent with earlier pronouncements, rejected
the doctrine."
B. Tenth Circuit Decision: Floyd v. Internal Revenue Service'
1. Facts
In Floyd, a group of creditors sought to use corporate assets to sat-
isfy a corporate shareholder's debt. The debtor, Thomas Bridges, had
founded and exercised complete control over three companies, Network
Billing Centers, Inc. (NBC), Med-Net Technologies, Inc. (Med-Net), and
Thomas Marketing, Inc. (TMI)." Bridges acted as the sole shareholder
and director of all three companies." Three creditors (the IRS, the State
of Kansas, and the "Floyd plaintiffs") obtained judgments against
Bridges.' All three fought for priority over two groups of assets: the pro-
1575 n.17, 1576-77. The traditional theories listed were "conversion, fraudulent conveyance of
assets, respondeat superior and agency law." Id. at 1577.
86. See id.




91. See, e.g., Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990) (declining to
apply outside reverse piercing in a case seeking to seize corporate assets to satisfy the tax liability of
the beneficial owners); Transarnerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24,
26-27 (Utah 1990) (declining to apply outside reverse piercing, the Utah Supreme Court imposed a
special limitation on the alter ego theory when used to allow creditors of controlling insiders to
attach the corporation's asset and required the claimant to show that the "corporation itself played a
role in the inequitable conduct at issue").
92. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998).
93. See Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300 (stating that "in the absence of a clear statement of Kansas
law by the Kansas courts, we will not assume that such a potentially problematic doctrine already
has application in that state") (citing Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577
(10th Cir. 1990)).
94. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998).
95. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1296.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1296-97.
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ceeds from the sale of a house" and the attached accounts of the compa-
nies."
The IRS sought to establish that Med-Net acted as an alter ego of
Bridges in order to hold Med-Net liable for Bridges' personal debt, and
thereby allow utilization of corporate assets to satisfy Bridges' debt.'"
The district court engaged in outside reverse piercing when it found that
Med-Net acted as Bridges' alter ego and subsequently granted the IRS
priority over the two other creditors, entitling the IRS to the corpora-
tion's assets.'"' On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered, in the context of
an alter ego theory, whether the IRS could pierce Med-Net's veil and use
corporate assets to satisfy Bridges' tax obligations.'"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court erred
in accepting the IRS's alter ego argument.'" The court noted that for the
purposes of outside reverse veil piercing, Kansas state law (as opposed to
federal law) should determine whether Med-Net acted as Bridges alter
ego.'" Kansas courts, however, had not yet spoken on the issue,'" and the
Tenth Circuit found significant reasons to resist the claim.'" While the
court recognized precedent authorizing piercing of the corporate veil, it
distinguished standard and reverse veil piercing." The court established
that reverse piercing deserved different treatment because reverse pierc-
ing holds the corporation liable for the debts or torts of its controlling
shareholders.'" In the instant case, because a party outside the corpora-
98. See id. The house had been purchased primarily with Med-Net funds in 1992, the legal
title was to pass from the construction company to Bridges's daughter, Brook Bridges McBride,
upon full payment under a contract for deed. See id. at 1297. Both Bridges and McBride lived in the
house. See id.
99. See id. at 1296.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1297-98. The lower court based its determination that Med-Net was the alter ego
of Bridges on Pemco Inc. v. Kansas Department of Revenue, 907 P.2d 863, 867 (Kan. 1995). See
Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1298 (citing Pemco).
102. See id at 1298.
103. See id. at 1300 (deciding not to apply a doctrine which the Kansas courts had not expressly
adopted). Additionally, the court stated that the taxation context of the government's claim did not
dictate the outcome in terms of priority of claims, but rather, the IRS as any other creditor seeking
veil piercing. See id. at 1299.
104. See id. at 1298 (citing Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 999 F.2d' 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.
1993)).
105. See id. at 1298-99.
106. See id. at 1299.
107. See id. at 1298 (holding that the facts of Pemco involved "standard" veil piercing and thus




tion, the IRS, wanted to treat the shareholder and the corporation as one,
additional complications arose."
As the court delineated, the theory posed several problems as ap-
plied to the facts of this case. First, it by-passed "normal judgment-
collection procedures.""' Second, unfair prejudice may result to third
parties if a creditor (in this instance, the IRS) was able to directly attach a
corporation's assets."' Such a scenario, the court argued, could ultimately
lead to greater culpability for third party corporate creditors harmed by
reverse piercing."2 Third, reverse piercing could unsettle corporate
creditors' expectations regarding securing loans with corporate assets."'
Fourth, it could reduce the corporate forms' effectiveness in raising
credit." This would result from corporate creditors demand for compen-
sation for the increased risk of default from outside reverse-piercing
claims."' Fifth, the case did not involve the situation for outside reverse
piercing."6 The court stated that, only where a subsidiary dominated its
parent, should courts find outside reverse piercing appropriate."' Sixth, as
an equitable remedy, disregarding the corporate form required the un-
availability of adequate remedies at law."' Possible alternative remedies
to consider included: (1) an agency or aiding and abetting theory, (2)
standard judgment collection procedures, and (3) in taxation cases, the
transfer of an economic benefit to a shareholder may be reachable for tax
purposes as a constructive dividend."9 The court concluded by holding
that the district court inappropriately applied the reverse piercing doc-
trine to attach liability.2 '
C. Other Circuits
During the survey period one other circuit dealt with reverse veil
piercing. The Third Circuit, in Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago,
Inc.,'2' effectively used the derivative injury rule, which prevents a share-
holder from suing for personal injuries that result directly from injuries
to the corporation, to reject an inside-piercing claim."2 Kaplan, the corpo-
109. See id. Thus this case represents a classic example of outside reverse piercing of the corpo-
rate veil. See id.







116. See id. at 1299-1300 (citing Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31
F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J)).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1300.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. 143 F.3d 807 (3d Cir. 1998).
122. See Kaplan, 143 F.3d at 811-12.
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ration's sole shareholder, sought reverse veil piercing to recover indi-
vidually for losses the corporation suffered as a result of the actions of
First Options of Chicago.'" The court noted the sole shareholder chose to
receive the benefits of structuring his business in the corporate form."
As the court determined that Kaplan and the corporation in question were
separate entities, the derivative injury rule prevented Kaplan, the sole
shareholder, from reverse piercing the corporate veil to recover individu-
ally for the corporation's losses.'" The rule would not, however, bar
Kaplan's claims if he sought to recover for injuries inflicted on him indi-
vidually rather than on the corporation."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit, in Floyd, added to the concerns addressed in
Cascade. Floyd also clarified the issues that require attention before
courts should adopt reverse veil piercing. The court seemed to balance
the potential negative effects of using this theory with the alternatives
available to resolve the issue. Floyd noted the existence of numerous
other theories available to hold the shareholder liable.
In one sense, the Tenth Circuit decision in Floyd adhered to Judge
Learned Hand's admonition to proceed cautiously. On closer inspection,
however, the decision went much further: it effectively rejected the doc-
trine until directed otherwise by the Kansas State Supreme Court. The
court extensively discussed the litany of potential problems with reverse
piercing, but primarily emphasized that, as a federal court, it declined to
dictate or influence Kansas corporate law. Nevertheless, while the
court's stated purpose in effect only lent more weight to Cascade's con-
clusion, the decision effectively precluded utilization of a doctrine ac-
cepted by many other jurisdictions.'"
123. Seeid at811.
124. See id at 812.
125. See id. (citing Kagan v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the plaintiffs could not obtain both "limited liability for debts incurred in the corporate name,
and direct compensation for its losses")).
126. See id.
127. See id. The traditional notions of limited liability within corporate law also provide insight
to the courts' resistance to piercing. See Gaertner, supra note 56, at 667. The objective in reverse
piercing aims to make the "corporation owner and the corporation become one legal entity when the
legal line of demarcation between the entities becomes virtually nonexistent," essentially holding the
corporation liable for the owner's actions. Id.; see supra Part I (stating that reverse piercing conflicts
with the fundamental principle of separateness of entities and limited liability).
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III. PIERCING JUSTIFIED BY EVASION OF LEGAL OBLIGATION OR BY
WRONGFUL ACTS
A. Background
Not all veil piercing cases involve judgment proof corporations."
Courts sometimes utilize the piercing doctrine when owners intentionally
use the corporate form to evade a specific obligation. '2 It is firmly estab-
lished that a court may disregard the corporate form to "prevent fraud,
illegality or injustice or when the recognition of the corporate entity
would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for a
crime."'" Courts may also disregard the separateness of a corporate entity
when an owner used the corporate form to defeat legislative policies or
circumvent provisions of a statute."'
As discussed in Part I, the choice of law issue potentially could effect
the outcome of a case. When the veil piercing claim stems from an area
of federal preeminence, the courts may apply the federal common law
test for piercing, rather than a particular state's.32 Recently courts have
encountered this issue involving violations under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)."3 They have also done so in cases involving violations of
federal labor laws. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) has the power to "hold a corporation's officers or owners person-
ally liable for violations of the [National Labor Relations] Act when the
corporate form is used to perpetuate fraud, evade existing obligations, or
circumvent a statute. '' 34
128. The Louisiana Court of Appeals stated that although veil piercing is usually used to "im-
pose personal liability on corporate shareholders for corporate debts, this is a flexible doctrine that
can be used in any situation in which the separate personality of the corporation appears to be
blocking a just result." Middleton, 707 So. 2d at 456; see Gevurtz, supra note 14, at 905-07.
129. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
130. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 45; see also Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362
n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Zubick v. Zubick, 348 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1967)); cf John E. Tobin,
Responsibility of the Corporate Parent for Activities of a Subsidiary: Advising the Corporate Parent
Before Litigation, 520 PRACr. L. INST. 129, 129 (1986).
131. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,630
(1983) (refusing to give the corporate form effect where it has been used to defeat legislative poli-
cies); Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally, 454 F.2d 1320, 1322 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Anderson v.
Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1944), in stating that "it is well settled that the fiction of a corporate
entity must be disregarded whenever it has been adopted or used to circumvent the provisions of a
statute").
132. See NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990); supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998)
(involving CERCLA case seeking to hold shareholder personally liable as operator); see also infra
notes 196-98 and accompanying text (discussing Bestfoods).
134. Schmitz Meat, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 554 (1993) (referring to violations of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)); see Bufco Corp. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 964, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding
the National Labor Relations Board's piercing of the corporate veil).
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Numerous cases illustrate a willingness to pierce the corporate veil to
impose personal liability for unfair labor practices and other unlawful
employment practices, such as employment discrimination." Where an
owner creates a corporation solely to avoid the effects of applicable laws
or regulations regarding unfair labor practices, courts may employ the
alter ego theory to justify disregarding of the corporate form. 36 The court
may engage in veil piercing and hold the individual shareholders liable
for the corporation's unfair labor practices if (1) the shareholder did not
maintain separate identities; (2) the shareholder personally participated in
the fraud, injustice, or inequity; and (3) failure to pierce sanctioned fraud,
promoted injustice, or allowed evasion of legal obligations.'37 Similarly,
where a parent corporation exercises a substantial degree of control and
the parent attempts to make the subsidiary nonunion, the parent company
and its insolvent subsidiary act as a single employer.3 s Thus the parent
faces liability for backpay owed by the subsidiary for unfair labor prac-
tices.'39
The willingness to pierce the corporate form when an entity uses that
form to evade legal obligations almost always comports with the "ineq-
uitable" or "unjust result" requirement of the veil piercing doctrine. Ap-
propriately, however, each prong of the unity/inequity test plays an im-
portant role, and neither unity of interest nor the evasion of legal obliga-
tion alone is sufficient to pierce in such a situation." Two Tenth Circuit
cases, NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing'' and NLRB v. I.W.G.,
Inc., 2 illustrate this reality.
In NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing,' 3 the Tenth Circuit applied
the federal common law test and refused to pierce the corporate veil un-
less both prongs of the test were met." Greater Kansas City Roofing
(GKC), a sole proprietorship, committed unfair labor practices, and the
135. See, e.g., NLRB v. O'Neill, 965 F.2d 1522, 1524, 1529 (9th Cir. 1992) (piercing appropri-
ate where an owner closed operations, then later resumed them under new corporations, in order to
evade labor obligations); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 61 (4th Cir. 1989) (imposing li-
ability on parent for subsidiary's liability for employment discrimination).
136. See United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1998) (involving
liability for fines imposed for criminal violations); NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d
1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding NLRB could not pierce veil without evidence that the corpo-
rate form was used to promote fraud or that the owner's disregard of the separate corporate existence
led to injustice or the evasion of a legal obligation); White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732 (1995)
(finding the owners personally liable for corporate violations).
137. See White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. at 732.
138. Package Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 845, 845-46, 848 (8th Cir. 1997).
139. See Package Serv. Co., 113 F.3d at 845-46.
140. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1054-55.
141. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
142. NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685 (10th Cir. 1998).
143. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the NLRB could not pierce the veil without
evidence that the corporate form was used to promote fraud or that the owner's disregard of the
separate corporate existence led to injustice or the evasion of a legal obligation).
144. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1055.
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NLRB ordered it to make payments."5 The proprietor's sister-in-law,
Tina Clarke, loaned money to GKC to pay its debts.'4 Later, Clarke
formed New Greater Kansas City Roofing (New GKC) unaware of
GKC's liability for the unfair labor practices. "7 Clarke acted as New
GKC's sole shareholder, officer, and director and failed to adhere to cor-
porate formalities.'" In many ways New GKC caried on aspects of
GKCs business." Alleging that New GKC and GKC were alter egos, the
NLRB sought to hold New GKC liable for the payments, attempting to
pierce New GKC's corporate veil to hold Clarke personally liable.'" An
administrative law judge found New GKC liable, but refused to attach
personal liability to Clarke through the operation of the veil piercing
doctrine.'
On administrative appeal, the NLRB disagreed and held Clarke per-
sonally liable for the judgment.' The Board declined to limit its ability
to pierce the corporate veil only to those cases that involved fraud.' 3 The
Board accepted that Clarke "was not acting fraudulently or with any in-
tent to violate the labor laws or to avoid payment of the preexisting
backpay order.'"" Nevertheless, it found her liable "solely because of the
intermingling of her affairs with those of New GKC and her failure to
observe corporate formalities."'"5
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, however, denied enforcement against
Clarke.' 6 The court stated that federal law applied to the question of
"whether a company or individual is responsible for the financial obliga-
tions of another company or individual" when the question arose in the
federal labor dispute context.'57 Further, as an equitable action, piercing
the veil applied only in circumstances involving obvious impropriety or
injustice. 8
The court characterized the alter ego theory as a two-part test.'59 First,
"was there such unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate
145. See id. at 1049.





151. See id. The AL found that Clarke "did not so intermingle her affairs with that of New
GKC to justify ignoring the corporate boundaries," and that "Clarke did not use the corporate status
of New GKC 'to perpetrate fraud, evade existing obligations, or circumvent a statute."' Id. (quoting
the AU's supplemental decision).







159. See id. at 1052.
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identity of the corporation by its shareholders that the personalities and
assets of the corporation and the individual are indistinct."" Second,
"would adherence to the corporate fiction sanction a fraud, promote in-
justice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations."'' The court further
underscored that the inequity justifying the pierce must result from the
corportite form's misuse."2
The court found no evidence of fraud with respect to Clarke's failure
to follow corporate formalities." Nor did the court find that the NLRB
adequately proved Clarke used New GKC to work an injustice." The
court noted that Clarke formed New GKC "long after the unfair labor
practices had occurred."'65 Further, the NLRB did not link Clarke's style
of conducting business to "any fraud, injury or injustice to the former
employees of GKC or their union with regard to the unfair labor prac-
tices that gave rise to this backpay order."" Thus, the court held the
piercing constituted clear error and denied enforcement of the NLRB
order.67
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit also addressed the appli-
cation of the alter ego doctrine to an attempt to evade legal obligations in
National Labor Relations Board v. L W.G., Inc." This case evidences the
courts' continued opposition to veil piercing absent facts clearly satisfy-
ing both prongs of the federal common law test."
B. Tenth Circuit Case: National Labor Relations Board v. I.W.G., Inc.'"°
1. Facts
The Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union filed charges which spurred
an investigation by the NLRB.'"' Based on the investigation, the Board
filed a complaint alleging that two corporations (I.W.G and Con-Bru)
and the owner (Gordon) acted as a single employer or alter egos. 2 The
Board alleged that a third corporation (Arlene), was the successor to
160. Id. To determine the degree to which the personalities and assets Inerged, the court should
consider to what extent the parties (1) complied with corporate legal formalities, and (2) commin-
gled the assets and affairs of the individual and the corporation. See id.
161. Id. Under this prong, the court should consider whether adequate justification to invoke
the court's equitable power. See id.
162. See id. at 1053.





168. 144 F.3d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1998).
169. Cf. L WG., 144F.3d at 689.
170. 144 F.3d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1998):




I.W.G./Con-Bru.' 7 An administrative law judge heard and decided the
case, which the Board adopted with slight modification.'7" The NLRB
found that Gordon created, then subsequently abandoned in succession,
three corporations (I.W.G., Con-Bru, and Arlene), "primarily to avoid
paying his employees pursuant to an extant collective-bargaining agree-
ment and to evade a statutory obligation to bargain with the Union over
the terms and conditions of employment."'" The Board held Gordon per-
sonally liable for Arlene's unfair labor practices and pierced the veils of
all three corporations. 176
Gordon claimed the unfair labor practice complaint did not allege an
alter ego claim against Arlene.1" Insufficient notice, therefore, created a
procedural impediment to the Board's finding that Arlene constituted an
alter ego of I.W.G. and Con-Bru.'" The NLRB contended that regardless
of whether it specifically pled the alter ego claim, the parties fully and
fairly litigated the claim, thereby making the decision proper.' When the
case came before the Tenth Circuit, the NRLB sought enforcement of the
order and Gordon sought review of the portion of the NLRB order hold-
ing him liable for the unfair laborpractices of the corporations.'"
2. Decision
The court found that the NLRB alter ego claim against Arlene was
neither sufficiently charged nor litigated at the hearing. 8' The court em-
phasized that the respondent must have understood the issue and had the
opportunity to justify its position. Therefore, the court held that the
Board's decision regarding notice of the claim violated Gordon's due
process rights.'
The court reiterated that the decision to pierce a corporate veil was a
question of law.' The court would give "great weight" to the Board's
determination that the facts justified piercing and would uphold that de-
173. See id. at 685. Arlene had notice of the potential liability for unfair labor practices thus
qualified as a Golden State successor potentially liable for the predecessor's liability. See Golden
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1973).







181. See id. at 689-90.
182. See id. at 688. It was not necessary for Gordon to identify specific unconsidered evidence
to contravene the Arlene alter ego theory because the complete lack of notice rendered Gordon's
counsel unable to defend against the unannounced claim through steps at the evidentiary hearing.
See id. at 689.
183. See id. at 687.
184. See id. at 689.
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termination when made within "reasonable bounds."'"3 The court noted
that the Board's findings were conclusive when the record, considered as
a whole, offered substantial evidence to support the finding.'"
In this case, however, because the "unlitigated conclusion that
Arlene is a single employer alter ego of I.W.G. and Con-Bru" provided a
substantial part of the basis for piercing, the court of appeals determined
that it could not accurately review the Board's veil piercing analysis."7
The Tenth Circuit stated that the lower court erred by not applying the
two-prong Greater Kansas City Roofing analysis to each corporation
individually, rather than combining evidence of all three corporations'
operations to justify the piercing."8 Accordingly, the court remanded the
issue of Gordon's personal liability to the Board for analysis consistent
with the court's opinion."
C. Other Circuits
Three other circuits have dealt with non-traditional veil piercing in
the context of imposition of liability for evasion of legal obligations. In
Donahey v. Bogle,"'9 the Sixth Circuit refused to pierce the veil in a
CERCLA case, holding that a lessee's shareholder was not liable as an
operator under CERCLA absent circumstances justifying piercing of the
corporate veil.'"' The court applied Michigan veil piercing doctrine, stat-
ing that Michigan follows the "general rule that requires demonstration
of patent abuse of the corporate form in order to pierce the corporate
veil."'" Notably, the dissent argued that by using state law the court af-
forded the savvy polluter the opportunity to protect himself from veil
piercing unless the claimant proved fraud, a difficult evidentiary standard
to meet.'" Thus, the savvy polluter could play state law against the fed-
eral policy of CERCLA, choosing to incorporate in a state with more
difficult requirements for piercing of the corporate veil.'9 ' The U.S. Su-
185. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1051 (1 Oth Cir. 1993)).




190. 129 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 1997), judgment vacated by Donahey v. Livingstone, 118 S.
Ct. 2317 (1998) (involving CERCLA case seeking to hold sole shareholder personally liable as
operator).
191. See Donahey, 129F.3d at 843.
192. Id. (citing United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 113 F.3d 572,580(6th Cir. 1997)). The
test applied requires that "such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and its owner cease to exist, and the circumstances must be such that adherence to the
fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Id.




preme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of United States v. Bestfoods.'"
In an opinion delivered a week before the Donahey ruling, the Su-
preme Court, in Bestfoods, essentially agreed with a Sixth Circuit deci-
sion to refuse to impose direct liability upon a parent corporation and to
require circumstances that justified veil piercing in order to impose de-
rivative CERCLA liability; however, the Court disagreed with the Sixth
Circuit's method of analysis.' In vacating and remanding, the Court
underscored that rather than focusing on the parent's relationship with
the subsidiary, the lower court should have focused on the parent's rela-
tionship with the facility.' The Court noted it would not address the is-
sue of whether state law or federal common law should dictate veil
piercing because the parties did not raise the issue.'"
In Bufco Corp. v. NLRB, '" the D.C. Circuit upheld the NLRB's deci-
sion to pierce the corporate veil, holding three individuals jointly and
severally liable for the wrongdoing of two corporations. ' The court
noted that when veil piercing arose in the context of a federal labor dis-
pute context, "the Board typically applies a test derived from the federal
common law" to determine whether to pierce.f' This two-part test con-
sists of the following inquires: "(1) have the shareholder and the corpo-
ration failed to maintain separate identities? and (2) would adherence to
the corporate structure sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or lead to an
evasion of legal obligations?"'
In United States v. Vitek Supply Corp.,' the Seventh Circuit utilized
the alter ego theory to justify disregard of the corporate form in a crimi-
nal case. ' The court demonstrated its willingness to pierce the corporate
veil to impose personal liability for criminal fines where an owner cre-
195. Donahey v. Livingstone, 118 S. Ct. 2317 (1998), vacated, United States v. Bestfoods, 118
S. Ct. 1876 (1998). In Bestoods, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeal's judgment and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its decision. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1890.
196. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
197. See id. at 1885. The court held:
(1) when (but only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation be
charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary's actions; (2) a participation-
and-control test looking to the parent's supervision over the subsidiary, especially one
that assumes that dual officers always act on behalf of the parent, cannot be used to iden-
tify operation of a facility resulting in direct parental liability; and (3) direct parental li-
ability under CERCLA's operator provision is not limited to a corporate parent's sole or
joint venture operation with subsidiary.
Id. at 1889.
198. See id. at 1886 n.9.
199. 147 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
200. See Bufco, 147 F.3d at 969.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732 (1995)).
203. 151 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1998).
204. See Vitek Supply, 151 F.3d at 585.
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ated a corporation solely to avoid the effects of applicable laws or regu-
lations.'
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in National Labor Relations Board v.
L W.G., Inc, is consistent with Greater Kansas City Roofing. The court
made a clear statement that, while the Board's decision to pierce de-
serves "great weight" if within "reasonable bounds,"' the Board must
apply the two-prong Greater Kansas City Roofing analysis to each cor-
poration individually.' The decision reinforces the strict adherence to
the fundamental notions of the separateness of entities and limited liabil-
ity.' Injustice will not outweigh correct application of the doctrine.
Although the court has consistently refused to pierce the corporate
veil in cases dealing with federal labor laws, the facts of these cases ren-
der the decisions appropriate. In LW.G., the Board did not apply the ap-
plicable federal common law test, and the court's refusal to veil pierce
was appropriate since the record did not clearly indicate reasonable
grounds for the Board's decision. If, after application of the two-prong
test, the Board determines that Arlene, I.W.G, and Con-Bru acted as alter
egos to evade I.W.G.'s & Con-Bru's obligations, Gordon may face per-
sonal liability.' This result would be consistent with Greater Kansas
City Roofing, in that the basis for piercing would satisfy the two-prong
test-unity of interest plus the requirement that inequity resulted from
the misuse of the corporate form.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit twice addressed piercing
the corporate veil in a non-traditional context. Both cases adhere to
precedent, adding little to the substantive law, and both refuse to disre-
gard the corporate form. The Floyd decision is notable for its thorough
discussion of reverse veil piercing and its delineation of issues that states
may consider in adopting the doctrine. The LW.G. decision is notable for
the court's insistence on the application of Greater Kansas City Roof-
ing's two-prong analysis for corporate veil piercing and the implied ac-
ceptance of piercing the corporate veil to hold an individual accountable
when a corporation is established as a means of evading previously es-
tablished legal obligations. These cases continue to demonstrate the
Tenth Circuit's respect for the corporate form and its hesitance to engage
in veil piercing unless clearly warranted by the facts of the case. When
205. See id.
206. NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685,689 (10th Cir. 1998).
207. See W.G., 144 F.3d at 689.
208. See Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1998); SOLOMON &




viewed together, these cases may indicate a great resistance by the court
to pierce the corporate veil in non-traditional circumstances. At the very
least, the court firmly established that lower courts must prudently set
forth and investigate the factors justifying their disregard of the corporate
form in each instant case.
Susan A. Kraemer*
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The subject of criminal procedure is as broad as it is significant. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit published over 150
decisions during this survey period' implicating concepts under the
criminal procedure umbrella. This survey addresses decisions focusing
on two of those concepts: procedural safeguards mandated by the United
States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,2 and the fundamental right
to counsel accorded to defendant's through the Sixth Amendment
In Miranda, the Supreme Court laid out the important elements of
what would later be called the Miranda warnings: the substance of those
warnings, a temporal limitation defining when authorities must give the
warnings,' and requirements for how police may obtain a waiver from the
suspect. Parts I and II of this survey focus on the timing and waiver as-
pects of Miranda-the more contentious issues raised by the decision
and subsequent applications. Part I discusses the requirement that the
Miranda warning precede custodial interrogation and reviews two Tenth
Circuit cases examining at what point contact between the police and a
suspect rises to this level.6 Part II focuses on a suspect's waiver of his
Miranda rights, analyzing two cases in which the defendant challenged
the validity of the Miranda waiver.7
Part III begins with an examination of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, including the distinction between that and the Fifth Amend-
ment's right to counsel provision under Miranda. The survey then fo-
1. This survey addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court held that under the Fifth
Amendment, the prosecution could not use a defendant's confession or self-incriminating statement
obtained during a custodial interrogation unless certain procedural safeguards were present. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Before questioning commenced, the person was to be warned of the "right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This survey will also highlight the distinction between the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel-which is mandated by the Constitution-and the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel as expanded by Miranda. See discussion infra Part 11I.
4. A Miranda warning is required prior to a custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444.
5. A waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id.
6. See United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Benally, 146 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 1998).
7. See United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bauti-
sta, 145 F.3d 1140, 1146-50 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 255 (1998).
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cuses on two Tenth Circuit decisions which address potential violations
of the Sixth Amendment!
I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION-THE TEMPORAL ASPECT OF MIRANDA
A. Background
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda was an attempt to find
balance between societal interest in prosecuting criminal activity and
constitutional protections provided to the accused? The Court reviewed
police interrogation methods and found the methods were intended "to
put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for
rational judgment."'" The Court stated that these procedures were used to
"persuade, trick, or cajole [the suspect] out of exercising his constitu-
tional rights."" Although Miranda has since spawned over thirty years of
debate, 2 the Court viewed its holding "not [as] an innovation in our ju-
8. See Strachan v. Army Clemency & Parole Bd., 151 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Lin Lyn Trading Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1998).
9. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439; see also Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two
Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAm L. REV. 715, 717, 725 (1994) (asserting that the
Supreme Court intended that Miranda would redress the inherently coercive nature of interrogations,
therefore creating an environment in which the suspect may invoke his constitutional rights.) A
Terry stop, however, enables an officer to stop and frisk a suspect for weapons upon reasonable
suspicion, rather than probable cause when the officer "has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. Training methods stressed the use of psychological factors
during interrogations. See id. at 448. For example, training advised that interrogations should take
place in a setting unfamiliar to the suspect. See id. at 449-50. Questioners were to act confidently
that the suspect committed the crime and direct comments as to why----and not whether--the suspect
was involved. See id. at 450. The questioner was to blame the victim or society, and de-emphasize
the "moral seriousness" of the crime. Id. If such "kindness and stratagems" did not work, the ques-
tioner was to rely on an "oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence." Id. at 451. Training stressed
that interrogation should be "steadily and without relent" for several hours. Id. In the most serious
cases, interrogation was to last for days--with only the required breaks for food and sleep-while
the police maintained an "atmosphere of domination." Id. Interrogators were trained that this final
method may cause the suspect to talk, but that the questioner had not used duress or coercion. See id.
Authorities should use this extended interrogation, however, only "when the guilt of the subject
appear[ed] highly probable." Id (quoting CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 112 (6th ed. 1994)).
11. Id. at 455.
12. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Per-
spective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV 1055, 1063, 1132
(1998) (asserting that the rate which police solve crimes, or "clearance rates," have declined because
of Miranda, causing society to bear the costs of restricting the abilities of police to solve crimes);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small
Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 503, 562 (1998) (arguing that the effects of Miranda on con-
viction rates are negligible because Miranda "does not protect suspects from conviction but only
from a particular method of conviction").
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risprudence, but [as] an application of principles long recognized and
applied in other settings.
' 3
It is well settled that a suspect must receive Miranda warnings be-
fore custodial interrogation." The Supreme Court, in Miranda, defined
custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement offi-
cers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."'" Two issues are often
raised in conjunction with claims of Miranda violations.'6 First, whether
the suspect was in "custody," and second, whether the questioning rose
to the level of an "interrogation."''
1. Custody
Custody determinations generally revolve around when-not how-
authorities administered the Miranda warnings.'8 A police officer may
stop someone based upon a "reasonable belief"9 that a crime is being
contemplated or committed; the investigation may then give the officer
probable cause to make an "arrest."' This series of events produces diffi-
culties in pinpointing when the contact became custodial and, therefore,
when the Miranda warning is required." In determining whether a person
is in custody for the purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts look
at the totality of the circumstances to determine "whether there is a 'for-
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442. For a comparison of pre- and post-Miranda confession cases,
see Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TuL. L. REv. 2195 (1996). Hancock as-
serts that due process focuses on excluding coerced confessions, while Miranda seeks to prevent
them. See id. at 2201.
14. See Godsey, supra note 9, at 717 (stating that "Miranda warnings are not triggered until a
police officer subjects a person to 'custodial interrogation'").
15. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
16. See Godsey, supra note 9, at 717 (discussing the requirement that both "custody" and
"interrogation" exist).
17. See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for
Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 901 (1997) (stating that the right to remain silent and
the right to counsel are triggered "by the simultaneous combination of custody and interrogation").
18. See United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 330 n.l I (5th Cir. 1981) ("There is generally
no question as to the sufficiency of the [Miranda] warnings themselves. They are either given or
they are not given.").
19. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held that, upon observation of
suspicious behavior, a police officer identifying herself as such, may make "reasonable inquiries."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. If these inquiries do not dispel her suspicion of the danger to herself or the
public, she may "conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an at-
tempt to discover weapons." Id.
20. Arrest is the curtailment of the suspect's "freedom of action." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420,440 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (holding that the non-threatening nature of Terry
stops precludes the need for Miranda warnings). But see United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding that Miranda warnings were required in a Terry stop involving police
questioning of an individual on an isolated road with police guns drawn); United States v. Smith, 3
F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that custody existed during a Terry stop, therefore trigger-
ing Miranda, when police removed the individual from an automobile, separated him from his
companions, and placed him in handcuffs).
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mal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated
with a formal arrest."
2. Interrogation
With respect to interrogation, proscribed investigative techniques
are not limited to direct questions.' For Miranda purposes, interrogation
"refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect."4
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Torres-Guevara'
a. Facts
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Detective Michael Judd observed
suspicious behavior by Torres-Guevara in an airport.' Judd followed
Torres-Guevara outside the airport and saw her approached by Miguel
Garcia, another passenger on the flight.' Judd approached the couple
and, in English, identified himself as a police officer.' Judd then showed
his DEA credentials, but neither person responded.' After ascertaining
that they spoke and understood Spanish, Judd continued the conversation
22. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (citation omitted); see also Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 442 (stating that in determining whether a suspect is in custody, "the only relevant in-
quiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation");
People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo. 1990) (stating that "the test for determining whether a
person is in custody is an objective one, which considers whether a reasonable person in the sus-
pect's position would believe that he is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way");
William F. Nagel, The Differences Between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Colorado Supreme
Court on the Test for the Determination of Custody for Purposes of Miranda, 71 DENY. U. L. REV.
427, 427 (1994) (comparing Colorado's objective focus on feelings of freedom deprivation to the
Supreme Court's focus on the atmosphere of the interrogation).
23. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted).
24. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
25. 147 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1998).
26. See Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d at 1262-63. The suspicious behavior involved the defen-
dant's style of dress, body language, mannerisms, and place of departure. See id. at 1263. She wore a
long, baggy sweatshirt over a T-shirt. See id. She held her hands over her stomach, "as if she was
holding something in place." Id She walked quickly through the airport, made no eye contact, and
picked up no baggage. See id. Finally, she departed from Los Angeles, a "drug source" city. Id at
1262; cf Mark J. Kadish, The Drug Courier Profile: In Planes, Trains, and Automobiles; and Now
in the Jury Box, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 747, 753-54 (1997) (discussing the numerous and sometimes
overlapping characteristics that are part of various "drug carriee' profiles and what profiles trigger
arrest or detainment).




in Spanish." Without blocking their path, Judd advised them they were
free to leave and then asked if he could speak to them for a minute.3'
Both consented, and "Detective Judd again asked whether they under-
stood that they were not under arrest and that they were free to go."'
Both indicated their understanding."
Judd asked to see their identification and airline tickets?' Special
Agent Michael Eddington joined Judd at this time." Judd returned the tick-
ets and asked if either of them were carrying drugs or large amounts of
cash.' Garcia replied, "No." Torres-Guevara did not respond." Judd
asked Torres-Guevara if she understood the question; again, she did not
respond.-' Judd asked for "permission to search their persons." Garcia
consented, and during the search Judd reiterated to Garcia that he was not
under arrest."' Judd did not find anything on Garcia and waved him on."
Judd again asked to search Torres-Guevara, but she did not respond.'
When asked if she understood the question, again, she did not respond."
Judd told her that if she had drugs she should turn them over to him.' Ser-
geant Mark Whittaker joined the other two officers." In Spanish, he said to
Torres-Guevara, "You have drugs, don't you?"'7 She lowered her head and
did not respond.' Whittaker asked, "Don't you?" and she replied, "Yes."'9
Torres-Guevara indicated that the drugs were under her shirtr' Whit-
taker placed her under arrest, and they proceeded to an airport office so






35. See id. One of the elements the court considered in determining whether a consensual
encounter escalated into a seizure was whether "more than one officer confronted the subject." Id at
1264. Other factors included whether "the encounter occurred in a confined or nonpublic space; the
officers confronting the subject were armed or uniformed; ... the officers exhibited an intimidating







42. See id Torres-Guevara argued that because Garcia left only after being searched and after
Judd "waved him on," she felt that she could not leave until she agreed to be searched. Id at 1265.










DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
before being given a Miranda warning, Torres-Guevara started to cry and
said, '"This was my first time." 2 After they reached the office, and before a
Miranda warning had been given, Whittaker asked if the drugs were in her
stomach area? She responded by removing two, kilogram-size packages
of cocaine from under her shirt and placing them on the table. '
Torres-Guevara claimed that her admission to carrying drugs, and
the statement that it was her "first time" carrying drugs, should not have
been admitted at trial because officers failed to provide Miranda warn-
ings before interrogating her.'5 The district court denied Torres-
Guevara's motion to suppress?' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed, concluding that Torres-Guevara made the incriminating state-
ments about carrying drugs while the encounter was still consensual and
that she had volunteered, rather than responded to police interrogation,
the statement that it was her "first time.
57
b. Decision
At issue were the two separate statements made by Torres-Guevara,
both of which came before she was given a Miranda warning." The ad-
missibility of these statements hinged on whether Torres-Guevara was in
police custody at the time she made them."9 The court looked at the "to-
tality of the circumstances"' to determine whether Torres-Guevara was
in custody6' and reviewed de novo the district court's finding that she was
not in custody.'
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the failure of the police to give the
Miranda warnings prior to the communication of the incriminating
statements was not a constitutional violation because the actions and
behavior of the police did not rise to the level of custodial interrogation
and, therefore, had not triggered Torres-Guevara's Fifth Amendment
Miranda rights. 3 Because Torres-Guevara made the admission to carry-
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id at 1263-64.
55. See id. at 1262.
56. See id.






63. id. The three types of encounters between an individual and the police identified by the
Tenth Circuit are
(1) consensual encounters which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment[;] (2) investi-
gative detentions which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration
and must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity[;] and (3) arrests,




ing drugs during a consensual search, ' as opposed to while in custody,'
the Miranda warning was not required." Additionally, the court found
that Torres-Guevara's statement that it was her "first time" carrying
drugs was admissible because she volunteered the statement, rather than
giving it in response to police interrogation. '7
2. United States v. Benally"
a. Facts
After finding a dead body near the house Benally lived in, police of-
ficers contacted Benally's mother. ' The police asked her to come to the
station and bring any members of the household present on the night the
victim was killed, in the hope that someone in the household had seen or
heard something helpful to the investigation." The authorities inter-
viewed Benally and his mother for twenty to thirty minutes, who then
went home following the interview." Later that day, the police asked
Id. (quoting United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir.1996)).
64. See id. at 1266. A consensual search is a search where the defendant is free to leave at any
time. See id. An objective test of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would feel
free to leave is applied. See id. at 1264 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
65. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered certain relevant factors in deter-
mining whether a search escalates into a seizure. See id. at 1264. These factors included: the type of
setting where the encounter happened, whether the officers were armed or uniformed, whether
coercive or intimidating tactics were employed, and whether potentially incriminating questions
were asked. See id. at 1264-65; cf United States v. Acklin, No. 97-6244, 1998 WL 110430 (10th
Cir. Mar. 13, 1998). In Acklin, authorities arrested the defendant on drug charges after a consensual
search outside an airport. See Acklin, 1998 WL 110430, at *2. Acklin argued that the encounter was
custodial at the time the police approached her because the police had a "subjective but unexpressed
belief they had sufficient probable cause to hold her based on the drug profile information." Id. She
argued that because the encounter was custodial from the start, the police erred in not informing her
of her Miranda rights when she was initially approached. See id. The court rejected her argument,
stating: "The subjective intentions or state of mind of either the defendant or police [are] irrele-
vant.. .. "Id. at *3.
66. See Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d at 1266. "Miranda warnings are required only when a
suspect is in custody." Id. The court looked at the "totality of the circumstances" in finding that the
defendant was not in custody. Id Relevant factors included: the authorities approached the defendant
in a public area, they did not prevent her from leaving, they did not produce weapons, they did not
threaten the defendant, they promptly returned examined tickets and identification, and they clearly
told the defendant that she was not under arrest and was free to leave. See id. at 1265.
67. Id. at 1266; see also United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 1993) ("If a
person voluntarily speaks without interrogation by an officer, the Fifth Amendment's protection is
not at issue, and the statements are admissible.").
68. 146F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1998).
69. See Benally, 146 F.3d at 1239.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1239. In California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), the Supreme Court held
that Miranda warnings were not required where the suspect was not placed under arrest, voluntarily
came to the police station, and left without incident following a brief interview. See Beheler, 463
U.S. at 1121-22. In Benally, there was no arrest during the first meeting, the parties voluntarily came
to the police station, and the interview lasted less than thirty minutes. See Benally, 146 F.3d at 1239.
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Benally to return because his earlier statements did not make sense."
After being Mirandized and questioned for ninety minutes, Benally ad-
mitted to being present during the victim's murder.73
A jury convicted Benally of voluntary manslaughter.7' On appeal, he
claimed that the district court should have suppressed statements he
made'during both interviews, arguing that they were made during custo-
dial interrogations, but before authorities informed him of his Miranda
rights.'3
b. Decision
The admissibility of the incriminating statements depended on
whether Benally was in custody when he made those statements.76
Benally argued that his initial interview was custodial. ' Because the de-
termination of custody is "fact intensive," the Tenth Circuit reviewed for
"clear error" the district court's finding that Benally was not in custody.
To determine whether Benally was in custody for Miranda pur-
poses, the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether police formally arrested
Benally or if the police restrained his freedom of movement to the point
where it objectively appeared he was in custody.' The court emphasized
that the presence of either of these conditions established the existence of
custody for Miranda purposes.'
Benally pointed to his mother's testimony that she felt "compelled"
to submit to an interview." He argued that "demanding his mother's
presence at the police station... curtailed his freedom of action as
well." The court, however, rejected Benally's claim because there was
no testimony showing that Benally heard his mother express this senti-
ment at the time of her interview.83 Benally also claimed that he was not
Mirandized before the second interview.' After independently reviewing
These factors led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the defendant's Miranda rights were not trig-
gered at this initial meeting. See id.
72. See Benally, 146 F.3d at 1239.
73. See id.
74. See id at 1234.
75. Seeid. at1238-39.
76. See id. at 1239.
77. See id. at 1238.
78. Id. at 1239.
79. See id.
80. See id.; see also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) ("The ultimate inquiry
[of whether a suspect is in custody] is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on free-
dom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (citation omitted)).






the record, the court rejected the argument, finding "adequate evidence to
the contrary.""
C. Other Circuits
In Torres-Guevara and Benally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the de-
fendants' claims that custodial interrogation preceded their Miranda
warning. Other circuits also evidence a reluctance to find that custodial
interrogation occurred prior to the administration of Miranda warnings. 6
The facts in United States v. Yusuff,8 a Seventh Circuit case, are similar
to those in Torres-Guevara.8 In Yusuff, officers on drug interdiction op-
erations approached Yusuff in an airport." Yusuff answered questions
and consented to a pat down search.' The agent felt a hard lump in her
jacket pocket.9' When asked, "What is that?" she replied, "Drugs."
When asked the quantity, she replied, "700 grams."93 The authorities then
took Yusuff to a less crowded area, where she opened her coat and re-
moved a plastic bundle from underneath her clothes." After opening the
package, the agents arrested Yusuff and advised her of her Miranda
rights."
Yusuff sought to exclude her statement that the lump consisted of
drugs, claiming that the agents were conducting a custodial interrogation
and, therefore, they should have given the Miranda warning." In reject-
ing this argument, the Seventh Circuit focused on the fact that the pat
down was consensual and had occurred in a busy, public area.97 Addi-
tionally, the court pointed out that "[m]oments before the pat down, the
officers.., told [the defendant] that she was not under arrest and was
85. Id. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that his statements were involuntary. See
id. The court reviewed the factors that pointed to a coerced confession, stating that a finding of
coercion comes from the totality of the surrounding circumstances, with no single factor being
determinative. See id. at 1240. The court evaluated the following factors in determining the defen-
dant's statements at both interviews were voluntary: "(1) the age, intelligence, and education of the
defendant; (2) the length of the detention; (3) the length and nature of the questioning; (4) whether
the defendant was advised of [his] constitutional rights; and (5) whether the defendant was subjected
to physical punishment." Id. at 1239-40 (citation omitted). The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment in part because of the non-coercive environment of the interviews and its finding that the
defendant received a Miranda warning prior to the second interview. See id. at 1240.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 568
(1998); United States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1996).
87. Yusuff, 96 F.3d at 982.
88. See United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1261--64 (10th Cir. 1998).






95. See id. at 984-85.
96. See id. at 987.
97. See id. at 988.
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free to leave." The only reason Yusuff did not feel free to leave was
because she knew the lump consisted of drugs and "that a reasonable
person, after consenting to a brief pat down search in a busy airport,
would not believe themselves in custody if an officer felt a lump (e.g., a
back brace or purse) and asked what it was."" Therefore, the agent's
"question of 'What's this?' did not turn the consensual encounter into
custodial interrogation requiring the Miranda warnings."'"
In United States v. Shea,'0 ' FBI agents arrested Shea for his part in
an attempted bank robbery." After his arrest, but before authorities ad-
vised him of his Miranda rights, Shea made several incriminating state-
ments that prosecutors subsequently used against him at trial.' 3 Shea
argued that the district court should have suppressed these statements
because he made them during a custodial interrogation, but before the
agents advised him of his Miranda rights.' There was no dispute that
Shea was in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements."
As for the existence of interrogation, Shea argued that the number of
agents and degree of force used in his arrest was the equivalent of inter-
rogation.'" The court rejected this argument, however, finding that
Shea's statements were "spontaneous utterances" and there was no evi-
dence suggesting any agent tried to elicit or coerce incriminating state-
ments from him.'
D. Analysis
The determination of whether a person is in custody, or is being in-
terrogated, can be a "fine line.' ' " The previous two cases demonstrate the
Tenth Circuit's analysis in determining whether the police cross that
line.'" While these holdings do not represent new positions for the Tenth




101. United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44 (1 st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 568 (1998).
102. See Shea, 150 F.3d at 47. Authorities charged the defendant with conspiracy to commit
armed bank robbery, attempted bank robbery, use and carrying of firearms during and in relation to a
crime of violence, and felon in possession of ammunition. See id.
103. See id. The following statements were made: "'How did you know I was here?'; 'Where
did you come from?'; 'I should have gone home.'; 'What do you got me for, a stolen jeep?'; 'What
am I going to get for bank robbery, forty years? I'll be out when I'm seventy."' Id
104. See id.
105. See id. at 48.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) ("[T]he interrogation process is 'inherently
coercive' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently
traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissi-
ble compulsion." (quoting New York v. Quarles 467 U.S. 649,656 (1984)).
109. See United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Benally, 146 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 1998).
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rowing the scope of Miranda. 0 For example, in Torres-Guevara, the
court stated that "[a] limited number of routine questions... followed by
a question about possession of contraband and a request to search, are
not sufficient to render an otherwise consensual encounter coercive.""'
From the detainee's perspective, however, it is unlikely there is anything
routine about being questioned by three plain-clothes officers outside an
airport.
The Tenth Circuit has addressed the conflict surrounding Miranda
in much the same way as courts across the country--courts continue to
limit the applicability of the Miranda procedural protections."' These
decisions are important because they reflect societal demands that courts
be "tough on crime.""' Because many perceive Miranda as impeding the
ability of the police to obtain confessions, criticism of the decision has
been fierce."' Additionally, the belief that Miranda was an unwarranted
expansion of the Constitution,"' has led critics to assail the decision on
legal grounds."6
110. See United States v. Leach, 749 F.2d 592, 598-99 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming the trial
court's finding that there was no custodial interrogation and, thus, no Miranda requirement, when
the defendant chose the time and location to speak with Secret Service Agents concerning his al-
leged counterfeiting). But see United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating
that Miranda was required in a Terry stop in which the police questioned the individual on an iso-
lated road with their guns drawn).
11. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d at 1265 (citation omitted).
112. A recent exception to this is United States v. Dickerson, No. 97-4750, 1999 WL 61200, at
*1, "20-'21 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 1999)). See discussion infra note 339.
113. Robert J. Cottrol, Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Crimi-
nal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 1029, 1080 n.2 (1998); see Mi-
chelle Johnson, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Sentencing of Sexual Predators, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 39, 39 (1998) (discussing how following public opinion lends legiti-
macy to the Court).
114. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 538 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that
confessions, "[plarticularly when corroborated, as where the police have confirmed the accused's
disclosure of the hiding place of implements or fruits of the crime... have the highest reliability and
significantly contribute to the certitude with which we may believe the accused is guilty"); Cassell &
Fowles, supra note 12, at 1055 (claiming that the Miranda decision "handcuffled] the cops"); David
Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063,
1080-83 (1986) (criticizing Miranda because the Fifth Amendment only protects against self-
incrimination in judicial proceedings, not during interrogation); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 106 (stating that Miranda was one of the
Warren Court's most controversial criminal procedure decisions).
115. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
116. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases of
National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 39, 88
(1996) (stating that critics of Miranda consider it "judicial legislation," and that Miranda tactics are
better suited "for a police manual than for a constitutional decision"); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 622 (1996) (stating that after Miranda, a
movement arose to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren and that "[tihe U.S. Department of Justice's
Office of Legal Policy under the Reagan Administration characterized the decision as illegitimate in
a 120 page report recommending that the Department of Justice urge the Supreme Court to overrule
Miranda altogether").
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There are two great forces working against the prospects of over-
ruling Miranda. Adherence to precedence always constrains the Court, to
some degree, in its subsequent decisions."7 The second factor is far more
difficult to quantify. For better or worse, Miranda is a part of the Ameri-
can culture."' While political, legal, and media organizations have at-
tacked and ridiculed Miranda,"9 it is often the first thing an accused
thinks of when dealing with the police.'" Therefore, overruling Miranda
could cause a popular "backlash" against police, bringing with it distrust
and resentment towards law enforcement and the courts.'2'
II. WAIVER OF A DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA
A. Background
The Fifth Amendment protects individuals against self-
incrimination in criminal matters." Miranda emphasized the need to
protect against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, because
"[a]s a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of
the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official in-
vestigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against
intimidation or trickery."'"
Simply reciting the Miranda warning does not ensure the admissi-
bility of subsequent statements by a suspect." Prior to interrogation, the
117. Although the Supreme Court has not overruled Miranda, the Court has extended the use of
harmless error analysis to "dilute the practical effect of" Miranda. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona
v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV.
152, 157-58 (1991); see also Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and
Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2036 (1996) (stating that "stare decisis remains far
more than a mere echo in our legal culture. At the very least, it is a formidable obstacle to any court
seeking to change its own law. And, of course, it still rigidly binds lower courts to much existing
case law.").
118. See United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 330 n.l 1 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Most ten year old
children who are permitted to stay up late enough to watch police shows on television can probably
recite [the Miranda warning] as well as any police officer").
119. See Leo, supra note 116, at 622 (discussing the reaction to Miranda by police, politicians,
President Nixon, the Congress, newspaper editorials, and cartoonists).
120. See generally J.M. Balking, What Is Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH.L. REV.
1966 (1992). Balking discusses the status of Miranda in the culture and how the mass media influ-
ences public perception of legal rights. See id. at 1981. He reports that in Canada, Canadian motor-
ists have demanded that they be read their Miranda rights. See id.
121. Leo, supra note 116, at 680.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... ).
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,461 (1966).
124. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 452-53 (1986) (Stevens. J., dissenting) (arguing that
Miranda clearly condemns threats or trickery that cause a suspect to make an unwise waiver of his
rights even though he fully understands those rights); see also Leo, supra note 116, at 621 (stating
that "[albsent a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the prophylactic Miranda warnings,
any admission or confession will be excluded from evidence in subsequent trial proceedings").
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police must obtain a waiver of the suspect's rights;' suspects must waive
their rights "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."' 6 If a waiver is
absent or improper, courts will exclude subsequent evidence.'"
A valid waiver must contain two components." First, suspects must
waive their rights without police coercion.'" Additionally, a suspect must
have an understanding of the "nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it."'" The Miranda court
stated that the government bore the "heavy burden" of proving the valid-
ity of a waiver."'
A suspect's "mental illness" may affect his ability to make a valid
Miranda waiver.' The mental condition of a suspect, however, does not
control the "voluntariness" analysis. 3 Absent a finding of police coer-
cion, courts will likely uphold the validity of a waiver by a mentally im-
paired suspect."
125. In Miranda, the Court carefully distinguished between statements voluntarily made to
police and those brought about via interrogation:
There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that
he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or
any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 444. In a subsequent case, the Court set out a two-tiered test for a valid waiver.
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the
"totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (citation omitted).
127. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against [the defendant].") (footnote omitted); ;f. Leo, supra note 116, at 621. But see Yale Kamisar,
On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 929, 940 (1995) (commenting on an article which proposed that during a pretrial hearing,
the government should be able to compel a suspect to give information to convict the suspect).
128. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
132. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 162 (1986).
133. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.
134. See id. at 165. But see Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11 th Cir. 1988) (stating that
a Miranda waiver of a mentally ill person may be invalid if it is not made knowingly); Common-
wealth v. Cephas, 522 A.2d 63, 64-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding that a Miranda waiver was not
made knowingly and was, therefore, invalid, when the defendant suffered from chronic undifferenti-
ated schizophrenia, police knew the defendant suffered from mental illness, and the defendant "ex-
hibited bizarre and psychotic behavior" in the detention room).
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Gell-Iren3 5
a. Facts
FBI agents arrested Gell-Iren for possession and intent to distribute
drugs.' According to law enforcement personnel testimony, after the
arrest, an agent read Gell-Iren his Miranda rights in Gell-lren's principal
language, Spanish. "7 When the authorities asked Gell-Iren if he under-
stood his rights, he replied, "Yes."'38 Gell-Iren, however, later "testified
that he ... told the agents he understood his rights 'a little bit' and that
he... believed that his statements would not be used against him."'3"
After indicating that he understood his rights, Gell-Iren asked to
speak with an agent."a Although Gell-Iren had not signed a waiver of
rights form, he incriminated himself to the agent by stating that he had
purchased the drugs, kept them in his van overnight, and delivered the
drugs to his buyer.''
A district court jury convicted Gell-ren of possession with intent to
distribute heroin. 2 On appeal, he argued that the district court should not
have admitted the post-arrest statements for two reasons."' First, he did
not sign a form waiving his Miranda rights, and second, he made state-
ments to an officer other than the one that Mirandized him.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit began with Gell-Iren's claim that the trial court
should have suppressed his statements because he did not sign a waiver
of rights form. " By a preponderance of the evidence, the government
had to prove that his choice to waive his rights was "free and deliberate,"
135. 146 F.3d 827 (10th Cir. 1998).
136. See Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 829.
137. See id. See generally Richard W. Cole & Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and
the Courts in Addressing Foreign Language and Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal
Proceeding, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 193, 202--04 (1997) (reviewing approaches taken by different
courts concerning language barriers when administering the Miranda warning).
138. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 829.
139. Id. at 830. The court stated that the defendant's testimony was not credible, while the
agent's testimony was credible. Id. See generally Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 428-29 (1996) (discussing the occurrence and differentiation
of lying told by police to suspects during interrogation).
140. See Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 829.
141. See id. at 830.
142. See i at 829.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 830.
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and not the product of "intimidation, coercion, or deception.'"" The court
explained that a waiver is only required to be "clear," it need not be ex-
press) 7
The court stated that "[wihere a defendant's actions clearly demon-
strate that he... voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, his failure to
sign a waiver of rights form does not render his waiver involuntary."'" In
this case, two actions by Gell-Iren were relevant to the court in deter-
mining that his waiver was voluntary. 9 First, he indicated that he under-
stood his rights and the authorities informed him of them, and second, he
gave information to the agents even though he knew he was not required
to provide such information.'"
Gell-Iren's also claimed that the district court should have sup-
pressed his statements because the authorities did not re-Mirandize him
after a new questioner substituted the original questioner-the one who
provided the initial Miranda warning.'' The court disagreed, stating that
Gell-Iren "must have known that his rights had not materially changed"
due to the existence of a new questioner 2 and that a "Miranda warning
does not lose its efficacy if a defendant is warned by one officer and then
interrogated by another."'53
2. United States v. Bautista'4
a. Facts
On April 5, 1996, FBI Special Agents Leggitt and Kohl interviewed
Bautista in his home regarding the murder of Bautista's friend.'" OnJune
26, 1996, Leggitt and FBI Special Agent Schum returned to Bautista's
home and requested that he accompany them to the police department for
further discussions.'" FBI Special Agent Langenberg joined the question-
ing at the station."
The agents told Bautista that they believed he knew more about the
victim's death than he previously indicated, and that they wanted to find
out "what really happened."'5 8 Bautista's story, however, remained consis-
146. 1d. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1318 (10th Cir. 1994)).
147. Id; see infra note 248.





152. Id. at 830-31 (quoting United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995)).
153. Id. at 831 (quoting Andaverde, 64 F.3d at 1312).
154. 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 255 (1998).
155. See Bautista, 145 F.3d ait 1143.
156. See id. at 1143-44.
157. See id. at 1144.
158. Id.
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tent.9 Leggitt then told Bautista, "This is really serious. We need the truth,
and before we do that we need to advise you of your rights.""'W Leggitt read
Bautista's Miranda rights.'6 ' Bautista "refused to sign the waiver of rights
form and stated that he did not want to answer any more questions.'" 2
Bautista agreed to be fingerprinted and, after the other agents departed,
Schum continued the questioning.'"
Bautista admitted to being present when the victim died; He then
told Schurn that he didn't want to say anything else until he had spoken
with a lawyer." The authorities fingerprinted Bautista and took him
home.'" On July 2, 1996, agents arrested Bautista and brought him in for
more questioning.67 Leggitt again read Bautista his Miranda rights.' 6 Bau-
tista waived his rights and agreed to answer questions.69 Bautista con-
fessed to stabbing the victim and signed a confession written out by Agent
Leggitt.
7 0
A jury convicted Bautista of second-degree murder. 7' On appeal,
Bautista argued that the district court should have suppressed his June 26.72
and July 2 statements.' 73 Bautista sought to have his July 2 confession sup-












170. See id. at 1144-45.
171. See i.
172. See id. Bautista argued that the trial court should have suppressed his June 26 statements
because police officers violated his rights by continuing the interrogation after he expressly invoked
his right to remain silent under Miranda. See iL Furthermore, he argued that once he invoked his
right to counsel on June 26, under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981), police should have
refrained from further interrogation until they supplied him counsel. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
Edwards held:
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial inter-
rogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he re-
sponded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of
his rights. We further hold that an accused .... having expressed his desire to deal with
the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Edwards, 451 U.S. 484-85 (footnote omitted).
173. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
174. See id. The defendant also asserted that the July 2 confession was inadmissible as "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Id For a discussion of this doctrine in relation to Miranda, see Paul G. Cassell,
The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme
Court Inventions, 28 ARtz. ST. L.J. 299, 302 (1996) (arguing that the doctrine applies only to con-
stitutional violations, not Miranda violations).
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his July 2 waiver was invalid because he had inyoked his Miranda rights
on June 26, but police continued the interrogation without providing coun-
sel."5 He argued that in the absence of the requested counsel he could not
properly or voluntarily waive his rights on July 2 prior to his confession.'7"
b. Decision
The relevant issue before the court centered on the validity of Bauti-
sta's Miranda waiver on July 2." Bautista argued that his July 2 waiver
was involuntary and therefore invalid because the authorities denied him
counsel after invoking his Miranda right to such counsel on June 26."7
The court found that because Bautista was never in custody on June 26,
his invocation of Miranda was ineffective."' Accordingly, the court only
analyzed whether Bautista made the waiver voluntarily and knowingly."
The court stated that for a waiver to be voluntary, the totality of the cir-
cumstances must show that "(1) the waiver was a product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, and (2)
the waiver was made in full awareness of the nature of the right being
waived and the consequences of waiving."' 8'
175. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1148. The Tenth Circuit also analyzed whether the trial court should have sup-
pressed Bautista's July 26 statements. See id. at 1145. The appeals court stated that "[aibsent either a
custodial situation or official interrogation, Miranda and Edwards are not implicated," and that "any
statement given in violation of the rules established in these cases cannot be introduced as evidence
in the state's case-in-chief." id. at 1147-48. Bautista argued that the interrogation became custodial
when he was Mirandized on June 26. See id at 1147-48. Therefore, Edwards should have barred the
July 2 interrogation. See id. at 1145. The government argued that because Bautista was not in cus-
tody on June 26, Miranda was not applicable, and that the agent's unnecessary advisement of
Miranda had no bearing. See id. at 1145-46.
The Tenth Circuit stated that "although giving a Miranda warning does not, in and of
itself, convert an otherwise non-custodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation, it is a factor to
be considered by the court." Id. at 1148 (citing United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446, 449 (6th Cir.
1977)). In Lewis, the Sixth Circuit held that the giving of Miranda rights does not produce a custo-
dial interrogation. See Lewis, 556 F.2d at 449 ("The precaution of giving Miranda rights in what is
thought could be a non-custodial interview should not be deterred by interpreting the giving of such
rights as a restraint on the suspect, converting a non-custodial interview into a custodial interrogation
for Miranda purposes."). The Tenth Circuit expressed concern that the interrogation may have
become custodial, but stated "we decline to discuss this issue further since our result would be the
same under either conclusion." Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1149.
The Tenth Circuit found that Bautista's interrogation on July 2 did not violate Edwards.
See id. at 1150. Custodial interrogations are by nature coercive, and Edwards was intended to pre-
vent police from continually harassing and questioning a suspect in custody who has invoked his
right to have an attorney present. See id. Because Bautista was released for a significant amount of
time between interrogations, however, the coercive atmosphere dissipated, and Edwards was not
violated. See id.
178. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
179. See id. at 1150; see also discussion supra note 177.
180. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1150.
181. Id. at 1149.
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The court noted that according to the record, only twenty minutes
passed between the time agents arrested Bautista and when they admin-
istered the Miranda warning," and that it was only another eighty min-
utes until the authorities finished taking his confession.'83 The court stated
that there was no indication of intimidation, coercion, or deception on the
part of the authorities and, therefore, held that Bautista waived his rights
"voluntarily and knowingly.""'
C. Other Circuits
In United States v. Salameh,'85 FBI agents arrested appellant Abou-
halima for his role in the bombing of the World Trade Center Complex
in New York City." Subsequent to his arrest and after agents advised
him of his rights,'" Abouhalima agreed to answer the agents' questions.'
During the interrogation he made incriminating statements linking him to
the bombing.'" Abouhalima was convicted in district court and, on ap-
peal, argued that his waiver was invalid because it came after he had
endured ten days of torture in Egypt.'" The Second Circuit rejected this
argument, stating that Abouhalima was not entitled to a suppression
hearing because there was no evidence that agents of the United States
engaged in coercive tactics.'"' Although it was possible that actions taken
by Egyptian police weakened Abouhalima's mental state, courts are not
required to look at a defendant's motivation for speaking when the ac-
tions of U.S. officials are not at issue.'" Because Abouhalima did not
allege physical or mental coercion by U.S. agents during the interview
when he made the incriminating statements, the court found no constitu-
tional violation.'"
In United States v. Schwensow,'" Schwensow argued against the va-
lidity of his Miranda waiver because the effects of alcohol withdrawal
and anti-anxiety medication prevented the waiver from being knowing
and voluntary.'" After a five-week drinking binge, Schwensow sought
182. See id.
183. See id. The court's reasoning seemed to suggest that police did not have time to coerce or
force a confession from the defendant.
184. Id.
185. 152 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., Abouhalima v. United States, 119 S.
Ct. 885 (1999).
186. See Salameh, 152 F.3d at 105.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 117.
189. See id.
190. See id. The defendant argued that the district court's failure to hold a suppression hearing




194. 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998).
195. See Schwensow, 151 F.3d at 660.
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out a detoxification center.' Unable to remember the name or address of
a previously recommended center, he visited a nearby Alcoholic
Anonymous office.'" Volunteers staffed the office, which served only as
a telephone hotline.'" A volunteer helped Schwensow locate a detoxifi-
cation center and agreed to drive Schwensow to the center.' Schwensow
asked if they could stop at a friend's house on the way in order to drop
off a duffel bag he was carrying.' To prevent Schwensow from getting
sidetracked, the volunteer offered to store the bag at the office until
Schwensow completed his detoxification.' After taking him to the cen-
ter, the volunteers opened the duffel bag, fearing it contained
contraband.' They found a semi-automatic pistol, sawed-off shotgun,
and various burglary paraphernalia. 3 The staff notified the authorities,
who arrested Schwensow at the detoxification center on an outstanding
warrant.' Schwensow waived his Miranda rights after receiving them
from the police, and denied ownership of the weapons found in the bag!'
After spending the next day in the hospital Schwensow was again ques-
tioned.' He received and waived his Miranda rights again, and told the
detective that "the items in the bag were his and that he had intended to
sell them."' Upon review of the record, the court found that Schwen-
sow's argument that "delirium tremens, blackouts, and hallucinations"
rendered his waiver invalid was not supported by fact.2m The court con-
cluded that Schwensow was not impaired and that his waiver was there-
fore valid.'
In United States v. Peck,20 law enforcement officers arrested appel-
lant Peck for possession with intent to distribute drugs.2 ' After the






202. See id. at 653.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. Schwensow then denied a request to search his apartment and stated that he was
"dying of a progressive liver disease." Id. Although he never expressly invoked his right to silence,
the police officer took the combination of responses to mean that Schwensow did not want to talk
about the case. See id. at 658 n.5. The district court concluded that Schwensow invoked his right to
silence, and the circuit court followed the district court's finding. See id.
206. See id. at 653.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 660.
209. See id. The court also held that questioning Schwensow on December 1, thirty-six hours
after he invoked his Miranda rights, was not a violation because police waited a significant amount
of time between interrogations and provided a fresh set of Miranda warning before the second inter-
rogation. See id. at 658; cf Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that police may
recommence interrogation if the defendant's original request to cease questioning was "scrupulously
honored").
210. United States v. Peck, 161 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1998).
211. See Peck, 161 F.3dat 1172-73.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
authorities Mirandized and took Peck into custody, he signed a "'state-
ment of cooperation' which stated that he was aware of his right to speak
with an attorney and that he could stop cooperating at any time."2 12 Peck
incriminated himself,"3 and the district court utilized these statements
were to categorize him as a "career offender.'"' Peck claimed that be-
cause he did not know the possible "adverse impact his statements could
have on sentencing,"2" his waiver was not "intelligent and knowledge-
able," and was therefore invalid.t 6 The Eight Circuit rejected Peck's
claims, stating that "[1]ack of awareness of the potential adverse impact
of statements is not sufficient in itself to invalidate a waiver of the right
to counsel." ' 7
In general, circuit court's were more likely to find a waiver invalid
in cases where the defendant's mental capabilities were at issue or where
a defendant's right to remain silent was not "scrupulously honored.""' In
United States v. Garibay,2 9 the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
Garibay's drug conviction because the prosecution did not show that
Garibay knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.' Cus-
toms agents arrested Garibay at the U.S.-Mexico border after finding
approximately 135 pounds of marijuana in a hidden compartment in his
car. 2' Two agents questioned the defendant after he waited in a holding
cell for approximately one hour." They asked Garibay if he understood
English.' He replied, "Yes," and an agent read Garibay his Miranda
212. Id. at 1173.
213. Peck incriminated himself by discussing his involvement with drug sales prior to his
arrest. See id. This included receiving several shipments of methamphetamine, each weighing over
eight ounces, and receiving one thousand pounds of marijuana. See id.
214. Id. To meet the requirements for a career offender, a defendant must have at least two
prior felonies involving violence or controlled substances within the last ten years. See id.; see also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.2, 4BI.l (1997). He was sentenced for two other
drug convictions, in September 1986 and July 1995. See Peck, 161 F.3d at 1173. Based on his in-
criminating statements, the district court concluded that his conduct in relation to the instant offense
had begun in early 1996, thereby qualifying him as a career offender. See id
215. Peck, 161 F.3dat 1173-74.
216. Id. at 1173. Peck also argued that his statements should have been suppressed because he
was tired after a long bus ride before he met the police and that officers suggested he would receive
leniency if he cooperated. See id.
217. Id. The court also rejected Peck's argument that his statements were involuntary, because
he did not show that his will was "overborne." Id. at 1174 (citing United States v. Meirovitz, 918
F.2d 1376, 1379 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The appropriate test for determining the voluntariness of a confes-
sion is whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, pressures exerted upon the suspect have
overborne his will." (internal quotation marks omitted))).
218. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that police may recommence
interrogation if the defendant's original request to cease questioning was "scrupulously honored").
219. 143 F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 1998).
220. See Garibay, 143 F.3d at 537.





rights in English. ' After orally waiving his rights,'m Garibay made in-
criminating statements.'6 On appeal, Garibay successfully argued that his
waiver was invalid because of his "limited-English skills and low mental
capacity."' The court stated that the prosecution bears the burden of
proving that Garibay waived his Miranda rights knowingly and intelli-
genly.' In finding that the prosecution failed to meet its burden, the
court pointed to Garibay's "English-language difficulties, borderline
retarded IQ, and poor verbal comprehension skills."' 9
In United States v. Tyler,' the authorities arrested Tyler for mur-
dering a government informant the day before she was supposed to tes-
tify against his brother.f' Police read Tyler his Miranda warning, and
Tyler said that he did not wish to make a statement.f2 Police ceased inter-
rogation, transferred him from the station to the barracks, and placed him
in a small room at approximately 10:00 P.M.23 On the walls was a "time-
line of the murder investigation and crime scene photographs, including
two photographs of the body of [the victim] (one of which was in
color)."2"' Police spoke with Tyler about his education; his mother's
health, hunting, and other subjects until approximately 10:55 P.M.' 35 At
that time Tyler began to cry, and an officer in the room told him to "tell
the truth. 2 .1 After an officer re-Mirandized Tyler, he gave incriminating
statements.237 The police obtained another incriminating statement from
Tyler on July 20," s after what the government claimed were repeated
Miranda warnings and Tyler's oral waiver of his rights.f9 Tyler argued
that the trial court should have suppressed his 10:55 P.M. statement on
July 9 and his July 20 statement because they came after he invoked his
right to remain silent.' The Third Circuit stated: "The appropriate in-
quiry under Miranda and its progeny, however, is not simply whether
Tyler knowingly waived his rights after receiving appropriate warnings.
224. See id.
225. See id. The court chastised the government's policy against using written waivers in either
English or Spanish at the border. See id. at 540.
226. See id. at 536. The defendant's incriminating statements included that he was paid one-
hundred dollars to drive the car across the boarder and leave it at an arranged drop off location. See
id. at 536 n.2.
227. id. at 536.
228. See id. The burden must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
229. Id. at 538.
230. 164 F.3d 150 (3rd Cir. 1998).
231. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 151-52.
232. See id. at 152.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 153.
235. See id. at 152.
236. Id. at 155.
237. See id. Tyler incriminated himself by saying that his brother wanted to kill the victim. See
id
238. See id.
239. See id. This time, Tyler stated that his brother only wanted to scare the victim. See id.
240. See id. at 152.
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Rather, the inquiry is whether the police 'scrupulously honored' Tyler's
assertion of his right to remain silent."2"' The court overruled the district
court's admission of the July 9 statements because the "mantra-like reci-
tation of Miranda warnings" and command to "tell the truth" were the
"antithesis of scrupulously honoring Tyler's right to remain 'silent."'
Additionally, the court stated that the record did not allow it to determine
the validity of Tyler's alleged waiver on July 20.23 The court took ex-
ception to the district court's statements that "there is nothing in the rec-
ord to support an argument that Defendant's waiver was not knowingly
made."' This suggested that the district court improperly reversed the
burden to Tyler to show the invalidity of his Miranda waiver.'
D. Analysis
One cannot overstate the value of a confession for the prosecution.'
Therefore, it is not surprising that Miranda's requirement that police
obtain a waiver before trying to illicit a confession has been assailed as
interfering with the efforts of law enforcement. ' Recent Supreme Court
decisions have made it easier for police to obtain Miranda waivers.2 ' As
evidenced in the Tenth Circuit cases discussed in this section, if the rec-
ord does not show coercion or manipulation, the likelihood of having a
waiver overturned on review is slight."'
The previous cases demonstrate three significant aspects to the va-
lidity of a Miranda waiver. First, a waiver does not require a signed af-
firmation by the suspect.' Second, a suspect can neither invoke nor
241. Id. at 154.
242. Id. at 155.
243. See id. at 152.
244. Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
245. See id.
246. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) ("The defen-
dant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted
against him.").
247. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv 387, 389 (1996) (arguing that Miranda leads to fewer confessions and, therefore, harms the
efforts of law enforcement).
248. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454, 559 (1994) (holding that suspect's state-
ment, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," did not trigger his Miranda right to counsel because any
such invocation must be sufficiently clear "that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney"); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
369, 373 (1979) (holding that waiver was valid even though suspect refused to sign a waiver because
"in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person
interrogated").
249. See United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bauti-
sta, 145 F.3d 1140, 1146-50 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 225 (1998).
250. See Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 830; see also discussion supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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waive his rights unless custodial interrogation exists."' Finally, for a
waiver to be valid, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it was made voluntarily and knowingly. "2
The Tenth Circuit's holdings in the previous cases are consistent
with its previous decisions. 3 These decisions do not represent new law,
but are examples of the court applying old law to new fact situations. The
court is attuned to the uneasiness created when a defendant's confession
or incriminating statement is not admitted due to a "technicality."'
Given societal attitudes towards criminals, the court's unwillingness to
exclude confessions or incriminating statements in these situations is not
surprising."5
III. THE SIxTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Background
The Sixth Amendment' has long been interpreted to provide counsel
to defendants for criminal proceedings in the federal courts. "7 In Gideon
v. Wainright," the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel is fun-
251. In other words, the suspect that confesses during a consensual meeting with police will not
be successful in arguing that he never waived his rights. See, e.g., Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1148-49; see
also discussion supra note 177.
252. See Gell-iren, 146 F.3d at 830. But see Leo, supra note 116, at 659-60 (stating that "the
Miranda waiver is not always automatically obtained but often becomes an act of consent negotiated
as police detectives employ subtle psychological strategies to predispose a suspect toward voluntar-
ily waiving his or her Miranda warnings").
253. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1503 (1996) (holding that an inter-
preter's failure to translate "waive" did not invalidate the defendant's waiver); United States v.
March, 999 F.2d 456,460 (1993) (holding that waiver was valid where police read and explained the
waiver form to an illiterate defendant); United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866 (1986) (holding
that waiver was valid when a mentally alert defendant had been given Novocain for pain caused by a
gunshot wound to the mouth).
254. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 12, at 1057-58 (citing a number of negative reactions to
the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1525 n.183 (1996) (discussing the
extreme negative public reaction for letting "bad guys" escape punishment due to a "technicality").
255. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) ("Admissions of guilt resulting from
valid Miranda waivers are more than merely desirable; they are essential to society's compelling
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." (internal quotation marks
omitted)). See generally Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Psychology, and the Law: Proto-
types That Are Common, Senseful, and Not, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 461, 461-64 (1997)
(supporting "commonsense justice" by disaggregating and examining prototypes held within differ-
ent segments of society); Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of
Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can't Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane's Truck?, 47 AM. U. L.
REv. 1221, 1228-37 (1998) (discussing the public and private costs of crime and how rising crime
leads to vigilantism).
. 256. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
257. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment withholds
from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his
life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." (footnote omitted)).
258. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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damental, applying to the states through operation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Therefore, the government must
provide counsel for indigent defendants in all felony prosecutions.' Ad-
ditionally, absent waiver, an indigent defendant may only be sentenced to
jail time in misdemeanor or petty offense cases if counsel represented
him at trial."'
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies automatically once a
person is indicted and requires the presence of counsel during any en-
counter where the government attempts to elicit information from the
defendant.' There can be no deliberate attempt to gather incriminating
information from a defendant without counsel unless the defendant
waives the right.' In comparison, the right to counsel established in
Miranda derives its authority from the Fifth Amendment.2 ' However, the
Miranda right is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a procedural
safeguard designed to protect a suspect's rights.' Moreover, the suspect
must invoke it.'
Courts analyze Sixth Amendment waivers under similar standards
to those used to assess Miranda waivers. 7 An individual must waive her
rights "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."' Similar to the Ed-
wards rule,' if police initiate interrogation after a defendant invokes his
259. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CO ST. amend. XIV, § 1.
260. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
261. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
262. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,205-06 (1964).
263. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
264. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 469 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.").
265. See id. (stating that the warnings are "procedural safeguards" to be used "unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise it"); cf Daniel C. Nester, Distinguishing Fifth and Sixth Amendment
Rights to Counsel During Police Questioning, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 101, 103 (1991).
266. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (holding that the right to counsel in
not triggered until the suspect "unambiguously" invokes the right); Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d
1104, 1107 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("rhe threshold inquiry with regard to the waiver of the right to counsel
is whether the right to counsel was in fact invoked."); cf Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 365 (1995) (stating that "Miranda required that after a suspect invokes
her rights, the questions must cease").
267. Cf Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988) (holding that where a Miranda
warning was sufficient to permit waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, it was also suffi-
cient to permit waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the same time).
268. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,403 (1977).
269. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) ("[A]n accused . having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the waiver is invalid, and any in-
criminating statements obtained after a waiver are inadmissible. '
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is both narrower and broader
than the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment."' The Sixth
Amendment's coverage is broader because it applies to any "critical
stage""27 of the judicial process, rather than only to custodial interroga-
tion.' However, it is narrower because the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel applies to interrogation for any suspected crime, whether or not
the adversarial relationship for that crime has been initiated.'
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Strachan v. Army Clemency & Parole Board"'
a. Facts
Appellant Strachan had served two years of a six-year sentence for
attempted kidnapping when he was paroled in 1992.27 Four years later he
was convicted of assault, for which he served ninety days in the city
jail." Based on his assault conviction and other parole violations, the
authorities revoked Strachan's parole, returned him to prison." Addi-
tionally, the credit 79 Strachan received towards his six-year sentence was
revoked." Strachan argued that his assault conviction was void under the
Sixth Amendment because he did not have counsel for his defense.2'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit stated that Strachan had a right to counsel under
Gideon' and that absent an indication of counsel or an effective waiver,
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."); cf Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638,
641 (1984) (articulating the Edwards rule as "once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any
subsequent conversation must be initiated by him").
270. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 628,636 (1986).
271. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,178 (1991).
272. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel can be triggered "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment").
273. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967); see also McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
274. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178; discussion infra note 306 and accompanying text.
275. 151 F.3d 1308 (10thCir. 1998).
276. See Strachan, 151 F.3d at 1310-11.
277. Seeid. atl311.
278. See id.
279. The credit for parole is commonly known as "street time." Id. at 1310.
280. See id. at 1311.
281. See id. The defendant also claimed that the district court erred in allowing his unconstitu-
tional conviction to be a basis for the revocation of his street time. See id.
282. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
applies to the states as well as the federal govemment).
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there exists a presumption that the right to counsel was denied." Where
an entitled defendant is denied counsel, any conviction is presumptively
void.'
The court indicated that the certified record of Strachan's conviction
contained blanks where either defense counsel was supposed to sign or
where the judge was supposed to indicate waiver of counsel."s The court
stated that an inconclusive record is equivalent to a silent one and, there-
fore, found that Strachan was not represented by counsel.2 The appellate
court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for pro-
ceedings consistent with the appellate decision.'
2. United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd.28'
a. Facts
Appellee Thomas and his wife owned co-appellee Lin Lyn Trading,
an import company targeted by Customs agents." As a result of an in-
formant's tip, on February 22, 1991, agents searched Lin Lyn's offices
and seized many documents.' Five weeks later, Customs inspectors at
the Portland International Airport detained Thomas as he returned from a
trip to Asia."' The inspectors conferred via telephone with Customs
agents in the Portland office about the investigation and proceeded to
inspect documents he was carrying.' Included in these documents was a
yellow legal pad which Customs officials subsequently seized, despite
Thomas's claim that the pad contained notes of his conversations with
his attorney.'
The defendants requested the notepad's return, but an Assistant
United States Attorney ordered the material sealed.' The investigation
continued, and in 1993 appellees were notified that they could make a
motion for return of the notepad pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e). ' On September 7, 1994, the district court granted the
283. See Strachan, 151 F.3dat 1311.
284. See id.
285. See id
286. See id. (citing Oswald v. Crouse, 420 F.2d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1969)).
287. See i- at 1310.
288. United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1998).






295. See id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) states:
Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or
by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the
property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is enti-
tled to lawful possession of the property. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of
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motion finding that "its seizure was unlawful and the government's con-
tinued possession of privileged attorney-client communications would
cause the defendants irreparable injury."
The defendants were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United
States, smuggling goods, and unlawful entry of goods.' Less than one
week after the indictment, the government returned the notepad.' The
district court dismissed the indictment based, in part, on the magistrate's
finding that the "government's deliberate intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship" violated the defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the decision to dismiss the indictment
for "abuse of discretion."'  The appellate court noted the lower court's
determination that the notepad's seizure "violated the Fourth Amend-
ment and that, because of the use of tainted evidence, the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel was violated immediately upon return of the in-
dictment."'  However, the Tenth Circuit, citing Maine v. Moulton,'
ruled that there was no Sixth Amendment violation and that the district
court erred in dismissing the indictment. 3
In reversing the dismissal of the indictment, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the Customs officials seized the notepad in 1991, but the government
did not issue an indictment until 1994.' Therefore, the defendant's right
to counsel was not violated' because the right to counsel attaches "at or
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings."'
fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be
returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access
and use of the property in subsequent proceedings. If a motion for return of property is
made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is
filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(e).
296. Lin Lyn, 149 F.3d at 1114.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 1115. The district court held that the actions of the government agents violated the
defendants' Fifth Amendment right to due process and a fair trial, and therefore, it dismissed the
indictment. See id. at 1117-18. The Tenth Circuit reversed because "the district court's failure to
consider alternative adequate remedies was an abuse of its discretion." Id. at 1118.
300. Id. at 1116.
301. Id.at1117.
302. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 & n.16 (1985) (stating that information obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment was not admissible in a case where an indictment had not been
handed down, but information was admissible if the Sixth Amendment right had not yet attached).
303. See in Lyn, 149 F.3dat 1117.
304. Seeid.at1118.
305. Seeid.at1117.
306. Id. The court cited Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion), for its dictum
that
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C. Other Circuits
In United States v. McLaughlin,' the defendant was on trial for his
role in the shooting of a government informant.' After prosecutors
cross-examined McLaughlin, the court took a fifteen-minute recess.3
The court told the defense counsel that she could redirect after the recess
and, at the prosecutor's request, ordered the attorney not to speak to
McLaughlin during the break about anything he had said during that
day's testimony."' After the recess, defense counsel stated that she had
no redirect, adding:
I did think to myself what other areas I might want to explore with
[the defendant]. I have identified other areas, and I would be prepared
to consult with him on that. But given the Court's ruling, I am not
permitted to do that, so I have no further questions.
McLaughlin was convicted on multiple counts and, on appeal, ar-
gued that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the
court ordered his attorney not to talk to him during the fifteen minute
recess between his cross-examination and redirect.3'2 The D.C. Circuit
discussed similar cases involving recesses of varying lengths '3 and held
that preventing McLaughlin from talking to his attorney during the brief
recess was not a Sixth Amendment violation."' The court stated that the
trial judge has the sole discretion to order a recess during the testimony
[tihe initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the
starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that
the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse posi-
tions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds him-
self faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intrica-
cies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the
commencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
Id. at 689-90. On the other hand, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), stated:
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police inter-
rogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings
commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in
some countries.
Id. at 477.
307. 164 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 1998).




312. See id. at 1.
313. Compare Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283-85 (1989) (holding no Sixth Amendment
violation where discussion was barred during a fifteen minute recess between the defendant's direct
and cross), with Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (stating that preventing communi-
cation over a seventeen hour recess was a Sixth Amendment violation), and Mudd v. United States,
798 F.2d 1509, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that preventing communication over the weekend was
a Sixth Amendment violation).
314. See McLaughlin, 164 F.3d at 4-5.
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of a witness."' Addressing McLaughlin's argument that the existence of
the recess allowed him to consult with his attorney about his testimony,
the court-stated: "We cannot hold that Sixth Amendment rights turn on
such happenstance. It cannot be the law that the right to counsel attaches
on the fortuity of a recess before defendant's redirect when there is no
right to such a recess. '
In United States v. Walker,3M7 appellant Quinn was involved in a car
chase with police?'8 After Quinn crashed his car and escaped on foot, the
police impounded the car and found a loaded 9mm semiautomatic hand-
gun."9 An investigation led to Quinn's arrest for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon." At trial, an acquaintance of Quinn's, Lamond
Walker, testified that he, not Quinn, had been driving the car. 2' Police
suspected that Quinn suborned perjury from Walker and enlisted Quinn's
cellmate for assistance." Quinn made incriminating statements to the
cellmate, leading to an against Walker for perjury and against Quinn for
subornation of perjury." Quinn claimed these statements violated his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.3 ' The court noted that Quinn was not
indicted for subornation of perjury until nearly eight months after his
statements to his cellmate .3 ' Because the right to counsel does not attach
until the initiation of an adversarial process, the court rejected Quinn's
argument."
In Rogala v. District of Columbia,3 27 a police officer stopped an
automobile operated by Rogala and conducted a field sobriety test.
3
1
During the administration of the test, the police officer prevented Rogala
315. See id. at 5. The court noted that when a defendant acts as a witness the rules that apply to
other witnesses generally apply to him as well. See id.
316. Id.
317. 148 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1998).
318. See Walker, 148 F.3d at 520.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id. The jury deadlocked in the first trial. See id. On re-trial, Quinn was convicted,
although Walker again testified that he had been driving the car during the chase. See id. at 520-21.
322. See id. at 521. The cellmate was asked to be "attuned" to anything Quinn might say about
his trial, but "not to initiate any conversation" with him. Id.
323. See id. Quinn told his cellmate "he should not be in jail because his 'home boy' had 'stood
up in court and took the rap for him being in the car."' Id. The cellmate then asked Quinn if he was
driving the car during the chase, to which Quinn replied that he was, but that "his 'home boy' had
claimed to be the driver." Id.
324. See id. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Court held that the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated "when there was used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
325. See Walker, 148 F.3d at 529.
326. See id. at 528-29 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality opin-
ion)); see also discussion supra note 306.
327. 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
328. See Rogala, 161 F.3dat45.
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from interacting with his passenger, an attorney. 9 Rogala claimed the
officer violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing any
consultation with the attorney.3" The D.C. Circuit ruled against the de-
fendant because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not begin
until adversary judicial proceedings begin."'
D. Analysis
The cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey period are
consistent with prior holdings."2 Issues involving the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel are far removed from the controversy and debate sur-
rounding Miranda because the Sixth Amendment is perceived as pro-
tecting liberty and fairness, while Miranda is perceived as impeding the
police.333 While there is some debate concerning whether the Supreme
Court and other judicial bodies have remained true to the Framers' origi-
nal intent for the Sixth Amendment," there are no indications that the
Court will apply a more narrow reading.'"
A reoccurring issue within all of the circuits involves the triggering
point for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As stated in Kirby v. Illi-
nois,'" an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at any "critical
stage" of the prosecution.37 Although the Supreme Court has indicated
when the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel, the Court
329. See id. at 48.
330. See id. at 55.
331. See id. The court pointed out that the defendant's "fortuity" to be stopped while riding
with an attorney did not grant additional Sixth Amendment protection. Id.
332. See, e.g., Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1351 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of formal adversary criminal proceedings 'whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' (quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality opinion))); Oswald v. Crouse, 420 F.2d
373, 374 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine the validity of his conviction where the trial record was ambiguous as to whether he was
represented by an attorney).
333. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (stating that the Sixth Amendment is
"deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty"); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("Left without the aid of counsel [the defendant] may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his de-
fense ...."); see also supra notes 12, 119-20 and accompanying text.
334. See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 35, 43 (1991) (stating that the Sixth Amendment "contemplated the
defendant's right to choose private counsel; it did not envision the provision of appointed counsel").
335. But see Ralph Ruebner, Police Interrogation: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
the Right to Counsel, and the Incomplete Metamorphosis of Justice White, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv,511,
539 (1994) (arguing that Justice White's decisions narrowed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
336. 406 U.S. 682,690(1972).
337. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690; accord United States v. Gordon, 4 F3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. Geittmann, 733 F.2d 1419, 1425 (10th Cir. 1984); Nees v. Bishop, 730 F.2d
606, 611 (10th Cir. 1984); cf. supra notes 272, 306.
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has not set specific guidelines for performance, other than saying "that the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 338
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit continued to narrowly
apply the Miranda doctrine. The Supreme Court has also refused to ex-
pand Miranda and may take the opportunity to further limit it in the fu-
ture.
39
The cases heard by the Tenth Circuit focused on the existence of
custodial interrogation and the validity of the Miranda waiver. In all
cases, the court rejected the defendants' claims. This reflects the difficult
burden for defendants in successfully winning Miranda issues before the
court.
The Tenth Circuit also followed its own precedent in issues involv-
ing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Here, the court found viola-
tions of a defendant's rights when it was unclear whether the defendant
had representation. The court also followed the Supreme Court in refus-
ing to grant a Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to the formal ini-
tiation of adversarial proceedings.
Kevin B. Davis*
338. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Jul. 30, 1999) (No. 97-159-A). In Dickerson, the defendant argued that his voluntary confes-
sion should have been suppressed due to a technical violation of Miranda. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d
at 671. The Fourth Circuit reversed because the lower court did not consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1994). See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671. Section 3501, enacted two years after Miranda, states that a
voluntary confession "shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear
relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the
confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a). Although
neither party addressed the statute, the Fourth Circuit held that "Congress, pursuant to its power to
establish the rules of evidence and procedure in the federal courts, acted well within its authority in
enacting § 3501. As a consequence, § 3501, rather than Miranda, governs the admissibility of con-
fessions in federal court." Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671-72. See generally Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda
Dead, Was It Overruled, Or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 461, 479-81 (1998) (discuss-
ing the impact of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 on the Miranda decision).
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Denver College of Law. I would like to thank the staff
of the Denver University Law Review for their assistance with this survey. Most important, this
survey is dedicated to my wife, Lisa, whose intellect, wit, and support have been invaluable.

EDUCATION
[Ulniversal education should go along with and accompany the uni-
versal ballot in America; that the very best, firmest, and most enduring
basis of our republic was the education, the thorough and the univer-
sal education of the great American people; and that the intelligence
of the mass of our people was the light and life of the republic.'
A crucial contemporary controversy revolves around appropriate
education for children. Specifically, parents, educators, and politicians
fear that problems stemming from factors such as financial stress within
the school districts and gang violence in schools riddle the current public
school system.2 Parents have begun to challenge the extent of their rights
to direct the upbringing of their children in the educational context.'
Home schooling, once the province of religious fundamentalists and
ideologues "who rejected the institutional nature of public schools," has
become increasingly mainstream. In many states, voters and politicians
hotly contest plans to organize school vouchers and private school tax
credits.' Congress increasingly is scrutinizing long-standing federal aid
plans to support specific populations in public schools.7
This survey will examine the current educational debate as exempli-
fied in three cases that came before the United States Court of Appeals
0
1. A statement by Abraham Lincoln recollected by William Henry Hemdon. DON E.
FEHRENBACHER & VIRGINIA FEHRENBACHER, RECOuLzECmD WORDS OF ABRAHAM LINcOLN 244
(1996).
2. Wendy Wheeler, Comment & Note, Is Home Schooling Constitutional?, 1995 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 78, 78 (discussing the myriad reasons parents are choosing to home school their chil-
dren including increasing violence, poor academic standards, drug use in public schools and relig-
ious beliefs).
3. See infra notes 137-68 and accompanying text.
4. Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, Learning at Home: Does It Pass the Test?,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1998, at 64, 66 (discussing the increasingly popular alternative of home
schooling in America).
5. See, e.g., Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP.
1, 1-2 (1997) (discussing the likely outcome of state litigation over the constitutionality of vouchers
that could encompass sectarian schools).
6. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Amendment 17: Income Tax
Credit for Education, in PUB. NO. 438, ANALYSIS OF 1998 BALLOT PROPOSALS 35, 36 (1998) (pro-
posing a constitutional amendment to institute an income tax credit for Colorado parents who either
home school their children or send them to private or public schools), available at
<http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstafflballotanaly-17.htm>; Jim Fisher, Kempthorne
Pressured to Drain School Budget, LEWISTON MORNING TRiB., Feb. 9, 1999, at 10A (discussing
pressures the Idaho governor faces as a supporter of private school tax credits); Ledyard King,
Private-School Tax Credit Killed, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 5, 1999, at B4 (describing the defeat of a
private school tax credit bill amid heated debate); Private-School Tax Credits Face Debate,
DESERET NEWS, Jan. 18, 1999, at B02.
7. See, e.g., Carol Jouzaitis, Senate Panel OKs Keeping School Lunches, Food Stamps-But
With Cuts, CRL TRIB., June 15, 1995, at 18 (approving the maintenance of the federal lunch program
in the Senate's welfare restructuring bill even though many conservative Republicans wanted to turn
this program over to state regulation).
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for the Tenth Circuit in 1997-98.& Part I examines the effect of the 1997
Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),9
in relation to public education services for disabled children whose par-
ents voluntarily placed them at private schools. Upon a Supreme Court
remand, the Tenth Circuit reexamined the application of the IDEA to
disabled children in private schools in Fowler v. Unified School District
No. 259, Sedgwick County, Kansas." In O'Toole v. Olathe District
Schools Unified School District No. 233," the Tenth Circuit held the
Amendments, while making significant changes to the IDEA, did not
change the interpretive standard that has controlled the application of the
IDEA for the last fifteen years. 2 Part II discusses the rights of parents to
direct the educational upbringing of their children. In Swanson v. Guthrie
Independent School District No. l-L, 3 the Tenth Circuit denied home
schooled students a constitutional right to attend public schools on a part-
time basis and further found a lack of any fundamental parental right to
control all aspects of a child's education.'
I. THE INDIVIDUALS wiTH DIsABILmES EDUCATION ACT 5
A. Background
The genesis of the current enactment of the IDEA came in 1966,
when Congress amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
to establish a grant program "for the purpose of assisting the States in the
initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects.., for
the education of handicapped children."'" A few years later, Congress
began to address the limited opportunities for appropriate public educa-
8. This survey address decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
9. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp.
1I 1997)).
10. 128 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Fowler I]. In this case, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld its previous determination that a school district must pay the same amount
for special education services provided to a student voluntarily enrolled at a private school as it pays
for such services for a public school student. See infra notes 55-76 and accompanying text. The
court reconsidered the issue in Fowler II because the Supreme Court had vacated and remanded its
first decision in light of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No.
259, Sedgwick County, Kan., 107 F.3d 797, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Fowler 1], vacated
and remanded by Unified Sch.. Dist. No. 259, Sedgwick County, Kan. v. Fowler, 521 U.S. 1115
(1997). For a discussion of Fowler 1, see Bryan M. Schwartz, Tenth Circuit Survey, Education:
Balancing the Interests of Schools, Students, and the Community, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 801, 802-09
(1998) (focusing on statutory aspects of the IDEA).
11. 144 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 1998).
12. See O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 701.
13. 135 F.3d 694(10th Cir. 1998).
14. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 702.
15. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp.
1111997)).
16. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, sec. 161,
§ 601(a), 80 Stat. 1191, 1204.
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tion for disabled children, appropriating funds to states upon the condi-
tion that they develop programs to meet the needs of handicapped stu-
dents.'7 It was not until 1974, however, that Congress put any bite into
the law, making each state grant for special education funding contingent
upon the state adopting "a goal of providing full educational opportuni-
ties to all handicapped children,... a detailed timetable for accomplish-
ing such a goal, and ... a description of the kind and number of facili-
ties, personnel, and services necessary throughout the State to meet such
a goal.'
'5
Despite these stringent requirements, when Congress enacted the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,' many in Con-
gress believed a majority of handicapped children in the United States
"were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in regular class-
rooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to 'drop out.'
''
Consequently, Congress drafted legislation granting states federal fund-
ing only if each state demonstrated that it had "in effect a policy that
assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public
education."'"
The IDEA's "free appropriate public education" requirement tailors
itself to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an "indi-
vidualized educational program" (IEP).' The IEP is a written statement
prepared at a meeting between "a representative of the local educational
agency," the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardians, and, when-
ever appropriate, the child. An IEP includes educational objectives and
services to be provided.23 The IDEA provides procedural requirements
for any change of an IEP ' and avenues for parent complaints regarding
the provision of special education and related services.' While the law
requires parental involvement in the development of an educational pro-
17. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 613(a) 84 Stat. 175, 179
(1970).
18. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, sec. 61 5(c)(1), § 613(b)(1)(C), 88
Stat. 484, 583.
19. Pub. L. No.94-142,89 Stat. 773(1975).
20. H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975).
21. Education for All Handicapped Children Act § 612(1), 89 Stat. at 780. Over the next two
decades, the name and statutory language of the Act was changed to reflect new nomenclature,
identifying persons covered under the Act as "disabled" rather than "handicapped." Cf., e.g., Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, sec. 25(a)(5), §
612(3), 105 Stat. 587, 606. The general thrust of the statutory provision remained the same, how-
ever, even with subsequent linguistic changes. Cf Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101, 111 Stat. 37, 60 (1997)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (Supp. InI 1997)).
22. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (Supp. 111 1997) (defining the term "free appropriate public
education"); id. § 1414(d) (giving the parameters for establishing and revising an IEP).
23. Id. § 1414 (d)(1)(B).
24. See id. § 1415(b).
25. See id. § 1415(e), (f).
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gram for disabled students, parents have limited authority to dictate daily
educational decisions for their children.'
1. Application of the IDEA Before the Amendments
Board of Education v. Rowley" drove the interpretation of the IDEA
before the 1997 Amendments.' In Rowley, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the lower courts' interpretation of a
free appropriate public education." The Court determined that a child is
receiving a free appropriate public education as defined by the IDEA "if
personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive
services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction.""w
The Court recognized that Congress, in its passage of the IDEA,
sought to provide access to education for handicapped children, but "did
not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard
than would be necessary to make such access meaningful."' The Court
determined that "the intent of the Act was more to open the door of pub-
lic education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guar-
antee any particular level of education once inside.' Thus, state-
provided specialized services did not have "to maximize each child's
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided other children." '33
The IDEA only secured access to special instruction and related services
as a "basic floor of opportunity" to disabled children. 4 Ultimately, for a
state program to be in compliance with the Act, educational agencies
need to provide disabled children a mere opportunity for educational
benefit.33 Critics of the decision claim the Court's focus on the educa-
tional benefit standard and other factors sets low expectations for educa-
tional advancement and allows educational agencies to minimally com-
ply with the provisions and policy goals of the IDEA.'
26. See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
27. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
28. See Tara L. Eyer, Commentary, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments
Raise the Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 8 (1998).
29. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.
30. Id. at 189.
31. Id. at 192.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 198.
34. Id. at201.
35. See id at 206-07.
36. See Eyer, supra note 28, at 1, 8 (1998) (including factors such as routinely granting pass-
ing marks and advancing children to the next grade level).
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2. The 1997 Amendments
In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA7 (Amendments) because
Congress believed "that the critical issue now is to place greater empha-
sis on improving student performance and ensuring that children with
disabilities receive a quality public education."" Congress set forth sev-
eral broad goals in conjunction with this legislation. Members of Con-
gress who drafted the Amendments emphasized "what is best education-
ally for children with disabilities" while still giving teachers and other
educational professionals more flexibility in providing education for dis-
abled students. 9 Additionally, Congress wanted to be certain parents had
an enhanced role in deciding the best educational course for their dis-
abled children.' While the law had been very successful over the course
of its twenty-two year existence, the Amendments aimed to remedy the
fact that "[t]oo many students with disabilities are failing courses and
dropping out of school."'
Thus, the Amendments support a continuum of educational place-
ments for disabled children that includes placement in "regular classes,
special classes, special schools," and home instruction.4" This legislative
support of varying educational placements for disabled children may
create tension between parents and educators. Even as the Act supports
parental involvement and a wide range of educational options for chil-
dren, the local educational agency has a tremendous amount of discretion
in both placing children and determining which special educational
services will be provided." Despite congressional language that suggests
a desire for parental involvement in the choice of appropriate education
for their children, too much parental control may conflict with specific
needs of local educational agencies. Local agencies must have flexibility
in the educational options they offer to children with disabilities so the
agencies can keep the costs of special educational services as low as pos-
sible."
One significant aspect of the Amendments is a congressional re-
sponse to increased litigation initiated by parents demanding IDEA funds
37. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
111 Stat. 37, 37-105 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419 (Supp. 111 1997)).
38. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 3 (1997).
39. Id. at 2.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 5. The Senate report notes that the number of disabled students involved in post-
secondary education tripled, while the unemployment rate for such individuals benefiting from the
act over the past 22 years is "almost half that of their older counterparts." Id.
42. - d. at 11.
43. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (suggesting that local educational agencies
have a great deal of discretion in placement and implementation of appropriate services).
44. SeeS. REP. No. 105-17, at 2.
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for their disabled children voluntarily placed in private schools.' The
Amendments, for the first time, specifically deal with unilateral parental
placement of disabled children in a private school.' The legislation states
the total amount of money spent to provide special education and related
services to children in the state placed voluntarily by their parents in pri-
vate schools is limited to a proportional amount of the federal funds
available. 7 This is an "amount consistent with the number and location of
private school children with disabilities in the State."'
The Amendments also permit school districts to provide IDEA
funded special education and related services on the premises of private
and parochial schools. ' Educational agencies must reimburse parents for
the costs of special education services for privately placed disabled chil-
dren only under certain conditions.' If, for example, an educational
agency failed to offer a disabled child a free appropriate public education
in a timely manner, an administrative law judge or court could order total
reimbursement for the child's private or parochial education." Even with
an adequate IEP in place and a public school providing a free appropriate
public education to the child, one interpretation of the new Amendments
suggests that parents may not be deprived of all federal assistance for
their disabled child even if they unilaterally place their child in a private
school.2
At the time the Amendments were signed into law, the Department
of Education (DOE) determined that it would take comments from the
public to aid it in developing regulations to govern the education of dis-
abled children under the amended IDEA. 3 As of January 20, 1998, the
DOE had received over 4,500 written comments." The DOE has yet to
45. See id at 13. For a more detailed discussion of the broad effects of the Amendments, see
Dixie Snow Huefner, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 122
EDUC. L. REP. 1103, 1103 (1998) (discussing the myriad changes that "affect eligibility, evaluation,
programming (IEPs), public and private placements, discipline, funding, attorneys' fees, dispute
resolution, and procedural safeguards for students served under IDEA-Part B").
46. See S. REP. No. 105-17, at 13 (noting that "[tihe bill makes a number of changes to clarify
the responsibility of public school districts to children with disabilities who are placed by their
parents in private schools").
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. 111 1997) ("Amounts expended for the provi-
sion of those services by a local educational agency shall be equal to a proportionate amount of
Federal funds made available under this subchapter.").
48. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 13.
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) ("Such services may be provided to children with
disabilities on the premises of private, including parochial, schools, to the extent consistent with
law.").
50. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C).
51. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
52. See discussion of Fowler II, infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
53. See Notice of Request for Advice and Recommendations, 62 Fed. Reg. 35,052 (1997).
54. See Department of Education, Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 63
Fed. Reg. 61,235, 61,236 (1998).
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post the amended regulations that should assist in the interpretation and
application of the Amendments?'
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259, Sedgwick County,
Kansas (Fowler I)'
a. Facts
Michael Fowler, a deaf twelve-year-old boy, qualified as a disabled
child under the IDEA." After spending four years at a public school
where the school district clustered students with hearing problems, Mi-
chael's parents voluntarily transferred him to a private school because
they felt the private school could better serve Michael's needs.58 The par-
ents asked the school district to provide Michael with interpretive serv-
ices at his private school. 9 The school district refused the request, and
administrative proceedings upheld the district's denial of services.' On
appeal, the district court ordered the school district to pay the entire cost
of on-site interpretive services for Michael." On appeal from that deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit found the school district was responsible for pay-
ing for such special services only an amount up to "the average cost to
the District to provide the same service to hearing-impaired students in
the public school setting."' In light of the 1997 Amendments to the
IDEA, the Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded the case to
the Tenth Circuit to consider the effects of the Amendments.63
b. Decision
On remand, the Tenth Circuit held that their prior interpretation of
the pre-Amendment IDEA applied to the parties in this case." Initially,
the court analyzed whether the IDEA Amendments should apply retro-
actively. The court reasoned that absent a clear congressional indication
that the Amendments merely clarified the proper implementation of the
IDEA, the Amendments would apply "only to events occurring after the
55. See Fowler I1, 128 F.3d 1431, 1438 n.5 (10th Cir. 1997) (utilizing the proposed regula-
tions in interpreting the IDEA).
56. 128 F.3d 1431. Fora procedural history of the Fowler cases, see supra note 10





62. Fowler 1, 107 F.3d 797, 807-08 (1Oth Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by 521 U.S. 1115
(1997).
63. See Fowler II, 128 F.3d at 1433.
64. See id. at 1436. The Tenth Circuit did not substantively change its interpretation of the
IDEA as it relates to federal funding for private school children but accentuated the need to calculate
a proportionate share. See id. at 1437.
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Act's effective date."3 Consequently, the old IDEA applied to the pay-
ment of Michael's interpretive services provided at the private school he
attended up to the effective date of the Amendments.' The school dis-
trict, therefore, was obligated to pay "an amount up to, but not more
than, the average cost to the District" for providing the same service to a
hearing-impaired child at a public school.67
The school district's obligation to Michael's parents changed
slightly, however, with the implementation of the Amendments. The
court held that the Amendments provided that parents who placed their
children voluntarily in private schools when a local agency has offered a
free appropriate public education are not entitled to reimbursement "for
the cost of the child's education, including any special education and
related services." Rather, in cases such a Michael's, "the local agency's
sole obligation is to spend... a 'proportionate amount of Federal funds,'
which amount is apparently to be derived from considering the 'number
and location' of such students compared to the total population of stu-
dents requiring special education and related services. '  The Tenth Cir-
cuit remanded the case to the district court to determine the calculation of
Michael's proportionate share of the funds the federal government gave
to Michael's local school district under the IDEA."
c. Analysis
Before Fowler 11, some critics feared the 1997 Amendments to the
IDEA would grant too much discretion to school districts because the
districts would have unilateral authority to decide whether or not they
would pay for a private school child's special education." The proposed
regulations for the governance of the IDEA suggest that the local agency
will have the authority to decide which private school children will re-
ceive services, which services will be provided, and in what manner. ' In
a footnote, the court suggested that implementing these proposed regula-
65. Id. at 1436.
66. See id,
67. See id.; cf. Julie F. Mead, Expressions of Congressional Intent: Examining the 1997
Amendments to the IDEA, 127 EDUC. L. REP. 511, 527 (1998) (discussing the requirements under
the statute for "equitable participation" that requires private school students to have the same op-
portunities available to them for IDEA benefits).
68. Fowler I1, 128 F.3d at 1436.
69. Id. at 1437 (quoting Individuals with Disabilities Act Amendments of 1997, 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. 1I 1997)).
70. See id. at 1439.
71. See, e.g., William L. Dowling, Special Education and the Private School Student: The
Mistake of the IDEA Amendments Act, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 83 (1997) (arguing that the 1997
Amendments limit a court's ability to require a school board to pay for the education of a disabled
child at a private school).
72. Cf. Proposed Rules Department of Education, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,026, 55,094 (1997) (to be
codified at 34 CF.R. pt. 300) (proposed Oct. 22, 1997).
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tions could lead to "the proportionate share of Federal funds [being] zero
for any particular private school disabled student."
Given the current absence of finalized interpretive regulations for
the Amendments, ' parents have little guidance in knowing whether a
private school placement may effectively remove their children from
federal funding as the local educational agency evaluation is determina-
tive. This illustrates the inherent conflict between what parents subjec-
tively believe is educationally best for their child, and the local school
district's goals of flexibility and cost cutting in providing education.'
Significantly, the Fowler I decision suggests that parents who place
their disabled children in private schools do not risk cutting their children
off from all federal funds for special education because such children
should still be entitled to a proportionate share of the federal money
available under the IDEA.
These unilateral parental placement decisions may, however,
threaten prompt disbursement of funding to disabled children as the state,
likely the school district itself, must determine the proportionate share of
federal funding to which the child is entitled. This calculation may be
complicated enough to delay getting the necessary funding to the needy
child and may give rise to a new and uncharted arena for litigation.
2. O'Toole v. Olathe District Schools Unified District No. 2337
a. Facts
Molly O'Toole was diagnosed with moderate to profound hearing
loss.'5 She began her education at her local school district's hearing im-
paired program where school district employees and her parents devel-
oped an IEP for her in February 1993." In June 1993, Molly's father had
the Central Institute for the Deaf (CID), a private residential student pro-
gram, evaluate Molly's special education needs. ' In light of CID's
evaluation, her parents requested another IEP meeting in August 1993,
where the school district agreed to change Molly's IEP in accordance
with CID's recommendations but decided to keep her enrolled in the
73. Fowler ll, 128 F.3d at 1438 n.5.
74. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
75. See supra text accompanying note 44.
76. See Fowler 11, 128 F.3d at 1436-37 & n.4.
The proposed regulations define 'proportionate amount' as 'an amount that is the same
proportion of the [local educational agency's] total subgrant [under Part B] ... as the
number of private school children with disabilities... residing in its jurisdiction is to the
total number of children with disabilities in its jurisdiction.'
Id. at 1437 n.4 (quoting Proposed Rules Department of Education, supra note 72, at 55094).
77. 144 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 1998).
78. See O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 695.
79. See id at 696. For a discussion of the nature of an TEP, see supra text accompanying notes
22-26.
80. See O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 696.
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district's program.' Molly's parents questioned the adequacy of the IEP
and the school district's ability to meet Molly's needs; consequently,
they enrolled Molly at CID. 2 When Mr. O'Toole requested that the
school district reimburse him for Molly's educational expenses at CID;
the district refused. 3 After exhausting their administrative appeals and
losing at the district court level, Molly's parents appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of Molly's IEP and arguing that Kan-
sas law requires a higher standard of education than under federal law.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit upheld the administrative law adjudication."
First, the court rejected the O'Toole's argument that a Kansas adminis-
trative regulation about placement of a disabled child evidences any in-
tent to require school districts to provide a particular level of educational
services." Second, the court evaluated the adequacy of Molly's IEP to
determine whether the IEP was "'reasonably calculated to enable [her] to
receive educational benefits. ' 
87
The court decided it could only evaluate the adequacy of the IEP as
of the time the' school district and Molly's parents designed it because
"'[n]either the statute nor reason countenance "Monday Morning Quar-
terbacking" in evaluating the appropriateness of a child's placement."'''
The fact that Molly's parents pulled her from the school before the
school district could implement the amended IEP mandated that the court
examine that IEP prospectively.' Given this, the court determined
Molly's IEPs, even if not optimal, were designed to, and did, confer edu-
cational benefits in accordance with the IDEA.'
The court stressed that although Molly was happier and made more
progress at CID, that did not necessarily make CID the appropriate edu-
cational setting for her." The court adopted a recent Second Circuit
analysis stating a "'disabled child is 'not entitled to placement in a resi-
dential school merely because the latter would more nearly enable the
child to reach his or her full potential." ' Ultimately, because "Molly's
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 696-97.
84. See id. at 697-98.
85. See id at 709.
86. See id. at 700-01.
87. Id. (quoting Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 726 (10th Cir. 1996)
(requiring the court to ask "whether the State complied with IDEA procedures, including whether
the TEP conformed with the requirements of the Act")).
88. Id. (quoting Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 534 (3d Cir. 1995)).
89. See id. at 707-08.
90. See id. at 708.
91. See id
92. Id. (quoting Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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IEPs were reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit on her and
she made sufficient progress toward" the goals set forth in the IEPs, they
met the requirements of both Kansas's law and the IDEA.93
c. Analysis
The court seems to support the independent discretion of the district
in both its refusal to pay for the private education of Molly O'Toole and
its determination of the adequacy of her IEPs." In fact, the court system
may not be the best place to determine the adequacy of a student's IEP
because courts are so removed from educational processes and goals.
First, a court evaluation of a school's plan for a student unjustly shifts the
focus from the needs of the student to the judicial proceedings."' Second,
this exercise of judicial discretion undermines the ideal cooperative rela-
tionship between the parent and school system and can make that rela-
tionship unduly adversarial."
The court did not examine the specific history and language of the
Amendments and conformed to the "'basic floor of opportunity' stan-
dard set forth in Rowley.' The fact that Congress specifically amended
the IDEA to include an explicit indication of "how the child's disability
affects the child's involvement and progress in the general curriculum""
as well as "a statement of measurable annual goals" has led critics to
suggest the Rowley "access" standard is no longer the correct measuring
stick for IDEA compliance." Rather, Congress designed the Amend-
ments to improve the effectiveness of special education and increase the
benefits afforded to children with disabilities "to the extent such benefits
are necessary to achieve measurable progress."'0 ' Measurable progress
suggests meaningful progress and not mere access to education as set
forth in Rowley."'
The court rejected any new standard for determining what level of
education the IDEA Amendments require educational agencies to offer
to disabled students." Indeed, the court made clear that the statutes and
93. Id
94. See id at 701-08.
95. Cf LaDonna L. Boeckman, Note, Bestowing the Key to Public Education: The Effects of
Judicial Determinations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act on Disabled and Nondis-
abled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 855, 879 (1998).
96. Cf. id.
97. O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 698 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,201 (1982)).
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 11 1997).
99. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii).
100. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 28, at 17 (suggesting that the courts should continue to define
the "educational benefit" standard so that it complies with the Amendments that suggest meaningful
educational progress).
101. Id. at 16.
102. See id. at 17.
103. See O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 701 (10th Cir.
1998).
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regulations only mandate that a school "'provide an appropriate educa-
tion, not the best possible education, or the placement the parents pre-
fer."''' Nor does the IDEA "require the best possible education or supe-
rior results.""
The O'Tooles' unilateral decision to enroll Molly at CID, despite
the school district's willingness to implement CID's suggestions into
Molly's IEP, eliminated the possibility of full reimbursement for Molly's
CID tuition.'" Arguably, however, the court could have ordered the
school district to determine and distribute the proportionate share of the
federal funds due to Molly under the IDEA. According to Fowler 11, this
proportionate share would have been available to her for special educa-
tion and related services regardless of where she went to school."
C. Other Circuits
Despite the controversy surrounding the application of the Rowley
standard of "educational benefit" to disabled children,'" no circuit court
has determined that the Rowley standard should be modified based on the
recent Amendments. Rather, like the Tenth Circuit in O'Toole, other
circuits have found that the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA do not re-
quire the local educational agency to pay for services if the disabled
child's parents voluntarily enroll her at a private school unless the local
agency did not provide an adequate educational plan for the child."
In Foley v. Special School District of St. Louis County,"' the Eighth
Circuit examined the language of the Amendments and their relationship
to existing state law."' The Foleys argued that the IDEA provision per-
mitting special educational services on-site at private schools preempted
104. O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 708 (quoting Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1057 (7th Cir.
1997)).
105. Id. (quoting Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1997)).
106. See id. at 697.
107. See Fowler II, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436-37 (10th Cir. 1997).
108. See Eyer, supra note 28, at 2.
109. See, e.g., Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 134 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that since the school district's IEP "complied with requirements of IDEA, it cannot be
ordered to reimburse the parents" for their voluntary enrollment of their child in private school);
Tucker v. Calloway County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that parents
"are not entitled to dictate educational methodology or to compel a school district to supply a spe-
cific program for their disabled child"); Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d
245, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide the student
with a meaningful educational benefit and his placement in public system was appropriate); Donald
B. v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 117 F.3d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the school
district was not required to transport student three blocks from private school to public school for
speech therapy as this did not deprive him "of a genuine opportunity for equitable participation in a
special education program").
110. 153 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 1998)




a state statute prohibiting public school educators on the premises of
private schools.' 2 The court held that the IDEA gives students and par-
ents no individual rights to services provided at a specific location."3
Furthermore, state law may effectively deny any provision of special
educational services on-site at private schools."'
Only one other circuit has formally adopted the "proportionate
share" rationale set forth in Fowler 11. In Russman v. Board of Education
of the Enlarged City School District (Russman 1),' the Second Circuit
decided that states need provide only those services to children voluntar-
ily enrolled in private schools that can be purchased with a proportionate
share of the allocated federal funds."6 In that case, the parents of a men-
tally retarded student deserving of special education services contended
that the school district must provide those services on the premises of the
private Catholic school where her parents voluntarily enrolled her."7
Like Fowler I, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Second
Circuit's first disposition of the case in light of the 1997 Amendments to
the IDEA."' In the first proceeding, the court upheld the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the Russmans and determined that the
school district must provide an on-site teacher and teacher's aide to Col-
leen at her private school."9
On remand, however, the Second Circuit held in favor of the school
district.'" The court reiterated the Fowler court's position that a local
agency's only obligation is "to expend a proportionate share of the fed-
eral" funding received under the IDEA for children voluntarily enrolled
in private schools when the local agency was willing and able to provide
a free appropriate public education.'"' The Second Circuit further clarified
a local educational agency's obligations to disabled children at private
schools. The court found the statute, in light of the legislative history,
could not be interpreted to require local school districts to provide spe-
cial education services on-site at private schools.'" Rather, the local edu-
cational agency may, at its sole discretion, determine where it shall pro-
vide services and clearly is under no statutory obligation to provide such
special services on site."
112. See id. at 865 (overruling the inferred preemption).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. 150 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Russman I1].
116. See Russman 1I, 150 F.3d at 221.
117. See id. at 220.
118. See Board of Educ. of the Enlarged City Sch. Dist. v. Russman, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
119. See Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Russman i].
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II. THE RIGHT OF HOME SCHOOLED STUDENTS TO BENEFIT FROM
PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION
A. Background
Providing public school facilities and services for its residents is one
of the most significant functions of a state."4 However important this
interest is, it must be balanced against parents' right to make the most
basic decisions about the upbringing of their children, including the right
to guide and direct their education.'" In the early days of our government,
Congress deemed that "[rieligion, morality, and knowledge, being neces-
sary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged."'26 In Meyer v. Ne-
braska,'27 the Supreme Court recognized the right of parents to make the
most fundamental decisions about their children.'25 The Court held that a
state statute prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English
infringed upon the rights of parents.' The Court stated "[e]vidently the
Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of mod-
em language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowl-
edge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their
own.''1° Soon after, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names
of Jesus and Mary,"' the Court struck down a state statute requiring pub-
lic school attendance as it "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.
'' 32
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically dealt with the is-
sue of home schooling, the Court determined that the parental right to
direct a child's education does fall within the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.3 3 If a constitutionally protected right
exists, then the government may not interfere with private educational
decisions concerning one's child without a compelling reason.' An ex-
124. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (discussing the state's responsibility for
the education of its citizens and its power to "impose reasonable regulations" thereon ).
125. Cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (stating that "a [sitate's interest in universal education.., is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests").
126. Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-West of the River Ohio, I Stat.
50,52 (1789).
127. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
128. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-401.
129. See id. at 401.
130. Id.
131. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
132. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
133. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (illustrating that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a broader range of liberty rights than those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution).
134. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (1988) (recognizing the state has a
compelling interest in the education of a child, the court found no persuasive arguments to indicate
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amination of the relevant case law, however, leads to the conclusion that
"there is no broad, if any, fundamental nonreligious right to home in-
struction.""' Additionally, the state interest in the upbringing and educa-
tion of its future citizens suffices to allow the government some level of
control in educational policies and practice within the state, thereby
abridging parental direction.'"
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School Dis-
trict No. I -L' 
3 7
1. Facts
Her parents home schooled Annie Swanson since she began school
because they wished to instruct her on Christian principles that the public
school curriculum excludes.'38 Through a special agreement between the
school superintendent and Annie's parents, Annie attended certain
classes at the public school on a part-time basis for her whole seventh
grade year.'39 The next year, the school board and a new superintendent
developed a policy mandating full-time enrollment for all students in the
public schools.'"' The board felt that because part-time students did not
count for state financial aid purposes, allowing Annie to attend on a part-
time basis would set a precedent for other part-time students to take ad-
vantage of public school facilities on an "as wanted" basis without any
increase in state funding."' After the district court granted summary
judgment for the school district, the plaintiffs appealed.'
4 2
the parents had a fundamental right to unlimited supervision of their child's education); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15, 234 (1972) (holding the religious beliefs of the Amish
were First and Fourteenth Amendment interests that prevented the state from compelling Amish
children from attending formal high school).
135. Perry A. Zirkel, The Case Law Concerning Home Instruction, 29 EDuc. L. REP. 9, 11
(1986) (recognizing the "power of the state to compel attendance at some school," and noting the
void in Supreme Court cases addressing home instruction). But see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 (sug-
gesting "that courts must move with great circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate
task of weighing a State's legitimate social concem when faced with religious claims for exemption
from generally applicable education requirements").
136. Cf Murphy, 852 F.2d at 1042, 1043.
137. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
138. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 696.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 696-97.
141. id.; cf Eugene C. Bjorklun, Home Schooled Students: Access to Public School Extracur-
ricular Activities, 109 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 5 (1996) (stating the school district argument that "a public
school's primary responsibility is to serve its own students and allowing home schooled students to
participate could take some opportunities away from the regularly enrolled students"); David W.
Fuller, Comment & Note, Public School Access: The Constitutional Right of Home-Schoolers to
"Opt In" to Public Education on a Part-Time Basis, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1626 (1998) (stating
that "the principal justification school districts offer when denying home-schoolers permission to opt
into classes or extracurricular activities is that of administrative inconvenience").
142. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 696.
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that the school board's policy pertaining to
part-time students was "a neutral rule of general applicability."'"3 The
policy allowed the "[diefendants to prove a reasonable relationship be-
tween the part-time attendance policy and a legitimate purpose of the
school board" which warranted an affirmation of the grant of summary
judgment.'"
The Swansons' argued that the part-time attendance policy dis-
criminated specifically against Christian home schoolers'" The court
rejected that argument as the policy did not prohibit the Swansons' "from
home-schooling Annie in accordance with their religious beliefs.'"' In
fact, the school board's full-time attendance policy applied to all home
schooled students regardless of their families' basis for this educational
choice' 7 Significantly, only a full-time student could take advantage of
the school district's educational opportunities."
The court determined "that parents simply do not have a constitu-
tional right to control each and every aspect of their children's education
and oust the state's authority over that subject."'4 9 Additionally, the court
found that no parental right allows parents to dictate that their children
can attend public school for only part of the day despite a contrary but
neutral school board policy.' The Swansons' claims were "mere invoca-
tion[s]" of a general right and did not suffice to make a "colorable
showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional
rights."'s'
143. Id. at 703.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 698.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 699-700.
149. Id. at 699. The court relied on cases that have limited the rights of parents to direct their
children's education in that they cannot exempt a child from reading programs they did not approve
of, a school's community service program, or from sexually explicit assemblies. See id.; see also
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 457 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenging a mandatory school
community service program); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir.
1995) (objecting to an allegedly indecent compulsory AIDS and sex education program in a public
high school); Fleishchfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1994)
(claiming that a grade school supplemental reading program indoctrinated children in values op-
posed to plaintiffs' Christian beliefs, thus violating the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir.
1987) (controverting the forced reading of school books which inculcate values in violation of re-
ligious beliefs).
150. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 702.




The Tenth Circuit declined to extend the concept of parental rights
so that parents of home schooled students could dictate all elements of
their child's education.52 Arguably, the court protected the states' "wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things af-
fecting the child's welfare" in the educational context."3 The rationale for
this arises from the state interest in securing a child's development into a
productive adult citizen of the state.' This, however, conflicts with the
views of proponents of parental rights who dislike the increased amount
of state intervention into the lives of families."" Critics of the parental
rights movement argue that proposed legislative reforms" "go too far
towards isolating parental authority from the oversight of the community,
to the detriment of children's interests and rights.""7 Regardless, the Su-
preme Court has yet to state that parents have a fundamental right to di-
rect the upbringing of their child in its totality, although choices about
family life rank as "of basic importance in our society.""
In the home school arena, without this fundamental parental right to
direct the totality of a child's education, states and public school districts
will continue to exercise a great deal of discretion in their designated role
as the trustees of public education. " ' Parents who wish to complement
their child's home education by enrolling their students part-time in pub-
lic schools likely must rely on the state legislatures and local policies, not
federal law to do so.
As a threshold matter, many states statutorily guarantee the right of
parents to educate their children at home."w Home schooling, however,
152. See id. at 699.
153. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
154. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168; see also David Fisher, Note, Parental Rights and the Right to
Intimate Association, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 407 (1997) (acknowledging that a state can "compel
school attendance, regulate child labor, and demand that children be vaccinated (whether or not this
violates parents' personal and religious view of medical treatment)").
155. See Fisher, supra note 154, at 399.
156. See, e.g., The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, S. 984, 104th Cong. §
2(b)(6) (reestablishing a four-part process for analyzing parental rights that are in conflict with a
government interest).
157. Fisher, supra note 154, at401. "This extended right of parental control results in a danger-
ous and unnecessary cession of state power that necessarily tramples on the fundamental rights of
children." Id.
158. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1996) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 376 (1971)). But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983) (stating that the "relationship
of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protec-
tion").
159. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (noting that "while parents have a
constitutional right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private
schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation").
160. See Fuller, supra note 141, at 1612 & n.62 (listing state statutes guaranteeing the right to
home school).
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cannot usually provide activities such as band, chorus, certain classroom
activities, and many sports without some level of cooperation with an
established educational institution.'1 To ensure such cooperation, states
(or local agencies) should enact laws that allow some type of public
school access to students who are educated primarily at home. So far,
thirteen states have enacted such statutes.62
Illustratively, in the arena of high school sports, the courts have
determined that a student's participation in sports is a privilege and not a
right, and consequently does not receive due process protection. Gener-
ally, a student's right to participate in sports does not rise to the level of a
fundamental right as the latter rights "have their genesis in the ex-
press[ed] and implied protections of personal liberty recognized in fed-
eral and state constitutions.'"" The right to participate in extracurricular
activities is not analogous to the right to free speech in both state and
federal constitutions; government cannot accord fundamental status to
the right to participate in extracurricular activities.'" Rather, this right is
subject to the whims of local educational agency regulations.'" Such an
unprotected status can, depending on the jurisdiction, isolate home
schooled students from local educational agency benefits.'67
Finally, full-time attendance policies can unduly burden the home
schooled student as they allow exclusion of students from a benefit that
they (or their parents) support through taxes. Ironically, in Annie Swan-
son's case, the court implies that the determining factor in the disposition
was the parent's exercise of an educational choice that excluded Annie
from public education and not the school board's policy against part time
attendance. '"
161. See Betty Jo Simmons, Classroom at Home, AM. ScH. BOARDJ., Feb. 1994, at 47,47.
162. See Fuller, supra note 141, at 1615 & n.73.
163. See Derwin L. Webb, Home-Schools and Interscholastic Sports: Denying Participation
Violates United States Constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection Rights, 26 J.L. & EDUC.
123, 123 (1997) (inferring that participation in sports and other extracurricular activities in public
schools is usually a privilege not a right). But see Boyd v. Board of Dirs. of the McGehee Sch. Dist.
No. 17, 612 F. Supp. 86, 93 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (holding that a high school football player who had the
potential to obtain a college scholarship had a constitutionally protected property interest in partici-
pation in sports as participation was a "vital and indispensible" part of his attempt to win a scholar-
ship).
164. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex. 1985) (holding that students
do not have a constitutionally protected interest in participation in extracurricular activities); see also
Webb, supra note 163, at 127.
165. See Stamos, 695 S.W.2d at 560.
166. Cf Webb, supra note 163, at 125 (listing numerous criteria on which state boards or
athletic associations base their admissions regulations).
167. Cf.id.
168. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998)
(stating that there is no constitutional protection to pick and choose which classes or activities your




Other circuits have yet to address home schooling and its constitu-
tional implications. The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Swanson makes the
case somewhat of an anomaly in the federal system.
HI. CONCLUSION
Education of children fundamentally concerns parents and politi-
cians alike. While the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA were supposed to
clarify the appropriate level of funding allocated per student, the fact that
each state may now be required to determine what proportionate share of
federal funds each child receives may delay the actual disbursement of
funds. Clearly, a delay in providing educational services was not the pur-
pose of the Amendments, but such delay threatens to emerge as more
complicated calculations determine allocation of funds to disabled chil-
dren. The Amendments confer a great deal of authority upon local edu-
cational agencies to determine the best educational solutions for disabled
children and while parents involve themselves in the approval of these
decisions, the legal trend seems to be one of deference to schools'
choices and not parental demands.
Likely, the current debate on the appropriate level of state and pa-
rental involvement in the direction a child's education will continue,
barring a Supreme Court determination that directing a child's education
is a fundamental parental right. Home schooling remains a viable and
legal option for parents; however, without state support or legislative
action, parents will continue to struggle to enroll their children in public
school programs on a part-time basis. Local educational agencies legally
and effectively may ban home schooled children from participation in
publicly funded activities.
Ingrid Carlson Barrier*





The area of employment law continues to expand and develop at a
rapid rate. During this survey period,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit published over one hundred decisions concerning
employment law. In an era of "employment at will," an employee seem-
ingly has little recourse when terminated in bad faith, such as in retalia-
tion for parallel discrimination claims, or for speech harmful to the em-
ployer. As exceptions to the employment at will concept develop,' how-
ever, courts increasingly hold employers responsible for improper termi-
nation decisions Although the Tenth Circuit has addressed a number of
issues within the larger category of employment law during this survey
period, this survey will focus on recent developments related to retalia-
tory discharge claims-in particular, retaliatory discharge claims result-
ing from protected speech and those derived from parallel statutory ac-
tions. Part I will address general concepts of employment implicated in
retaliatory discharge claims, laying the foundation for Part II, which dis-
cusses recent decisions in the Tenth Circuit and other circuits in the area
of retaliatory discharge.
I. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE--GENERAL CONCEPTS
A. Common Law Concept of Employment at Will
Traditionally, the common law concept of employment at will per-
mitted an employer, absent agreement to the contrary, to discharge an
employee "at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all." Today,
American courts essentially preserve and frequently recognize this con-
cept,' yet judicially developed exceptions have eroded an employer's
ability to terminate an employee without cause.7 While the common law
1. The survey addresses decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
2. Cf. Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will-When Should
Courts Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 960-61 (1993).
3. See John Michael Anderson, Tenth Circuit Survey, Employment Law, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 455,455 (1997).
4. Jennifer Staley, Comment, Professional Responsibility-The "Snitch Rule, " DR 1-103(A),
Meets the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Weider v. Skala, 19 J. CORP. L. 353, 353 (1994); cf. Payne
v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884) ("The law leaves employer and employe[e] to
make their own contracts; and these, when made, it will enforce; beyond this it does not go. Either
the employer or employe[e] may terminate the relation at will, and the law will not interfere .... ).
5. See Michael D. Wulfsohn, Comment, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz: Palpable Public Policy
and the Superfluous Sixth Element, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 589, 591-92 (1993).
6. Cf. Mark E. Walker, Case Comment, Workers' Compensation: Florida's Resistance to
Nonstatutory Limits to the Employment-at-WiU Doctrine, 43 FLA. L. REV. 583, 584 & n.13 (1991).
7. See Daniel P. Westman, Implied Limitations on Employer's Exercise of Discretion in At-
Will Setting, 558 PLI LITIG. & ADMIN. 605, 607 (1997).
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doctrine of employment at will ostensibly provided equal protection for
both the employer and the employee, it became increasingly apparent
that employers, generally in a position of greater power, benefited from
this concept far more than employees who received little protection from
discriminatory employment practices and were given little recourse.
1. History of At-Will Employment
The doctrine of at-will employment finds its roots in the English con-
cept of servitude,8 which grew from the law regulating the relationship
between master and servant. The law of master and servant afforded some
protection for the employee.! For example, it provided a one-year period
of employment, during which the master could not terminate the servant;
0
and in some circumstances, the employee could seek damages in the
amount of wages he would have earned during the one-year period."
2. American Adoption of Employment at Will
The adoption of the American concept of "at-will" employment "can
be traced to Horace Gay Wood's treatise... [which indicated that] an
employment contract was presumed to be terminable at will unless its
duration had been specified by the parties."'2 With the advent of the
American concept3 came the elimination of the few protections afforded
by the English concept of servitude."' Although the concept as expressed
by Wood lacked support in case law,'" it "was welcomed by American
courts for its laissez-faire, free-market approach to employment con-
tractual relationships."'" Thus, the American twist on the concept of ser-
8. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591; see also Fahleson, supra note 2, at 959-60.
9. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591 (emphasizing that the
original concept presumed a one-year hiring).
10. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Develop-
ment of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 721 (1991); see also Fahleson,
supra note 2, at 959; Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591.
t1. See CHARLES MANLEY SMrTH, ESQ., A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT
93 (Blackstone Publ'g Co. 1886).
12. Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; see also Peck, supra note 10, at 722.
13. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591; see also Staley, supra note 4, at 356.
14. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591; see also Staley, supra note 4, at 356. American courts
adopted the concept of at-will employment sometime after 1877. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5,' at 591;
see also Staley, supra note 4, at 356.
15. Cf Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; Peck, supra note 10, at 722; Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at
591-92.
16. Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; see also Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337
S.E.2d 213, 221 (S.C. 1985) ("Legal scholars and opinion writers agree that the doctrine, if not
expressly created to subserve the laissez-faire climate of the late 19th century, has had the effect of
doing so."); Daniel A. Mathews, Comment, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged
Employee, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 1435, 1438 (1975) (stating that the "rule was thoroughly consistent
with the deeply rooted laissez-faire convictions of the time").
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vitude reflected the growing trend toward a free market economy by in-
corporating free market principles into employment practices.'7
In practice, at-will employment favors the employer." While the at-
will concept permits an employer to terminate an employee for any sub-
jective reason, it is arguably less likely that an employee might leave a
job for an equally subjective reason. In general, employees are replace-
able, while jobs are much more difficult to replace. 9 As such, the at-will
concept of employment, which ostensibly provides equal protection,"
actually creates an atmosphere generally favorable to the employer while
providing little, if any, protection for the employee.
3. Creation of Exceptions to At-Will Employment
Prior to 1970 few avenues existed through which an employee could
seek redress for unjust termination.' In fact, some commentators have
noted that the United States is one of the few places in the western world
allowing an employee such scant recourse.' Exceptions to the at-will
doctrine have become increasingly available in both number and scope,'
17. Cf Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591 (describing how the American concept of at-will em-
ployment "allowed either the employer or the employee to terminate the employment contract at any
time for good cause, bad cause or no cause"). See generally ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LEsTER C.
THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED 11-24 (1987) (explaining the emergence and development of free
market economies).
18. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 10, at 720-21 (describing how New England textile employers
adopted the policy of firing employees without notice while requiring notice from an employee
intending to quit); see also Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947 (1984).
19. Although unemployment rates have remained constant at about 4.5% for the past year, and
total employment rose by 814,000 in January of 1999, the total labor force increased by 67% in
January. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary (February 5, 1999)
<http://stats.bls.gov/news.releaselempsit.nes.htm>. Further, according to the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, between 1991 and 1995 roughly 37% of both men and women experienced one period of unem-
ployment. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Number of Jobs, Labor Market Experience, and Earnings
Growth: Results From a Longitudinal Survey Summary (June 24, 1998) <httpJ/stats.bls.gov/
news.release/nlsoy.nws.htm>. Of those who experienced at least one unemployment period, over
29% reported being unemployed for three or more periods. See id.
20. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591.
21. Cf. Staley, supra note 4, at 356-57. Prior to 1970, three general categories of employees
had some statutory redress: civil service employees, employees governed by collective bargaining
agreements, and employees claiming class-based discrimination. See id.
22. Cf. Janice R. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U.
MICm. J.L. REFORM 207, 208-09 (1983) ("The United States stands virtually alone among Western
industrialized countries in failing to provide a remedy for employees wrongfully dismissed .... The
American practice of not guaranteeing workers a right of fair dismissal diverges from that of other
industrialized countries."); Fahleson, supra note2, at 959 n.9 (noting that Canada and most Western
European countries have provided protection for the employee against "socially unwarranted dis-
missals," such as requiring notice prior to discharge, shifting the burden on the employer to prove
that a discharge was legitimate, and mandating predismissal hearings).
23. See Staley, supra note 4, at 354; Walker supra note 6, at 584; see also Maureen S. Binetti
et al, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swallowed the Rule? Common Law
Limitations Upon an Employer's Control over Employees-at-Will, 581 PLI IG. & ADMIN. 447,
457 (1998); Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960-61.
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thus providing avenues through which terminated employees may obtain
a remedy.' Such exceptions, which vary significantly among the states,'
include "implied contracts (based upon oral promises, handbooks, or the
parties' course of dealing); violation of public policy; and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' Some legal scholars argue that
these remedial exceptions have virtually eliminated the doctrine of em-
ployment at will;27 however, many courts remain hesitant to recognize
such exceptions.'
B. Wrongful Termination
Wrongful termination actions are based on statutory provisions and
judicially created exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will.' An
employee may bring these actions under both federal and state law.' This
survey focuses on wrongful termination actions arising under the public
policy exception. In the early 1980s, the New Jersey Supreme Court,. in
the pivotal case of Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., clearly ar-
ticulated the creation of the public policy exception as a cause of action
for wrongful discharge. The court stated that "an employee has a cause
of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear
mandate of public policy."32
1. Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception for a wrongful termination claim pro-
vides a remedy for employees terminated while exercising a legal right,
performing a legal duty, refusing to commit an illegal act, or "whistle
blowing."33 These activities may be grouped into the more general cate-
24. Cf Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960.
25. See Staley, supra note 4, at 357-58.
26. Binetti, supra note 23, at 457.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254, 256-57 (Ala. 1991); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc.,
320 S.E.2d 872, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 877
(Miss. 1981); Waldermeyer v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 767 F. Supp. 989, 994 (E.D. Mo. 1991);
DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see also
Walker, supra note 6, at 584. But see Peter A. Muhic, Recent Decision, Labor Law-Drug Testing
and the Employment At-Will Doctrine: Third Circuit Defines New Cause of Action for Wrongful
Discharge-Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992), 66 TEMP. L. REv. 327,
327 (1993). See generally MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 3 (1988).
29. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; W. Muzette Hill, Employment Practices Liability: The
Other Year 2000 Problem?, 584 PLI LITIG. & ADMIN. 293, 301 (1998).
30. See Hill, supra note 29, at 299; cf Anderson, supra note 3, at 455 (discussing the role of
congressional statutes enacted to protect employees).
31. 417A.2d505,512(NJ. 1980).
32. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512.
33. Cf Hill, supra note 29, at 301.
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gories of (1) refusal to commit an unlawful act, (2) fulfilling a public
obligation, and (3) exercising a right or privilege.'
Sources and types of public policy are many;' however, in an at-
tempt to "forward a clearly articulated public policy,"' courts have lim-
ited the sources from which a public policy exception may emanate?7
Courts may differ in their understanding of public policy, 8 but in general,
"public policy includes general notions of goodness, justness and absten-
tion from activity which is injurious to the public good."39 As with
wrongful termination actions, both state and federal law provide sources
of public policy,' including constitutional and statutory provisions at
both levels."' Courts may look to "general public standards and morals,
without requiring plaintiffs to point to a specific source of positive law."
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,'3 the New Jersey Supreme
Court attempted to define sources of public policy when it stated that
"the sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules,
regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a
professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy.'"
Despite this definition, the nature of "public policy," as well as "public
concern," remains nebulous because these categories are extremely broad
and support differing interpretations. The increasing number of claims3
arising in this area indicates that courts intend not only to promote mat-
ters and values of public concern but to protect them.
34. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 964-66.
35. Cf id. at 967.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 968.
39. Id. at 967; cf Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal.
1953).
40. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 967-68.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 968; cf, e.g., Palmateer v. Int'l. Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (111. 1981)
(holding that "[n]o specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to take an active
part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime-
fighters").
43. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
44. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512.
45. A number of cases address the many exceptions to at-will employment founded in differ-
ent sources of public policy. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1103 (10th
Cir. 1998); Curtis v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 1998);
Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1998); Radwan v. Beecham Lab., 850
F.2d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1988); Tameny v. At. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 108 (Colo. 1992); Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367,
1373 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980);
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880; Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512; Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d
386, 391 (Vt. 1996).
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2. History of the Public Policy Exception
California courts were at the forefront of recognizing the public pol-
icy exception to at-will employment. ' In 1959, the landmark case of Pe-
termann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396,"' created
the framework for the public policy exception ' when the court deter-
mined that certain societal values mandate the protection of employees
from unfair action by disproportionately powerful employers. Petermann
surveyed definitions of "public policy," recognizing it as a "principle of
law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a ten-
dency to be injurious to the public or against the public good," or that
which "contravenes good morals or any established interests of
society." A series of cases in the 1970s provided the "framework of the
types of employer actions that violate 'public policy.""' They established
the foundation for causes of action currently recognized as retaliatory
discharge in violation of public policy-that is, discharge contrary to a
core societal value." These cases "recognized that strict adherence to the
at-will doctrine could bring potential harm to society in general." 3 Ac-
cordingly, the public policy exception grew from a general concern over
the erosion of core societal values caused by the at-will concept of em-
ployment. Thus, although at-will employment provided certain freedoms
for both the employer and the employee, it became evident that restraints
were necessary to prevent the potential exploitation of employees.
C. Retaliatory Discharge
1. Retaliatory Discharge As a Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception seeks to protect employees from a re-
taliatory termination resulting from their involvement, or lack of in-
volvement, in activities generally considered valuable to society and
worthy of protection. Such activities include exercising a legal right,
46. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 593; see also Westman, supra note 7, at 609.
47. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
48. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27.
49. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721,
726 (Cal. 1953)).
50. Id.; cf. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 594.
51. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 594; see, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (creating an exception for retaliatory discharge); Cloutier v. Great Adl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1144 (N.H. 1981) (finding that violation of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 constituted a violation of public policy); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d
549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (ruling that a breach of employment contract occurs when termination "is
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation"); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or.
1975) (creating exception for employee discharged after fulfilling jury duty); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (creating an exception for whistleblowing).
52. Cf. Binetti, supra note 23, at 503 (citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 686-87 (Cal.
1992), overruled by Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. 1998)).
53. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 597.
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refusing to commit an illegal act, or fulfilling a public obligation. ' For
example, in Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc.," the manager of an auto
dealership assaulted an employee and the employee filed criminal
charges.' The employee, Dudewicz, alleged that the owner ordered him
to withdraw the complaint or face termination. Dudewicz ultimately lost
his job"7 after he refused to drop the complaint. The court found that
Dudewicz had the right to file a criminal complaint regarding an incident
of criminal assault in the workplace without fear of losing his job. 8 The
court stated that retaliatory discharge "infer[s] a motive of the em-
ployer's desire to 'get even' with the employee for the employee's
words, acts, refusals or omissions to act."5"
It is important to note that a parallel statutory claim, such as one
arising under Title VII carries an additional hurdle to the employee
seeking to successfully assert a claim of wrongful discharge because the
remedies provided by the statute may preempt any other wrongful dis-
charge claim. Although this issue will not be discussed in depth in this
survey, the frequent statutory preemption of other claims arising from
discriminatory activity requires individuals to evaluate whether a statute
provides the "exclusive remedy" for such activities.'
2. Retaliatory Discharge in Violation of Title VII
An employer may not terminate an employee in retaliation for cer-
tain employment discrimination claims. Title V116' prevents retaliatory
discharge actions resulting from a complaint against an employer on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 The following cases
illustrate both statutory and public policy claims. In Roberts v. Roadway
54. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 964-66; see also Binetti supra 23, at 504-11.
55. 503 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. 1993).
56. Dudewicz, 503 N.W.2d at 646.
57. The parties disputed whether the company fired Dudewicz or whether he voluntarily
resigned. See id. While the court did not specifically address this dispute, the court's analysis clearly
indicates that it considered the separation to be a termination. See id. at 646-50.
58. See id.
59. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 609. While Dudewicz provides an example of retaliatory dis-
charge for both an act and a refusal to act, Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.
1998), discussed later, provides a clear example of retaliation for words spoken. In that case, Cragg
lost his job for publicly voicing his opinion of individuals running for public office. See Cragg, 143
F.3d at 1345; see also infra notes 70-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Cragg).
60. Binetti, supra note 23, at 513. For example, the court in Dudewicz ultimately denied the
availability of the plaintiffs public policy claim because Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act
pre-empted such an action. See Dudewicz, 503 N.W.2d at 650 ("A public policy claim is sustain-
able ... only where there also is not an applicable statutory prohibition against discharge in retalia-
tion for the conduct at issue.").
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
62. See id.; see also Anderson, supra note 3, at 456; Jennifer A. Nemec, Comment, Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English: Free Speech May Have Lost the Battle, But in the End It Will Win
the War, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 117, 127 (1998).
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Express, Inc.," an employee complained to the national headquarters of
racial harassment by fellow employees. Following these allegations, lo-
cal supervisors subjected the complaining employee to a number of dis-
ciplinary actions and eventually terminated him. The employee alleged a
retaliatory discharge in violation of a valid public policy and stated a
claim under Title VII. Similarly, in Curtis v. Oklahoma City Public
Schools Board of Education," an employee filed a discrimination claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but was
terminated before the EEOC hearing; and, as in Roberts, the employee
eventually alleged retaliatory discharge in violation of both public policy
and Title VII. Title VII protection is contingent upon "'which party's
explanation of the employer's motivation [the court] believes."' If the
court determines that the employer used the parallel statutory claim as a
reason for termination, the employee may receive protection.' Alterna-
tively, should the court determine that circumstances justified the termi-
nation, the employee should not receive protection." The burden of per-
suasion in a claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII lies with the
plaintiff.' Further, courts consider the sufficiency of statutory remedies
in the context of parallel claims.
II. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE-CASE DISCUSSION
A. Background
Public policy exceptions to at-will employment developed to protect
and further core goals and values of society. Retaliatory discharge cases
by their nature arise under common law, and courts in such cases have
the difficult task of balancing these societal interests. Because these ele-
ments lack strict definition, courts frequently have little guidance in de-
termining what qualifies as a valid public interest. A court maintains the
powerful position of deciding which values society wants protected and,
when a discrepancy arises, which values are more important. For exam-
ple, a court may consider the important competing interests of the need
for strong government versus a right to freedom of speech. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided three cases which present this
63. 149 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 1998).
64. 147 F.3d 1200(10th Cir. 1998).
65. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1207-09.
66. Love v. REIMAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
67. See, e.g., Love, 738 F.2d at 386 (finding employer's dissatisfaction with employee's per-
formance to be a pretext). Some commentators have noted that claims based on discriminatory
conduct will "fail because of statutory preemption." Binetti, supra note 23, at 513. "However, some
courts allow a public policy discharge claim, even if there is also a statutory remedy. The key usu-
ally is whether the statutory remedy is deemed exclusive." Id.
68. Cf., e.g., Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1217 (holding that the Title VII claim was properly dismissed
due to evidence in record justifying employer).
69. See Love, 738 F.3d at 385-86.
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need for balancing. Although factual differences exist, in each situation
the court balanced the relevant interests in determining which interest
should prevail-a difficult task because of the delicate nature of the in-
terests involved.
B. Retaliatory Discharge for Protected Activity
1. Tenth Circuit-Cragg v. City of Osawatomie'
a. Case History
John Cragg, a terminated city police chief, brought action against the
City of Osawatomie, Kansas, alleging breach of contract and retaliatory
discharge in violation of the First Amendment.' The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas entered summary judgment for the
city.72 On appeal, Mr. Cragg raised five issues for relief, three of which
the court did not address." The two issues that the Tenth Circuit re-
viewed were, first, whether the district court failed to properly apply the
First Amendment balancing test required by Pickering v. Board of Edu-
cation," and second, whether the district court's interpretation of Kan-
sas's law was in error with regard to Mr. Cragg's contract claim.' The
Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 6
b. Facts
For over twenty years, John Cragg worked as the Osawatomie police
chief." Prior to a city election, the city manager questioned Chief Cragg
concerning the possibility that certain candidates for city council had
felony convictions 8 and whether it was legal for a convicted felon to hold
70. 143 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998).
71. See Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, No. 95-2492-JWL, 1996 WL 707108, at *2 (D. Kan.
Nov. 8 1996), affid in part, rev'd in part, 143 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998).
72. See Cragg, 1996 WL 707108, at *5.
73. See Cragg, 143 F.3d at 1345.
74. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see Cragg, 143 F.3d at 1345. The
Supreme Court, in Pickering, asserted that "the problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. One commentator has noted:
[Tihe Pickering decision appeared to finally make clear that the government's interest in
regulating an employee's speech is only strong enough to overcome the employee's First
Amendment right when the employee's speech impedes or interferes with the efficiency
of serving that part of the public that the employee has a duty to serve.
James G. Fahey, United States v. National Treasury Employees Union: Restrictions on Free Speech
of Government Employees and the Rebalancing of Pickering, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 555, 561
(1996).
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a position on the city council."9 Chief Cragg investigated the individuals
and the legal matters involved, discovering that three of the candidates
for office were convicted felons and that convicted felons may legally
hold office unless they are on probation or serving a sentence.' Chief
Cragg informed the city manager and then placed a television advertise-
ment on local cable television urging voters to choose their candidates
wisely.8 The advertisement did not indicate that Mr. Cragg was the chief
of police.' During a later recall election, Chief Cragg placed a sign on
his front lawn urging voters to "vote no on recall."8 Eventually, the
newly appointed City Manager terminated Chief Cragg's employment
prompting Mr. Cragg to bring an action under the theory of retaliatory
discharge." Mr. Cragg alleged that the city terminated his employment in
retaliation for his political activities: the television advertisement and the
lawn sign. He also alleged that the termination violated his rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
c. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that
Mr. Cragg's interest in free speech outweighed the city's interest in
functional efficiency.' The court performed the applicable four-step
analysis for cases involving public employees alleging retaliatory dis-
charge in violation of the right to free speech under the First Amend-
ment.87 This analysis requires, first, that the court "determine whether the
public employee's speech touches on a matter of public concern."8 Sec-
ond, the court must consider whether the "employee spoke as a citizen on
a matter of public concern" and if so, the court must "weigh 'the interests
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern' against the State's interest 'as an employer in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."'"
Third, following a determination that the plaintiffs speech interests out-
weigh the government's efficiency interests, the plaintiff must prove that
the speech was a key factor in the employee's termination.' And finally,








86. See id. at 1346-47.
87. See id. at 1346.
88. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983)).
89. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
90. See id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
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nation, the defendant must establish that the same decision to terminate
would have been reached absent the speech issue?'
In Cragg, the only relevant issue for consideration on appeal was the
question of efficiency, whether it was proper to restrict Mr. Cragg's
speech in order to allow the city to adequately deliver appropriate public
services.92 The city alleged that the efficiency interest at issue was that of
avoiding a "disruption" within the city." The city argued that Mr.
Cragg's political activities either resulted in, or had the potential to result
in, a disruption of the functions of the police department and therefore
rendered his actions subject to censorship. Yet the city failed to recog-
nize that neither the television advertisement nor the lawn sign indicated
that the Chief of Police was in support of the statements on the adver-
tisements." In balancing the interests of the parties, the court determined
that Mr. Cragg's actions (voicing his opinion on political candidates)
were at the center of protected speech, and concluded that Mr. Cragg's
speech interests tipped the balance in his favor.' Since the city failed to
prove that Mr. Cragg's actions caused any disruption to the efficient
functioning of the police department, Mr. Cragg's speech interests out-
weighed the city's efficiency interest.'
d. Analysis
The four-part free speech analysis, including the efficiency portion
of that analysis, is rooted in the need to protect speech and is implicated
in situations presenting competing social concerns such as those involv-
ing constitutionally guaranteed interests of individuals and the interests
of the city in fulfilling its obligations to its residents." In a series of em-
ployment cases," the Supreme Court established this test that provides
analytical guidelines for determining whether an employee has been im-
properly terminated in violation of his First Amendment rights. Balanc-




93. See id. at 1346-47.
94. See id. at 1347.
95. See id. at 1345.
96. See id. at 1346.
97. See id. at 1347.
98. See id. at 1346. The Supreme court has arrived at various interpretations and determina-
tions concerning these competing interests. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388
(1987) (balancing law enforcement employee's right to criticize the President's policy against state's
interest in promoting efficiency of public service); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-53 (1983)
(balancing employer's interest in institutional efficiency against employee's right to circulate ques-
tionnaire); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-72 (1968) (balancing employee's right to
comment on matter of public concern against employer's interest in efficiency).
99. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563.
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In Cragg, the Tenth Circuit considered the balance between the right
of free speech and the need for the government to operate smoothly-
two socially critical interests which, in this case, could not successfully
coexist. Although the elements of the analysis are clear, it is difficult to
assess which competing interest shall and should prevail for the better-
'ment of society." In the instant case, the court properly considered the
relationship between the two interests and weighed the merits of each
side. Although the competing interests in this case lean toward the pro-
tection of the individual because there was no disruption of city services,
the balancing test is not always so clear, and each situation is likely to
create a different result. The more closely balanced the interests are, the
more difficult it is to predict what interest a court might determine is
more valuable. In Cragg, however, the court provided a check on the
system by disciplining a government entity that stepped outside of its
own boundaries.
2. Other Circuits
There is considerable Supreme Court support for the efficiency analysis,'
which the circuit courts rely upon. Application of the efficiency analysis is an
attempt to streamline decisions in cases involving freedom of speech and public
officials by strictly applying a clearly defined analysis strucure." There is, how-
ever, no clear indication of how a court will nle given a specific set of facts. In
evaluating an immunity issue within the efficiency analysis, the Ninth Circuit has
stated that "under Pickering... a fact-sensitive, context-specific balancing of
competing interests, [will cause] the law regarding public-employee free speech
claims [to]... 'rarely, if ever, be sufficiently "clearly established" to preclude
qualified immunity."' Therefore, although there can be no clear outcome of the
balancing tests, the circuit courts are in accord in using the efficiency analysis to
structure the factual analysis. '- Thus, the Tenth Circuit's approach to factual situa-
tions involving freedom of speech and public officials corresponds to the approach
of other circuit courts.
100. See Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1560-61 (9th Cir. 1995).
101. Cf. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
102. This efficiency analysis arises from the Pickering balancing test and its progeny. Cf.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
103. Brewster v. Board of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Moran v.
Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 1998)).
104. A number of courts have used the Pickering balance test to determine which interest
weighed more heavily. See, e.g., McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1998); Brewster,
149 F.3d at 981; McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1997); Watters v. City of Philadel-
phia, 55 F.3d 886, 895 (3rd Cir. 1995); Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374, 377 (11 th Cir. 1993); Gonzales v.
Benavides, 712 F.2d 142, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1983).
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C. Retaliatory Discharge for Parallel Statutory Actions
1. Tenth Circuit-Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc."
a. Case History
A jury found that Roadway Express retaliated against Roy Roberts in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.(6 The District Court for the District of Colorado granted Mr. Rob-
erts costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." Roadway alleged error on
numerous grounds, including refusal to grant judgment as a matter of law
for insufficiency of the evidence, exclusion of relevant evidence, and
admission of prejudicial evidence." The Tenth Circuit affirmed.'"
b. Facts
After more than twenty years as a truck driver and laborer for Road-
way Express, the company transferred Mr. Roberts from Kansas City to
Denver where he allegedly suffered racial harassment including two ra-
cially offensive notes, the "sabotag[ing]" of his truck by fellow employ-
ees, and general interference with his work."' Mr. Roberts complained to
his local supervisors and eventually formally complained to Roadway's
national headquarters."' After these complaints, Mr. Roberts's supervisor
subjected him to multiple disciplinary actions and eventual termination."'
Mr. Roberts filed suit in district court claiming he was subjected to a
hostile work environment and that his discharge had been retaliatory."3
Although he did not prove the hostile work environment claim, the jury
found Roadway retaliated against Mr. Roberts,"" and awarded damages
for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees."
35
c. Decision
On appeal, Roadway claimed that Mr. Roberts presented insuffi-
cient evidence to support the jury finding of retaliation."' In evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence of retaliation, the Tenth Circuit Court of
105. 149 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 1998).




110. Id. at 1102.
111. See id
112. See id. at 1102-03. The company later reinstated Mr. Robert's to his prior position after
union intervention. See id.
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Appeals applied the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation."7 Under
this test, Mr. Roberts needed to "establish that: (1) he engaged in pro-
tected opposition to discrimination; (2) he was subject to adverse em-
ployment action; and (3) that there exists a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action.""' 8 Roadway alleged a fail-
ure to establish "(1) [that Mr. Roberts] suffered adverse employment
action; (2) that adverse action, if established, was causally connected to
his written complaint of March 1993; and (3) that he suffered compensa-
ble emotional distress.'" 9 The court stated that in order to establish that
the jury properly found the discharge retaliatory, "the issue [was]
whether [Mr.] Roberts presented sufficient evidence for the jury to de-
termine that adverse employment action was taken against him in re-
sponse to the protected activity."'" After engaging in a quasi-balancing
test to determine whether these elements were satisfied, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the jury findings on these elements were reasonable."' The
claim of racial discrimination that Mr. Roberts made to Roadway head-
quarters was protected activity." Following this claim, Roadway subjected
Mr. Roberts to numerous warning letters, suspensions, and eventually ter-
mination.'" And finally, the court found that these actions were by their
nature adverse" and, therefore, satisfied Mr. Roberts's requirement of
proof that he was subjected to adverse employment action.'"
In addressing whether Mr. Roberts established a sufficient causal
connection between his discharge and his claim of racial harassment, the
court recognized the competing interests of Mr. Roberts and Roadway."
Mr. Roberts's interest was his right to assert his claim of racial harass-
ment while Roadway had an interest in an maintaining an efficient busi-
ness. Roadway asserted that there was not a prima facie causal connec-
tion between the Mr. Robert's allegations and the termination, arguing
that the disciplinary actions imposed on Mr. Roberts were a result of the
application of workplace regulations.'27 The court, however, determined
117. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993); cf Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981), and explaining that the evidence presented may be considered
by the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant's evidence rebuts plaintiffs prima facie
case).
118. Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1103.
119. Id. at 1104.
120. Id. at 1103.




125. See id.; see also Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329 (10th Cir. 1996); Berry v.
Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980,986 (10th Cir. 1996).




that because Roadway failed to raise the issue below, consideration of
the argument was not appropriate."
Finally, the Tenth Circuit held Roadway's claim that Mr. Roberts
failed to provide adequate grounds for compensatory damages without
merit." Roadway argued that since Mr. Roberts received compensation
under the Colorado Workers Compensation Act, he was not entitled to
any other remedy for emotional distress from a work-related injury.'"
The court quickly disposed of this issue under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution,'3 ' recognizing that federal law entitled Mr.
Roberts to compensation for the work-related injury because a state
compensation law cannot preempt the federal law.'32 The court also held
that Roadway failed to prove that Mr. Roberts had already recovered
under state law for these injuries.'33 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the damage award ordered by the district court. "
d. Analysis
The Roberts court applied a test similar to the one used in Cragg,'
35
balancing the interest of Mr. Roberts to work in a environment void of
discrimination against Roadway's interest in requiring and enforcing
certain workplace standards. While the Cragg court balanced the effi-
ciency interest of the city government against individual rights,'" Roberts
indicates that a similar analysis may be applied in the private sector.
Roadway, much like a government, had an interest in efficiently operat-
ing its business and providing the best possible service to its customers,
while ensuring that its employees were not deprived of their rights as
citizens. Thus, after deciding the preliminary matters, such as whether
Mr. Roberts engaged in a protected activity and suffered adverse em-
ployment action,'37 the Tenth Circuit, under the guise of establishing a
causal action, '8 essentially applied a balancing test. The court applied an
efficiency analysis to determine if the actions of the alleged victim inter-
fered with the operation of the defendant employer and if so, whether the
need for public protection of these values outweighs the efficient opera-
tion of the employer's business.
128. See id.
129. Seeid. at ll05.
130. See id.
131. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; see Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1104.
132. See Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1104; see also U.S. CONST. art VL cl. 2; Karcher v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 1996); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1190 (2d
Cir. 1987).
133. See Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1103.
134. See id.
135. Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 70-
100 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Cragg).
136. See Cragg, 143 F.3d at 1346.
137. See Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1104.
138. Cf. id.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. Tenth Circuit-Curtis v. Oklahoma City Public Schools Board
of Education'39
a. Case History
William Curtis filed an action against the Board of Education of the
Oklahoma City Public Schools, members of the board in their individual
capacity, and various supervisors,'" claiming harassment and retaliation
in violation of his First Amendment rights, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and state law prohibiting retaliatory discharge and breach of
contract.' After determining that all but two of Mr. Curtis's expressions
relating to racial equality in the school district were not protected by the
First Amendment, 2 the district court granted a motion for judgment as a
matter of law for the defendants on Mr. Curtis's Title VII, state law re-
taliatory discharge, and contract claims.' 3 On appeal, Mr. Curtis argued
that the district court erred in ruling that certain speech was not protected
by the First Amendment." The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court in
part, holding that portions of the speech at issue were protected for pur-
poses of Mr. Curtis's civil rights and retaliatory discharge claims, but
affirmed all other issues.'5
b. Facts
Mr. Curtis alleged that he was discharged from his position as the
Equity/Affirmative Action Officer for the Oklahoma City Public Schools
in violation of state and federal law." Mr. Curtis's position involved the
implementation of a "model school system" with respect to equity and
affirmative action programs" and also provided a necessary communi-
cation link between various entities of the school system.'" In addition,
Mr. Curtis facilitated the Equity Committee, a committee established to
achieve desegregation goals. "'
After two years of employment with generally favorable evaluations,
Mr. Curtis began to have difficulty with a new supervisor and received
multiple reprimands for his performance." Mr. Curtis argued that these
actions were retaliatory, while the Board of Education claimed that Mr.
Curtis failed to meet deadlines and follow directives and thus did not
139. 147 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 1998).
140. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1205.
141. See id. at 1209.
142. See id. at 1205.
143. See id. at 1210.
144. See id. at 1205.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1207 n.2.
148. See id. at 1206-07.




comply with the requirements of his job."' Later, Mr. Curtis testified at a
School Board hearing, supporting a collegue's allegations of harassment
by her supervisor and accusing the same supervisor of racial harassment
directed at himself. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Curtis's supervisor placed him
on a plan to improve his work deficiencies.. and eventually terminated
Mr. Curtis on incompetence grounds." Prior to the termination, Mr.
Curtis testified before a grand jury regarding the harassment and filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which
was eventually dismissed.'" Additionally, he presented a report to the
Equity Committee indicating that a group of schools in the district were
not successfully implementing the model school system.'5' In the time
between Mr. Curtis's testimony and his termination, the board responsi-




On appeal, the court considered two issues relevant to this survey.
The court first considered whether the First Amendment protected Mr.
Curtis's activities.'7 A government employee may not be terminated
based on a constitutionally protected activity."" Thus, the court recog-
nized that Mr. Curtis could not be terminated in retaliation for his testi-
mony concerning the alleged harassment or his other activities if they
constituted protected speech." Consistent with Supreme Court and Tenth
Circuit rulings, the court first considered whether the speech was "fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern."'"
Speech which is a matter of public concern is protected by the First
Amendment and the court must apply the Pickering balancing test."' If
the speech is solely a matter of personal concern, however, it is less
likely that a court will find support for its protection.
The court determined that the speech involved a matter of public
concern because it "directly concerned issues of public interest, including
whether there was equity in the Oklahoma City public schools."'' 2 Thus,
the court employed the Pickering balancing test in an effort to ascertain
whether Mr. Curtis's speech interest outweighed the School District's
151. Seeki.
152. See id.
153. Seeid. at 1209.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1208-09.
156. See id. at 1208.
157. See id. at 1210.
158. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987).
159. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1211.
160. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); see Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811
(10th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the Pickering balancing test, see supra note 74.
161. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1211.
162. Id. at 1212.
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interest in providing public services. 3 In accordance with prior Tenth
Circuit decisions,' the court considered whether restricting Mr. Curtis's
speech was necessary to provide adequate government services-in this
case, the efficient operation of the school system and the equity program
within the system." After applying the balancing test, the Tenth Circuit
determined that some statements did not receive protection under the
First Amendment for purposes of Mr. Curtis's retaliatory discharge
claim. The court found that Mr. Curtis's statements made prior to the
initiation of a new purpose for the Equity Committee, on which Mr.
Curtis served, were protected because they did not cause any disruption
to the efficient operation of the committee." Statements made following
this change, however, caused a disruption to the Equity Committee by
calling into question Mr. Curtis's ability to do his job.'67 Thus, the court
indicated that factual distinctions may provide differing results when
balancing efficiency interests.
d. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit continues to employ the Pickering balancing test
when considering whether the right to protected speech is implicated in a
retaliatory discharge claim. In doing so, the court balances the interest of
the employee in his right to free speech with the necessary functions of
government and the essential limitations on these functions. The American
system of government requires a delicate balance among all branches of
government as well as the protection of fundamental rights and liberties.
When the government is also an employer, there is potential for improper
interference and constraints upon these rights. In the instant case, for ex-
ample, the court addressed the possibility that the school board had used its
position of governmental power to chill the speech of an employee. Unlike
the decision in Cragg,"' the court found that portions of the employee's
speech did not require protection. The court also found that the interests of
the government outweighed those of the individual employee.' The court
found that the speech of the employee interfered with the relationship be-
tween different branches of the school system to the point of requiring a
check on this speech. Once again, individual courts are charged with
evaluating which interest is more deserving of protection, determining for
the people which interest is of more value to society.
163. See id. at 1212-13.
164. See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying the Pickering
balancing test).
165. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1212.
166. See id. at 1213.
167. See id. at 1214.
168. Cragg v. City of Osawatonie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1998).




The requirements of a retaliatory discharge claim, as applied by the
Tenth Circuit in Roberts," are consistent with Title VII requirements"' and
decisions in other circuits."' Determining the direction of the law, how-
ever, is difficult due to the unique factual circumstances of each case and
the nature of balancing tests which yield results based upon these fact-
specific situations.
Additionally, findings by the Roberts court, such as the criteria that
establish an adverse employment action,'73 are consistent with other cir-
cuits' rulings on these issues." The Eighth Circuit has determined that
items such as negative employment reports may lead to serious employ-
ment consequences, even termination, and are thus sufficient to establish
an adverse employment action."' In accordance with this definition, the
Roberts court found that Mr. Roberts's suspensions, temporary termina-
tion, and employment reports were adverse employment actions due to
their potential harm to Mr. Roberts.'76
The Roberts court also addressed whether the Colorado Workers
Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy for work-related inju-
ries.'7 The court ruled consistently with the Second and Eighth Circuits
when it found that state law did not supersede Mr. Roberts's right to re-
covery under federal law. In Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc.,"' the Second
Circuit determined that a state workers compensation law barring recov-
ery under federal law was inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution."' In Karcher v. Emerson Electric Co.,' ' the Eighth Circuit
held that a state workers compensation law did not preempt the right to
recover for emotional distress created by a federal law."'
Despite the difficulty in finding a trend in decisions involving bal-
ancing tests between competing interests of the employer and the em-
170. See also Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993)); Sorensen v. City of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 353
(10th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1993).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
172. See, e.g., Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass'n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1182-83
(8th Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir. 1998); Hernandez-
Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 46-47 (lst Cir. 1998); Parkins v. Civil Con-
structors of Ill., Inc., No. 98-1687, 1998 WL 909885, at *2(7th Cir. Dec. 30, 1998).
173. See Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir. 1998).
174. See, e.g., Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060-61 (8th Cir. 1997); Karcher v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 508-09 (8th Cir. 1996); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d
1184, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1987).
175. See Kim, 123 F.3dat 1060.
176. See Roberts, 149 F.3d. at 1104.
177. See id. at 1105.
178. 831 F.2dat 1184.
179. See id. at 1190; see also U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
180. 94 F.3d at 502.
181. See Karcher, 94 F.3d at 509.
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ployee,'" courts commonly attempt to provide adequate protection for
individuals. As exceptions to at-will employment develop, it is evident
that courts are attempting to protect and delineate valid public policies
and core goals. For example, the court in United States v. National Treas-
ury Employees Union'13 required that the government demonstrate more
than a mere threat of harm to the efficient functioning of the services they
provide.'" In doing so, the court expressed a clear intent to provide ade-
quate protection for certain core rights, such as free speech. In analyzing a
case alleging wrongful termination in violation of a valid public policy, a
court applies a balancing test, and in doing so, balances the needs of the
legal system in drawing a line around valid public policy exceptions--a
task, some would argue, that is better left to the legislature."
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has consistently evaluated competing value inter-
ests and has done so in accordance with other circuits. Although the
trend involves recognition of the public policy exception to the concept
of at-will employment, there are "some courts [that] continue to refuse to
recognize a public policy exception."'" Retaliatory discharge claims in
violation of public policy have a well-defined set of analytical guidelines
that a court may use in balancing competing interests between the par-
ties; however, the results remain fact driven. It may be wise to establish
further guidelines by which a court can evaluate each situation, and es-
tablish legislation that defines what types of actions are protected and
which are not.
Elizabeth H. Confer*
182. See Fahey, supra note 74, at 556 n.16 (discussing the Pickering Court's determination that
there is not a standard against which statements by public employees can be judged); see also Bi-
netti, supra note 23, at 559 ("[Mhe opportunities for creative pleading of common law causes of
action, alleging limitations on the employer's discretion in the at-will employment setting, are le-
gion.... [Tihe legal landscape in which they practice surely will continue to present challenges to
their ingenuity.").
183. 513 U.S. 454 (1994).
184. See Fahey, supra note 74, at 598.
185. See generally Fahleson, supra note 2 (discussing the public policy exception and the
interaction between the judiciary and the legislature).
186. Binetti, supra note 23, at 560.
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Denver College of Law. This article could not have
been written without the inciteful comments and generous time contributions of Steve Gibson and
Kent Modesitt.
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EVIDENCE: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege of the common
law.' It provides protection to confidential communications between a
client and his attorney by prohibiting disclosure of communications re-
lating to legal advice or opinion.2 As the Supreme Court stated, this
privilege is necessary "to encourage full and frank communication be-
tween attorneys and their clients." The work-product doctrine affords
protection to materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of trial."
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine prevents
disclosure of information related to the client's case. The work product
doctrine encourages careful and thorough research by the attorney, with-
out fear an adversary will use their work.' It protects the attorney as he
finds facts and devises strategy, whereas the attorney-client privilege
protects the client. The liberal discovery rules of both civil procedure and
I. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
2. See Michael J. Chepiga, Federal Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine,
583 PLI LITIG. 473, 476 (1998) (discussing the federal courts' recent interpretation and application
of the attorney-client privilege); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (articulating that the privilege
"exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the
giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice").
3. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. One aspect of the attorney-client privilege to receive a substan-
tial amount of attention over the last year concerns governmental attorney-client privilege. See
generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83
MINN. L. REV. 473, 475 (1998) (arguing the United States government controls the same type of
attorney-client privilege that exists for a corporation). The issue has arisen numerous times during
the Independent Counsel's investigation of President William Jefferson Clinton's administration. See
id. In a case of first impression, the District of Columbia Circuit held the Deputy White House
Counsel could not assert the attorney-client privilege to avoid responding to a grand jury if he pos-
sessed information relating to possible criminal violation. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1102
(D.C. Cir. 1998). In Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), the Supreme Court
rejected the Independent Counsel's argument that the attorney-client privilege should not protect
confidential communications when the client has died and the communications relates to a criminal
proceeding. See Swindler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2084. The Supreme Court reaffirmed well over a
century of case law by stating the attorney-client privilege survives the death of a client. Cf. id. at
2087.
4. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). The Second Circuit recently expanded
the work product definition, Cf United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998). In Adlman,
the Second Circuit held the work product doctrine may protect a document prepared by a party if the
document is intended to help in making a business decision which turns on the party's appraisal of
the probable result of litigation expected to result from the transaction. See id. at 1197; cf Harvey
Kurzweil et al., Second Circuit Interprets and Potentially Expands Work Product Protection, 12
INSIGHTS, JULY 1998 at 27 (stating that the "practical effect of the Adlman decision is the work
product doctrine may protect certain advisory or opinion materials created by non-lawyers for the
purpose of advising whether to undertake contemplated business transactions").
5. See Emily Jones, Keeping Client Confidences: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Prod-
uct Doctrine in Light of United States v. Adlman, 18 PACE L. REv. 419, 433 (1998) (describing the
policy considerations supporting the attorney-client privilege).
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evidence conflict with both privileges.' Although the attorney-client
privilege may serve as a "roadblock to the truth," at least on an interme-
diate level, society has subordinated the search for truth to a preferred
value of full, confident, candid, confidential legal representation of a
client!
This survey examines how the United States Court of Appeals for
the.Tenth Circuit dealt with several important issues implicating the at-
torney-client privilege and work product doctrine during the survey pe-
riod.' Part I addresses the controversial areas of implied subject matter
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the effect of subsequent liti-
gation upon the work product doctrine. In Frontier Refining, Inc., v.
Gorman-Rupp Co.,9 the Tenth Circuit approved the Hearn" test to ana-
lyze issues of implied subject matter waiver" and decided that the work
product doctrine affords protection to subsequent litigation. 2
Part II of this survey analyzes a corporation's ability to assert attor-
ney-client privilege, as well as a corporate employee's ability to assert an
individual attorney-client privilege with corporate counsel. In Grand
Jury Subpoenas v. United States,3 the Tenth Circuit held a finite, indi-
vidual, attorney-client privilege existed between a corporate officer and
corporate counsel." In Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, a case
derived from the same activities as Grand Jury Subpoenas, the Tenth
Circuit held a corporate officer may assert an individual attorney-client
privilege for documents related to corporate activities when the officer's
personal rights are at issue.'5 Finally, in Sprague V. Thorn Americas,
Inc.," the court held the corporation's attorney-client privilege protected
documents prepared by in-house counsel for management.'7
6. See id. at 425.
7. T. Maxfield Bahner & Michael L. Gallion, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Via Issue
Injection: A Callfor Uniformity, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 199, 199-200 (1998).
8. This survey period addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
9. 136 F.3d 695 (10th Cir. 1998).
10. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
11. See Frontier, 136 F.3d at 701.
12. See id. at 703-04.
13. 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 1998)."
14. See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 659.
15. See Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 1998).
16. 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997).
17. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370.
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EVIDENCE
I. WAIVER OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE EFFECTS OF
SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION UPON WORK PRODUCT
A. Background
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, which protects communications be-
tween attorneys and clients, can be defeated by two general categories of
waiver: (1) actual or expressed waiver and (2) implied subject matter
waiver.'" Actual or express waiver occurs when confidential communica-
tions are revealed to third parties, outside the attorney-client
relationship.'9 Implied waiver occurs when communications protected by
the attorney-client privilege are divulged or injected as part of a claim or
defense in litigation.' The concept of issue injection waiver seems rela-
tively straightforward; clients waive the privilege if they affirmatively,
plead a claim or defense that puts the privilege at issue.2' Yet, jurisdic-
tions have had tremendous difficulty applying a test in a uniform
manner.' Three main tests have emerged: (1) the automatic waiver rule,'
(2) the balancing test,24 and the (3) Hearn test.' The majority-accepted
Hearn test, a three-part conjunctive test, provides a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege when
(i) assertion of the privilege is the result of some affimative act by
the asserting party, such as filing suit; (ii) through the affirmative ac-
tion, the asserting party has placed the protected information at issue
by making it relevant to the case; and (iii) application of the privilege
would deny the opposing party access to information vital to its de-
fense.26
18. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 199-200.
19. See id. at 200. The requirement of confidentiality is an essential part of the privilege. Cf.
Leathers v. United States, 250 F.2d 159, 166 (9th Cir. 1957). A "corporation must show that the
allegedly privileged documents were available to corporate employees only on 'a fairly firm "need to
know" basis."' In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D. Minn. 1979).
20. See Balner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 200.
21. Seeid at201.
22. See id.
23. See id. (citing Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y.
1958)). The automatic waiver rule holds a party who puts forth a claim, counterclaim, or affirmative
defense injecting an issue into the forefront of the litigation automatically, waives all corresponding
privileges. See Independent Prods., 22 F.R.D. at 276-77.
24. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202 (citing Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alli-
ance v. Public Serv. Co., 838 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1988)). The balancing test weighs the need for dis-
covery of the confidential information against the need to protect the confidentiality of the commu-
nication. See Clamshell Alliance, 838 F.2d at 20.
25. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202-03 (citing Heam v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581
(E.D. Wash. 1975)).
26. Id. (citing Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581).
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
A fourth approach, the anticipatory waiver test, has recently gained lim-
ited approval.
2. Work Product Doctrine
Since its beginning in the seminal case Hickman v. Taylor,28 an im-
mense body of judicially-created law has sprung from the work product
doctrine.' The work product doctrine was codified into Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 26 states that a party may obtain
discovery of documents "prepared in anticipation of litigation" only upon
showing a substantial need for the materials and an inability to acquire the
materials from a different source without undue hardship.' The rule, how-
ever, is silent on the question of whether materials prepared in anticipa-
tion of one litigation are protected in subsequent litigation.32 Federal
common law governs subsequent litigation because of Rule 26's silence
on that issue.3 Federal circuits are split on application of the doctrine in
subsequent litigation. ' In 1983, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier, Inc." The Court held the work
product doctrine codified in the Freedom of Information Act' protects
attorney work product "from mandatory disclosure without regard to the
status of litigation for which it was prepared." 7
B. Tenth Circuit Case
1. Frontier Refining, Inc., v. Gorman-Rupp Co."
a. Facts
Frontier ran a refinery in Cheyenne, Wyoming.' In June 1992, four
of Frontier's contractors were severely burned when a fire erupted in the
slop system of the refinery where they were working. ' Gorman-Rupp
27. See id at 201 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863-64
(3d Cir. 1994)). This test provides that the privilege is waived when parties asserting claims or
defenses compel them "inevitably to draw upon a privileged communication at trial in order to
prevail." Id at 204 (quoting Smith v. Cavanaugh Pierson Talley, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1145 (La. 1987)).
28. 329 U.S. 496 (1947).
29. See John M. Palmeri & Thomas B. Quinn, Work Product in Subsequent Litigation: The
Tenth Circuit Enters the Fray, 27 CoLO. LAW. 79,79 (1998).
30. See id.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
32. See id
33. See Palmeri & Quinn, supra note 29, at 79.
34. See id,
35. 462 U.S. 19,22-23 (1983).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
37. See Grolier, 462 U.S. at 28.
38. 136 F.3d 695 (10th Cir. 1998).




manufactured two of the centrifugal pumps used in Frontier's slop sys-
tem." Three of the injured contractors filed lawsuits against Frontier.'2
Frontier settled all three suits, while its insurance 'company settled the
claim brought by the fourth contractor.:3 Joe Teig, of Holland & Hart,
served as Frontier's counsel in defense of all four claims.' Following
settlement of the claims, Frontier hired new counsel and filed indemnifi-
cation lawsuits against Gorman-Rupp. ' During the discovery process,
Gorman-Rupp filed a discovery motion seeking production of Joe Teig's
files from his representation of Frontier in the underlying suits.' The
district court granted the motion and ordered production of Holland &
Hart's documents and a deposition of Joe Teig.' Joe Teig and Holland &
Hart unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the order on the first day of
trial.,8 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for Gor-
man-Rupp, and Frontier appealed. '9
b. Decision
Frontier argued that the lower court erred when it held that Frontier
had waived its attorney-client and work product privileges by bringing an
indemnity action against Gorman-Rupp: ° Wyoming law controlled the
outcome of this issue.' Because Wyoming lacked applicable law on
waiver of attorney-client privilege, the Tenth Circuit decided how it be-
lieved Wyoming would act.2 The court held that Wyoming would apply
an intermediate approach regarding waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege based on the Hearn test.3 Three elements are necessary to establish
implied waiver under the Hearn test.' The third element requires a dem-
onstration that the privilege would deny the opposing party "vital" in-
formation relevant to its defense The court held, based on'the "avail-
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 697-98. The claims were settled for respective amounts of $8.25 million, $6.75
million, $3.50 million and $750,000. See id.





49. See id. at 699.
50. See id. The Tenth Circuit noted it would not overrule the discovery ruling absent an abuse
of discretion; however, the court would review the "underlying factual determinations for clear error
and review de novo purely legal questions." Id.
51. See id. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, state law is determinative in
diversity cases concerning issues of privileges. See FED. R. EvID. 501.
52. See Frontier, 136 F.3d at 700.
53. See id. at 701.
54. See id.; cf supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing the Hearn test).
55. Frontier, 136 F.3d at70.
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ability of other sources for evidence[,]" the third element for waiver of
the privilege was not established. 6
For Frontier to win its indemnity claim against Gorman-Rupp,
Frontier had to show the underlying settlements with the injured con-
tractors were reasonably made in good faith." Frontier also had to prove
Gorman-Rupp was responsible for the fire."8 Gorman-Rupp contended
that they were permitted to see the privileged communications made by
Frontier's attorneys in the underlying claims to determine the motivation
and reasonableness of the settlements. 9
The Tenth Circuit decided Gorman-Rupp had other resources avail-
able for these questions without the use of Joe Teig's communications.'
For example, the testimony of two attorneys for the plaintiffs in the un-
derlying claim indicated that Mr. Teig admitted Frontier had no explana-
tion for its negligence claims.6 Also, Gorman-Rupp was free to interview
any employee of Frontier who could shed light on Frontier's reasoning
for settling.' Thus, the court decided that the privileged information Was
not vital and the trial court had abused its discretion in ruling to the con-
trary.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the work
product doctrine applied even though Frontier had prepared the pertinent
information in preparation of the underlying claims, and not in anticipa-
tion of the present suit." The Tenth Circuit decided the district court's
ruling, "which failed to extend the work product doctrine merely because
the relevant materials were prepared in anticipation of other, albeit re-
lated litigation, [was] against the great weight of well-reasoned author-
ity." In its decision, the court determined the appropriate starting point
for a decision on this issue was Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.'
56. Id.
57. See id.; cf Schneider Nat'), Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 579 (Wyo. 1992)
(describing circumstances under which indemnification is permitted). Under Wyoming law, the
party seeking indemnification must show the underlying settlement was reasonably "made in good
faith to discharge a potential or actual liability." Id.
58. See Frontier, 136 F.3d at 701.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 701-02.
61. See id. at 702.
62. See id.; cf Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 415-16 (D. Del.
1992) (stating waiver is not justified simply to aid the adversary or to uncover the adversary's moti-
vations for acting).
63. See Frontier, 136 F.3d at 702.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id Contrary to the attorney client privilege, "the work product privilege is governed,
even in diversity cases, by a uniform federal standard embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)7' Id at
702 n.10. Rule 26(b)(3) states:
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The Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in dicta, recog-
nized that Rule 26(b)(3) protects materials prepared for "any litigation or
trial as long as they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent
litigation." 7 Additionally, every circuit to address the issue concluded, to
some extent, that the work product doctrine may survive in subsequent
litigation.'" For the reasons set out above, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the work product doctrine extends to subsequent litigation." Yet, the
court refused to decide whether subsequent litigation must be closely
related to the underlying litigation, because the indemnity action in
Frontier was "unquestionably 'closely related' to the underlying suit
between Frontier and the injured contractors."7"
Since the court held the work product doctrine extended to subsequent
litigation, relevant materials in the instant case were not discoverable by
Gorman-Rupp unless they could show a substantial need for the material
and an inability to obtain substantially equivalent material without undue
hardship.' Rule 26(b)(3) does not allow for discovery of an attorney's
work product unless the discovering party shows substantial need and un-
due hardship. As the court explained in its analysis of waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege, Gorman-Rupp failed to show both substantial need for
the work product materials and an undue burden if the materials were not
produced. 3 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
concluded the district court erred in compelling discovery of the Holland
& Hart materials and ordering Teig to submit to deposition.'
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things ... prepared in antici-
pation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's repre-
sentative ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In
ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
67. Frontier, 136 F.3d at 703 (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25
(1983)). The Tenth Circuit has recognized it considers itself bound to the Supreme Court's dicta
almost as fervently as to its outright holding if it "is recent and not enfeebled by later statements." Id




71. See id. at 704.
72. Cf. id.
73. See id.
74. See id at 704-05. In an unpublished decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the attomey-client and work product protections were waived by selective dis-
closure of protected materials. See Quark, Inc. v. Harley, 1998 WL 161035, at *2-*3 (10th Cir.
1998). The Tenth Circuit's opinion correlates with most circuits' treatment of subject matter waiver
"as an all-or-nothing proposition." Chepiga, supra note 2, at 496. Under the subject matter waiver
theory, when an individual voluntarily discloses a portion of privileged communications, the privi-
lege is waived as to all privileged communication on that subject matter. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
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C. Other Circuits
Regarding implied subject matter waiver, the D.C. Circuit follows a
balancing test, weighing the need for the privileged information versus
the need for protection of the confidential information to analyze implied
waiver.' Both the Eighth and First Circuits apply some type of balancing
test as well.76 A majority of federal circuits, including the Second,'
Fifth, Seventh,9 Ninth,' and Eleventh,8 favor the Hearn test. The Third
Circuit follows the anticipatory waiver test.'
Numerous circuits find an implicit waiver when a client relies on
attorney advice as a defense.83 In United States v. Workman," the Eight
Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege cannot be used "as both a
shield and a sword"-a defendant cannot rely on an attorney's advice as
a defense without allowing the prosecution to look at the essence of the
advice." In Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson,' the Third Circuit found
an implied waiver when a trust company asserted reliance on advice of
counsel as an affirmative defense to a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. In United States v. Bilzerian,' the Second Circuit held that a de-
fendant in a securities fraud case impliedly waived the attorney-client
privilege when he asserted reliance on advice of attorney as a defense.'
Every circuit that has addressed subsequent litigation has concluded,
at least to some extent, that the work product doctrine extends to subse-
quent litigation. The Third Circuit suggests the doctrine should apply
only to closely-related, subsequent litigation, although it has declined to
expressly so hold.' Meanwhile, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits extend the
Proceedings, 78 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting disclosure of some communications on a
subject matter waives privilege as to all communications on that subject matter).
75. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202 (citing Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d
1243, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
76. See id.; cf Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Public Serv. Co. 838 F.2d 13, 20
(Ist Cir. 1988); Sedco Int'l S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982).
77. Cf. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991).
78. Cf. Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431,434 (5th Cir. 1989).
79. Cf. Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1987).
80. Cf. Home Indem. Co. v. Lane, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1995).
81. Cf. Cox v. United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1419 (11 th Cir. 1994).
82. Cf. Smith v. Kavanaugh, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1146 (La. 1987).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263--64 (8th Cir. 1998); Glenmede
Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292
(2d Cir. 1991).
84. 138 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. Workman, 138 F.3d at 1264.
86. 56 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 1995).
87. See Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 478.
88. See Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292.
89. See id. at 1289.
90. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979).
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privilege to all subsequent litigation, related or not? Finally, at least
three circuits, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth, recognize that the work prod-
uct doctrine extends to subsequent litigation, but have either declined to
decide, or have failed to discuss, whether the doctrine extends only to
closely-related, subsequent litigation."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's analysis of implied subject matter waiver is not
reflective of federal law, but of a federal court interpreting what a Wyo-
ming state court would do. Being one of the more conservative circuits
throughout the years, it is not surprising the Tenth Circuit held the Hearn
test would apply. The Hearn test remains the majority approach, as it has
for more than two decades, and is recognized by critics as striking the
most equitable balance."3 Although the Tenth Circuit does not expressly
hold the Hearn test applicable in federal cases, based on Frontier," it
seems likely that it would.
Commentators note that determining the scope of a waiver can be
difficult due to varied interpretations by circuit courts regarding when an
implied waiver occurs." A strong argument is made that "[t]hese incon-
sistencies... serve as compelling justification for the Supreme Court to
assure litigants predictability and consistency by adopting a uniform
standard for determining the scope" of when the attorney-client privilege
is implicitly waived." Inherent in the attorney-client privilege is its goal
of promoting full and frank communication with a client and the need for
certainty and predictability in its application. '
The Tenth Circuit joins the majority of circuits by holding work
product remains protected in subsequent litigation. In Hickman v.
91. Cf, e.g., United States v. Pfizer, Inc., 560 F.2d 326, 335 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v.
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 484 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding the clear com-
mand of the second sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) directing courts to "protect opinion work products
against disclosure" was applicable to all work product materials referred to in the first sentence of
Rule 26(b)(3), and therefore no showing of substantial need or undue hardship could justify the
compelled disclosure of an attorney's opinion work product).
92. Cf, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing two
approaches and refusing to choose between the two); United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d
655, 660 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that were the work product doctrine an unpenetrable protection
against discovery, courts would be less willing to apply it to work produced in anticipation of other
litigation); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting the
existence of little authority restricting work-product protection "to materials prepared in connection
with the very litigation in which the discovery is sought).
93. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202-03.
94. Frontier Refining, Inc., v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695 (10th Cir. 1998).
95. Cf., e.g., Jennifer A. Hardgrove, Scope of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: Articulat-
ing a Standard that Will Afford Guidance to Courts, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 643, 643 (1998) (propos-
ing a three-part test to guide the Supreme Court in articulating a uniform test).
96. Id.
97. Cf. Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 200.
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Taylor,"8 the Supreme Court recognized attorneys should be able to liti-
gate without fear that adversaries might discover their work,99 thus en-
couraging lawyers to prepare early and thoroughly for trial without the
threat that an opponent may discover their thoughts and impressions.
Protection of work product in subsequent litigation furthers this goal and
is consistent with Hickman. The Tenth Circuit, however, stopped short of
holding that work product remains protected in unrelated litigation.'"
In Frontier, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the underlying purpose of
the work product doctrine.' ' The purpose of the doctrine is to encourage
thorough and independent investigation by attorneys and is furthered by
protection of the work product in all subsequent litigation, related or not.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit would likely hold attorneys' work product should
remain protected even after resolution of the litigation for which it was
prepared.
HI. CORPORATE ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Background
The attorney-client privilege is not limited to individuals; corpora-
tions can assert the privilege as well."2 Yet, applying the attorney-client
privilege to a fictional entity such as a corporation is not easy, because a
fictional entity is unable to interact with its attorney except through its
corporate personnel." The attorney-client privilege has become a hot
topic in corporate America today.'" This is due in part to the growth in
the number of corporations'" and the "vast and complicated array" of
federal regulations governing the businesses of corporations." The com-
bination causes disharmony. On the one hand, corporations are trying to
insulate confidential communications, and on the other, the government
is seeking disclosure through the use of a multitude of corporate rules
and regulations." 7 .
98. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
99. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-l1.
100. Cf Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 703 (10th Cir. 1998).
101. See Frontier, 136 F.3d at 704.
102. Cf. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
103. See Brian M. Smith, Be Careful How You Use It or You May Lose It: A Modem Look at
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege and the Ease of Waiver in Various Circuits, 75 U. DaT. MERCY
L. REv. 389,394 (1998).
104. See id. at 389-90.
105. See id. at 390.
106. Id. at 389 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 499 U.S. 383, 392 (1981)).
107. See id. at 390.
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In Upjohn v. United States,'" the Supreme Court faced the question
as to whether employees of a corporation could assert the attorney-client
privilege on behalf of the corporation.'" The Upjohn Court refused to
draft a definitive set of rules to decide when the attorney-client privilege
applies in the corporate context and stated that courts should engage in a
case-by-case analysis to determine the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege."0 Yet, Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, set forth
a standard to provide guidance for the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate setting:
[Als a general rule, a communication is privileged at least
when... an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of
the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed con-
duct within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one
authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and must be
seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the fol-
lowing functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has
bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal conse-
quences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal
responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with
regard to that conduct."'
Since the Supreme Court's historic decision in Upjohn, lower courts
have had difficulty in establishing when a corporate agent has standing to
assert the attorney-client privilege."2 This is due, in large part, to the lim-
ited guidance provided by the Upjohn decision."3 While the majority of
jurisdictions follow the requirements outlined in Upjohn, namely that all
corporate agents may fit the role of being a client, other jurisdictions are
unwilling to give credence to the test."" One reason for the inconsisten-
cies among jurisdictions is Rule 501 of the Federal Rule of Evidence,
which requires federal courts to apply state law when determining the
existence of the attorney-client privilege."' The following two related
108. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Supreme Court rejected the use of the "control group" test to
determine if an attorney-client privilege existed for a corporate employee. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at
397.
109. See id. at 386. The control group consisted of those in a position to control or take sub-
stantial part in a decision about the corporation may require the advice of an attorney. See id at 390.
110. See id. at 396.
111. ld at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
112. See Smith, supranote 103, at 395.
113. See id. The application of the attorney-client privilege can become even trickier to apply in
a limited liability company or a closely held corporation. See generally Roland J. Santoni, Applica-
tion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Disputes Between Owners and Managers of Closely-Held
Entities, 31 CREiGHToN L. REv. 849, 850-852 (1998) (noting that commentators have contended a
more "broad-based piercing of the privilege" should apply). In general, a lawyer for a corporation or
similar entity owes his loyalty to the entity and not to a director, officer, shareholder, representative,
or other individual associated with the entity. See H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate
Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Dis-
charge, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 777, 779 (1996).
114. See Smith, supra note 103, at 395.
115. Cf id. at 396.
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cases focus primarily on the separate issue of a corporate employee's
ability to assert a personal attorney-client privilege with corporate coun-
sel. The third case focuses on application of a corporation's asserting the
attorney-client privilege.
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Grand Jury Subpoenas v. United States"
6
a. Facts
Several hospital doctors and the Intervenor"' were suspects in a con-
tinuing grand jury investigation."8 During the relevant time period, the
Intervenor was employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the hospital."9
By responding to the grand jury hearing's subpoenas duces tecum, the
hospital implicated the use of attorneys John Doe and Jane Roe to carry
out alleged crimes.' During the period of the alleged crimes, attorneys
John Doe and Jane Roe provided legal counsel to the hospital.''
On January 21, 1997, the grand jury delivered subpoenas to the hos-
pital's counsel compelling their testimony.22 Five days earlier, Intervenor
moved to intervene and to quash the subpoenas by asserting the attorney-
client privilege on his own behalf, independent of the attorney's official
relationship with the hospital.'" On February 24, 1997, the court granted
Intervenor's motion to intervene, yet simultaneously refused to quash the
subpoenas because the court found the crime-fraud exception applied,
thereby vitiating the attorney client privilege. The court based this find-
ing on the government's establishment of a prima facie case of criminal
conduct between the hospital and its attorneys.24
In March and April of 1997, Ms. Roe. and Mr. Doe both appeared
before the grand jury and both asserted the attorney-client privilege to
almost every question asked.'" The district court found the crime-fraud
exception applied and granted the government's motion to compel the
116. 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 1998).
117. Since the appellant was the subject of a grand jury investigation, the court referred to him
as "Intervenor," and the two attorney's involved were referred to as "John Doe" and "Jane Roe." See
id. at 656 n.1.










testimony of Ms. Roe and Mr. Doe." The Intervenor then appealed the
district court's order.27
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Intervenor had no
authority to assert the attorney-client privilege except for private com-
munications made to Ms. Roe and Mr. Doe in his personal capacity. In
formulating its decision, the Tenth Circuit adopted a five-part test used
by the Second and Third Circuits to determine whether a corporate offi-
cer may assert an individual privilege with corporate counsel." Under
this test, the corporate officer must show:
First ... they approached [counsel] for the purpose of seeking
legal advice. Second, they must demonstrate that when they ap-
proached [counsel] they made it clear that they were seeking legal
advice in their individual rather than in their representative capacities.
Third, they must demonstrate that the [lawyer] saw fit to communi-
cate with them in their individual capacities, knowing that a possible
conflict could arise. Fourth, they must prove that their conversations
with [counsel] were confidential. And, fifth, they must show that the
substance of their conversations with [counsel] did not concern mat-
ters within the company or the general affairs of the company.'"
Using this test, the Tenth Circuit held a limited privilege existed only to
those communications "in which Intervenor sought legal advice as to his
personal liability without regard to any corporate considerations. ''
The court next addressed whether the crime-fraud exception vitiated
the attorney-client privilege. "2 The court recognized that the privilege
does not apply when the client consults an attorney to further a crime or
fraud. "' The crime-fraud exception is applicable only when the party
opposing the privilege can establish a prima facie case of attorney par-
ticipation in the crime or fraud.'"0 The court found the government estab-
lished a showing of attorney involvement in the crime."5 Reviewing the
126. See id.
127. See id. at 656.
128. See id. at 658.
129. See id. at 659.
130. Id. (citing United States v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.
1997)).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 661.
133. See id. at 660 (citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995)).
134. See Motley, 71 F.3d at 1551.
135. See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 660-61. To assert the crime-fraud exception, the
opposing party has to establish a prima facie showing that attorney participation in the crime has
some factual foundation. See id. Even though the standard of proof required to make out a prima
facie showing has not been articulated by the Supreme Court, several circuits have articulated one.
See id.; cf. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563-64 n.7 (1989) (noting that the use of the phrase
"prima facie case" to describe the showing needed to defeat the privilege has caused some confu-
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record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the evidence presented made a
prima facie case that the services of Mr. Doe and Ms. Roe were used in
furtherance of the crime or fraud."6 Thus, the crime-fraud exception nul-
lified the limited attorney-client privilege between Intervenor and corpo-
rate counsel.'37
2. Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States38
a. Facts
This case stems from the grand jury case just discussed.9 In re-
sponse to the grand jury's subpoenas, the hospital agreed to produce
certain documents.' The Intervenor moved to quash the subpoenas and
bar production of particular documents based on the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine.' The district court denied the
Intervenor's motion and ordered production of the documents. 2 The
Intervenor appealed.
b. Decision
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Tenth Circuit used the five-
part test adopted by the court in Grand Jury Subpoenas v. United States. 3
The court noted that the district court erred in interpreting the fifth prong
sion). cf., e.g., In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the government
satisfies its burden of proof if it offers evidence, if believed by the trier of fact, that would establish
the elements of an ongoing or imminent crime or fraud); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377,
381 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining that the court must find reasonable cause to believe that the attor-
ney was involved with fraud); United States v. Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995)
(suggesting that a party must demonstrate there is probable cause to believe some crime or fraud has
been attempted); United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing what the gov-
ernment must prove in order to trigger the crime-fraud exception); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
975 F.2d 81, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a party seeking discovery must present evidence that
would determine the elements of the crime-fraud exception had been satisfied); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (setting forth a two-prong test to determine
whether the crime-fraud exception applies to a communication between a lawyer and his client);
Koenig v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982) (defining a
"prima facie case" as evidence sufficient until "contradicted and overcome by other evidence"). The
Tenth Circuit decided it was not necessary to articulate a standard in this case because, under any of
these standards above, the government had established a prima facie showing. See Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 660-61.
136. See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 660-61.
137. See id. at 661.
138. 156 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1998).
139. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1039; see also discussion supra notes 116-37
and accompanying text.
140. See id. at 1040.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 1041 (citing Grand Jury Subpoenas v. United States, 144 F.3d 653, 659 (10th
Cir. 1998)); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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of the test.'" Although the documents at issue related to corporate matters,
Intervenor was not barred from showing the application of an attorney-
client privilege.' However, the Intervenor did not satisfy the fifth prong
because he did not demonstrate that the documents at issue were primarily
limited to his individual legal rights.'" Nor was the fourth prong, confi-
dentiality, 7 satisfied, because Intervenor did not show the documents at
issue were confidential communications between himself "and the corpo-
rate attorneys acting in their capacity as his personal lawyer."'4 8
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, and held the
preponderance of documents pertained to corporate issues and had been
distributed not only to the Intervenor, but to third parties as well.' 9 The
court also held that the work product doctrine did not protect the docu-
ments" ° and that a joint-defense privilege did not apply to bar the pro-
duction of the documents.151
3. Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc."52
a. Facts
Ms. Sprague brought this lawsuit based on Title VII and the Kansas
Acts Against Discrimination, alleging sexual harassment and gender
discrimination." Ms. Sprague worked as a market analyst for Thorn
Americas, Inc. (Thorn) and in June 1992 received additional responsi-
bilities in the jewelry department under the supervision of Ed
Kowalski." Ms. Sprague left Thorn in September 1993." She informed
Thorn she would return only if Mr. Kowalski was no longer her manager
and the company upgraded her position." Thorn refused Sprague's de-
mands and deemed her terminated on November 1, 1993."5
144. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1041. The fifth prong of the test states that the
corporate officer "must show that the substance of their conversations with [counsel] did not concern
matters within the general affairs of the company." Id.
145. See id. at 1042.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1041. The corporate officer must prove that "their conversations with [counsel]
were confidential." Id.
148, Id. at 1042.
149. See id.
150. See id The court concluded the corporate official failed to demonstrate the district court
clearly erred in fimding that the documents were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. See id.
151. See id. at 1043. The court held the Intervenor failed to establish a joint-defense privilege
because he "failed to produce any evidence ... of a joint-defense agreement with the Hospital." I.
152. 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997).
153. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1359,
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1359-60.
157, See id.
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Sprague filed her original complaint one month later.' The district
court denied Sprague's motion to compel production of documents and
dismissed Sprague's claim on Thorn's motion for summary judgment.'"
At issue was a memorandum prepared by in-house counsel Doug
Westerhaus. Westerhaus refused to produce the memorandum based on
his assertion of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.'"
The memorandum prepared by Westerhaus for senior management alleg-
edly addressed issues of disparate treatment of women employees at
Thorn.'' Ms. Sprague's appeal focused on the district court's denial of
her motion to compel discovery of the memorandum.62
b. Decision
In making its decision, the Tenth Circuit stated the "discovery issue
turns on the issue of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product
privilege."'63 Since Sprague asserted both federal and state claims, con-
sideration of both federal and Kansas law was required.' In state causes
of action, the Federal Rules of Evidence direct a federal court to use state
law to determine issues regarding privileges.'63 While difficulties may
arise if the privilege applies under state law but does not under federal
law,'" the court was persuaded that the attorney-client privilege was ap-
propriate, in this instance, under both federal and state law.6 Since the
attorney-client privilege applied, the court decided it was unnecessary to
determine whether the work product doctrine applied.'"
The affidavit of Ms. Melanie Owens supported Ms. Sprague's mo-
tion to compel discovery.69 Ms. Owens stated that she had a conversation
with Westerhaus in which Westerhaus informed her of his concern




161. See id. at 1367-68.
162. See id. at 1368.
163. Id. Discovery issues are reviewed by an abuse of discretion standard. See id. (citing Go-
mez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995)).
164. See id.
165. See id. (citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995)). The
pertinent part of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "in civil actions and pro-
ceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rle of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. Evi. 501.
166. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1369.
167. See id. Thus, the court did not need to formulate a remedy for conflicts in attorney-client
privilege roles. See id.
168. See id. at 1372.
169. See id. Ms. Owens worked for Thorn from January 1990 until September 1995 in the
Human Resources Department. See id. at 1369.
170. Id. Westerhaus was the staff attorney at Thorn for the Human Relations Department. See
[Vol. 76:3
EVIDENCE
affidavit, Ms. Owens contended that Westerhaus told her he distributed a
memorandum relating to the issue of disparate treatment of women at
Thorn to the Vice President and the General Counsel."' Owens stated the
division she worked in at Thorn had been responsible for compiling sta-
tistical information used by Westerhaus in support of his memorandum.'
Westerhaus commented that based on the information he received, dispa-
rate treatment of women existed at Thorn.'"
The Tenth Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege protected
the memorandum because in-house counsel prepared it for higher man-
agement and it related to the giving of legal advice.'7" The court found a
broad rule prevailed in federal courts, protecting from disclosure any
communication regarding legal advice from an attorney to his client.'"
The court was also convinced that, under Kansas's statutory language,
the broad rule would apply to protect the memorandum. 6
Ms. Sprague argued the attorney-client privilege had been waived.'"
The court rejected this argument, stating that the corporation's ability to
waive the privilege rests with the corporation's management, specifically
with officers and directors." In this case, there was no express or implied
waiver of the privilege by either the directors or officers of Thorn in re-
lation to the memorandum as required by federal law.' The court also
held that there was no waiver under Kansas's statutory law.'8°
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1369-70.
174. See id. at 1370. The court noted that "[ijegal advice.., from an attorney to his client,
individual or corporate, has consistently been held by the federal cous to be within the protection of
the attorney-client privilege." Id. (quoting United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986
(3d Cir. 1980)). The court also cited a Tenth Circuit case which held that "[t]he recognition that
privilege extends to statements of a lawyer to a client is necessary to prevent the use of the lawyer's
statements as admissions of the client." Id. (quoting Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,692-93 (10th Cir.
1968)).
175. See id. It has been noted that the attorney-client privilege has been more difficult to apply
when it is asserted in the corporate setting as opposed to when it is asserted by outside counsel. See
Beverly W. Garofalo, Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to In-House Counsel, CORP.
COUNS. November, 1998, at 1. In general, the courts will hold that the attorney-client privilege
protects corporate communications only if legal advice, and not business advice, predominates. See
id. The courts, however, have been unable to establish a bright line test to determine what constitutes
legal advice as opposed to business advice. See id
176. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370.
177. See id. at 1371.
178. See id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-49
(1985)).
179. See id.
180. See id. Under Kansas's statutory law, the waiver of the privilege is limited to instances
when the judge may determine that the corporation (through an authorized individual) has waived
the privilege in accordance with Kansas's statutes. See id No such waiver was shown satisfying
such requirements. See id.
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Ms. Sprague also contended that the attorney-client privilege did not
apply due to the crime-fraud exception.' Under both Kansas's statutory
law and federal law, the attorney-client privilege does not apply when the
client contacts an attorney to perpetuate a crime or fraud." The court dis-
missed Sprague's contention, noting that she provided no evidence to indi-
cate "Westerhaus' s advice was sought to perpetuate a crime" or fraud.'"
C. Other Circuits
In In re Perrigo Co.,' ' a shareholder derivative action was brought
against officers, directors, securities underwriters and controlling share-
holders based on their actions during a public offering. The Sixth Cir-
cuit articulated the general parameters of the corporation's attorney-
client privilege as set forth in Upjohn as the appropriate statement of the
law.' In particular, the Sixth Circuit held that the corporate attorney-
client privilege may apply to any communication by a corporate em-
ployee acting within his corporate duties when he is aware that the in-
formation provided to the attorney is required to help corporate counsel
give legal advice to the corporation.' 7
One of the more recent developments of the corporate attorney-
client privilege, recognized by the Third Circuit, occurs when a corporate
employee asserts a personal privilege for communications made with
corporate counsel.' In United States v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,'" the Second Circuit adopted the Third Circuit's require-
ments, set forth in In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management
Corp., for an individual to assert a personal attorney-client privilege
between a corporate employee and a corporate attorney.'9 ' The Second
Circuit held that the five-part test" described above was not satisfied
because the individual seeking to assert the privilege had "neither sought
181. See id.
182. See id. at 1371-72; cf. Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547,1551 (10th Cir. 1995));
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 167 F.R.D. 134, 140--41 (D. Kan. 1996).
183. Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1369.
184. 128 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1997).
185. See In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d at 430.
186. See id. at 437.
187. See id. (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).
188. See Chepiga, supra note 2, at 484 (citing In re Bevill, Brester & Schulman Asset Mgmt.
Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1986)) (noting that the Second Circuit adopted the requirements,
set out in Bevill, for a corporate employee to assert the privilege after communicating with corporate
counsel).
189. 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
190. 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). Note that in this case the Third Circuit held that corporate
officers could not assert individual attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure of corporate com-
munications with corporate counsel after a corporation's privilege was waived. See In re Bevill,
Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d at 124-25.
191. Cf Chepiga, supra note 2, at 484.
192. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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nor received legal advice in his individual capacity during conversations"
with corporate counsel.'""
The Sixth Circuit, though not relying on the formulation set out in
the Second Circuit, nevertheless has required an employee to make it
clear to corporate counsel that he sought legal advice on personal matters
in order to assert a privilege over ensuing communications with corpo-
rate counsel.'" The Eighth Circuit has also recognized that an individual
corporate officer may have a personal claim or attorney-client privilege
with regard to communications with corporate counsel.'
9'
D. Analysis
In Sprague, the Tenth Circuit recognized a contradiction of treatment
of the attorney-client privilege in several cases.'" Under the narrower
approach, the corporate attorney-client privilege does not protect confi-
dential communications between an attorney and his client unless it re-
lates to legal advice pertaining to client confidences.'"' Under the broader
approach, the corporate attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure
any communication from a corporate attorney to his client in which the
communication relates to giving legal advice." The court was persuaded
by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Natta v. Hogan,'" which was repre-
sentative of the broader approach.' The Tenth Circuit followed the
broader rule-a rule which the majority of circuits follow.
Meanwhile the Tenth Circuit adopted the five-part test used by the
Second and Third Circuit. As other circuits consider the issue of whether
a corporate employee can assert an individual attorney-client privilege
with corporate counsel, it is reasonable to expect that the test used by the
Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits will be adopted.
CONCLUSION
The work product doctrine is alive and well in the Tenth Circuit.
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit in Frontier followed the
trend of other circuits in affording attorneys work product protection in
subsequent litigation. Unlike other circuits, the Tenth Circuit stopped
short of determining whether an attorney's work product is protected in
unrelated subsequent litigation. The Tenth Circuit's decision is appropri-
ate to further the goal of the work product doctrine, namely to encourage
193. International Bd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d at 217.
194. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
195. Cf. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
196. See Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997). For a discus-
sion of the two general approaches, see Loftis v. Arnica Mutual Ins. Co., 175 F.R.D. 5 (D. Conn.
1997).
197. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370 (citing Loftis, 175 F.R.D. at 9-10).
198. See id. (citing In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
199. 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1968).
200. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370.
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complete and thorough preparation for litigation. Due to the conflicting
standards used by circuit courts to determine the applicability of the
work product doctrine in subsequent litigation, it would be appropriate
for the Supreme Court to establish a uniform standard.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Frontier only suggestively adopted
the Hearn test to determine whether clients waive the attorney-client
privilege when they affirmatively plead a claim or defense that puts the
privilege at issue. This decision followed the majority thinking of other
circuits. However, the discrepancies among the circuit courts when im-
plied subject matter waiver is in question does implicate the need for a
uniform standard. To allow the attorney-client privilege to achieve its
goals of open and complete communication between a client and an at-
torney, like other areas of the law, uniformity and predictability are re-
quired.
The Tenth Circuit in Grand Jury Subpoenas, further developed a
personal corporate attorney-client privilege when it adopted a five-part
test to determine whether a corporate employee may assert an individual
privilege with corporate counsel. This decision gives corporate attorney's
and corporate employee's important guidance surrounding when an indi-
vidual assertion of the attorney-client privilege exists between a corpo-
rate employee and corporate counsel. Although only the Second and
Third Circuits use the test adopted by the Tenth Circuit, the other circuits
have established similar standards regarding personal attorney-client
privilege with corporate counsel.
Finally, in Sprague, the Tenth Circuit applied a straightforward
analysis of a corporation's ability to assert the attorney-client privilege.
Following the general parameters of a corporation's attorney-client
privilege established in Upjohn, the court held a memorandum prepared
by in-house counsel for higher management and related to the giving of
legal advice was privileged. Although there is no definitive, uniform
standard the circuit courts apply to establish applicability of a corpora-
tion's attorney-client privilege, the circuits generally adhere to the
framework established by the Supreme Court in Upjohn. To assert the
privilege, the confidential communication must fall within the em-
ployee's scope of duty and must relate to corporate legal advice not oth-
erwise available from upper management."'
Kenneth L. Rothenberg*
201. Cf. Gregory J. Wallace & Jay W. Waks, Internal Investigation of Suspected Wrongdoing
by Corporate Employees, 1057 PLI CORP. 515,524 (1998).




The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided
several issues dealing with Native Americans between August 31, 1997
and September 1, 1998. The decisions reinforced and delineated Native
American dependence on the states and the federal government.' This
survey will address and analyze Tenth Circuit decisions that reinforced
precedents in the areas of gaming, tribal membership, and Indian trust
lands. Each topic focuses on one central issue: the delicate, and some-
times arbitrary, negotiation of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments and the imperfect sovereignty of the respective Indian nations.
Historically, American Indian law has not incorporated Native
American culture or custom into its precedents.! Indeed, this trend ex-
tends deep into the nineteenth century. As de Tocqueville noted in his
journals during his travels through the United States during the early part
of the century, "the conduct of the United States Americans toward the
natives was inspired by the most chaste affection for legal formalities."3
The United States Supreme Court analyzed this trend in its opinion in
Worcester v. Georgia by discussing the persistent eagerness of the
United States to enter into treaties with Native American tribes and to
impose Anglo-American mores on them Between the American Revo-
lution and the late nineteenth century, Congress used treaties and stat-
utes, often engineered from the white perspective,' to define the relation-
ship of the United States with American Indian tribes.7
During the initial grafting of Anglo-American law onto Native
American cultures, tribes existed as sovereign entities, separate from the
states. The Court in Worcester illustrated this fact by affi-ming the sov-
1. See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., The Evolution of Federal Indian Policy Making, in
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 239, 239-56 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985)
[hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY] (illustrating the development of the policy of dependence
through a survey of United States policy). Deloria notes that Native American tribes seem to have
the same degree of sovereignty as small European nations, such as Monaco and Liechtenstein, but
actually remain trapped in "a state of political and economic pupilage." Id. at 239.
2. See Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, American Indian Policy: An Overview of the Legal Complexi-
ties, Controversies, and Dilemmas, SOC. SCI. J., July 1982, at 9, 9, reprinted in Joyotpaul Chaudhuri,
American Indian Policy: An Overview, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note I, at 15, 15.
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 339 (J.P. Meyer ed. & George Lawrence
trans., Harper & Row, 1st Perennial Library ed. 1988) (1835).
4. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
5. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557-58.
6. See FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 62 (Ren-
nard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
7. Cf., e.g., id. at 62--64 (discussing the making of Indian treaties through the United States
system).
8. Cf. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
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ereignty of the Cherokee Nation and emphasizing that the state of Geor-
gia had no jurisdiction over the Nation itself nor the individual members
of the Tribe." The Court had previously held that Native American sover-
eignty was not absolute, as with a foreign nation. Justice Marshall com-
pared the relationship between the United States and Native American
tribes as a trust relationship similar to that of ward and guardian, with the
federal government acting as a benevolent tutor."
American policy toward Native Americans grew more invasive as
the nineteenth century progressed. Initially, Congress intended to act as
a tutor to Native American tribes until the American government be-
lieved that the Indians had adapted well enough to white culture to oper-
ate their own judicial and political institutions." Congress, however,
changed its role in the 1830s with the initiation of the removal policies
that began with the implementation of the campaign promises of Presi-
dent Andrew Jackson.' The Great Removal forcibly removed 60,000
Indians from their ancestral homelands to the western, undeveloped part
of the continent." To survive, Native Americans would now have to as-
similate and to learn the ways of their American tutor.'6 This policy of
gradual assimilation into mainstream culture guided American policy
toward Native Americans throughout the nineteenth century.'7 The ex-
pectation was that the "Indians would become small republics protected
by the United States and at some distant future date might be represented
in the halls of Congress."'"
The United States intensified this policy until the late nineteenth
century, 9 when Congress enhanced its policy of assimilation.' In 1887,
9. See id. at 561. The Court indicated that the Cherokee Nation was:
a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have
no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of [Clongress.
Id.
10. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831).
11. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
12. See Deloria, supra note 1, at 242-46. Deloria noted that Congress found itself in the posi-
tion of reconciling two contradictory interests: protecting the Indians and creating a bureaucracy
capable of regulating trade. See id. at 243. Because the Indians could not make correct "decisions"
for themselves, Congress designated itself as the decision maker for the Indians until they could or
decided to make "appropriate" decisions for themselves. See id. at 243-44.
13. Cf. id.
14. See id. at 242.
15. See HUGH BROGAN, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 67-68
(1990).
16. See id. at 68.
17. See id.
18. Deloria, supra note 1, at 245.
19. See id. at 246.
20. Cf. id. at 246-47. Deloria notes that this policy is particularly reflected in the Allotment
Act, which shifted the American perspective from that of tutor to supervisor. See id.
[Vol. 76:3
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Congress enacted the Indian General Allotment Act, which created a
specific policy to force Native Americans to assimilate into white soci-
ety.' The statute was intended to turn the Indians into "true Americans"
by splitting native lands into individual plots for farming." The Supreme
Court affirmed this policy in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,' endorsing Con-
gress's right to unilaterally abrogate treaties with Native Americans. '
Through the Allotment Acts, Native Americans lost eighty-six million
acres of land between 1887 and 1934.' This devastating effect left the
Indians destitute and defeated.?
American policy toward Native Americans shifted again in the early
part of the twentieth century with the passage of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1934.27 Indian identity and culture had almost disappeared
because the federal government had controlled all aspects of Native
American life for the previous fifty years.' This statute, an acknowledg-
ment by Congress that the policy focus of allotment had failed, allowed
for some degree of tribal autonomy. 9 The statute stopped the allotment of
tribal lands, allowed for Native American ceremonies, and attempted to
resuscitate Native American culture? This new congressional policy,
which emphasized decreasing Native American dependency on the fed-
eral government, escalated with the Termination Era of the 1950s.'
During this period, Congress enacted its legislation affecting Native
Americans with the sole intent of ending the dependency of Indians on
the federal government." As a reincarnation of the assimilation policies
of the nineteenth century, the Termination Era legislation attempted to
homogenize Indian culture with general American culture "by breaking
21. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996)).
22. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 509 (2d ed. 1985).
23. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
24. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564-67.
25. See BROGAN, supra note 15, at 70.
26. See id.
27. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)).
28. See generally Tom Holm, Indian Concepts of Authority and the Crisis in Tribal Govern-
ment, Soc. Sa. J., July 1982, 59, 59-71, reprinted in Tom Holm, The Crisis in Tribal Government,
in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 1, at 135, 135-54 (arguing that Indian culture faces obliv-
ion because internal political strife is largely caused by dissatisfaction with the operation of tribal
governments). Holm emphasizes that "Indian lands had been confiscated or dismembered; tribal
governments had been dissolved; American Indian arts had been all but lost; and tribal religious
ceremonies banned or destroyed." Id. at 140.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Sharon O'Brien, Federal Indian Policies and the International Protection of Human
Rights, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 1, at 35, 44.
32. See id.
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down cultural and tribal bonds."'33 Ultimately, through this policy, Con-
gress terminated the relationship between itself and 109 Indian tribes.'
The 1970s and the Nixon Administration brought the current gov-
ernment policy of self-determination.' Despite the sweeping tone of this
policy, it applied only to federally recognized Indian tribes, excluding
almost one-third of the native peoples in the United States.' Unrecog-
nized tribes still must apply for and receive federal recognition to par-
ticipate in many federal programs designed for Native Americans.'7 The
relationship between the federal government and the Native American
tribes has come full circle and has evolved from one of a guardianship
back to a trust relationship, where American Indian tribes have some
degree of internal autonomy. 8
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT:
GUIDED SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Background
In the past decade federal courts have decided numerous cases in-
volving the rapid growth of the gaming industry, especially high-stakes
gambling, on Native American reservations. Before 1988, Native Ameri-
can tribes chose to develop gambling facilities on their respective reser-
vations as a lucrative, fast path toward economic growth and self-
sufficiency. 9 Federal statutes did not regulate reservation gambling, and
the states had no jurisdiction over the Indian casinos within their respec-
tive jurisdictions.' Gaming on reservations has tempered some of the
harsher effects of poverty some Native Americans have endured for gen-
erations and has enhanced the political power of a few tribes."
Controversy arose over tribal casinos in the 1970s and 1980s when
state governments began to dispute tribal authority to operate the casinos
without any state regulation.' Congress addressed state concerns with the
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Cf id. President Nixon noted that it was time for "a new era in which the Indian future is
determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions." Id. (citing MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at
1(1970)).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 45.
38. Cf id. at46.
39. Cf Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. A Forum for Conflict Among
the Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REv.
127, 131 (1993).
40. See id. at 129.
41. See Sherry M. Thompson, Comment, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of
Reservation Gaming in the United States and Canada, 11 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 521, 521
(1994).
42. See id. at 528-29.
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enactment of the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).'
Intending to temper the escalating tension between states and Native
American reservations," the Congress enacted the IGRA to provide a
legal framework for Native Americans to use gaming "as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments."' Specifically, Congress attempted to create a bal-
ance between tribal and state interests with the creation and the
empowerment of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).' The
NIGC, a body composed of three members, two of whom must be Native
Americans,"7 oversees casino activities, supervises the parties, and evalu-
ates casino financial practices." The NIGC also has the authority to cre-
ate tribal gaming regulations, '9 to contract with tribal and state entities,"
and to conduct investigations of premises, records, and the bookkeeping
of tribal casinos."
The structure of the statute divided gaming into three categories:
Class 1,52 Class II," and Class HIL' The statute permits completely un-
regulated Class I gaming5 and limited regulation of Class II gaming.'
Class III gaming requires state assent." Receiving state assent requires
that tribes comply with certain specific procedures, including asking the
respective state to negotiate a Class III gaming compact." The state must
negotiate in good faith. 9 Should a state refuse to negotiate a gaming
compact with a tribe, the statute confers standing on the tribe to bring an
action against the state in federal court.' If the tribe can meet its burden
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. lI 1996).
44. Cf. Thompson supra note 41, at 522, 530. Congressional concern stemmed from the possi-
bility of the influence of organized crime and the lack of federal regulatory authority on reservations.
See id. at 530. Once again, with the construction of the statute, Congress assumed a guardian-type
role over Native Americans.
45. Id. at 530-31.
46. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (setting forth the composition of the National Indian Gaming Com-
mission and stating that at least two members of the Commission must be from an Indian tribe, and
no more than two members can be from the same political party).
47, See id. § 2704(b)(3).
48. See id. § 2706(b).
49. See id. § 2706(b)(10).
50. See id. § 2706(b)(7).
51. See id. § 2706(b)(2)-(4).
52. See id. § 2703(6). Class I gaming is for small prizes or gaming that includes traditional
Indian games used during traditional tribal ceremonies and festivals. Id. Neither the states nor the
federal government has the authority to regulate this type of gaming. Id. § 2710.
53. See id. § 2703(7). Class II gaming includes games such as lotto, bingo, and card games,
with the exclusion of banking card games such as blackjack and baccarat. Id. § 2703(7)(A)-(B).
54. See id. § 2703(8). Class II games include all games not listed under Class I or Class II,
such as banking card games, slots, keno, animal racing, and jai-alai.
55. See id. § 2703(6).
56. Seed. §2710(Ob).
57. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
58. See id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
59. See Ed.
60. See id § 2710(d)(7)(A) & (B).
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and prove that the state failed to negotiate in good faith, the district court
can order the state to conclude a compact with the tribe within a sixty-
day period. Should the state fail to negotiate a compact within this time
period, the tribe can resort to a federal mediator, who has the authority to
select one of the compacts proposed by either the state or the tribe.'
Should the state reject federal mediation, the Secretary of the Interior can
determine procedures to facilitate the conclusion of the compact.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida" significantly altered the operation of the IGRA.'
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe sued the state of Florida and
Governor Lawton Chiles for refusing to negotiate a Class In gaming
compact with the Tribe and for violating the "requirement of good faith
negotiation" mandated by section 2710(d)(3) of the IGRA.' Florida
moved to dismiss the Tribe's complaint claiming that the suit violated
the state's sovereign immunity that protected it from suit in federal
court.' The district court denied the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, concluding that the Indian Commerce Clause did not give Con-
gress the power to abridge the Eleventh Amendment immunity granted to
the states." In addition, the Court also found that its precedent in Ex
parte Young did not allow a tribe to sue a state for good faith negotia-
tion and force a state's governor to negotiate with a tribe."
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from enacting
legislation to allow Indian tribes to sue a state under the Indian Com-
merce Clause." The Indian Commerce Clause did not give Congress the
power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states and violate their
Eleventh Amendment rights under the Constitution. ' Thus, section
271 0(d)(7) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act could not confer federal
61. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii) & (iii). A court must balance state interests against tribal inter-
ests. See id.
62. See id § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
63. See id § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
64. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
65. Cf Amy L. Cox, The New Buffalo: Tribal Gaming As a Means of a Subsistence Under
Attack, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 863, 871 (1998).
66. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44,51-52 (1996).
67. See id at 52.
68. See id. at 52-53.
69. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Ex parte Young, the Court decided an appeal based on a suit
brought by the stockholders of various railroad companies against, among others, members of sev-
eral regulatory bodies of the state of Minnesota and the Attorney General of Minnesota. Cf. id. at
127-30. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the promulgation and enforcement of price
controls fixing the tariff rates of railroads in Minnesota. See id. at 127-31. The Court decided that
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit brought by citizens of a state or nation against another
state. See id. at 149.
70. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52.
71. See id. at 52-53.
72. See id. at 47.
[Vol. 76:3
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
jurisdiction over a state that has not consented to be sued.' Finally, the
Court held that Ex parte Young could not be used to enforce the good
faith requirements of section 27 10(d)(3) against an official of the state. '
In analyzing the context of the statute, the Court determined that
Class III gaming was only legal if it was authorized by the Tribe's gov-
erning body, satisfied the requirements of the statute, was approved by
the NIGC, was located in a state permitting such gaming "for any pur-
pose by any person, organization, or entity,"' and conformed with the
tribal-state compact. 6 In its analysis of the statute and the constitutional
questions governing it, the Court addressed two issues: whether the
Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from authorizing suits by In-
dian tribes against the states as injunctive relief to enforce legislation
enacted by the Indian Commerce Clause, and whether the doctrine of Ex
parte Young permitted actions against a state's governor for injunctive
relief.' The Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the
second in the negative.'
The Supreme Court addressed the Eleventh Amendment argument
and noted that the text indicated that the judicial power of the federal
government could not be extended to any action in "law or equity"
against a state by citizens of another state or a foreign nation.' The Court
held that the scope of the statute extended beyond Article III courts and
stood "not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... to
which it confirms."' This presupposition has two parts: each state is a
sovereign entity in the federal system, and a state cannot retain its sover-
eignty if it cannot consent to potential suits brought against it.8 Thus, the
federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a suit against a state that does
not consent to be sued.' Here, Florida did not consent to be sued.83
The Tribe claimed that the IGRA abrogated state immunity and that
Congress explicitly expressed its intent to do so in the statute." Analyz-
ing this claim, the Court noted that Congress can only abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity "by making its intention unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute."' The Court examined the text of the statute, and
the language that specifically referred to the state as a defendant' and
73. See id.
74. See id.; cf. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
75. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48.
76. See id. at 48-49.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 53.
79. Id. at 54 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. )a).
80. Id (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
81. See id. (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 55.
84. See id.
85. ld.,at 56 (quoting Delimuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
86. See id at 57.
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concluded that Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity. '
The Court then addressed whether, in abrogating the immunity, Congress
had overstepped its constitutional boundaries." The Court began by its
assessment by analyzing whether the Indian Commerce Clause conferred
on the federal government the authority to abrogate states' rights. ' Since
neither the language in article three, section two, clause one of the United
States Constitution, nor the absence of a prohibition in the text of the
Eleventh Amendment allowed a state to be sued without its consent,.' the
Seminole's claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."'
Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether the Tribe might
exercise jurisdiction over its own suit to enforce the good faith require-
ments of section 2710(d)(3) against Governor Chiles, regardless of the
jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment.' The Court, however, did
not see the Seminole's situation as one similar to that in Ex parte
Young."3 In distinguishing the instant case from Ex parte Young, the
Court noted that the IGRA statute contained a provision for enforcement
in section 2710(d)(7). 4 The opinion emphasized that section 2710(d)(3)
provided a sixty-day requirement that the state and the tribe complete a
compact, should the state not negotiate in good faith.' In addition, if the
tribe and state did not satisfy the requirement within the sixty-day time
period, the statute required that both parties submit proposals to a federal
mediator, who then would select the best proposal." Finally, if the state
did choose not to accept the compact selected by the mediator, the me-
diator must notify the Secretary of the Interior, who then would prescribe
regulations for gaming on the reservation in question." Ultimately, the
87. See id.
88. See id. at 59.
89. See id. at 62. The Court referred to its decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1989), where a plurality determined that the Interstate Commerce Clause allowed Congress
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, noting that Congress had to have complete authority to regu-
late interstate commerce, including the authority to assess damages. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-
20 (1989). The Court recognized that the decision in Union Gas misled lower courts and granted
more power to Article Ill courts than the Constitution intended. Cf Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65.
The Court concluded that Union Gas departed from precedent and overruled the decision. See i. at
66.
90. See id. at 67.
91. Seeid.at73.
92. See id. The Seminoles argued that the court had, in the past, found federal jurisdiction
when a party sought only prospective injunctive relief. See id.; see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 68 (1985); cf 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
93. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73; cf Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
94. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-74. The Court noted that it would not allow a supple-
mental judicial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right if the statute had already
created a mechanism to enforce the right. See id. at 74; cf Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423
(1988).
95. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74.
96. See id. The Court noted that the statute required that the federal mediator select the pro-
posal that best represented the intent of the statute. See id.
97. See id. at 74-75.
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Seminole Tribe could not use the Ex parte Young precedent because
Congress included a remedial provision in the statute that required the
submission of the state and tribal plans to a federal mediator, who se-
lected the plan that best comported with the statute and a provision that
allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to implement Class lII gaming
procedures should a state fail to accept the federal mediator's choice."
The Seminole Tribe decision undermined the IGRA." The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment recognizes a state's
right not to negotiate with Indian tribes over Class II gaming." Public
opinion, which historically has been opposed to Native American gam-
ing, no doubt, may encourage states not to negotiate with Native Ameri-
can tribes--especially now that the Supreme Court's decision in Semi-
nole Tribe has nullified the enforcement provision of the IGRA. ' ' The
Seminole Tribe decision has directly affected the outcome of the deci-
sions in the Tenth Circuit and other circuits that have addressed the issue
of Class III gaming on Native American reservations.
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Kelly'"
a. Facts
In Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Kelly, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
legality of Class III gaming on tribal casinos within New Mexico.'" The
Jicarilla Apaches negotiated a tribal-state, Class III gaming compact with
the governor of the state of New Mexico under the auspices of the
IGRA."'° On May 20, 1996, the Tribe opened a casino on its reserva-
tion.'" After the opening of the casino the United States Attorney for
New Mexico, John Kelly, warned the Tribe that the government would
take action against it for the illegal operation of a Class III gaming facil-
ity.' In response, the Tribe filed a lawsuit against John Kelly, United
States Attorney for the District of New Mexico; Janet Reno, Attorney
98. See id. at 76.
99. Cf Cox, supra note 65, at 871-72.
100. See id. at 872. Because states now have immunity from litigation via the Eleventh
Amendment, the statutory safeguard that the states negotiate in good faith not longer exists, giving
the states "veto" power over Class III gambling. Id.
101. See id. at 874.
102. 129 F.3d 535 (10th Cir. 1997).
103. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 536.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Cf Brief for Appellant at 3, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Kelly, 129 F.3d 535 (10th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-2192).
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General of the United States; and Bruce Babbit, Secretary of the Interior,
alleging four claims."
First, in seeking declaratory relief, the Tribe argued that the com-
pact allowed it the right to continue its Class InI gaming activities." Sec-
ond, the Tribe claimed that its casino was legal and that its threatened
closure by the federal government violated the Tribe's Fifth Amendment
rights."° Third, the Tribe claimed that Class III gaming was legal and
authorized by federal law and the compact.'' Fourth, the Jicarilla
Apaches claimed that the defendants had a fiduciary duty to protect the
Tribe's gaming activities from interference by others "purporting to act
under color of state or federal law.""' The defendants counterclaimed and
sought an order declaring the Class III gambling activities by the Tribe to
be illegal, violating both New Mexico and federal law."' The district
court issued an order invalidating the compact and dismissing the Tribe's
claim for declaratory relief."'
b. Decision
In affirming the decision of the district court, the Tenth Circuit
based its decision on Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly,"" where it held that a
compact nearly identical to the one in this case was invalid because it
violated the IGRA and New Mexico state law."' In Pueblo, the Tenth
Circuit made several central determinations regarding the IGRA statute.
First, the court decided that the parties to a compact, the state and the
tribe, must have agreed to form a gaming compact and that the compact
must govern both of the parties before the Secretary of the Interior can
approve Class III gaming on the reservation in question."6 Second, the
court held that state law dictated the process by which a state legally can




111. Id. The Jicarilla Apaches also argued that New Mexico waived its Eleventh Amendment
Immunity by filing a pleading in reply to the Tribe's claims. See id. a 537. Additionally, the Tribe
challenged the district court's dismissal of its case, which prevented it from filing a cross claim
against New Mexico for failure to negotiate in good faith. See id. a 537-38.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 536-37.
114. 104 F.3d 1546 (l0th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997).
115. See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1559. The Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court
decision upon which the district court relied in dismissing the action of the Jicarilla Apaches. See id.
The court found that the Governor of New Mexico did not have the authority to negotiate a compact
with the Tribe under New Mexico law. See id. The court also rejected the Jicarilla Apache's attempt
to distinguish its claim from the facts in Pueblo of Santa Ana by recognizing that New Mexico law
estopped the state from arguing the illegality of the agreement and also that New Mexico did not
negotiate in good faith. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 537.
116. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 537 (quoting Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at
1553).
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enter into a compact with a tribe."7 Third, the Tenth Circuit agreed with
the New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson on the
issue of whether New Mexico and a Native American tribe had estab-
lished a legal compact under New Mexico law."' It held that the New
Mexico Supreme Court was correct in its conclusion that the governor's
lack of authority undermined the legality of any compact negotiated un-
der the IGRA."9 Based on Pueblo of Santa Ana and the decision of the
New Mexico Supreme Court, the court concluded that that the compact
in the instant case between the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and governor failed
under both state law and the IGRA.
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the Tribe's request to remand the
case to the district court so that it could file its cross-claim against New
Mexico for failure to negotiate in good faith.' The court concluded that
the lower court's dismissal of the claim was neither premature nor incor-
rect."' It supported its decision by referring to Seminole Tribe,' which
held that the Eleventh Amendment shields states from litigation. '" De-
spite the limitations created by the Eleventh Amendment, the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that immunity can be waived.2" In applying this standard, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the Jicarilla Apache's claim that the state of New
Mexico waived its sovereign immunity, noting that New Mexico never
filed a motion to dismiss; it merely entered an appearance."z The court
emphasized that an appearance in court is not, in itself, a definitive
waiver of sovereign immunity.
2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico'27
a. Facts
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Apache Tribe
of the Mescalero Reservation could sue the state of New Mexico to com-
pel the state to negotiate a Class III gaming compact."8 The Mescalero
Apache Tribe began negotiating with the state to conclude a tribal Class
117. Id. In State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995), the New Mexico Supreme
Court considered both the state constitution and state law in holding that neither authorized the
governor of New Mexico to negotiate and sign a gaming compact. See Johnson, 904 P.2d at 22-26.
118. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 537.
119. See id. The court noted that the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari in
Pueblo of Santa Ana and that the decision by the Tenth Circuit is the law of the circuit. See id.
120. See id.
121. Seeid. at538.
122. For a discussion of Seminole Tribe, see supra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.
123. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 538.
124. See id. The court noted, however, that waiver is difficult to prove and must be "unequivo-
cal ... [since clonstructive consent is insufficient." Id. (quoting Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544,
1553 (10th Cir. 1995)).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. 131 F.3d 1379 (10th Cir. 1997).
128. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1380.
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III gaming compact in the late 1980s.'" In the early 1990s, a task force
established by then Governor Bruce King and the Tribe arrived at a ten-
tative agreement to allow limited gaming on the reservation." Later,
however, the governor refused to sign the agreement.'3 ' In 1992, the Tribe
filed an action to compel New Mexico to negotiate a Class II gaming
compact,'32 alleging bad faith negotiation by the governor and the state of
New Mexico under section 2710(d)(7).'33
New Mexico filed a motion to dismiss the Tribe's case, arguing that
its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the Tribe's claim." The dis-
trict court agreed with New Mexico and dismissed the case.' In Ponca
Tribe v. Oklahoma,"' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that states cannot assert either the Tenth or the Eleventh Amend-
ments as defenses to an IGRA action to compel good faith negotiation.'37
On remand, New Mexico filed an answer and a counterclaim requesting
an order that the compact was invalid, again arguing that a state cannot
be sued by a tribe because of the immunity protections of the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments' 38
In turn, the Mescalero Apaches filed a motion to strike the state's
constitutional defenses and counterclaim for constitutional immunity. "9
New Mexico moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim that the
tribal compact was invalid."' While on remand, the United States Su-
preme Court decided Seminole Tribe,"' invalidating the IGRA provision
abridging Eleventh Amendment immunity protection for the states." In
light of its decision in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court vacated the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma and remanded the
case to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration."3
129. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 131 F.3d 1379
(10th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2156) (hereinafter Mascalero Appellant's Brief].
130. Id. at 5-6.
131. Id. at 6. The governor also refused to sign a negotiated compact with the Sandia Tribe, in
spite of the recommendations to sign by all of the tribes and the New Mexico Attorney General. id.
132. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
133. See Mascalero Appellant's Brief, supra note 129, at 6.
134. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381; cf. Mascalero Appellant's Brief, supra
note 129, at 7 (detailing the procedural history).
135. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
136. See 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated by 517 U.S. 1129 (1996). The Tenth Circuit
chose to consider four separate Indian gaming appeals, including that of the Mescalero Apaches,
because the dispositive issues were identical. See id at 1425 n.1.
137. See Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1437.
138. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).




After the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe and its subse-
quent decision to vacate the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ponca Tribe, the
district court held a hearing on the outstanding motions of both parties.'"
The district court denied the Mescalero Apache's motion to strike New
Mexico's Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. 5 It granted the
Tribe's motion to strike New Mexico's Tenth Amendment immunity
defenses and denied the Tribe's motion to dismiss New Mexico's coun-
terclaim.' 6 It granted the State's motion for 'summary judgment on the
compact's legality, finding that the compact was invalid, and the Tribe
appealed.'47
During the pendency of Tribe's appeal, the Tenth Circuit decided
the case of Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly'" and found that the compacts
entered into by the tribes, which were very similar to the Mescalero
Apache compact, were invalid and not "in effect" under the IGRA." The
court held that New Mexico law did not grant the governor the authority
to negotiate a compact with the tribe."
The Tenth Circuit sought to clarify the issues on appeal by ordering
the parties to brief the following issues: the effect of the decision in Pueblo
of Santa Ana on this appeal,"' and the effect that recent changes in New
Mexico state law might have on any of the issues raised by the appeal.' 2
The Mescalero Apaches argued that Pueblo of Santa Ana was not
controlling because the issues presented in this appeal were not raised in
that case. ' First, the Tribe sought to distinguish its appeal from Pueblo
of Santa Ana because the United States was not a party to the suit, as it
had been in Pueblo of Santa Ana, and the court did not have to consider
whether the federal government was an indispensable party.'" The court
decided that the state's counterclaim would stand even if the United
States were a necessary party because the federal government cannot be
sued without its consent. The court concluded that it could only grant





148. 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997).
149. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1559.
150. See id.
151. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1381-82.
154. See id. at 1382. The Tenth Circuit noted that deciding whether or not a party is indispensa-
ble includes a determination under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) that the party is necessary and can be joined
if possible. See id. at 1383. The elements that determine whether a party is necessary include
whether complete relief is available to the individuals and entities already party to the suit, whether
the unnamed party has an interest in the claims and would be hampered by its absence, and whether
a party in the suit would be at a substantial risk of "multiple or inconsistent obligations." Id.
155. See id.
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that the federal government was also an indispensable party.'" Second,
the Tribe argued that the absence of the federal government in this dis-
pute compelled the court to decide whether Congress abrogated the
Tribe's sovereign immunity."5 Third, the Tribe claimed that the court did
not address the political question doctrine in Pueblo of Santa Ana, an
issue for consideration in the instant case, because the court did not have
the jurisdiction to entertain the claim under the doctrine. 8 Fourth, the
Tribe argued that New Mexico's form of sovereign immunity differed
from that of Florida in the application of Seminole Tribe. 9 Last, the
Tribe argued that New Mexico had substantially changed its law as re-
lated to this decision, requiring the court to revisit its decision in Pueblo
of Santa Ana.'
6
New Mexico countered the Tribe's arguments by contending that
the holding in Pueblo of Santa Ana was binding in this appeal because
the Tenth Circuit found that the compacts in Pueblo of Santa Ana, which
were identical to the compacts in this case, were invalid.' The state also
argued that recent changes in New Mexico law now allowed the gover-
nor to enter into gaming negotiations with tribes.'6" New Mexico reported
that the state and the Apaches had entered into a new Class III gaming
compact,'" and that the recent state law changes and the new compact
between New Mexico required the Tenth Circuit to certify three state law
questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court before deciding the merits
of the appeal."'
156. See id. The court sets out the rules of an indispensable party as enumerated in FED. R. CIv.
P. 19(b), which include the degree that a judgment made in the individual's absence would be preju-
dicial to the individual or already named parties, the degree by which the prejudice can be lessened
by the judgment through relief and other considerations, if the judgment will be "adequate" despite
the absence of the individual, and if the plaintiff will retain a sufficient remedy even if the case is
dismissed for nonjoinder. See id. The court also noted that the Supreme Court of the United States
has required that any court reviewing an appeal from an appellate perspective for the first time
analyze the successful plaintiff's interest in maintaining the judgment, the defendant's unsuccessful
attempts to litigate his claim, the interest of the individual not named in the suit, and the interests of
judicial time and efficiency. See id (citing Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United
States, 883 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1969))).





162. See id. The state claimed that New Mexico had recently enacted legislation giving the
governor the authority to make compacts with tribes. See id
163. See id.
164. See id. New Mexico, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, requested that
the court certify the following questions: (1) Whether the New Mexico legislature acted within its
constitutional authority when enacting the state statute, (2) Whether the tribal resolution authorized
the governor to negotiate and to enter into a treaty with the tribe, and (3) If the statute was unconsti-
tutional, whether the defective portions of the statute could be excised from the valid sections of the
statute. Id.
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issues raised, including whether the
United States was an indispensable party, the applicability of the prece-
dent in Seminole, tribal sovereign immunity, the political question doc-
trine, the court's jurisdiction over the counterclaim, and the changes in
New Mexico law.'" The court concluded that the Tribe was correct in
asserting that the issues of indispensability could be raised at any time,
despite the fact that the Tribe only raised the issue after an initial unfa-
vorable ruling." The court concluded that the United States was not an
indispensable party to the action.67 Citing its precedent in Pueblo of
Santa Ana, it found that the approval of the Secretary of the Interior
could not and did not predicate the intrinsic legality of the compact. '"
The court also concluded that the absence of the government did not
prejudice any party to the action and that the United States could not
challenge the ruling in a later claim.'" Finally, the court determined that
judicial efficiency weighed against the inclusion of the federal govern-
ment as an indispensable party.7 The court held the state's counterclaim
valid, despite the absence of the federal government.'
Next, the Tenth Circuit considered the applicability of Seminole
Tribe to the Tribe's claims." The court rejected the Tribe's argument
drawing distinctions between their situation and Seminole Tribe, and held
that the Tribe's argument confused general state sovereignty and Elev-
enth Amendment immunity." Citing Seminole Tribe, the court explained
that a state could waive its general sovereign immunity in state court and
subject itself to a civil action.'7' A waiver, however, is not enough to ab-
rogate its Eleventh Amendment immunity.'" The court emphasized that
immunity encompassed not only whether the state could be sued but also
165. The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by discussing the district court's holdings. See id. at
1383. The district court concluded that the Ponca Tribe decision, which held that the IGRA did not
violate the Tenth Amendment, was binding in the instant case. See id. The court also found that New
Mexico had Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for failure to negotiate in good faith. See id.
In addition, the district court held that New Mexico did not waive this claim by filing a counter-
claim. See id. The court also held that it had the jurisdiction to determine the state's counterclaim
and that the Tribe's sovereign immunity action did not bar it from hearing this claim. Id. at 1382-83.
It also concluded that the state's counterclaim was not barred by the political question doctrine. See
id. at 1383. Finally, the court ruled that the compact negotiated by the New Mexico governor and the
Tribe was invalid because the governor lacked the requisite constitutional authority to negotiate with
the Tribe on New Mexico's behalf. See id.
166. See id. at 1383.
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when it could be sued.'76 Therefore, the court concluded that New Mexico
must explicitly specify its intention to waive its immunity in federal
court and emphasized that New Mexico's actions did not alter its Elev-
enth Amendment immunity from actions in federal court.'" Thus, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Tribe's motion to
strike New Mexico's Eleventh Amendment immunity defense.'
The Tenth Circuit then addressed the tribal sovereign immunity
issue and whether Congress abrogated this protection.'7 Citing Santa
Clara Pueblo,"w the court reasoned that common law immunity protects
Native American tribes from litigation.'8 ' The court did not consider this
immunity to be absolute and noted that it could be waived in an affirma-
tive act.'" However, it noted that the exception to the rule is narrow and
any act must be express and unmistakable. 3 The court also noted that the
IGRA gave the district court authority over any claim to prevent Class III
gaming activity on Indian reservations.'" The Tenth Circuit concluded
that the IGRA waived tribal sovereign immunity not only in instances
involving compliance with IGRA provisions, but also in situations where
one party requested injunctive relief in its initial claims."
The court summarily addressed the fourth, fifth, and sixth issues.
The court, relying on its opinion in Pueblo of Santa Ana, determined that
the claim was justiciable.'" In assessing whether or not it has jurisdiction
176. See id. (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,241 (1985)).
177. Seeki.
178. See id. at 1385. The court of appeals also addressed whether New Mexico waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing a counterclaim against the Tribe. See id at n.4. Agreeing
with the district court's sua sponte resolution of this matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that even
though a state can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consent to be sued, a "stringent
test" must be used to determine the validity of such waiver. See id. (citing Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d
1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995)). This test is satisfied only upon a showing that the language is so ex-
press in its intent or in its statutory or constitutional mandate "as [will] leave no room for any other
reasonable construction." Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40
(1985)) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). The Tenth Circuit concluded that
New Mexico had not waived its sovereign immunity by filing a counterclaim or responding to a
claim against it. See id. (citing Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb. v. Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427 (8th Cir.
1997); American Fed'n. of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Corrections Dep't., 783 F. Supp.
1320, 1327 (D.N.M. 1992); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Roundtree Transp. & Rigging, Inc.,
896 F. Supp. 1204, 1206-07 (M.D. Fla. 1995)).
179. See id at 1385.
180. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
181. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1385.
182. See id.
183. See id. (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1386. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the state's counterclaim was not a non-
justiciable political question and that the claim was not made in Pueblo of Santa Ana, which showed
why the argument did not succeed. See id The court explained that a political question involves a
"'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political develop-
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."' See id. (quot-
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over the claim, the court concluded that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction,
again referring to its decision in Pueblo of Santa Ana.'" Finally, the court
refused to decide whether the recent legislation passed by the New
Mexico had any bearing on the outcome of the instant case, noting that
the new statute was not at issue."
C. Other Circuits
Other circuits also wrestled with gaming issues during the survey
period. The Sixth Circuit, in reversing a district court decision, con-
cluded that the IGRA applied to gaming in Keweenaw Bay Indian Com-
munity v. United States.'" In this case, the Tribe acquired a plot of land
that was later taken into trust by the federal government for the benefit of
the Keweenaw Tribe.'" The Tribe and the state of Michigan agreed to
negotiate a tribal-state compact for Class III gaming on tribal lands if the
Tribe met four conditions.'9' The Tribe met each of the stated conditions
and applied for approval from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).'92 The
BIA indicated that the Tribe must conform to the requirements enumer-
ated in section 2719 of IGRA.93 The Tribe refused and sued the state in
federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief.'" The Sixth
Circuit rejected the Tribe's argument that the existence of the compact
removed gaming from the jurisdiction of IGRA'9" and found that the va-
lidity of its compact did not exclude it from conforming with section
2719 of the IGRA.
The Eighth Circuit also addressed the issue of Class III gaming in
United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska."" When negotiations
between the state of Nebraska and the Sioux Tribe to open a Class III
ing Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1647 n.34 (1997) (quoting Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962))). The court emphasized that it resolved the issue of the legality of the gaming compact,
which the Tribe claimed was non-justiciable, in Pueblo of Santa Ana. See id.
187. See id. The court of appeals noted that in Pueblo of Santa Ana, the Tribe agreed that the
Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction over the gaming compact but that the Tribe would not agree that the
court had jurisdiction over New Mexico's counterclaim. See id It did not put any credence in the
Tribes "concession," noting that it had an independent duty to determine whether, in fact, it did have
jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction in Pueblo
of Santa Ana and that it also had jurisdiction in the instant case. See id.
188. See id. at 1386-87. The court explained that the new legislation was not part of the case or
controversy of the case and that events since Pueblo of Santa Ana did not require it to reconsider that
decision. See id.
189. 136 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 1998).
190. See Keweenaw Bay, 136 F.3d at 471.
191. See id. The four conditions included: (1) endorsement by the tribal council and approval of
the tribal chairperson. (2) approval by the governor and state legislature by resolution. (3) endorse-
ment by the Secretary of the Interior. (4) publication in the Federal Register. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 471-72.
195. See id. at 475-76.
196. See id. at 475.
197. 135 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1998).
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gaming facility failed in the early 1990s, the Tribe opened the facility
anyway. ' Concurrently, the Tribe sued Nebraska for failure to negotiate
in good faith.'" After a NIGC decision, the Tribe was forced to close its
facility.' The district court did not enjoin the Tribe from its gaming ac-
tivity."' In reversing and remanding the lower court's decision, the Sixth
Circuit determined that the Attorney General had the authority to enforce
the closure order, 2 that the Tribe's operation of the video poker, black-
jack, and slot machines was illegal,' that Nebraska law provided for
injunctive relief,' and that the Tribe's operation of the casino was a
violation of IGRA.'
The Ninth Circuit decided two cases regarding the IGRA during the
same time period. In United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians,' the
court addressed whether the portions of the IGRA not struck down by
Seminole Tribe remained valid.' The dispute revolved around compact
negotiations that went sour between the state of Washington and the
Spokane Tribe.' The district court dismissed the Tribe's claim against
Washington based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. ' During the pen-
dency of its initial claim, the Tribe increased its gaming activity, despite
the lack of a valid compact."' The district court issued an order enjoining
the Tribe from most of its gaming activities. "' The Ninth Circuit found
that those portions of the IGRA that had not been overruled by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe remained valid but could not
serve as the foundation for an injunction invalidating tribal gaming.
212
Thus, the court vacated~the injunction and remanded the case back to the
district court, noting that other agencies within the executive branch, such
as the Department of the Interior, might also serve as appropriate forums
for the resolution of the differences between the Tribe and the state.213
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also addressed the IGRA in Confederated
Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. State of Oregon,2"4 which arose out
of compact negotiations between the Tribe and the state of Oregon for a
198. See Santee Sioux, 135 F.3d at 560.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 561.
201. See id
202. See id at 562.
203. See id at 564.
204. See id. at 564-65.
205. See id. at 563-65.
206. 139 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).





212. See id. at 1298.
213. See id. at 1302.
214. 143 F.3d 481 (9th Cir. 1998).
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casino on their reservation.! The parties agreed that the state could
monitor gaming activity in the casino." ' After the routine inspection of
the casino, the state announced to the Tribe that it intended to release its
report as required by the Oregon Public Records statute."' The Tribe sued
to prevent the release of this report.2"8 The district court granted the
Tribe's motion for summary judgment, and the state of Oregon ap-
pealed.2' The Ninth Circuit held that the compact did not prevent the
state of Oregon from releasing its report under the public records stat-
ute.' The court also found that the IGRA did not prevent the application
of Oregon's public records laws.'
D. Analysis
The recent decisions in the circuit courts reflect the tension and the
inconsistencies of the Supreme Court's analysis in Seminole Tribe. Semi-
nole Tribe has gutted the effective functioning of the IGRA and the abil-
ity of Native American tribes to establish and to implement a reliable
form of income.2 The decision in Seminole Tribe has removed the parity
between the states and Native American tribes. States now have the power
to squelch Class Ell gaming without any serious discussion or negotiation
with the tribe.' 3 The Court effectively has placed Class I1 gaming under
the jurisdiction of the states, weakening the ability of Native Americans to
implement Class III gaming activities on their reservations.
Consequently, the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have broken
with recent precedent in fostering and maintaining Native American tribal
sovereignty. The Tenth Circuit and other federal courts now no longer
have the power to mediate disputes between Native American tribes and
the states. The Supreme Court has limited the power of federal courts to
215. See Siletz Indians, 143 F.3d at 483.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 484 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.410-192.505 (1996)).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 484-85.
221. See id.
222. See Joanne C. Brant, Seminole Tribe, Flores and State Employees: Reflections on a New
Relationship, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 175, 180 (1998); Cox, supra note 65, at
863; Heidi L. McNeil, Indian Gaming in Arizona the Great Casino Controversy Continues, ARiz.
A'rr'Y. 13, 13 (1998); cf William Bennet Cooper, 11, Comment, What's in the Cards for the Future
of Indian Gaming Law? 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 129 (1998). But see Sharon Wheeler, Comment,
Is the Die Cast? Indian Casino Gaming in Maine, 50 ME. L. REv. 143, 144 (1998).
223. State concerns over tribal gaming include, among other things, license fees, the impair-
ment of state sovereignty, loss of revenue, and state concerns over the extent of tribal sovereignty.
Cf. Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Com-
pacts Under the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act, 29 ARIz. ST. LJ. 25, 26-28 (1998); Cooper,
supra note 222, at 129; Brian Casey Fitzpatrick, Case Note, Finding a Fair Forum: Federal Juris-
diction for IGRA Compact Actions in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 35 IDAHO L.
REv. 159, 161 (1998); Brad Jolly, Comment, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering
Policy of Termination Continues, 29 ARmz. ST. LJ. 273, 274 (1997).
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assert jurisdiction over such disputes, and as a result, has departed from
decades of judicial deference not only to the tribes but also to congres-
sional leadership. The result has limited the statute's intent to retain parity
between the parties. Without recourse in the federal courts, Native Ameri-
can tribes no longer have an effective remedy to compel a recalcitrant
state to negotiate in good faith. Although the remaining sections of the
IGRA remain in effect in some circuits, these sections are unenforceable
without the judicial remedies designed to enforce them. While the Court's
Eleventh Amendment analysis presents compelling arguments, interest-
ingly, the Court does not address the other side of the issue: Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause and its power to regulate interstate
commerce under its express power conferred by Article I of the Constitu-
tion. Clearly, both Congress and tribal sovereignty must subjugate them-




The federal government classifies Native Americans as members of
political organizations, or tribes, not as members of a particular ethnic
group-a' Congress often relies on tribal membership in identifying
whether a person can be treated as a Native American for federal legisla-
tion and government programs.2' Because the government has negotiated
treaties with separate Indian tribes and not with the Native Americans
themselves, its primary responsibility lies in its obligations to the tribe,
not to the individuals.26 The judiciary consistently has upheld a tribe's
right to determine its own basis for membership.'m A tribe can create
membership "by usage, by written law, by treaty with the United States,
or even by intertribal agreement."'
Native American tribes register their members on tribal rolls, but
requirements for such registration vary.' The criteria can range from
one-quarter to as much as one-half Indian ancestry; other tribes do not
have such stringent, or any, requirements.w Some tribes even allow for
224. Cf Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-based and Membership-based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PIT. L. REv. 1, 79-81 (1993).
225. See id. at 84.
226. See id. (noting that "in a number of statutory provisions, and regulations promulgated
under such provisions, being an Indian and being a tribal member are synonymous, or tribal mem-
bership alone is one possible ground for an individual being considered an 'Indian"').
227. Cf COHEN, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that the tribe has the power "to grant, deny, revoke,
and qualify membership").
228. Id.
229. See id. at 22-23.
230. See id. at 23.
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the enrollment of all tribal relatives, regardless of blood content."' Con-
gress has the authority to determine tribal membership in a different
fashion if it chooses to facilitate the administration of Native American
affairs. 2
B. Tenth Circuit Case-United States v. Von Murdock "3
1. Facts
United States v. Von Murdock must be viewed within the context of
the Ute Termination Act (UTA).' Congress intended the UTA to divide
and distribute the assets of the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reser-
vation between full-blooded and mixed-blooded members of the Tribe.2
5
The goals of the statute include "the termination of Federal supervision
over the trust, and restricted property, of the mixed-blood members ... ;
and for a development program for the full-blood members .... to assist
them in preparing for termination of Federal supervision over their prop-
erty." ' The statute defines "full-blooded" Utes as individuals with one-
half Ute ancestry and "mixed-blooded" as individuals with less than one-
half Ute ancestry."" The Utes created rolls consisting of mixed-blood and
full-blood Utes, which were published in the Federal Register and be-
came final after a review and protest period.' The statute stipulates that
the Tribe can only determine new membership according to the laws and
regulations promulgated by the Tribe.239 It also divides tribal assets of the
mixed-ancestry Utes evenly.2' Finally, it calls for the establishment of a
tribal committee to manage assets that cannot be equitably divided."
The defendant's parents were listed on the final rolls as mixed-
blood Utes according to the terms of the statute and thus received their
share of the Tribe's property. ' 2 According to the property distribution of
the UTA, the defendant's parents lost their respective memberships and
all rights in tribal property after the final asset distribution. 3 The defen-
231. See id.
232. See id Congress can create different distinctions for Native Americans for the purpose of
determining "eligibility for social programs, jurisdiction in criminal matters, preference in govern-
mental hiring, and administration of tribal property." Id
233. 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 41 (1998).
234. 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1994); cf Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 535.
235. See 25 U.S.C. § 677.
236. Id.
237. Id. § 677a(b)-(c).
238. See id. § 677g. The statute indicates that that the Tribe will only be made up of full-
blooded members and that mixed-blooded Utes cannot have an interest in the Tribe unless the statute
indicates otherwise. See id. § 677d.
239. See id. § 677d.
240. See id. § 677i.
241. See id.
242. See United States v. Von Murdock, 132 F.3d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 41 (1998).
243. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 536.
19991
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
dant, Von Murdock, applied with the Ute Tribe for permission to hunt on
tribal lands.2" The Tribe denied the application, noting that he was not a
member of the Tribe and had no ancestral rights to the land. Von Mur-
dock hunted on the Ute lands anyway.' The authorities arrested him and
charged him with hunting on Indian tribal land in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1165.2
The defendant claimed that since he was a member of the Tribe, he
had a right to the use of the tribal land, and that the UTA was unconsti-
tutional. 7 The district court rejected defendant's argument, and defen-
dant entered a plea of nolo contendere.' The defendant appealed his
conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.4 9
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district courtl ° In
addition, the court denied defendant's rehearing petition and revised its
published opinion of October 20, 1997.f' Citing both the tribal constitu-
tion and the UTA, the court determined that because defendant's parents
had already received their share of the tribal property, they were no
longer members of the Tribe. 2 Therefore, Von Murdock was not a
member of the Tribe and not eligible for tribal membership. 3 The court
noted that defendant based his argument on the Kalamath Termination
Act (KTA) discussion in the Kimball cases.' Using both Kimball cases,
the defendant reasoned that because the KTA did not terminate the user
rights of terminated descendants, the UTA could not terminate his user
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 535.
247. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 537.
248. See id. at 535.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. The court opted to "issue... a revised opinion nunc pro tunc to October 20, 1997,"
and withdraw the opinion of October 20, 1997. Id.
252. See id at 536.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 536-37. In Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 1974), decided in 1974,
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, five Kalamath Indians who withdrew from the Tribe, re-
tained their treaty rights to hunt, trap, and fish without state interference, even though they had been
compensated for their portions of tribal property. Kimball, 493 F.3d at 567. The Ninth Circuit based
its opinion on the United States Supreme Court decision regarding the Menominee Termination Act
in Menominee Tribe v. United States, where the Court found that because the statute did not specifi-
cally mention the hunting and fishing rights of the Tribe, it could not be used in a manner that abro-
gated such rights without explicit congressional intent. Id. (citing Menominee Tribe v. United States,
391 U.S. 404,412 (1968)). In the second Kimball case, Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.
1979), the Ninth Circuit affirmed its decision in the first Kimball case and explained that it had based
its decision and analysis on the explicit language in the Ute Termination Act that indicated that
withdrawal from the Tribe did not extinguish the right to hunt or fish on tribal lands.
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rights.'2 In addition, the defendant argued that the tribal rights at issue in
this case were only those of the Uintah Tribe and not the Ute Tribe.
Therefore, the defendant claimed that he had rights to use the land as a
member of the Uintah band.'
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the decision by the district court by fo-
cusing a significant amount of attention on the Felter cases.5 7 In Felter,
the state prosecuted the defendant, a mixed-blood Ute terminated from
the Tribe after the passage of the statute, for fishing on the tribal lands
without a permit." The district court found that the UTA did not explic-
itly deny mixed-blooded Utes the right to hunt and fish on tribal land,
and conversely, that UTA did not have any statutory language preserving
the rights of mixed-bloods to indivisible tribal assets. 9 Using the deci-
sion in Menominee Tribe, the district court held that because the UTA
did not specifically extinguish hunting and fishing rights or individual
interests in these rights and that these rights were specifically preserved
by the statute, withdrawal from the Tribe did not eliminate the right to
hunt and to fish on tribal lands if not specifically stated in the statute.m
In considering the hunting and fishing rights held by the Tribe and
mixed-blooded Utes, the district court held that such rights and powers
belong to the Tribe and that these rights are to be determined in relation
to the Tribe's right, noting that the rights of a tribe are "owned by the
tribal entity, and not as a tenancy in common of the individual members,
including hunting and fishing rights." ' Therefore, while leaving the
Tribe would eliminate all of the individual rights of the withdrawing
member in the Tribe's property, section 677(i) of the UTA preserved the
rights of a mixed-blood Ute to use tribal property.' Based on this analy-
sis, the district court decided that Utes of mixed-blood listed on the final
roll could hunt and fish on tribal lands while living, the right terminating
at an individual's death.263
In Felter, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court,
holding that the language in Menominee Tribe dictated that UTA could
not be interpreted as abridging the right to hunt and fish on tribal lands
255. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 539.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 538-39.
258. See id. at 538.
259. See id. (citing United States v. Felter, 546 F. Supp 1002, 1017 (D. Utah 1982)).
260. See idt (citing Kimball 1I,.590 F.2d at 773).
261. Id. (citing Kimball l1, 590 F.2d at 1021).
262. See id. (citing Kimball 11, 590 F.2d at 1023). The district court decided that this right is a
personal right that was not "alienable, assignable, transferable nor descendable." Id. The court based
its decision on Grits v. Fisher, which held that tribal lands and funds belonged to the community
"and not to the members severally or as tenants in common." Id (citing Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S.
640, 642 (1912)). Individual rights to use of tribal property are predicated by tribal membership, a
right that ends at death or termination. See id. (citing Gritts, 224 U.S. at 642).
263. See id. at 538-39 (citing Felter, 546 F. Supp. at 1025).
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because of the absence of any express language in the statute.' The court
agreed that hunting and fishing rights on reservation lands are tribal
rights and that tribal members hold user rights to reservation lands.f' The
court declined to impute a desire by Congress to eliminate hunting and
fishing rights of mixed-blood Utes to the statute.26 In Von Murdock, the
court emphasized that the defendant used the Felter cases as a basis for
his claim that he had a right to hunt and fish on tribal lands. 7 The court
concluded that the Felter cases could not be interpreted in a manner that
would support the defendant's claims.'
The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's arguments.' Citing the
statute, the court decided that the UTA specifically ended the tribal
membership of Native Americans of mixed-ancestry. 7 The court rein-
forced its decision by explaining that a tribe, had the right to determine its
own membership.'" In addition, the court also decided that the Ute Con-
stitution specifically abolished the Uintah Band of the Ute Tribe.Y It also
rejected the defendant's arguments claiming that the UTA was uncon-
stitutional and violated his right to equal protection.*' The court upheld
the UTA against claims that it arbitrarily and capriciously discriminated
against Utes of mixed ancestry.' The court underpinned this conclusion
by noting that the racial classifications used by the Utes were permissible
considering the relationship between the federal government and Native
American tribes." The court also found no equal protection violation, 6
264. See id. at 539 (citing United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1506 (10th Cir. 1985)).
265. See id. (citing Felter, 752 F.2d at 1510).
266. See id. The court concluded that the right to hunt and to fish cannot be equitably and
practically distributed. See id
267. See id.
268. See id. The court noted that despite the fact that the district court and the Tenth Circuit
cited to the Kimball cases in the Felter case, they only concurred with the decision of the Ninth
Circuit that under Menominee Tribe, congressional intent to abolish tribal rights will not be found
unless there is explicit language in the statute. See id. (citing Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509-10 & n.8;
Felter, 546 F. Supp. at 1011, 1018).
269. See id at 541. The court argued that defendant's claim was precluded by the precedent in
Felter, noting that user rights were predicated by the holder's status as a tribal member, and were,
therefore, personal rights that could not be conveyed to another. See id. at 539-40; cf Felter, 752
F.2d at 1509.
270. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 540.
271. See id
272. See id. at 541. The court noted that "jurisdiction over what was formerly the territory of
the Uintah Band was to be exercised by the Ute Tribe, and that the rights formerly vested in the
Uintah Band were to be defined by the Ute Constitution." Id.
273. See id. The court decided that the defendant did not have the standing to raise any of the
constitutional issues in his claims. See id at 542. Nonetheless, the court proceeds to address the
defendant's equal protection and due process arguments anyway. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. The court noted that "'[flederal regulation of Indian tribes ... is governance of
once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a racial group consist-




nor any violation of the defendant's procedural due process claim, ex-
plaining that the notice of termination of mixed-ancestry Native Ameri-
cans received adequate notice in the Federal Register.' Finally, the court
rejected the defendant's claim that the statute violated the Tribe's First
Amendment rights, noting that the defendant had no standing to assert
his claim. 78 The opinion noted that since Von Murdock was not a mem-
ber of the Tribe, he had no standing to assert an infringement of the con-
stitutional rights guaranteed to the Tribe.279
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit remained consistent with legislative and judicial
policies granting deference to Native Americans in regulating their inter-
nal affairs and membership.' The court's opinion followed the express
language of the statute and allowed the Tribe to determine its member-
ship and whether an individual of Native American ancestry falls within
the prescribed criteria established for tribal membership.l' Native
Americans have complete authority to govern themselves within the con-
fines of the reservation. In this instance, the only decision by the Tenth
Circuit in the survey period addressing this issue remained consistent
with congressional intent and recent public policy regarding tribal sover-
eignty and self-government. Only the respective tribe can assess who can
remain as a member of a tribe and establish the criteria in determining
the ancestry (i.e., ethnic composition) necessary to remain as a member
of the tribe. Because such determinations belong solely to a tribe, federal
courts will not to involve themselves in issues involving who can claim
himself or herself of tribal membership.
III. INDIAN TRUST LANDS
A. Background
During the nineteenth century, the federal policy of removing Na-
tive Americans from their ancestral homelands slowly gave way to the
policies of the reservation and allotment. 2 As the American frontier ex-
276. See id In fact, the court explained that statutes that expressly address Native American
tribes is a permissible classification and that such classification has express constitutional provisions





280. See Mark K. Ulmer, The Legal Origin and Nature of Indian Housing Authorities and the
HUD Indian Housing Programs, 13 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 117-19 (1988); cf Vicki J. Limas,
Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes: Respecting
Sovereignly and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIz. ST. L. 681 (1994). But see Robert K. Reeve, Did
the North Dakota Supreme Court Properly Decide State v. Hook?, 68 N.D. L. REv. 695 (1992).
281. Cf id. at 540.
282. Cf. COHEN, supra note 6, at 122-24.
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panded farther west, the federal government concluded that the constant
removal of the Native American tribes to new and isolated areas frus-
trated the American policy goal to "civilize" and to facilitate the assimi-
lation of the Native American into mainstream culture.83 This concern, as
well as the constant collision of the American frontier with tribal lands,
prompted the federal government prompted the federal government to
focus not on removal, but on the establishment of fixed, definitive tracts
of land known as reservations, land specifically designated for tribal
use. M
Sensing that Native Americans had not assimilated quickly enough
into the dominant American culture, later in the century, Congress read-
justed its policy of allotment to hasten assimilation.8 The policy of al-
lotment began in the late- nineteenth century and involved doling out
tribal land on American Indian reservations to individual groups of
American Indians or to their families in an attempt to encourage home-
steading and assimilation.' The federal government intensified this ef-
fort after the Civil War,' which culminated in 1887 with the passage of
the General Allotment Act, a statute requiring mandatory allotment of
Native American tribal lands.' Allotment statutes granted land in fee to
Native Americans with some restrictions on alienation.' The govern-
ment began allotting land in trust to the United States for the benefit of
Native Americans toward the end of the century, and the General Allot-
ment Act provided the basis for the present technical definition of the
term allotment."9 After the cession of lands to each eligible Indian fam-
ily, the government either sold or allowed homesteading on the remain-
ing land."' The government abandoned the unsuccessful allotment proc-
ess in the 1930s,' and the definition of the term "allotment" has not
changed significantly in the modern era.' 3
283. See id.
284. See id. at 124. Several of the removal treaties of the nineteenth century allowed Native
American tribes to remain on land ceded by the federal government, which came to be known as
reservations. See id.
285. See id. at 612-13.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 613.
288. See Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
289. See id.
290. Cf id. Cohen notes that the present meaning for the term "allotment" is based on the 1887
Act. See COHEN, supra note 6, at 615-16.
291. Cf COHEN, supra note 6, at 613-14. After each tribal allotment, the government often
required the "cession" of the remaining tribal land back to the Untied States. See id. at 612-13.
Cohen also suggests that the allotment policy was a not so subtle attempt to appropriate land from
the tribes. See id.
292. See id. at 614.
293. See id. at 615-16. Cohen notes:
allotment is a term of art in Indian law, describing either a parcel of land owned by the
United States in trust for an Indian ("trust" allotment), or owned by an Indian subject to a
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Individual tribal members cannot hold title to land on Native
American reservations; instead, all title to the land rests in the tribe it-
self.2 ' Individuals also have no personal vested interest in tribal prop-
erty." However, tribal members do have privileges and rights to the use
of tribal property, although the rights and use are regulated by tribal law,
policies, and custom.' Tribal membership predicates how and whether
an individual can use the land; withdrawal from the tribe or the loss of
one's membership eliminates a member's right to the use of the land.'
B. Tenth Circuit Case--Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Collier,
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision granting the
Tribe's motion for summary judgment, holding that a decision by the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) for the Absentee Shawnee Tribe
was "contrary to law."' The parcel in question received the reservation
designation in 1867 in a treaty between the federal government and the
Tribe.' Individual members of the Absentee Shawnee Tribe had already
settled on the land in question, which was later to become the Potawa-
tomi reservation." ' Absentee Shawnee tribal members requested that the
federal government give them title to the land.' In turn, the Potawa-
towmi Tribe agreed to allow the Absentee Shawnees to remain and peti-
tioned the federal government for an expansion of their land that included
and area equivalent to the area occupied by the Absentee Shawnees.' "
To finalize this arrangement, Congress passed an allotment act in
1872 allotting land to each member of the Potawatomi Tribe and to the
Absentee Shawnees living on the Potawatomi's reservation.' In 1890,
the federal government and the Potowatomi Tribe negotiated a treaty
restriction on alienation in favor of the United States or its officials ("restricted fee" al-
lotment).
Id.
294. See id. at 605.
295. See id. at 606.
296. See id. Cohen notes that an American Indian's "right to tribal property is no more than the
prospective and inchoate, unless federal of tribal law recognizes a more definitive right." Id.
297. See id. at 607. Cohen notes that the right is neither inheritable nor assignable. See id at
608.





303. See id. at 1327-28.
304. See Act of May 23, 1872, ch. 206, 17 Stat. 159. The statute also provided for allotments
for the Absentee Shawnees. See id. § 2.
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through which the reservation was ceded to the government.' Several
years later, the Potawatomi Tribe filed a claim against the federal gov-
ernment for additional compensation for surplus land on the reservation.
The government countered this claim and argued that the Tribe had al-
lowed the Absentees Shawnees to remain on the surplus land.' The
Court of Claims rejected the government's claim, noting that the Tribe
had never waived its claim of ownership of the land occupied by the Ab-
sentee Shawnees.'
A century later in 1992, the Potawatomi Tribe learned that the Ab-
sentee Shawnee Tribe had applied to take the lands on which they re-
sided into trust.' The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) determined that the
Potawatomis and the Shawnees commonly shared a reservation and that
the Potawatomi's consent was not necessary to put the lands into trust 09
The Potawatomis sued the Absentee Shawnees and the federal gov-
ermnent to stop the BIA from placing the lands in question into trust."'
The government countered with a motion to dismiss the Potawatomi's
claim for failure to join the Absentee Shawnees as an indispensable party
and for failure to exhaust its administrative remedies."' The district court
granted the government's motion, and the Potawatomi Tribe appealed the
decision. 1
The Tenth Circuit began its discussion with the governing statute,
the General Allotment Act, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire land for Native Americans through "purchase, relinquishment,
gift, exchange or assignment, any interest in lands, within or without
existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments,
whether the allotee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing
land for the indians."' The court defined a reservation as "an area of
land over which the Tribe is recognized by the United States as having
governmental jurisdiction, except that, in the state of Oklahoma... In-
dian reservation means that area of land constituting the former reserva-
tion of the Tribe as defined by the Secretary."3 ' The court also noted that
under federal regulations, a Native American or a Native American tribe
can only "acquire land in trust status on a reservation other than its own"
305. See id. The statute setting out this agreement required that the Potawatomi Tribe surrender
title to the reservation. See id. The Absentee Shawnees also surrendered their land to the govern-
ment. See id.
306. See Citizen Band, 142 F.3d at 1328-29.






313. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1996)).
314. Citizen Band, 142 F.3d at 1327 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(0 (1997)).
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when the "governing body of the tribe having jurisdiction over such res-
ervation consents in writing to the acquisition."3 ' For acquisition pur-
poses, Indian consent is not required if the land is already owned in un-
divided trust or restricted interest in land."6
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court to grant
the dismissal.3" On remand, the government renewed its motion, which
was granted by the district court.'" Concurrently, the Interior Board of
Indian Affairs (IBIA) affirmed the decision of the Director of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs."9 The Potawatonis countered this action by filing an
amended claim in district court challenging the IBIA decision."' The gov-
ernment, again, renewed its motions for summary judgment, which the
district court granted.32' On appeal, the defendants claimed that the IBIA's
decision did not receive proper deference.22 The Tenth Circuit held that
the statute did not sever the Potawatomi's treaty right to exclusive use and
occupancy of its reservation. 2 Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that the
Secretary of Interior should have obtained the consent of the Potawatomi
Tribe before it could acquire trust lands for the Absentee Shawnees. z'
The court's decision turned on whether the Tenth Circuit must defer
to the IBIA's mandate that the Absentee Shawnee Tribe had a recogniz-
able interest in the Potowatomi lands after June 15, 1890.2 The court
noted that it must determine if the agency's decision contradicted con-
gressional intent." It determined that the Potawatomis presented a com-
pelling argument that IBIA should not receive the Chevron deference
usually accorded to an agency decision because Congress had not dele-




318. See id. at 1330.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id. The district court based its decision on two factors: (1) The Absentee Shawnees
never had a reservation, and (2) The Absentee Shawnees had no interest before 1890, and Congress
did not give any interest to it after the Shawnee surrender of the land. See id. at 1330-31.
322. See id. at 1331.
323. See id. at 1334.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 1332.
326. See id. The court indicated that it had to determine Congressional intent when it ratified
the 1891 statute, the embodiment of the treaties under which reservations lands were given to the
federal government. See id.
327. See id. (comparing the situation in the instant case with the facts and the holding in Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990)). In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should give "considerable weight" to an
agency's interpretation of a statute if Congress has given that agency the authority to implement the
statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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explained that it did not need to consider the issue of agency discretion
because the statutory construction of the case indicated that the interpre-
tation and decision of IBIA contradicted statutory intent.2
3
The court held that the Tribe did not obtain rights in the Potawatomi
reservation between June 5, 1890 and the 1891 statute. 32 The court re-
jected the defendant's claim that the district court failed to give the IBIA
decision proper deference.3 Noting that Congress has the right to abro-
gate treaty rights, the court found that the statutory language must be
express.' Ultimately, the court decided that the legislative history and
the historical ramifications of the Act did not create clear congressional
intent to breach the Potawatomi's treaty right to the exclusive use and
331occupancy of its former reservation.
D. Analysis
Again, as with tribal membership, the Tenth Circuit has remained
consistent with recent American legislative and judicial policy regarding
Native American self-determination. In this instance, the court retained
the balance of power between the federal agency, in this case the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, and the tribe's right of self-determination. The court of
appeals followed historical precedent to find in favor of the tribe, unless
Congress had specifically stated limitations of tribal authority in the stat-
ute. The court deferred to tribal sovereignty because of the lack of ex-
press intent in the statute to limit the authority of the Potawatomi Tribe.3
As with Indian trust lands, the court focused completely on the express
language in the statute in rendering its decision, and maintained tribal
sovereignty in this instance. Because of the vagaries of the treaty and
the fact that Native American tribes have almost absolute sovereignty
within the confines of their reservations, the federal courts did not (and
should not) involve themselves in the matter.
This is true unless the agency's decision unless the agency's decision violates express Congressional
intent. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
328. See Citizen Band, 142 F.3d at 1332.
329. See id. at 1331-32.
330. See id. at 1332.
331. See id. at 1332-33.
332. See id. at 1333-34.
333. See Timothy W. Joranko, Tribal Self-Determination Unfettered: Toward a Rule of Abso-
lute Tribal Official Immunity from Damages in Federal Court, 26 AZ. ST. LJ. 987,991 (1994); cf.
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1, 1-7 (1995). But see Darby L. Hog-
gat, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit Act: Enforcing Tribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND &
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CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Tenth Circuit addressing Indian disputes in the
past year demonstrate a consistency with past precedents and public pol-
icy concerns of allowing and encouraging Native American tribes to en-
gage in self determination and self government. Tenth Circuit precedent
dictates that if events occur on Indian lands and involve other Indians,
that the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over such events. Indeed, if Na-
tive Americans engage in transactions and associations with non-Indians,
the courts have granted deference to the tribes, unless the tribe has ac-
tively and expressly acted to avail itself to the jurisdiction of a federal
court. The majority of the decisions discussed in this analysis, including
tribal membership, Indian trust lands, and sovereign immunity suggest
and reinforce the notion that the federal government, and specifically the
judiciary, has a policy of deference to the self-governance of Native
American tribes. The courts, however, have not extended the same defer-
ence in the adjudication of disputes involving the now defunct Indian
Gaming and Regulatory Act. The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe has gutted the statute in the area of initiating and developing gam-
bling facilities on their reservations. The tribes now remain at the mercy
of the individual states in which their respective reservations are situated.
The history, culture, and present situation of the Native Americans
and their reservations will continue to present difficult judicial, legisla-
tive, and policy problems for the American political and judicial systems.
The lines that divide the exact authority of Native American tribes and
that of the states and the federal government are imprecise and subject to
the whims of politics, as the creation of IGRA and the Supreme Court's
decision in Seminole Tribe indicates. Consequently, the American gov-
ernment still struggles to walk the tightrope between self-determination
for the Native Americans and benevolent paternalism.
Heather A. Weckbaugh*
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Denver College of Law. The author would like to
thank her father and stepmother, Walter and Janice Weckbaugh, and the editors of the Denver





Juvenile law has always been a complicated subject to untangle.
Courts historically have had difficulties deciding how to label and treat
juveniles because the crimes they commit are difficult to categorize and
society is reluctant to view children as mature individuals. Simply stated,
children are immature, lacking the faculties and responsibilities of adults.
Juveniles learn and react through their unique experiences which creates
a severe tension when courts attempt to treat individuals in a common
juvenile system. Society tends to protect a child offender's innocence,
but this tendency is difficult to sustain when children commit increas-
ingly atrocious crimes.
Juveniles were subjected to the same justice system as adults until
the late nineteenth century.' The juvenile justice system today is an en-
tirely different entity from the justice system for adults.' "These systems
are governed by different laws, follow different procedures, use different
terminology, and operate under different philosophies as to their purpose
and the nature of the suspects who come before them."3
Be it the commission of crimes or the capacity to stand trial or tes-
tify, the struggle to define the contours of juvenile justice within an adult
focused system is a persistent reality. This survey' attempts to unravel
some of the mysteries behind the juvenile justice system, why it exists as
it does, and where it is going through an analysis of the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of juvenile law. Part I explores the transfer of juveniles to adult
status through United States v. Leon, D.M.' Part II discusses children as
witnesses through United States v. Allen J." Although competency re-
quirements are the same for both children and adults,7 courts treat child
witnesses with more discretion. Questions arise regarding the veracity of
children's statements and their ability to withstand the severe psycho-
logical impact of trial type proceedings.8 Issues of child abuse further
1. See MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 179 (1997).
2. See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., AGE, CRIME, AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION
FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT at v (1980).
3. Id.
4. This survey addresses cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals between Sep-
tember 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
5. 132 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
6. 127 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1997).
7. The Federal Rules of Evidence state: "Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules." FED. R. EVID. 601. The rules set out no further exceptions for
children. See id.
8. Cf. Lucy Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 167, 169 (1985).
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complicate these proceedings.9 This survey examines the advantages and
disadvantages of allowing children to testify and discusses the emer-
gence of juvenile witnesses and their place in the juvenile justice system.
I. TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO ADULT STATUS
A. Background
In recent decades, an onslaught of juvenile offenders committing
heinous crimes flooded the justice system."' Appalled citizens recognized
that sentences for many felonies, including murder, allowed a juvenile to
go to jail only until he or she attained the age of majority after which
time he or she was returned to the streets." The courts may impose more
lenient sanctions and penalties on young criminal offenders until the ju-
venile system labels them as "adults.""2
The trend is for society to respond to juvenile offenders with reha-
bilitation, not severe punishment.'3 Underlying this trend is the theory
that children are of a tender age, and the system has an obligation to try
to "fix" them so that they can become a functional part of society."' Fur-
thermore, the different capacities of adults and children require different
treatment under the law." The state acts as the parens patriae of the
9. See generally Elizabeth Vaughan Baker, Psychological Expert Testimony on a Child's
Veracity in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 50 LA. L. REV. 1039 (1990) (arguing that the justice
system needs to revamp itself in order to serve the needs of increasing child sex abuse cases); Chris-
tine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault v. The Ac-
cused's Right to Confrontation, 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 439 (1994) (discussing the different
theories as to how children react to testifying and whether it is contrary to the defendant's due proc-
ess rights); Julie A. Dale, Comment, Ensuring Reliable Testimony from Child Witnesses in Sexual
Abuse Cases: Applying Social Science Evidence to a New Fact-Finding Method, 57 ALB. L. REV.
187 (1993) (analyzing whether children's testimony in sexual abuse cases is reliable enough to
utilize, and suggesting ways to improve the process).
10. See generally JUDGE JERRY L. MERSHON, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE ADJUDICATORY AND
DISPOSmONAL PROCESS 11-1; (1991) (analyzing the juvenile justice system from its inception
through the present adjudicatory process); Charles J. Aron & Michele S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice
at the Crossroads, 22 CHAMPION 10, 10-tI (1998) (discussing the expansion of younger juvenile
offenders and how they should be handled in the justice system, and encouraging the maintenance of
the juvenile court system as a means of protecting our children); Edward L. Thompson, Juvenile
Delinquency: A Judge's View of Our Past, Present, and Future, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 655, 655 (1993)
(addressing the increase in serious juvenile crimes, particularly with respect to the Oklahoma Juve-
nile Code); Holly Beatty, Comment, Is the Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer Statutes Just an Easy
Answer to a Complex Problem?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 980 (1995) (questioning the motives
behind transferring juveniles to adult status in criminal court).
11. Cf Thompson, supra note 10, at 655-56.
12. See DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING,
AND THE LAW 1-2 (1992).
13. Cf. Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and Rehabilita-
tion in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1038-39 (1995); Thompson, supra note
10, at 656-57; Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 373 (1998).
14. See Aron & Hurley, supra note 10, at 11-12.
15. See Ross, supra note 13, at 1038.
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child, striving to protect the child's integrity. 6 Difficulties arise, how-
ever, when juveniles commit particularly violent crimes, and society
favors punishment over protection in the belief that doing so serves the
best interests of justice." Ongoing tension results between the desire to
protect and rehabilitate juvenile offenders, and society's appetite for ret-
ribution in cases where especially violent crimes are committed.'8
Historically, judges looked to the nature of the offender, not the of-
fense.'9 Considering the increasingly violent nature of juvenile crimes,
the particular circumstances of juvenile offenders are eliciting less sym-
pathy from the public and, looking forward, the life circumstances of
juvenile offenders likely will carry less weight with the courts. Judges
may be hesitant to send a juvenile to jail for fear of the consequences of
exposure of the juvenile to prison life, yet more and more juveniles are
being prosecuted in adult criminal courts.'
1. Emergence of Procedural Rights
Two Supreme Court decisions primarily shape juvenile rights within
the judicial system. Kent v. United States' paved the way for emerging
juvenile rights, holding that juveniles are entitled to a hearing before trans-
fer to adult criminal court and the right to confer with counsel throughout
the hearing process.23 The ideals expressed in the Kent case stemmed from
"social welfare policy rather than in the corpus juris."' The parens patriae
role of the state dictated a supervisory role of the government:
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal
16. See id. at 1039. Parens patriae is the theory that the government acts as an "ultimate
parent and guardian of all children, car[ing] for all children who need [] protection." Id.
17. See id. at 1039-41.
18. Cf. id. at 1044; Beatty, supra note 10, at 979.
19. See Klein, supra note 13, at 377.
20. See id. at 402.
21. See Aron & Hurley, supra note 10, at 10-12. Aron and Hurley raise the point that the
offenders are still children:
As society becomes more punitive in response to rising crime rates, it fails to recognize
and acknowledge that juvenile offenders are children. They are children often confronted
by family and socioeconomic problems and personal trauma which negatively influence
their behavior, often resulting in heinous acts. Many juvenile offenders live lives more
problematic and horrific than most adults can imagine. Such backgrounds call for reha-
bilitation, not punishment; opportunity, not ostracism. They are, after all, children.
Id. at 11.
22. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Kent, age 14, was convicted of housebreaking and robbery and
placed on probation. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. Two years later, police officers took Kent into cus-
tody for robbing and raping a D.C. woman. See id. They interrogated him at the police headquarters
without the benefit of counsel or his parents. See id at 534-44. Kent was then detained in a Receiv-
ing Home for a week, with no hearing or arraignment. See id. at 544-45. The juvenile court waived
jurisdiction without a hearing and without ruling on any of the motions filed by Kent's counsel. See
id. at 546.
23. See id. at 561.
24. Id. at 554.
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conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and re-
habilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal
responsibility, guilt and punishment.25
The Court's decision in In re Gault' expanded the definition of juve-
nile rights by granting the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to con-
frontation, to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against
self-incrimination.' Both Kent and Gault underscored the fact. that
"[j]uvenile courts had failed to deliver on their promise of treatment, and
instead were merely providing punishment in the form of training
schools or other types of incarceration."2
2. Transfer Process
Removal of juvenile offenders from the juvenile to adult judicial
system occurs by way of a "transfer" of jurisdiction." Since the juvenile
courts were developed to address juvenile crimes, a compelling reason to
prosecute under adult law must exist. Juvenile defendants will typically
argue against the transfer process because the sentencing alternatives
under the adult system may be much more severe."
Only three avenues exist for a juvenile to be transferred to adult
criminal court, all of which are governed by statute.3 First, the juvenile
court may waive jurisdiction.32 Second, statutes may mandate immediate
transfer, depending on the type of crime.33 Finally, the legislature may
give the prosecutor discretion to file charges either in juvenile or adult
criminal court.'
Few jurisdictions provide for an intermediary court where juvenile
sentencing may be more appropriate.' Although transfer methods exist,
juveniles tried in juvenile court may be awarded longer sentences and
harsher punishments than offenders tried for similar crimes in adult
25. Id. The Court continues to explain that the parental role of the state encourages a civil, not
a criminal dimension to juvenile proceedings. See id. at 555. "[The child cannot complain of the
deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases. It has been asserted that he can claim
only the fundamental due process right to fair treatment." Id. (footnote omitted).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was fifteen years old when he was convicted of making obscene
phone calls. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-7. Gault was sent to the State Industrial School for a
maximum of six years by the juvenile court for being a "delinquent." Id. at 4.
27. See id. at 28-31.
28. THoMAs GRusso, JuvENiLES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 4-5 (1981).
29. See Leta R. Holden, Tenth Circuit Survey, Juvenile Law, 73 DENy. U. L. REv. 843, 855
(1996).
30. See Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juve-
nile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1254, 1261 (1996).




35. See Holden, supra note 29, at 855.
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criminal court?' Alternatively, juveniles tried in adult criminal court will
be subject "to the full range of adult punishments, including life impris-
onment and the death penalty."37
Title 18, section 5032 of the United States Code governs
delinquency 8 proceedings in federal district courts and the transfer of
children for criminal prosecution. 9 The statute deters the transfer of ju-
veniles to adult status in order to encourage individual rehabilitation and
discourage the stigma attached to adult status and criminal trials.'
On the other hand, the statute indicates that juvenile offenders may
be transferred to adult status if it serves the best interests of justice.' The
statute sets out six factors to weigh when considering a transfer:
[11 the age and social background of the juvenile; [2] the nature of the
alleged offense; [3] the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delin-
quency record; [4] the juvenile's present intellectual development and
psychological maturity; [5] the nature of past treatment efforts and
the juvenile's response to such efforts; [and 6] the availability of pro-
grams designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.42
The statute also provides for an analysis of the nature of the offense,
taking into consideration
the extent to which the juvenile played a leadership role in an organi-
zation, or otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal
activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled substances or
firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a
transfer to adult status, but the absence of this factor shall not pre-
clude such a transfer. 3
3. Transfer in the Tenth Circuit
In addressing whether a court should transfer juveniles transferred to
adult status, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concentrates pri-
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. It is important to distinguish between "delinquency" and "status offenses." Delinquency
exists when children commit offenses that would also be offenses if committed by an adult. See
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 199. Status offenses are those that are unique to children (such as tru-
ancy). See id. Juvenile courts tend to have original jurisdiction over both. See id.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
40. See In re Sealed Case (Juvenile Transfer), 893 F.2d 363, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating
that the purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act lies in the recognition that "it is in the best interest
of both the juvenile and society that juveniles be insulated from the stigma associated with criminal
trials, the publicity, the retributive atmosphere and threat of criminal incarceration attendant to
criminal proceedings"); see also U.S. v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1980) (stat-
ing that the purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act is to remove juveniles from the regular criminal
justice system and to treat them separately from adults).
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manly on jurisdictional issues, as opposed to the section 5032 statutory
factors. The Tenth Circuit has established that the court does not have
jurisdiction over transfer orders because they are not final orders.' In
1996, the Tenth Circuit was in accord with other circuits in claiming that
"an order transferring a juvenile to be tried as an adult is immediately
appealable." 5 This is the doctrine of collateral order.' which provides
certain exceptions to the general rule requiring a final judgment for an
interlocutory appeal. The three situations that warrant an immediate ap-
peal are when the order has conclusively determined the question in de-
bate, resolved a separate important issue other than the merits of the case,
or will be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 7
The Tenth Circuit's 1996 decision, United States v. Angelo D..' al-
lowed an immediate appeal of a transfer order because any delay would
threaten the benefits afforded by the juvenile justice system. 9 These
threatened benefits included serving time at a foster home or a commu-
nity-based facility closer to the juvenile's home, instead of an adult
prison that may be far away and more dangerous;' keeping records and
photographs sealed from the public and the media; and concealing the
juvenile's identity." If the defendant had to wait until there was a final
judgment at the close of the trial before bringing an appeal, these benefits
could not accrue, defeating the purpose of having a separate juvenile
justice system." The Tenth Circuit also ruled that "[t]he purpose of the
federal juvenile delinquency proceeding is to remove juveniles from the
ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal
conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation."' 3 In 1997, the
Tenth Circuit decided the following case in an effort to further this
proposition.
44. See United States v. Angelo D., 88 F.3d 856, 857-58 (10th Cir. 1996).
45. Id. Other circuits have followed this rule as well. Cf United States v. J.J.K., 76 F.3d 870,
871-72 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 865 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. One
Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 701-02 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gerald N., 900
F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 368; United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d
706, 708 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. A.W.J., 804 F.2d 492, 492 (8th Cir. 1986); United States
v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1984).
46. The doctrine of collateral order arose out of the 1949 Supreme Court decision in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,545-47 (1949).
47. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
48. 88 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1996).
49. See Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858 (citing United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir.
1996)).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1994); see also Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (1994 & Supp. II1996); see also Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858.
52. See Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858.
53. United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Mechem, 509 F.2d 1193, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1975)); Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 481
(10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Webb, 112 F. Supp. 950,950-51 (W.D. Okla. 1953)).
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B. Tenth Circuit Decision-United States v. Leon, D.M?'
1. Facts
Leon D.M., seventeen years old, was charged with murdering a two-
year-old boy on a San Juan Indian reservation in New Mexico." Before
the murder, Leon moved in with a twenty-five-year-old woman, Ms.
Chavez, had a child with her, and helped take care of three children from
her previous marriage. 6 On November 16, 1995, Leon called Ms. Chavez
at work because one of her children had allegedly fallen off of a bicycle
and needed medical attention 7 Leon attempted to administer cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, but upon arrival at the hospital the victim died.'
An autopsy revealed that the injuries and death could not have resulted
from a bicycle injury, but only from multiple blows inflicted at the same
time.59 The government submitted evidence of some child abuse, and the
court asked both parties to submit information regarding facilities that
accepted juvenile offenders.' The trial court judge considered the factors
set forth in section 5032 of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Acte' and
denied a motion to transfer to adult status. 2 On appeal, the government
contended that the district court erred in denying the motion to transfer.
Leon argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and, on the
merits, the record supported keeping him in juvenile status."
2. Decision
a. Jurisdiction
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals claimed jurisdiction over this
appeal through the Cohen collateral order doctrine.6" Although a final
decision had not been issued, the court agreed that the required elements
for an immediate appeal had been satisfied. ' The first two elements were
readily apparent: "[tihe transfer order conclusively determine[d] whether
the defendant [was] to be tried as an adult or a juvenile and resolve[d] an
important issue separate from whether the juvenile [was] innocent or
54. 132 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
55. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 584-85.




60. See id. at 585-86.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
62. See id. at 586.
63. See id. at 587.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 589 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)); see
also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. See id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Angelo D., 88 F.3d 856, 858 (10th Cir. 1996)).
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guilty of the current charges." 7 The third requirement, "[w]hether the
transfer order would be effectively unreviewable from a final judgment,"
warranted a deeper analysise and required the court to consider the pur-
pose behind the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act." As previously dis-
cussed, the Act intends to grant further protection to children by remov-
ing them from ordinary criminal proceedings and attempting to rehabili-
tate them, thereby enhancing their chances of becoming functional adults
in society."'
Leon argued that no right was irretrievably lost if the appellate court
required the government to wait until the district court rendered a final
decision. Leon distinguished his case from a prior Tenth Circuit case,
Angelo D., asserting that when the government rather than the defendant
requests an appeal on a denial of transfer, the third Cohen element is not
satisfied.' The reason for this is that the government loses no right if the
court requires a final judgment before appeal.73
Leon was a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit and the
court followed the approach adopted in both the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits in allowing the government to request such an appeal.' These cir-
cuits weighed the interests of the state in promoting rehabilitation and
protecting juveniles against the opposing interest of protecting citizehs
by keeping dangerous juveniles off the streets, especially if they met the
adult status requirements under the Federal Delinquency Act. Further-
more, because of the "double jeopardy" clause articulated in United
States v. Hawley,' the government would be unable to retry the juvenile
for the same offense." The government is permitted only one opportunity
to prosecute and should be afforded the same benefit as the defendant by




69. See id; see also Federal Juvenile Deliquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. II
1996).
70. See id. (citing Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858; United States v. Brian N., 900 F,2d 218, 220
(10th Cir. 1990)).
71. 88 F.3d 856 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
72. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 588.
73. See id.
74. See id. (citing United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1995)).
75. See id. at 588-89.
76. 93 F.3d 682 (10th Cir. 1996).
77. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589 (citing United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 687 (10th
Cir. 1996)). The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects against a second
prosecution or multiple punishments for the same offense. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see also
Hawley, 93 F.3d at 687.




b. Motion to Transfer
In analyzing the district court's determination on the motion to
transfer, the Tenth Circuit balanced the six factors listed in section 5032
of the Federal Delinquency Act.' The court concluded that despite strong
arguments by the government in favor of transferring Leon to adult
status, the district court had broad discretion in weighing these factors."'
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that more pertinent
factors, other than Leon's proximity to the age of majority and the sever-
ity of the crime, outweighed the transfer to adult status.
82
The court reiterated that under section 5032, juvenile adjudication is
presumed suitable and the government has the burden to convince other-
wise. 3 Moreover, appellate review of section 5032 cases is highly defer-
ential, and the appellate court will only review when there is an abuse of
discretion.' A district court's ruling should only be overturned if the
court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, and not if another court
could merely weigh the factors differently and arrive at a different con-
clusion."
Despite Leon's proximity to the age of majority and the seriousness
of his crime, the court concluded that his slower intellectual development
and psychological immaturity, as well as the existence of several treat-
ment programs available to offenders of his type, required the Leon to be
tried as a juvenile.'
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Leon supports the argument that
courts aspire to protect the integrity of children. Since the appellate court
gave deference to the district court in weighing the statutory factors, an
analysis of the district court's findings is proper. On the merits, the dis-
trict court conducted a weighing of the various factors to determine the
appropriateness of either a juvenile or adult course of judicial action."
The court found that the two most influential factors favoring a transfer
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. [I 1996) (establishing statutory factors such as age
and social background of the child, the nature of the alleged offense, the extent and nature of the
juvenile's prior offense record, the child's present intellectual development and psychological ma-
turity, the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to them, and the availability of
programs developed to treat the child's behavioral problems).
81. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590.
82. See id. at 590-91.
83. See id. at 589; see also United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 588 (2nd Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1995).
84. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590; see also Juvenile Male No. 1,47 F.3d at 71.
85. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590; see also Juvenile Male No. 1,47 F.3d at 71.
86. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590.
87. See id. at 589-90.
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were that D.M. was almost of majority age, eighteen, at the time of the
offense and the crime's violent nature."
a. Factors Warranting a Transfer to Adult Status
The court pointed out the fact that Leon was three days away from
his eighteenth birthday, indicating just how close he was to being tried as
an adult without any further consideration of his disposition."' But Leon's
age was not the only factor examined.' The court also analyzed Leon's
social background, which included dropping out of high school and be-
ginning a relationship with a much older woman? Leon placed himself
in a father figure role by both fathering a child at the age of sixteen and
also by taking care of his mate's children from a previous relationship.'
Leon assumed these roles without any indication that he was capable of
doing so."
The court also weighed the seriousness of the crime as a factor fa-
voring adult adjudication." Leon was accused of murder, the most grave
of all criminal offenses." He sought to mitigate the impact of the charge
by arguing that he was under an incredible amount of pressure and was
burdened by the responsibility of caring for four children." Of course, the
fact that the Leon was himself a minor placed him at an even higher
risk.' Leon argued that these factors led to a loss of temper which, while
not excusable, should be considered.98
b. Factors Warranting Retention of Juvenile Status
The factors warranting juvenile adjudication were more persuasive
to the court. The first was Leon's immature nature-the court agreed that
his relationship with Ms. Chavez put him in an adult situation that he was
not mentally prepared to handle.? Moreover, school records indicated
that he was a slow learner and a below-average student." Leon was oc-
casionally employed, and his unsettled lifestyle weighed heavily in the
court's decision.'0'
88. See id. at 586.
89. See United States v. Leon, D.M., 953 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 132 F.3d
583 (10th Cir. 1997).














Leon's delinquency record was substantial quantitatively, but not
qualitatively, and did not support a transfer particularly since he previ-
ously demonstrated no violent behavior." His record showed three minor
infractions: malicious mischief, a minor drug violation, and disorderly
conduct, for each of which he was fined only $100."'0 He failed to pay the
fines and also testified to smoking marijuana on occasion, but the court
viewed this as insignificant as compared to the behavior of juveniles in
other jurisdictions.'"
Additionally, Leon never had the benefit of prior treatment, a factor
which encouraged the court to retain him as a juvenile." The court ac-
knowledged the availability of many programs that had the potential to
successfully educate and rehabilitate Leon in a manner useful to
society.'"
c. Standard of Review
The government carries the burden of persuading the court of the
necessity of a transfer to adult status,' 7 and the court found in this situa-
tion that the statutory factors weighed heavily in favor of retaining Leon
as a juvenile." The court is not required to give equal weight to each
factor, but it can balance the factors in a manner that appears appropriate
under the specific circumstances."'" The trial court is afforded broad dis-
cretion in applying the balancing test, and no court of appeals has ever
reversed a trial court's decision on this matter."' Even if a higher court
could have reached a different conclusion, this would not suffice to re-
verse the lower court's decision, so long as the court made the requisite
factual findings."' Furthermore, the court is not required to state specifi-
cally whether each factor alone warrants a transfer."' Therefore, the dis-
trict court's findings set a foundation upon which the appellate court
could expand.
d. Impact of Decision
In deciding Leon, the Tenth Circuit followed the traditional path of
protecting the innocence of our children. The Tenth Circuit must be pre-
102. See United States v. Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d 583,586-87 (10th Cir. 1997).
103. See Leon, D.M., 953 F. Supp. at 348.
104. See id.
105. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 586-87.
106. See Leon, D.M., 953 F. Supp. at 349.
107. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589.
108. See id. at 590.
109. Cf. United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1995). A seventeen-year-
old male was convicted on a charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See i at 69.
110. See Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 71; see also United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40
F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Parker, 956 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1992).
ill. Cf. Juvenile Male No. 1,47F.3dat71.
112. See United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1995).
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pared for the steady increase in the number of violent juvenile crimes
that will be reflected in the juvenile justice system. Other circuits have
been forced to address juvenile crimes that shock the conscience-
schoolyard shootings, for example. These types of crimes will eventually
exert a formidable influence on the Tenth Circuit's direction in juvenile
law, and will force the courts to question the practicality of the current
trend protecting children. Society may shift away from rehabilitation, as
emphasized in the juvenile delinquency statutes, and toward harsher pun-
ishments that serve as a deterrent to the commission of further crimes
and satisfy society's appetite for retribution."3 Proponents of the punish-
ment theory may be anticipating the rising tide of public outrage against
violent juvenile crime, and the Tenth Circuit may adopt the punishment
theory perspective if they continue to address violent crime cases.
C. Other Circuits
Several circuits use the balancing test when deciding to transfer ju-
veniles to adult status."' The Fifth Circuit has rejected the argument that
each statutory factor needs to be argued and has said that the factors as a
whole must be balanced." In United States v. Three Juvenile Males, the
court held that some factors might indicate a stronger preference for
transfer, while others may mandate a retention of juvenile status."" Un-
like the Tenth Circuit's decision in Leon, the seriousness of defendants'
crimes and unsuccessful past rehabilitative treatments warranted a trans-
fer to adult status."7 This illustrates the discretion of trial courts in
weighing each statutory provision.
The Second Circuit also followed an "in the interest of justice"
scheme for transferring juveniles to adult criminal status."8 In United
States v. Juvenile Male No.1]," the court justified the transfer primarily
on the severity of the crime, which was drug distribution.' 2 "In the inter-
ests of justice, one last effort to stave off the downward course of life
[the defendant] has followed is the more appropriate choice."'2 ' The Sec-
ond Circuit also noted that the trial court's choice to focus more on a
defendant's background and lack of past treatment efforts, rather than the
seriousness of the crime and the defendant's past record, does not suffice
113. See Beatty, supra note 10, at 992-93. Retribution stands for the proposition of revenge,
while deterrence discourages offenders from repeating criminal acts. See id.
114. See United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d 1058, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1995).
115. See Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d at 1061.
116. See id. at 1060-61 (citing United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1989)).
In this case, a thirteen-year-old juvenile was convicted of armed robbery. See id. at 1249.
117. See Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d at 1062.
118. See United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1995).
119. 47 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1995).
120. See Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 69-70.
121. Id. at 70.
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for a finding of abuse of discretion.'" Here, another circuit diverged from
Leon in concluding that the seriousness of the crime was enough to jus-
tify adult adjudication.
Another Second Circuit opinion, United States v. Nelson,'" focused
on whether age should be considered at the time of the offense or at the
time of the possible transfer.' Since the judicial process is so time con-
suming, a defendant may not be best suited for juvenile-type rehabilita-
tion by the time of adjudication." This appellate court disagreed with the
trial court's decision to exclude the defendant's current age from its
analysis and remanded the case for further findings." This notion was
not addressed in the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the Leon case.
The Seventh Circuit also emphasized the importance of discretion in
the trial court:
[W]e join those circuits today and hold that the district court had dis-
cretion to give more weight to some factors than to others. Determin-
ing whether the transfer of a juvenile to adult status is in the interest of
justice is not a simple arithmetical exercise, where the court adds up
all the factors to see if the sum is a positive or negative number."' 7
As a result, most circuits use the balancing test, but each circuit gives
weight to different statutory factors.
II. JUVENILES As WITNESSES
A. Background
Another prevalent issue in the juvenile justice system focuses on
when children may be called as witnesses. The history of juveniles as
witnesses illustrates the special protection that courts offer only to chil-
dren."" Deeply rooted in our justice system is the desire to maintain a
person's innocence until proven guilty." The United States Constitution
provides that a defendant is entitled to confront any witnesses
presented;' 3 however, the inclination to protect children offsets this
122. See id. at 71.
123. 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995).
124. See Nelson, 68 F.3d at 589.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 589, 591 (stating that "[b]y completely eliminating current age from its assess-
ment, the district court misinterpreted the full significance of the age factor").
127. United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610,614 (7th Cir. 1998).
128. Cf. Hon. Barbara Gilleran-Johnson & Timothy R. Evans, The Criminal Courtroom: Is It
Child Proof?, 26 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 681,682 (1995).
129. Cf. Kermit V. Lipez, The Child Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases in Maine: Presentation,
Impeachment, and Controversy, 42 ME. L. REv. 283, 286-87 (1990).
130. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
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ideal.' Courts envision children as very delicate and hesitate to put them
through the trauma of testifying live in court.
Moreover, courts may be reluctant to place children on the stand
since they fear that their testimony is likely to be both inconsistent and
inaccurate. These concerns make it difficult for any court to find a reli-
able formula to use when exercising its dual role as protector of the in-
terests of juvenile witnesses and the constitutional ideal.
The Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights"' (CVCWR) statute
governs juvenile witnesses. Congress enacted the statute as an answer to
the public policy concerns of protecting and nurturing our children."' The
CVCWR allows two alternatives to live testimony: taped deposition or
live, two-way, closed-circuit television." Furthermore, the statute ex-




The first question to address is the competency of the juvenile to tes-
tify. Second, if a court finds a child to be competent, it must assess his or
her credibility, and determine if allowing the child to testify is in the
child's best interest.'" Particularly in sexual abuse cases, the child may
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also LUCY S. McGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES 159-61 (1994) (discussing
judicial interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and, in particular, the definition of "confronta-
tion").
131. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 682.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. H 1996). This statute defines words under "Child vic-
tims' and child witnesses' rights." Id. A "child" is defined as "a person who is under the age of 18,
who is or is alleged to be--(A) a victim of a crime of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or exploitation;
or '(B) a witness to a crime committed against another person." Id. The statute also sets out alterna-
tives to live in-court testimony, including competency examinations, privacy protection, closing the
courtroom, victim impact statements, use of multidisciplinary child abuse teams, guardians ad litem,
adult attendants, speedy trials, stay of civil actions, and testimonial aids. See id.
133. Cf. Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 692.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1), (2). The statute allows for these alternatives "in a proceeding
involving an alleged offense against a child." Id § 3509(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A).
135. See id. § 3509(c)(1), (2).
136. See id. § 3509(b)(2)(B)(i). This section states that a child may be unable to testify live in
court for any of the following reasons:
(1) The child will be unable to testify because of fear.
(U) There is a substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that the child
would suffer emotional trauma from testifying in open court.
(I1) The child suffers a mental or other infirmity.
(IV) Conduct by the defendant or defense counsel causes the child to be unable to con-
tinue testifying.
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be too afraid to face his or her alleged assailant,'37 and the child's fear
may affect the quality of his or her testimony.' 3
a. Competency
A court must find children as well as adults "competent" before
granting them the opportunity to testify.'3 The Federal Rules of Evidence
provide that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as oth-
erwise provided in these rules,"'" which the CVCWR expanded upon.
While most children are found competent to testify, it is the absence of
credibility that ultimately bars their testimony."' Courts have the oppor-
tunity to manipulate the system. A judge may prohibit a child's testi-
mony by discrediting him or her on account of lack of personal knowl-
edge'2 or due to unfair prejudice."" Higher courts also prefer to honor
lower courts' discretion on the issue of competency and will rarely
overturn a trial court's holding."
Witness competency is usually the overriding issue in child sex
abuse cases because the child victim is often the only eyewitness to the
alleged event besides the purported abuser.'' Courts are concerned that
children, either because of emotional trauma, lack of sophistication, or
fear of consequences, may not be the most reliable witnesses." Yet,
sometimes these children are the only direct link between the child and
the offender.' 7 Although federal rules" are in place regarding these fac-
137. See Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
138. See id.
139. Cf Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685.
140. FED. R. EVID. 601.
141. Cf Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 686; Robin W. Morey, The Competency
Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 245,
272 (1985).
142. See FED. R. EVID. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is intro-
duced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.").
143. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that any piece of evidence may be inadmissible if the risk
of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value). Here, if the children relay a frightening story, or
one that is incredibly offensive, a jury might convict out of sympathy for the child instead of a belief
that the evidence proved the defendant's guilt.
144. See id. ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."); see also United States v. Gomez, 807 F.2d
1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Bickford v. John E. Mitchell Co. 595 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050 (10th Cir. 1973)).
145. Cf. MCGoUGH, supra note 130, at 2; Morey, supra note 141, at 245.
146. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685, 687 (stating that before the court
may allow a child to testify as a witness, it must determine that the child is capable of "observing the
events of the particular matter in question," recalling the events, and truthfully relating those events
to the court).
147. See id. See generally MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS at ix (Maria S.
Zaragoza et a]. eds., 1995) (observing that "[miounting pressures to prosecute cases of child sexual
and physical abuse have increased the courtroom appearances of child witnesses and raised ques-
tions about the accuracy and reliability of their reports").
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. U 1996).
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tors, different jurisdictions implement them in different ways. 9 Judges
ask children different questions in order to ascertain their competency as
witnesses." This lack of a single standard fosters inconsistency through-
out the judicial system.
b. Credibility
A widely held theory regarding child testimony is that children have
a tendency to get confused and do not comprehend concepts of truth and
falsehood, right and wrong, and memory." Some argue that children do
not have many experiences from which to draw and compare, they have
a smaller vocabulary," and they are not sophisticated enough to make
certain rational connections. Adults also assume that even if children are
capable of understanding what it means to tell the truth, they do not un-
derstand the ramifications if they fail to do so, especially in the court-
room." Although many adults believe that children succumb to coaching
and suggestions,"' they forget to acknowledge the susceptibility of adults
to these practices as well."'
But evidence of weak child testimony is not indisputable. Another
theory claims that while a child witness's recollection of events may be
less complete than an adult's, it is qualitatively richer." Many psycho-
logical experts express their desire to describe techniques to those who
interview children that will "maximize the informativeness of children's
testimony while minimizing the risks of impeaching their credibility." 
7
c. Constitutional Issdes
Another concern governing child witnesses involves speculation of
emotional trauma on the child after testifying. According to the United
States Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to confront his or
her witnesses."" But, this right "must be balanced against the potential
149. Cf. Morey, supra note 141, at 257.
150. See id. at 268.
151. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 686-87 (noting that children most often
become confused when testifying as the victim, that this confusion is really a mask for the emotional
trauma they feel, and that testifying can be devastating to the child).
152. See Michael E. Lamb et al., Making Children into Competent Witnesses: Reactions to the
Amicus Brief in In re Michaels, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 438,440 (1995).
153. See Belle Kinnan Deaver, The Competency of Children, 4 Cooley L. Rev. 522,523 (1987).
154. See id.; see also JON'A F. MEYER, INACCURACIES IN CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY: MEMORY,
SuGGESTILITY, OR OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY? 34-35 (1997).
155. See Deaver, supra note 153, at 526, 531; see also MEYER, supra note 154, at 31, 48;
Lamb, supra note 152, at 445 (asserting that "[aldults, like children, respond to coercion, peer pres-
sure, and manipulation, and children are not well served by the implicit assumption that they hold
within their minds more information than they are able to provide").
156. See MEYER, supra note 154, at 15; see also Lamb, supra note 152, at 439.
157. Lamb, supra note 152, at 439.
158. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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psychological injury the victim may suffer from such encounters."'" The
state's interest is not always met since preventing a juvenile from testi-
fying who may have "the most accurate information ' can lower the
probability of conviction resulting in less punishment to offenders.
2. Case Law and the Child Witness in the Tenth Circuit
The first case to address the issue of child competency arose in 1895.
In Wheeler v. United States,'6' the Supreme Court introduced the theory
that "there is no precise age which determines the question of compe-
tency."" The Court began to consider the different rates at which people
mature"3 and held that competency depended on "the capacity and intel-
ligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and
falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former.'"" In 1973, the Tenth
Circuit used the Wheeler test to decide if a five-year-old child was intel-
ligent, could tell the difference between truth and falsehood, could un-
derstand the repercussions of lying at trial, and knew what it meant to
take an oath."3 The Wheeler test remains active with some variation de-
pending on the circuit." In 1975, Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence'67 was enacted which, along with the 1990 statute addressing child
witnesses,'" attempted to streamline competency requirements. Through
the promulgation of these rules, the Tenth Circuit now presumes children
competent witnesses and "the party seeking to prevent a child from testi-
fying has the burden of providing a compelling reason for questioning
the child's competence.'"
159. Julie Oseid, Defendants' Rights in Child Witness Competency Hearings: Establishing
Constitutional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1377, 1380 (1985); see also
infra note 224 and accompanying text.
160. Oseid, supra note 159, at 1380.
161. Wheeler v, United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895). This was a murder trial in which the
son of the deceased was going to testify. See id
162. Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524.
163. See id.
164. Id. The trial court judge essentially was given sole discretion to determine the capacity of
the child. See id. at 524-25 (stating that the decision of the trial judge will only be overturned upon a
showing that the decision was clearly erroneous).
165. See United States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 1973) (citing Wheeler,
159 U.S. at 523). The court does not explain whether "intelligence" means average intelligence for a
five year old or more intelligent than the average five-year-old.
166. A number of courts have followed the Wheeler test. Cf., e.g., Turner v. American Sec. &
Trust Co. 213 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1909) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524); United States v. Schoe-
field, 465 F.2d 560, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 523); Pocatello v. United
States, 394 F.2d 115, 116-17 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 523); State v. Oliver, 49
N.W.2d 564, 573 (N.D.-1951) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 523).
167. FED. R. EVID. 601 (deeming "every person" competent).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
169. United States v. Allen J., 127 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1997).
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B. Tenth Circuit Case-United States v. Allen J.70
1. Facts
Allen J. was fifteen years old when a federal court convicted him of
violating the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 7' for knowingly using
force to engage in a sexual act with a thirteen-year-old juvenile."" The
court obtained jurisdiction because both Allen J. and the victim were
Native American and the crime took place within the Navajo Nation In-
dian Reservation.'" Although the case involved rape and sexual abuse,
the sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding that
the thirteen-year-old victim was competent to testify."
Allen J. filed a motion challenging the victim's capability to testify
and requested an official competency examination by the court."' In sup-
port of the motion, Allen J. introduced evidence that the victim suffered
from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome," and argued that the Syndrome rendered
the victim mildly retarded and learning disabled.'" Allen J. also con-
tended that due to the victim's poor verbal skills, she would be unable to
correctly relate the events of the evening in question. Allen J. argued
that this showed the victim was incompetent to testify.'
79
The trial court rejected Allen J.'s argument on the grounds that de-
spite the victim's slower learning capabilities, she was generally older
than most, and at least as capable as many children who previously testi-
fied."l The victim answered preliminary questions about her name and
age, and questions regarding truth and falsehood in general.' Although
the victim answered most of these questions accurately, Allen J. rested
the incompetency claim on the silences and inconsistencies that riddled
the victim's testimony concerning the rape."'
170. 127 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1204 (1998).
171. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
172. See Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1293.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1294.
176. See id. The two pieces of evidence introduced consisted of (1) a "6-9 Year EPSDT
Tracking form" which was completed four years prior to the trial (December 30, 1992) and (2) a
report from a pediatrician dated October 9, 1993. Id. This document stated that the child suffered
from "developmental delay and mild mental retardation," but that it was inconclusive as to whether
this was a result of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. The defendant stated that a competency examination was needed due to the vic-








The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's de-
termination that the victim was competent to testify. 3 The court rea-
soned that any inconsistencies in the victim's story or problems with her'
testimony raised questions of credibility, not competency," Rule 601 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence presumes competency of a witness,'" and
the trial court had broad discretion in declaring the victim competent to
testify.'86
In addition to the discretion granted to the trial judge, the court rec-
ognized the statutory presumption that children are competent
witnesses.'87 The statutory scheme places the burden of proof on the party
seeking to discredit the child's competency. 8 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3509, Allen J. needed to produce evidence that would show a "compel-
ling reason" to mandate a competency examination.'" The court rejected
Allen J.'s evidence as unpersuasive, and allowed the victim to testify,
leaving her inconsistent answers for the trier of fact to assess.'"'
183. See id. The questioning proceeded as follows:
When the victim was called to testify, the court asked her a series of questions seeking to
confirm she understood the importance of the oath. These questions included: "Do you
understand what it is to tell the truth?" and "Do you know the difference between the
truth and a lie?" The victim did not respond to the judge's questioning. (The court then
asked the prosecutor to try questioning the witness. The prosecutor began with simple
questions ("[Wihat is your last name?", "How old are you?", and "Where do you live?"),
which the victim answered. After about thirty questions along these lines, almost all of
which the victim was able to answer correctly, the prosecutor shifted the questions relat-
ing to the difference between the truth and lies. Among other questions, the prosecutor
asked the victim if she understood she had promised to tell the truth in court, to which the
victim responded affirmatively. After this series of questions, which established the vic-
tim knew the difference between a truth and a lie, knew she was to tell the truth in court,
and knew she would be punished if she told a lie, the court directed the prosecutor to pro-
ceed to the heart of her case.).
Id. at 1295 (alteration in original).
184. See id. at 1296.
185. FED. R. EvID. 601.
186. See Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1295, 1296 (citing Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-
25 (1895) (stating that the standard of review is abuse of discretion)).
187. See id. at 1294; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(2) (1994).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(1)--(4). This section states:
(1) ... Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to abrogate rule 601 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. (2)... A child is presumed to be competent. (3) ... A competency
examination regarding a child witness may be conducted by the court only upon written
motion and offer of proof of incompetency by a party. (4) ... A competency examination
regarding a child may be conducted only if the court determines, on the record, that com-
pelling reasons exist. A child's age alone is not a compelling reason.
Id.
189. Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1295.
190. See id. at 1296. The court continued by pointing out:
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court held it was proper for a five-year-old to
give critical testimony in a capital case .... Since that time, the trend in the law has been
to grant trial courts even greater leeway in deciding if a witness is competent to testify.
Id. (citing Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895); United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289,
293 (10th Cir. 1991)); cf, e.g., supra note 186.
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3. Analysis
a. Competency
The Tenth Circuit expanded upon basic principles of evidence law
in rendering its decision. Courts approach the competency of witnesses,
whether children or adults, in a similar manner.'9 ' Competency is such an
essential issue because the presence or absence of a witness's testimony
may decisively affect the outcome of a case. By passing the threshold
requirement of competency, the doors open as to the amount of informa-
tion attainable through a witness, thereby bolstering his or her believ-
ability.
The court in Allen J. rejected the Wheeler test for competency of
children, a test that "depends on the capacity and intelligence of the
child, [the child's] appreciation of the difference between truth and
falsehood, as well as of [the child's] duty to tell the former."' Wheeler
was decided before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which state that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules."'93 The court interpreted this narrowly
and rejected Allen J.'s claims that a child victim's hesitation and inaccu-
rate answers should cause the court to deem that child incompetent. '
Attorneys must realize the importance of deeming a child a competent
witness. Although it appears that recent statutory provisions make it easy
to deem a child competent,'" judges still retain broad discretion to reject
claims of competency.'" The judge can discredit a child witness due to a
finding of lack of personal knowledge"' or unfair prejudice,'" but he or she
may also find other compelling evidence rendering that child
191. See Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1294 (stating that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 and 18 U.S.C. §
3509 serve as guidelines to determine when children are competent to be witnesses).
192. Id. at 1294-95 (quoting Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524).
193. FED. R. EviD. 601. The federal rules on witnesses do not specifically mention children.
See id.
194. Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1296 (stating that "[a]ny inconsistencies in the victim's story or
problems with her testimony, however, raise questions of credibility, not competence," and, "[t]his
court has rejected similar arguments before").
195. See FED. R. EviD. 601 (deeming every person competent to be a witness).
196. See FD. R. EvID. 403 (stating that, "[ajlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence").
197. See FED. R. EvID. 602.
198. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
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incompetent.'" Advocates for child witnesses must be prepared to show
that the child witnesses meet the threshold standard for competency.'
Furthermore, comparison between a juvenile's and an adult's abili-
ties to recall information, to relay that information accurately, and to be
susceptible to suggestion and leading questions are factors in determin-
ing competency." The court will focus on specific attributes unique to
children,' such as the child's capacity to tell the truth.' The child must
be aware of the difference between truth and falsehood, and comprehend
the taking of an oath. 4 Next, the court tests the child's mental capacity.'
To help assure accurate recall of the event, the court will require that the
child have sufficient mental capacity and memory at the time of the
event.' Finally, the child must be able to effectively translate his or her
experiences to others and be able to understand and answer simple ques-
tions.' Each of these elements will play a role in determining the com-
petency of juveniles to testify,' making it harder for juveniles than for
adults to freely testify and tell their stories.
The myth that adults tell the truth and children lie' is not only ap-
parent in our judicial system, but also in our everyday lives. "[T]he rela-
tionship between age and memory is complex, with a variety of factors
influencing the quality of information provided." ' Since this research is
inconclusive, it is often difficult to create ways to improve the quality of
children's testimony. 211
199. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685 (stating that the court will also
examine the child's intelligence, ability to receive correct impressions, and the child's age when
determining whether a child is competent to testify).
200. See id. at 685 (explaining that to show competency, the advocate of the child witness must
show that the witness has "a minimum capacity to observe, recollect, and recount the incident to
which the witness will testify").
201. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1044-45.







209. See Deaver, supra note 153, at 522.
210. Lamb et al., supra note 152, at 440. Some factors mentioned are the difference between
script memories (representations of typical events, not a particular one as remembered) and episodic
memories, recall memory ("tell me everything you remember... ") and recognition memory ("Was
his shirt red'?"), and memory performance and memory capacity (children are less capable of retain-
ing large amounts of information, particularly due to their age). Id. at 439-40.
211. See MEYER, supra note 154, at 115. Despite the varying opinions of others, Meyer sug-
gests ways to improve children's testimonies, including: learn from others' mistakes, avoid leading
questions, use indirect and nonverbal techniques, rehearsals, reduce perceived authority of inter-
viewer, teach children about their role in the courts, train children to answer questions, and teach
children to watch for misleading items. See L at 116-23. 1
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b. Effects on Juveniles Who Testify
Finding a juvenile competent to testify represents only the first hur-
dle in considering the issue of children as witnesses.2 As previously
mentioned, a child-victim may suffer profound detrimental effects by
confronting his or her alleged perpetrator.2 3 A child's advocate must con-
sider whether the benefits of allowing the child an opportunity to be
heard outweigh the potential trauma of giving testimony.2"' Factors to
consider include, but are not limited to, the age of the child, the circum-
stances surrounding the trial (e.g., the type of offense), the ability of the
child to speak effectively in front of groups, and the level of maturity." '
The state has a particularly strong interest in protecting victims of
sexual assault."6 Accordingly, the government enacted federal statutes to
enlarge the opportunity of juveniles to testify while at the same time di-
minishing their trauma."7 As an alternative to live testimony, attorneys
may request the testimony to be taken outside of the courtroom and be
televised by a two-way closed-circuit television."' The number of periph-
eral people permitted in the room is limited,"9 and this may serve as a
more efficient and less shocking way to gather information.'
Another alternative to live, in-court testimony is to obtain a video-
taped deposition from the child."I This method provides the child with a
completely private interview session, possibly serving as an incentive to
testify.
The most controversial aspect of juvenile witnesses is balancing the
rights of the accused against those of the victim.' "The state's interest in
protecting child witnesses from the distress of testifying conflicts with
the accused's right to confront all witnesses against him."' There is no
concrete answer to'this inquiry, and one must be sensitive to the different
212. See generally Berliner, supra note 8, at 169 (discussing two issues surrounding the use of
juveniles as witnesses: emotional trauma afforded to the child by testifying and whether or a not a
child is competent to testify).
213. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 687.
214. See id. at 682 (explaining that before a minor testifies, judges and attorneys must weigh
the interests of justice against the best interests of the child).
215. See id. at 685-87.
216. See Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (providing alternatives to live testimony).
218. See id. § 3509(b)(1).
219. See id. § 3509(b)(1)(D).
220. Cf Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(2).
222. See Brannon, supra note 9, at 459 (arguing that alternative procedures by which a child
can testify. may lessen the trauma to the child).
223. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1055.
224. Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
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arguments on each side. Each situation should be determined on a case-
by-case basis, utilizing a test which weighs the interests of the parties.'m
Considering the dramatic increase in sex abuse cases over the last
few years, there likely will be a dramatic increase in the number of child
witnesses.' Communities and children's advocates have begun to de-
velop ways to make the testimonial process easier for juveniles.'m In or-
der to reduce emotional trauma, entities involved in protecting child
abuse cases agree to follow certain procedures and "create[] an atmos-
phere of cooperation and coordination in order to facilitate child partici-
pation."' Some approaches include using of specially trained personnel
who understand the importance of their work, decreasing the number of
interviews with juveniles and the number of people who interview them,
and assigning the same individual to work with them throughout each
case to promote consistency." In addition, advocates encourage the use
of certain devices, such as special interviewing rooms and anatomically
correct dolls.' ° Specialists in juvenile law believe that if legal entities
follow these operations, children's performance as witnesses will im-
prove, thereby increasing their credibility."
C. Other Circuits
Treatment of child witnesses is not uniform throughout the judicial
system.2 Statutes and rules of evidence serve as guidelines for both fed-
erally enacted and state enacted law"3 under which the competency of
juvenile witnesses is construed liberally.' Before these rules were en-
225. See id. at 449 (stating the test denoting when an exception should exist to the confrontation
clause: "First, the exception must further an important public policy. Second, an individualized
determination that the particular child witness would be traumatized by testifying in the presence of
the accused must be made.").
226. See Berliner, supra note 8, at 169.





232. See Morey, supra note 141, at 257. Morey offers the following example:
In one jurisdiction, the courts treat the child's ability to receive accurate impressions of
fact as merely indicating the credibility of the witness. In another jurisdiction, the same
ability determines the child's competency to be a witness. Thus, the inconsistency is
more significant than having the same child found competent by one judge and incom-
petent by another.
Id.
233. Cf id. at 251 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 1974 Uniform Rules of
Evidence reflect the modem view of competency in children witnesses).
234. See id. at 247-48.
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acted, some courts grappled with the issue of child testimony,""5 and dif-
ferent state laws reflect the different policies among jurisdictions.'
For example, a 1953 D.C. Circuit case, Doran v. United States,37
emphasized that competency determinations should rest within the dis-
cretionary authority of the trial court." The court reasoned that the judge
is in a much better position than any appellate tribunal to consider
and to weigh all of the impalpable factors which should be taken into
account, such as the attitude and demeanor of the witness, the extent
of her intelligence and the degree of moral responsibility of which she
might be capable.239
Furthermore, this early decision mentioned that specific answers to
questions are not the deciding factors; rather, the child's responses in-
form the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony. 240
Recently promulgated rules reflect the century-long trend toward al-
lowing children to testify." In particular, the Ninth Circuit, using rea-
soning similar to the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Allen J., allowed the
inconsistent testimony of a four-year-old child.' 2 "A finder of fact might
well look with scepticism on [the child's] testimony, but that is a ques-
tion of weight, not admissibility." ' Another issue in earlier Ninth Circuit
cases was the controversy about testifying via two-way closed-circuit
television.2 " As designated in the United States Code, this is an accept-
able way for children to testify if the child exhibits a fear of confronting
the alleged perpetrator. ' A 1993 Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.
Garcia,' used a Supreme Court decision, Maryland v. Craig," to ana-
lyze whether the use of a video violated the Confrontation Clause as
specified in the Constitution's Sixth Amendment.' The court held that
since Congress enacted section 3509 after the decision in Craig, it in-
235. See id. at 250 (recalling that, for example, two early commentators argued that even if
courts admitted child testimony, the testimony would be of "dubious value" because all children are
limited by immaturity and imagination).
236. See id. at 257.
237. 205 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
238. Doran, 205 F.2d at 718 (citing Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895)).
239. Id. at 718-19 (citing Williams v. United States, 3 App. D.C. 335 (1894)).
240. See id. at 719.
241. Cf Morey, supra note 141, at 247, 250-51.
242. See Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1389 (1998). This case also examines the testimony of a child who allegedly was sexually as-
saulted and raped by an older man. Walters, 122 F.3d at 1175
243. Id.
244. See United States v. Garcia, 7 F3d 885, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (including an analysis of
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation).
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (b)(l)(B) (1994).
246. 7 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993).
247. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
248. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tended for a child's concerns to outweigh a defendant's ability to con-
front the witness face-to-face, thereby codifying this rule?'9
The Eighth Circuit also ruled on the use of two-way, closed-circuit
televisions.2" This court held that the statute does not require a "because
of fear" finding to let the child testify through video." The court merely
needs to use its own discretion in deciding whether the child shows any
signs of needing to testify this way, either through judicial questioning or
analysis of the child's appearance. " By making such an inquiry, the
court again protects the rights of children. Although most jurisdictions
seek to protect children, it is apparent through different state laws that
jurisdictions implement this desire in differing degrees.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged the intricacies of the current
juvenile justice system through decisions involving both transfer pro-
ceedings and child witnesses during the survey period.
Although the balancing test set forth in the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act is used in prosecuting transfer cases, the underlying issue is
not the consideration of each factor. The courts are concerned with the
broader ramifications of trying juveniles as adults. Some research indi-
cates that adult criminal courts treat juveniles more sympathetically than
in juvenile courts."3 Unfortunately, it is impossible to accurately predict
who will benefit from rehabilitative efforts and who is bound for a life of
crime. Courts must analyze each situation on a case-by-case basis; be-
cause society strives to promote individual growth and stimulation in its
children, inflexible standards governing transfer might serve as inade-
quate.
The trend to treat juveniles as adults is not only recognized in trans-
fer proceedings, but also when considering children as witnesses. 2'
Courts must analyze three conditions: competency, credibility, and the
psychological effect of live testimony.' Although it seems that child
249. See Garcia, 7 F.3d at 888.
250. See United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997).
251. See Rouse, 111 F.3d at 569.
252. See id.
253. See Klein, supra note 13, at 402. Klein states:
In addition to sentencing disparities between the juvenile and criminal systems, there are
four main areas where the concrete negative consequences of transfer can be seen as they
relate to the individual child. These are (1) the swiftness of sanctions imposed; (2) recidi-
vism rates for transferred juveniles versus those for non-transferred juveniles; (3) the loss
of rehabilitative opportunities for transferred juveniles; and (4) the effects of incarcerat-
ing children in adult prisons.
Id.
254. Cf Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685 (stating that in all cases, after ana-
lyzing three separate criteria, a court must find all witnesses competent, whether they are adults or
children, before allowing either to testify).
255. See id. at 682, 685.
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witnesses often are given the opportunity to be heard, judges can still
exclude testimony when there is a lack of personal knowledge' or unfair
prejudice. 7 More commonly, courts also consider the child's maturity
level, memory, communication skills, and mental capacity.7s As illus-
trated, the trend of protecting children begins and ends with each indi-
vidual juvenile defendant. In order to keep some form of standardization,
however, Congress should develop a consistent framework by which the
courts can analyze each case.
The area of juvenile law is forever changing. Although historically
the justice system has protected children's innocence, the future is un-
certain. With increasing juvenile crime rates and new technological de-
velopments, the prospects for the promulgation of a uniform standard by
which to treat juveniles, particularly in the Tenth Circuit, seem bleak, but
attainable.
Florence B. Burstein*
256. See FED. R. EVID. 602. For text of the rule, see supra note 142.
257. See FED. R. EvID. 403. For text of the rule, see supra note 196.
258. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685.
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Denver College of Law. The author would like to
thank Bill Pryor for his helpful comments and editorial expertise during the development of this
article. The author would also like to thank her brother, Mark A. Burstein, for his generous




From September 1, 1997 to August 31, 1998, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth decided three cases substantially ad-
dressing securities law. Blinder v. Stellatos' focused on timely filing re-
quirements in a liquidation proceeding, and whether notice, given the
circumstances, satisfied due process. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc.2
addressed fraudulent misrepresentation claims, primary liability, and
"control person" liability. In Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc.,3 the
court decided a section 11 claim, the adequacy of a section 10(b) claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)," and the statute of limitations
applicable to federal securities claims. Relevant to these issues, this sur-
vey will present background information regarding the state of the law,
the decisions of the Tenth Circuit, holdings in other circuits, and analyses
of the court of appeal's decisions.
I. LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE SECURITY INVESTOR
PROTECTION ACT: NOTICE & FILING REQUIREMENTS
A. Background
In a liquidation proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1971Y (SIPA), many investors will have interests at stake. These
investors are entitled to due process, including the important element of
notice. The trustee in a bankruptcy or liquidation proceeding is the party
obligated to provide sufficient notice to allow these investors to present
their claims.6 Further, investors are required to adhere to filing require-
ments regarding presentation of a claim in liquidation proceedings under
the SIPA.'
The central issue when evaluating the sufficiency of notice given by
the trustee is due process! Due process requires notice reasonably cal-
culated to apprise all interested parties of the pending action, thereby
1. 124 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1997).
2. 144 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 1998).
3. 124 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1994). According to legislative history, SIPA's purpose is to provide
protection to customers against losses that might occur when a securities broker-dealer suffers finan-
cial failure. See S. REP. No. 95-763, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 764, 764.
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(a)(l).
7. See id. § 78fff-2(a)(3) ("No claim of a customer or other creditor of the debtor which is
received by the trustee after the expiration of the six-month period beginning on the date of publica-
tion of notice.., shall be allowed ... ").
8. Cf. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) ("Elementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice ... .
903
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allowing interested parties the opportunity to present their claims.9 Ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,' the reasonableness and constitutional va-
lidity of the chosen method of notice can be defended on the ground it is
reasonably certain to inform interested parties."
Thus, the next step is determining what form of notice will satisfy
the requirements of reasonable notice explained in Mullane. One issue in
Mullane was whether notice by publication alone was sufficient to allow
interested parties to present their claims.'2 The Court held that publication
by itself, typically, does not constitute sufficient notice." The Court,
however, recognized that notice by publication is acceptable when it is
"supplemental to other action which in itself may reasonably be expected
to convey a warning."' Notice by mail is one form of notice that courts
agree is reasonable to allow interested parties to present their claims."
According to Mullane, due process requires notice be sent to interested
parties with known addresses.'" Finally, numerous courts have held no-
tice by mail, supplemented by other forms of notice such as publication
9. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An ele-
mentary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
10. While Mullane arose in the context of a common trust fund, the Supreme Court's holding
has not been limited to the facts of that case.
[Mullane] generally is recognized as the keystone of modern philosophy regarding the
notice requirement and its importance should not be underestimated. In a series of cases
decided since Mullane, the Supreme Court has made it clear that notice to defendant must
measure up to the standards set forth in that case in all types of actions.
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1074, at
465 (2d ed. 1987) (citing Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)).
11. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
12. See id.
13. See id. ("It would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed here, is a reliable
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts."). However,
the Court notes an exception to this rule, stating, "[tihis court has not hesitated to approve of resort
to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible
or practicable to give more adequate warning." See id. at 317; cf 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
10, § 1074, at 461-62 (explaining that service by publication will only be sufficient "when it is used
to serve an absent domiciliary who cannot be served in any other way.").
14. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316.
15. See id. at 319 (discussing the inadequacy of providing notice by publication alone when it
is possible to notify parties by other means, and further stating "the mails today are recognized as an
efficient and inexpensive means of communication."); cf 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, §
1074 (stating that notice by mail is sufficient under due process, however, also citing Bonita Packing
Co. v. O'Sullivan, 165 F.R.D. 610 (D.C. Cal. 1995), where notice by mail was deemed insufficient).
16. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318 ("Where the names and... addresses of those affected by a
proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise
them of its pendency."); cf. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (stating
that when name and address are reasonably ascertainable, notice by mail insures actual notice).
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in national newspapers, will generally satisfy due process, even when the
interested party does not actually receive notice."
The courts have established extensive caselaw regarding what con-
stitutes acceptable notice under the requirements of due process. To
comply with these well-established requirements, the SIPA expressly
requires that:
Promptly after the appointment of the trustee, such trustee shall
cause notice of the commencement... to be published in one or more
newspapers of general circulation in the form and manner determined
by the court, and at the same time shall cause a copy of such notice to
be mailed to each person who, from the books and records of the
debtor, appears to have been a customer... with an open account
within the past twelve months, to the address of such person as it ap-
pears from the books and records of the debtor.... ,
Thus, SIPA clearly requires notice by mail, supplemented with notice
published in one or more newspapers.
Another important aspect in liquidation proceedings under the SIPA
is the section governing the time frame in which investors must file their
claims. The Act requires that claims must be filed within six months
from the date of notice, and no claims will be allowed after such date. 9
This statutory requirement, however, provides an exception for incom-
petent persons without guardians.' While some courts have attempted to
allow extensions based on equitable grounds," such decisions have been
reversed in favor of the requirement that requests for extensions must be
made within the six-month period.' Therefore, the six-month period for
17. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17
F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir. 1994); Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 649, 652 (2d Cir.
1988); Nelson v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 863, 868-69 (D. Md. 1997); Scott
v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 381, 387 (D.D.C. 1996); Pou v. United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, 923 F. Supp. 573, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aftid, Pou v. Loszynski, 107 E3d 3 (2d Cir. 1997);
United States v. Franklin, 897 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (D. Or. 1995).
18. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(a)(1) (1994).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff-2(a)(3) ("No claim of a customer or other creditor of the debtor
which is received by the trustee after the expiration of the six-month period beginning on the date of
publication of notice ... shall be allowed .... ).
20. See id. ("[T]he court may, upon application within such period [six month time frame] and
for cause shown, grant a reasonable, fixed extension of time for the filing of a claim by the United
States, by a State or political subdivision thereof, or by an infant or incompetent person without a
guardian.").
21. Cf, e.g., Gov't Secs. Corp. v. Morey, 107 B.R. 1012, 1022 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (involving a
situation where the bankruptcy court in error allowed a late claim based on "fairness and equity");
Gov't Secs. Corp. v. Carson, 95 B.R. 829, 832 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that the allowance of a late
claim in an attempt to reconcile the SIPA with sections of the bankruptcy code was in error).
22. See Morey, 107 B.R. at 1022; Carson, 95 B.R. at 833 (explaining that even if the late
claimant was an incompetent person under the act, allowing a late claim was not possible because an
extension was not requested within the six-month time period).
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filing claims is deemed an absolute rule by the courts, and failure to file a
claim within this period results in exclusion of the claim.'
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Blinder Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos4
1. Facts
Blinder Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos addressed the sufficiency of
notice given by the trustee after three separate investors filed late claims.
When assessing the correctness of the district court's decision, which
allowed the investor's claims, the Tenth Circuit applied the same stan-
dard of review exercised by the district court when it evaluated the bank-
ruptcy court's decision.' The applicable standard was whether the lower
court's decision was clearly erroneous.'
Blinder, Robinson & Company, Inc. (hereinafter "debtor") filed a
voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code on July 31, 1990. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
then applied to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado for
protection under SIPA.' As a result of the filing, the district court ap-
pointed a trustee and removed the case to bankruptcy court.' The bank-
ruptcy court subsequently ordered the trustee to mail notice to each in-
vestor who maintained an open account with the debtor during the past
twelve months and to publish notice in twenty-six newspapers through-
out the country)0 The notice informed individuals of the six-month rule
for filing claims under section 78fff-2(a).3 Under this six-month rule, all
claims filed after February 14, 1991, were considered late'.3
Three investors filed claims after the bar date of February 14, 1991,
for various reasons; as a result, the trustee rejected these claims.' The
bankruptcy court did not agree with the rejection of the claims by the
trustee and ordered the claims be treated like claims timely filed.' The
23. See, e.g., Morey, 107 B.R. at 1022; Miller v. Austin, 72 B.R. 893, 894, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Secs. Investor Protection Corp. v. J. Shapiro Co., 414 F. Supp. 679, 680, 683 (D. Minn.
1975); Weis Secs. Inc. v. Borghi, 411 F. Supp. 194, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 513
(2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 353 F. Supp. 496,497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Adler,
Coleman Clearing Corp., 204 B.R. 99, 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re OTC Net, Inc., 34 B.R.
658,659-60 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
24. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos, 124 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1997).
25. See Stellanos, 124 F.3d at 1241.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 1239.
28. See id.
29. See id. (requiring appointment of trustee for the liquidation under 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3)




33. See id. at 1239-40.
34. See id. at 1240.
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bankruptcy court found that the trustee's publication of notice and mail-
ings were reasonable, but that the three investors never received actual or
constructive notice of the proceedings concerning the debtor.3 The bank-
ruptcy court held the investors rebutted the presumption of actual receipt
of notice, and each of the claims should be considered along with the
timely-filed claims.' Further, the bankruptcy court accepted the assertion
by each investor that they did not receive constructive notice because
they had not read the newspaper during the six-month period." Accord-
ing to the bankruptcy court, based on the absence of actual or construc-
tive notice, application of the SIPA to each of the investors who filed late
claims would be unconstitutional."
On appeal, the district court did not analyze the case under due pro-
cess, but held the mailed notice was inadequate with regard to two of the
investors.39 Further, with respect to one claim, the court found the incom-
petent person exception was applicable.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the bankruptcy court's finding that
each investor was mailed a customer claim packet, and the trustee suc-
cessfully published notice in twenty-six newspapers throughout the
country." The court of appeals found the bankruptcy court's findings to
be reasonable and logical. '2 Thus, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's holding of clear error in the bankruptcy court's finding that
sufficient notice occurred.' Further, the court of appeals found that even
though two of the investors' names did not appear on a list of mailings
subsequent to the original mailing, such evidence did not invalidate the
bankruptcy court's decision that the two investors were mailed notice in
the original mailing."
The Tenth Circuit then analyzed the sufficiency of notice under the
requirements of due process. Although the district court decided not to
analyze the case under due process,' the court of appeals held the mail-
ing of notice and the supplemental publication of notice in twenty-six
newspapers was sufficient. ' Based on the court of appeal's holding that
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1240-41.






43. See id. at 1242.
44. See id.
45. See id. (stating that the district court did not address the issue and affirming on other
grounds).
46. See id. at 1243 (finding that the combination of mailing and publication in 26 newspapers
to be a reasonable method of notification).
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the trustee's methods of notice were reasonable, the combination of no-
tice by mail and publication was "reasonably calculated to apprise inter-
ested parties of the SIPA liquidation and afford them an opportunity to
be heard." 7
Finally, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the six-month time requirement
for interested parties to file claims. Citing extensive authority, the court
of appeals decided that the six-month time period was an absolute re-
quirement." The only relevant exception under the circumstances of this
case was for an "incompetent person without a guardian." 9 Although one
investor was in a car accident, the court of appeals held she was still re-
quired to file for an extension of time within the six-month period and
her failure to file resulted in a late claim." Therefore, the court of appeals
found that the district court's holding that the investor's late filed claim
fell under the exception to the six-month requirement was "contrary to
the plain language of the statute.""
C. Other Circuits
Regarding the requirement of due process, the Second, Ninth, and
District of Columbia Circuits are in accord with the Tenth Circuit's ap-
proach,5 and do not require the party to actually receive notice in order to
satisfy due process. 3 For instance, the Second Circuit held that with the
existence of supplemental mailings, as in Blinder, the risk of non-receipt
is constitutionally acceptable.'
Decisions among the various circuits regarding the six-month time
requirement in the SIPA are also in accord with the Tenth Circuit's rec-
ognition of an absolute rule. The Second Circuit denied late claims even
though there was a lack of actual receipt of notice.5 Further, other district
courts and bankruptcy courts. agree with the Tenth Circuit's interpreta-
tion. In Florida, a district court held that the six-month time requirement
is absolute, allowing no exceptions to the rule through application of
equitable considerations.' A New York district court held the six-month
47. Id.
48. See supra 23 and accompanying text.
49. Blinder, 124 F.3d at 1243.
50. See id. at 1243-44.
51. Id. at 1244.
52. See id. at 1243; see also United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir. 1994).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Nelson v.
Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Md. 1997); Scott v. United States, 950
F. Supp. 381, 387 (D.D.C. 1996); Pou v. United States Drug Enforcement Agency, 923 F. Supp.
573, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
54. See Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646,649,652 (2d Cir. 1988).
55. See Weis Secs., Inc. v. Borghi, 411 F. Supp. 194, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd 538 F.2d
513 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. See Gov't Secs. Corp. v. Morey, 107 B.R. 1012, 1022 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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requirement was an "absolute outer limit,"' and a district court in Minne-
sota also found the six-month rule to be absolute, holding the receipt of
actual notice was immaterial. 8 Finally, bankruptcy decisions in New
York and Colorado are in accord, holding that the six-month rule of sec-
tion 78fff-2(a)(3) is an absolute bar."'
D. Analysis
Based on the holdings of various courts,' it is evident the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeal's holding is in accord with current approaches
throughout the judicial jurisdictions. With regard to the requirements of
reasonable notice, notice by mail, when supplemented with other pub-
lished notice, is sufficient to satisfy due process." The purpose of notice
is to apprise interested parties of the pending proceeding, allowing them
the opportunity to present their claims. 2 In Blinder, the complaining par-
ties were mailed notice and notice was also published in twenty-six
newspapers. Only a certain degree of notice can be given within reason:
other factors such as cost, inconvenience, court delays, and the interests
of other investors are relevant in cases where many investors are in-
volved.' The resulting delays, if each individual were given additional
notice, would contradict the basic notice requirement that only notice
reasonably certain to apprise interested parties of a proceeding is neces-
sary. There is no requirement that parties are entitled to perfect notice. In
fact, the reasonableness and constitutional validity of such notice is
judged by whether it is reasonably certain to inform interested parties.'
Additionally, the resulting delays of providing further notice would
adversely impact the rights of other investors with claims. The purpose
of the six-month requirement under the SIPA is to expedite liquidation
proceedings and allow investors to get on with their financial endeav-
ors.' The longer an investor's money is tied up in a liquidation proceed-
57. SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 353 F. Supp. 496,497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
58. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. J. Shapiro Co., 414 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D.
Minn. 1975).
59. See In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 204 B.R. 99, 103 (Bankr. S+D.N.Y. 1997);
Miller v. Austin, 72 B.R. 893, 896-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re OTC Net, Inc., 34 B.R. 658, 660
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
60. See supra text accompanying note 17.
61. Cf Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 649, 652 (2d Cir. 1988) (after sending
notice "reasonably calculated to inform" of forthcoming foreclosure action, the court found no
further requirement to send notices for each subsequent step in the proceedings).
62. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950).
63. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 ("This court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publi-
cation as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or
practicable to give more adequate warning.").
64. See id. at 314-15.
65. See generally Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat.
1636, 1637, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 5263, 5264 ("[I]t is in the interests of customers of a debtor that
securities held for their account be distributed to them as rapidly as possible in order to minimize the
period during which they are unable to trade and consequently are at risk of market fluctuations.").
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ing, the greater the chance that investor will be subjected to fluctuations
in the market.' One cannot expect a court to continue giving additional
notice, delaying a case and jeopardizing the interests of the many other
investors that fulfilled the filing requirements. As mentioned previously,
the key factor is whether the notice given is reasonable to apprise inter-
ested parties of a liquidation proceeding. The combination of notice by
mail and publication and the six-month requirement for filing a claim is a
reasonable method, producing an effective balance between the interests
of the investors and the state when resolving liquidation proceedings.
II. CONTROL PERSON AND PRIMARY LIABILITY
A. Background
In cases involving alleged violations under section 15 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (1933 Act)67 and section 20(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act),' one of the central issues revolves
around the determination of control person liability. When a person con-
trols another individual who violates securities laws, that person can be
held jointly and severally liable under section 15 of the 1933 Acte and
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act." Section 15 of the 1933 Act states, in part,
that a person who
controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title [sec-
tions 11 or 12], shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to
the extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is al-
leged to exist.7
Under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation there-
under shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such con-
trolled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts consti-
tuting the violation or cause of action.72
66. See id.
67. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(o)
(1994)).
68. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (1994)).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77(o).





Based on the above sections of the statute, the relevant question is
whether an individual is liable as a control person. To assert a prima fa-
cie case for control person liability, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
requires the plaintiff to show, "(1) a primary violation of the securities
laws and (2) 'control' over the primary violator by the alleged control-
ling person."" In cases of control person liability, "once the plaintiff es-
tablishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
lack of culpable participation or knowledge."'7
The Tenth Circuit expressly disagrees with the view that it is neces-
sary for a "plaintiff to show the defendant actually or culpably partici-
pated in the primary violation."" This test, employed by a minority of the
courts, requires a plaintiff to prove actual or culpable participation in
addition to control.'6
The prima facie case required by the Tenth Circuit, including the
eventual burden shift to the defendant, conforms with the approach taken
by the majority of the circuits." The circuits are split, however, on the
issue of what must be proven to allege "control." The two different ap-
proaches involve whether it is necessary to prove the controlling person
(1) actually exercised control over the primary violator's general affairs,
or (2) simply had the power to control the general affairs of the primary
violator."8
In 1985, the Tenth Circuit addressed control person liability in San
Francisco-Okla. Petroleum Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co."' While control was
an issue in the case, the court was satisfied that the defendant was sig-
nificantly involved in the corporation and was thus a controlling person'
Consequently, the court did not specifically address what degree of con-
trol is necessary, and instead focused on whether the defendant's lack of
knowledge exempted him from liability." The court, however, did state
that "[iut seems apparent that [the defendant] had the authority and the
power to control although he may not have sought to exercise the
73. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1998).
74. Maher, 144 F.3d at 1305 (citing San Francisco-Okla. Petroleum Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co.,
765 F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1985)).
75. Id. (quoting First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
76. Cf. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[A] plaintiff must
show a primary violation by the controlled person and control of the primary violator by the targeted
defendant"). For further discussion of this rule, see Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Con-
trolling Person Liability Under 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities
Act, 53 Bus. LAW 1, 9, 20-26 (1997).
77. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 6.
78. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8.
79. 765 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1985).
80. See Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d at 964 (explaining that the defendant was heavily involved in
the affairs of the business, was a director, and was the sole shareholder).
81. See id. at 964-65.
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power."8 Overall, the court implicitly appeared to acknowledge indirect
control, but did not clarify what degree of control is necessary.
The Tenth Circuit also addressed control person liability in First
Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring,"3 finding the defendant was at least in
a position of indirect control based on various factors. Once again, the
court failed to specifically discuss what degree of control was necessary
and only found the defendant was possibly a controlling person." Thus,
the degree of control necessary in the Tenth Circuit is unclear from these
cases addressing control person liability.
Another claim an investor might bring is primary civil liability un-
der section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933." An individual is primar-
ily liable if he or she "offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e
of this title."' Additionally, an individual can also be primarily liable
under section 12(1) for improper solicitation of the purchase of securi-
ties."
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc.'
1. Facts
The plaintiff, William J. Maher, claimed defendants, Colina Oro
Molino, Inc. ("COM") and Gwen Fraser, were liable as control persons
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts for securities violations committed by
Durango," the company that issued the stock at the center of this dis-
pute.' The plaintiff first alleged primary violations of section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, and sections 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act by the de-
fendants.9 ' Further allegations against the defendants were as follows:
(1) Fraser was the sister of Tatman, who Maher alleged was "an offi-
cer or employee of Defendant Durango Metals and/or Defendant
COM, Inc." and the general manager of the Gold Hill Mill, owned by
COM; (2) Fraser was the sole or principal owner of COM; (3) both
82. Id. at 965.
83. 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992) rev'd on other grounds, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
84. See Pring, 969 F.2d at 898 (explaining that the evidence presented was enough to prevent
sumrnnary judgment against the plaintiffs, but that further determination was necessary and the issue
was remanded to the district court).
85. 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (1994)).
86. Id. (referring to section 77e which addresses prohibitions relating to interstate commerce
and the mail).
87. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988) (stating liability will continue to an individ-
ual "who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own
financial interests or those of the securities owner").
88. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1303 (10th Cir. 1998).
89. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1303.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1304-05.
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COM and Fraser had access to information relating to Durango that
was not available to the public; and (4) pursuant to a Memorandum of
Contract.... COM purchased from Durango "a sufficient amount of
outstanding stock to request a position on their Board of Directors"
and "has the option to acquire [a] controlling interest" in Durango.9
Plaintiff's claims also alleged violations of various sections of the Colo-
rado Securities Act.93
Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions induced him to invest in Durango.' The misrepresentations alleged
by plaintiff were that Tatman and Hartley, allegedly an officer and di-
rector of Durango, said they were involved in Durango along with Fraser
and COM, and Durango was a "good potential investment."'9 The plain-
tiff further alleged he was denied access to Durango's financial records,
that he had not received a dividend promised to him, and that he de-
manded and never received the return of his investment."
The district court dismissed plaintiff's section 10(b), section
12(a)(1), and section 12(a)(2) claims as a matter of law, concluding that
Fraser and COM were not liable as control persons for Durango's alleged
violations.' Further, plaintiffs failure to allege Fraser and COM were
"sellers of the stock at issue" precluded a finding of primary liability
under section 12(a) of the 1933 Act, and failed to show how the "finan-
cial interests of [the] defendants related to the sale."" The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed only the purported violations under the 1933
and 1934 Acts.
2. Decision
a. Control Person Liability
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit cited its previous decision in
Richardson v. MacArthur, which held that the 1934 Act was remedial
and should be construed liberally.9 This decision held a requirement of
some indirect influence, but not actual direction, was necessary to find
controlling person liability." Analyzing the plaintiffs complaint, the
appellate court found the alleged primary violations of the 1933 and
1934 Acts enough to satisfy the first element of a prima facie case.''
92. id. at 1305.
93. See id. at 1303 (referring to The Colorado Securities Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-
125(1), repealed by Laws 1990, H.B. 90-1222, § 1, effective July 1, 1990).
94. See id. at 1303-04.








DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
However, the court found the plaintiffs allegations, even when viewed
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, fell short of establishing COM's
control over Durango (the second element of a prima facie case)."2 The
court concluded the plaintiff only established a tenuous connection be-
tween COM and Durango and failed to prove COM was a control person
in'any way." Thus, the court dismissed the allegation of control person
liability against COM because the plaintiff did not allege COM's power
to control Durango, but simply alleged COM's ability to acquire that
power." Consequently, the court declined to address "whether a plaintiff
must allege actual control of or simply the power to control the primary
violator's general affairs in order to establish a prima facie case of con-
trol person liability."'" Further, the court of appeals held that although
the determination of control person liability is a question of fact, the
court can dismiss the claim when, based on the allegations, it cannot be
reasonably inferred the defendant was a control person."°
The court also found the plaintiffs allegations of control person
liability against Fraser (Fraser's control of Durango) were insufficient."
The plaintiffs claims that Fraser had an ownership interest in COM, and
that Fraser's brother was an officer or employee of Durango were simply
not enough to demonstrate control person liability." Thus, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs section 10(b),
section 12(a)(1), and section 12(a)(2) claims under sections 15 or 20(a)
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts against COM and Fraser based on control
person liability.'
b. Primary Liability Under Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act
Under section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, a person is liable if he or
she "'offers or sells a security' in violation of the registration require-
ment of § 5.""' Further, according to the United States Supreme Court,
"§ 12(a)(1) liability is not limited to the person who passes title to the
securities, but extends 'to the person who successfully solicits the pur-
chase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial
interests or those of the securities owner.""" The district court dismissed
this claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that COM or Fraser were
"sellers" of the Durango stock, and failed to establish the financial inter-
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1305-06.
104. See id. at 1306 n.8.
105. Id.




110, Id. at 1307 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (1994)).
111. Id. (quoting Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988)).
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ests of either COM or Fraser regarding the sale."2 Because the plaintiff
did not claim COM and Fraser sold the stock, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish solicitation by COM and Fraser, and their financial
interests, to support the claim."3 The appellate court, however, held the
plaintiff failed to allege the necessary facts in his complaint regarding
such solicitation, resulting in failure of the primary liability claim."'
C. Other Circuits
1. Control Person Liability
a. Majority Rule/Test
Under the majority test, after the plaintiff proves control by the
controlling person and a primary violation of securities laws by the con-
trolled person, the burden shifts to the defendant (controlling person) to
prove his or her defense."5 However, the various circuits are in disagree-
ment regarding what evidence is necessary to state a prima facie case for
control person liability. This split is focused on determining the meaning
of the term "control." The question is whether it is necessary for the
plaintiff to prove "the alleged control person actually exercised control
over the primary violator's general affairs, or whether it is sufficient to
show the control person had the power to exercise such control.""6
The Eighth Circuit held that in order to state a prima facie case of
control person liability, the alleged control person must actually exercise
control over the primary violator's operations."7 The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the Eighth Circuit, and applied the same test regarding con-
trol person liability."' Overall, the test established by the Eighth Circuit
is the most commonly used test to determine control."'
The test established by the Eleventh Circuit requires only that the
plaintiff show the alleged control person had the power to control the
general affairs of the primary violator to state a prima facie case of con-
trol person liability." The Fifth Circuit adopts a test virtually identical to
the Eleventh Circuit test.'
2 '
While there is some disagreement, the majority of the circuits agree




115. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 6.
116. Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8.
117. See id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630-31 (8th Cir. 1985)).
118. See id. (citing Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992)).
119. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 14.
120. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8 (citing Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 &
n.6 (I Ith Cir. 1996)).
121. See id. (citing Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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the transaction underlying the alleged securities violation rather than
proving actual use of that power to satisfy the requirements of a prima
facie case."
b. Minority Rule/Test
The minority test is referred to as the culpable participation test. In
addition to proving the control element, the plaintiff is also required to
prove "culpable participation" by the controlling person regarding the
primary violation." While the Third Circuit clearly follows this test,
some commentators believe the Second Circuit is steering away from the
minority test.' There is even stronger evidence the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits are moving, or have moved, toward the majority rule that does
not require proof of actual or culpable participation. "
2. Primary Liability Under Section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act
The court of appeals found the allegations in the plaintiff's com-
plaint insufficient to satisfy the requirements for stating a prima facie
case of primary liability under section 12(a)(1). 6 The plaintiff did not
allege that COM or Fraser sold the stock, thus, the only way to state a
prima facie case was to allege and support a claim of solicitation. 7 The
court found the plaintiff failed to do so. The court drew support for its
position based on a holding in the First Circuit'" and a decision in a dis-
trict court in northern California."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the question of control person li-
ability in this case, dismissing plaintiffs claims based on the insuffi-
ciency of the complaint.'" In the complaint, the plaintiff failed to show
that COM or Fraser even possessed the power to control Durango. Thus,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals left open the question of "whether a
122. See id. at 1306 n.8.
123. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996); Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975).
124. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 24. But see Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8
(citing First Jersey, 101 F.3d at 1472 (stating generally that to establish a prima facie case of control
person liability, a plaintiff must show that the alleged control person was in some sense a meaningful
participant in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person)).
125. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 25-26.
126. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1307.
127. See id.
128. See id. (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st Cir. 1996) (conclud-
ing dismissal of section 12(2) claim under Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate)).
129. See id. (citing In re Words of Wonder Secs. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1427, 1435 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (dismissing, with leave to amend, section 12(2) claims because plaintiffs failed to allege facts
demonstrating that defendants "solicited" the purchase of the relevant securities)).
130. See id. at 1306&n.8.
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plaintiff must allege actual control of or simply the power to control the
primary violator's general affairs in order to establish a prima facie case
of control person liability."'3 ' While the Tenth Circuit's requirements for
stating a prima facie case fall under the majority rule, the court chose not
to decide what evidence would suffice when alleging control.
The distinction between the two views regarding control are
whether actual control or just the power to control the general affairs of
the primary violator is necessary to satisfy the control element of the
prima facie case. The majority approach requiring actual control by the
alleged control person over the primary violator's general affairs appears
to be the better choice. It would be inequitable to hold the alleged control
person jointly liable for the acts of the primary violator, based solely on
the power to control the general affairs of the primary violator. By re-
quiring actual control for a prima facie case, liability will only extend to
those control persons who actually participated in the affairs of the pri-
mary violator, rather than holding a potentially innocent party liable
based on the power to control.
Although the Maher court declined to specifically decide the issue,
it appears at least arguable that the court is leaning in the direction of
only requiring the power to control the general affairs of the primary
violator. In its decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cites a prior
case where it construed the statute liberally, further stating a requirement
of "only some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual
direction to hold a 'controlling person' liable."'' The Maher court then
reiterated that summary judgment in favor of the defendant is inappropri-
ate when the defendant is in a position of at least indirect control over
two companies that together control the primary violator.' Based on
language in Maher, advocating a liberal approach, one can formulate the
argument that the Tenth Circuit would not require proof of actual control
by the controlling person over the primary violator's general affairs.
III. RELATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 10(B) SECURITY EXCHANGE ACTS
(1933 AND 1934) CLAIMS TO F.R.C.P. 9(B) AND THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR A FEDERAL SECURITIES CLAIM
A. Background
When pleading securities fraud, the particularity requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'" often become an issue. Regarding
a section 11 Securities Act claim, "a plaintiff who 'purchased a security
131. Id. at 1306.
132. Id. at 1302 (quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967)).
133. See id. at 1305.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally.").
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issued pursuant to a registration statement... need only show a material
misstatement or omission to establish [a] prima facie case. Liability
against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute, even for innocent
misstatements.""35 However, courts addressing section 11 claims have
held that because section 11 claims are not necessarily based on fraud,
the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) are inapplicable." Finally, a
plaintiff can sue various parties for misrepresentations, or misleading
statements, assuming the plaintiff who purchased the securities did not
have knowledge of the false or misleading statement, or omission at the
time of the acquisition.""
In regard to section 10(b) claims, Rule 9(b) requires the claim to
include identification of circumstances constituting fraud."8 The com-
plaint must also include time, place, and contents of the false representa-
tion, identity of the party making the false statements, and consequences
of such statements.'39 The complaint must state the identity of each party
in relation to each statement made.'" The purpose of requiring parties to
comply with Rule 9(b) in securities cases is to protect the defendant's
business reputation from unsupported fraud claims.'"' Additionally, the
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) also provide specific notice re-
garding which acts of the defendant are related to the fraud claim.' 2
Finally, the statute of limitations for a federal securities claim is one
year.'' This period is measured from the point the plaintiff has notice of
the violation, and extends for one year from such notice."
135. Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)).
136. See 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 1490 (1993). Compare Schoenfeld
v. Giant Stores Corp., 62 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding Rule 9(b) inapplicable to a
section 1 claim), with Stac Elec. Sec. Litig. v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
Rule 9(b) requirements applicable when the claims are grounded in fraud).
137. See Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994)). The
statute states the ability to sue applies to
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; (2) every person who was a di-
rector of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of
the filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to which his liability is as-
serted; (3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as
being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or part-
ner;... (5) every underwriter with respect to such security ....
Id.
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
139. See Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1-252 (quoting Lawrence Nat'l Bank v. Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176,
180 (10th Cir. 1991)).
140. See id. at 1253 (citing Ednonds, 924 F.2d at 180; Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, 800
F.2d 1008, 1011 (loth Cir. 1986)).
141. See 69A AM. JuR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 1490 (1993).
142. See id.
143. Cf Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 908 (codified as amended at 15




B. Tenth Circuit Case-Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc."5
1. Facts
Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of himself, and others similarly situ-
ated, against Celestial Seasonings, Inc. (Celestial) and other defendants
for violations of securities laws.'" In July 1993, Celestial "issued ap-
proximately two million shares of stock in an initial public offering
(hereinafter 'IPO'). W'4 7 At the time, Celestial was the largest manufacturer
and marketer of herbal teas in the United States.'" The IPO Prospectus
stated Celestial was preparing to introduce a new ready-to-drink tea to
the market."'4 The IPO also stated this venture would include an agree-
ment with Perrier (Perrier Agreement), which gave Perrier the exclusive
rights to make and sell the product in the United States and Canada.'
In January 1994, Celestial made a secondary public offering (SPO),
again referring to the Perrier Agreement.'' In May 1994, Celestial an-
nounced that discussions were under way to amend or terminate the Per-
rier Agreement. ' After this announcement, Celestial stock prices began
to fall.'
53
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, Celestial,
Celestial insiders, and the underwriters for the IPO and SPO, issued
statements leading investors to conclude
that Celestial would be able to utilize Perrier's manufacturing, mar-
keting, and distributing capabilities to sell its [ready-to-drink or
"RTD"] teas in the United States and Canada; that the Perrier Agree-
ment would enhance Celestial's position as a specialty beverage
company, increase the availability of its products at convenience
stores, wholesale clubs, restaurants and food service operations, and
allow it to further capitalize on its high brand awareness and on the
growth in the RTD market; that Perrier, having promoted Celestial's
RTD teas in test markets, would be selling Celestial's RTD products
in fourteen major metropolitan markets in the Summer of 1993; and
that a joint venture between Perrier's parent Nestle, and Coca-Cola
would not adversely impact the Perrier Agreement.'
5 '
Further, plaintiff alleged defendants' knowing and reckless disregard of
numerous facts. These facts included that Perrier's distribution system
was incompatible with the sale of RTD teas, that Perrier would have to
145. Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, (10th Cir. 1997).
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spend large amounts of money to adapt this system to market RTD teas,
that Perrier was not in a position to focus its time and efforts on market-
ing Celestial's product, that Nestle's arrangement with Coca-Cola was
interfering with Perrier's agreement with Celestial, and that Celestial
would not be able to afford the shelf space necessary for expansion based
on the limited distribution of teas under the Perrier Agreement." Based
on these allegatibns, plaintiff claimed
(1) primary liability for direct violations of § 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933 and § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (in-
cluding Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10(b)(5) promul-
gated thereunder); and (2) secondary liability of 'control persons' for
violations of § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20 of the 1934 Act."
6
The district court eventually dismissed plaintiffs claims. The court
found the sections 11 and 10(b) claims were based on fraud, and the
complaint failed to satisfy the particularized pleading requirement of
Rule 9(b)."'7 The court held the complaint insufficiently identified "the
circumstances constituting fraud upon which his various securities claims
rely." '" Further, the district court found cross-referencing in the com-
plaint inadequate, that the sections 11 and 10(b) claims failed because
there was no indication of which documents contained the alleged
fraudulent statements."9 Finally, the district court stated "that the § 10(b)
claim failed to 'identify the specific misrepresentations made and which
defendants [were] alleged to have made diem."''
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held the section 11 claim was not subject to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).'6' The plaintiff was not required to al-
lege fraud to establish a section 1 1 claim.' However, defendants argued
that plaintiffs claim was based on fraud, and Rule 9(b) was therefore
applicable.'6' The court of appeals concluded, based on the plaintiffs
complaint, that there was absolutely no allegation of fraud.'" Thus, Rule
9(b) was inapplicable to the section 11 claim pleaded by plaintiff.
155. See id. at 1249-0.
156. Id. at 1250.
157. Seeid.at 1250&n.l.
158. Id. at 1250 (explaining further that the complaint failed "to meet the particularity require-
ments of Rule 9(b) because it does not adequately identify (1) the time, place and contents of the
fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions; (2) the identity of the party alleged to have made the




161. See id. at 1252.
162. See id. at 1251.
163. Cf id. at 1250.
164. Id. at 1252. The case lists the allegations under Count I of the complaint:
[Vol. 76:3
SECURITIES
The court of appeals found the section 10(b) claim was sufficient
under Rule 9(b) because the plaintiff satisfied the factual allegation re-
quirements of Rule 9(b). First, the court assessed whether plaintiff satis-
fied the time, place, and content requirements of Rule 9(b).'" The com-
plaint satisfied these requirements by stating and quoting the alleged
fraudulent statements, identifying the sources of such statements, and
even alleging facts that the alleged fraudulent statements misrepresented
or failed to disclose." The court of appeals found error in the district
court's finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy these requirements, stating
"[a] fair reading of the Complaint indicates that by cross-referencing as
allowed by Rule 10(c), it sufficiently particularizes the circumstances
constituting fraud to comply with Rule 9(b)."'6
Next, the court of appeals addressed whether the complaint satisfied
the requirement of identifying the parties who made the alleged fraudu-
lent statements. With regard to the corporate defendant, the court found
the complaint "plainly attributes the statements of the individual defen-
dants to Celestial Seasonings, Inc. itself.""' The court also looked at the
identification requirement in regard to the individual defendants at Ce-
lestial.' The court of appeals did not accept defendant's argument the
complaint violated Rule 9(b) because it failed to pair the individual state-
ments with particular individual defendants.7 Finally, the court assessed
the identity requirement with regard to the securities underwriter defen-
dants. The court of appeals found the complaint sufficiently alleged the
roles of the underwriters with regard to the alleged fraudulent statements. 7'
[D]efendants failed to make a "reasonable investigation of the statements contained in the
Registration Statements and Prospectuses"... ; that the misrepresentations "would have
been known [by the defendants] had they carried out their responsibilities with reasonable
care"... ; and that [the] defendants "failed to make a reasonable investigation.... [did
not] possess[] reasonable grounds for belief, .. . and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable




167. Id. at 1253 (citing Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Edmonds, 800 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir.
1986)).
168. Id.
169. See id. The case states that the complaint alleged the individual defendants at Celestial
were responsible for all of Celestial's alleged fraudulent statements:
The Individual Defendants had the power and the influence ... to cause Celestial
to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct alleged herein. The Individual Defen-
dants caused the publication of the materially false and misleading Prospectuses,
Registration Statements and Celestial's public filings and statements issued during
the Class Period ....
Id.
170. See id. at 1254 ("Identifying the individual sources of statements is unnecessary when the
fraud allegations arise from misstatements or omissions in group-published documents such as
annual reports, which presumably involve collective actions of corporate directors or officers.").
171. See id. ("In order to adequately allege underwriter responsibility for Celestial's statements,
the complaint must identify the specific role of the underwriters in propounding the fraudulent
statements.").
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit assessed whether plaintiff identified the
consequences of the misrepresentations or omissions." The court of ap-
peals found the complaint sufficiently described the alleged fraudulent
scheme and its consequences. " Further, the complaint detailed the his-
tory of Celestial's stock price, the inflationary impact of the fraud, and
the future decline of the stock price and rating upon Celestial's state-
ments regarding the possible termination of the Perrier agreement."
The court finally held plaintiff's action was not barred by the statute
of limitations.'" The court of appeals found the plaintiff could not have
known about the violations until the release of Celestial's Form 10-Q
that announced Celestial and Perrier were considering termination of the
Perrier agreement." Thus, plaintiffs claims were filed within one year
following publication of Celestial's 10-Q."
Based on the above holdings, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
also allowed plaintiff to bring secondary liability claims under sections
15 and 20 of the 1933 and 1934 Acts."' These claims were disallowed
under the district court's analysis.
C. Other Circuits
1. Section 11 (1933 Act) Claims & 9(b) Requirements
The Tenth Circuit's holding that Rule 9(b) does not apply to a sec-
tion 11 claim is in accord with decisions in other districts. For instance, a
district court in New York held that Rule 9(b) does not apply to a section
11 claim because fraud is not required under a 1933 Act section 11
claim.' However, a Ninth Circuit decision holds that when a section 11
172. See id. at 1254-55.
173. See id. The court stated:
[The Complaint] identifies the fraudulent statements and alleges the facts which the
statements misrepresented or failed to disclose... The Complaint specifically pleads:
mhe materially false and misleading... statements ... led investors to believe that, as a
result of the Perrier Agreement, Celestial would obtain a substantial market for its ready-
to-drink tea in the very near future, with a resulting increase in earning and profits.
The ... unlawful acts and conduct alleged herein ... maintain[ed] an artificially high
price for Celestial's shares.... By stressing the Perrier Agreement and its imminent
prospects, defendants knew that and intended that investors would look at Celestial as an
immediately viable competitor to Snapple, in the then exploding market for ready-to-
drink teas. To accomplish this illusion, the Prospectus repeatedly touted the existence of
the Perrier Agreement ....
Id.





179. See Schoenfeld v. Giant Stores Corp., 62 F.R.D. 348, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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claim has its basis in fraud, the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b)
are applicable."
2. Section 10b Claims and the Requirements of Rule 9(b)
The Tenth Circuit's application of the particularity requirements of
Rule 9(b) is also in accord with decisions in other courts."' A decision in
the Ninth Circuit required parties to meet the particularity requirements
when alleging 10(b)(5) claims."" Additionally, the Second Circuit upheld
dismissal of a complaint based on Rule 9(b) particularity requirements
because it only contained conclusory allegations of fraud."'
Further, a district court in Utah held a "securities purchaser's alle-
gations of fraud against securities issuing company and company direc-
tors to be sufficient under Rule 9(b) because they set forth specific time
period and content of misrepresentations."''M
3. Statute of Limitations for Federal Securities Claims
Though the decision only briefly addressed the issue, the one year
statute of limitations starts from the date when the party knows of, or
should have discovered the violations.'" However, it is important to note
there are varying definitions of notice that differ from that of the Tenth
Circuit."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's determination that section 11 claims under the
1933 Act, not based on fraud, do not trigger the particularity require-
ments of Rule 9(b) correctly recognizes that a section 11 claim does not
require allegations of fraud. An allegation of negligent misrepresentation
is enough to satisfy the requirements of claiming a violation under sec-
tion 1 l." Further, requiring particularity under Rule 9(b) would be in-
consistent with the policy that "liability against the issuer of a security is
180. See Stac Elec. Sec. Litig. v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996).
181. For further discussion, and an extensive list of decisions requiring pleadings with particu-
larity in cases based on fraud, see Barney J. Finberg, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Provision of Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Circumstances Constituting Fraud or
Mistake Be Stated with Particularity, 27 A.L.R. FED. 407 (1976).
182. See Clow, 89 F.3d at 1404.
183. See Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1252 (citing Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir.
1972)).
184. See id. (citing Bradford v. Moench, 670 F. Supp. 920, 923 (D. Utah 1987)).
185. Id. at 1255 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 908 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994)).
186. For further discussion of inquiry notice, see Lawrence Kaplan, Annotation, What Consti-
tutes "Inquiry Notice " Sufficient to Commence Running of Statute of Limitations in Securities Fraud
Action- Post-Lampf Cases, 148 A.L.R. FED. 629,648-51 (1998).
187. See Schoenfeld v. Giant Stores Corp., 62 F.R.D. 348,350 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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virtually absolute, even for innocent misstatements.""' This policy is
obviously intended to protect investors and hold those who issue regis-
tered securities accountable for their misstatements and omissions. Re-
quiring plaintiffs or investors to allege section 11 claims with particular-
ity would contradict the policy of virtual absolute liability.
In regard to the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), as applied to
10(b) claims, the Tenth Circuit's decision again appears to be correct.
Allegations of 10(b)(5) violations require the plaintiff to allege fraud,
and to plead such fraud with particularity.'" Further, the purpose of the
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) are to give the defendant notice of
the claim against them, and the factual allegations in support of that
claim."w Thus, requiring pleadings with particularity in cases alleging
fraud supports the purpose behind Rule 9(b). Further, requiring a plaintiff
to support claims of fraud results in many benefits. First, this require-
ment expedites resolution of the case by notifying the defendant of the
alleged false statements, thereby giving the defendant an opportunity to
defend him or herself. Further, expedition of claims will prevent backlog
in the courts. It seems sensible to require a plaintiff to support claims of
fraud when making allegations in the complaint, as opposed to using the
judicial process to adjudicate claims which could be baseless. The sever-
ity of fraud allegations should require the presence of facts that indicate
and support the fraud claim. Overall, the requirement of pleading 10(b)
claims with particularity is supported by the purpose of Rule 9(b) and by
decisions of various courts.
CONCLUSION
In Blinder, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took the opportunity
to correct the decision made by the district court.'9' The court found the
combination of mailing and publishing notice satisfied due process re-
quirements and that the six-month requirement for filing claims was ab-
solute." Further, the court established that an incompetent person is re-
quired to file for an extension within the six-month period to take ad-
vantage of the exception enumerated in the statute. 93
In Maher, the court explained the split among the circuits regarding
interpretation of the term "control."" Although the court does not spe-
188. Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
382 (1983)); see also Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1994) ("No scienter is required
for liability under § 11; defendants will be liable for innocent or negligent material misstatements or
omissions.").
189. Cf., e.g., Stac Elec. Sec. Litig. v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996).
190. See Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1252.
191. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos, 124 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 1997).
192. See Blinder, 124 F.3d at 1244.
193. See id. at 1243.
194. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.8 (10th Cir. 1998).
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cifically answer the issue, it is arguable the language in the opinion ad-
vocating a liberal approach is an indication the Tenth Circuit would rec-
ognize the controlling person's power to exercise control over the gen-
eral affairs of the primary violator as a sufficient amount of control.'"
Finally, in Schwartz the court assessed the applicability of the Rule
9(b) particularity requirements when pleading section 11 (of the 1933
Act) and section 10(b) claims (of the 1934 Act). ' The court determined
the plaintiff's complaint clearly did not allege fraud in connection with
the section 11 claim and thus, Rule 9(b) was inapplicable." In regard to
the section 10(b) claim, the court held the plaintiffs detailed complaint
satisfied the requirements of Rule 9(b) and found the cross-referencing in
the complaint to be acceptable.'"
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195. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8.
196. See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997).
197. See Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1252.
198. See id. at 1253.
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